Connecticut Committee on Judicial Ethics
Informal Opinion Summaries

2025-05 (December 18, 2025)
Governmental Commissions/Committees; Extrajudicial Activities
Rules 1.2, 1.3, 2.11, 3.1, & 3.4; C.G.S. § 51-39a.

Issue:

Under the Connecticut Code of Judicial Conduct (the “Rules”), may a Judicial Official (the “JO”) serve on a Merit Selection Committee that evaluates applications and interviews qualified candidates for the Federal Public Defender position?

Additional Facts:

The Federal Public Defender is the chief executive of the Office of the Federal Public Defender, which provides criminal defense services in federal courts to individuals that are unable to afford counsel. The JO has been asked by a Circuit Court judge to serve on a Merit Selection Committee related to the appointment of a new Federal Public Defender. The JO has indicated that the Merit Selection Committee will be comprised of a group of lawyers and two judges (including the inquiring JO and the federal judge who requested their participation.)

The JO’s role on the committee, along with the other members, will be to first interview and vet the most qualified candidates for the position of Federal Public Defender. The Merit Selection Committee will then consult with the federal district court for their recommendation as to the best qualified candidate. Subsequently, the Merit Selection Committee will refer the best qualified candidate to the Circuit Court for the final selection and appointment.

The JO has conveyed that attorneys from the Office of the Federal Public Defender do not appear in state court; their primary role is to represent indigent defendants in federal court and it was highly unlikely the eventual individual selected would appear before the JO in state court.

Relevant Code and Statutory Provisions: Rules 1.2, 1.3, 2.11, 3.1, & 3.4; C.G.S. § 51-39a.



Rule 1.2 (Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary) states that a judge “should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that reflects adversely on the judge’s honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge.”

Rule 1.3 (Avoiding the Abuse of the Prestige of Office) states that a judge “shall not use or attempt to use the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others or allow others to do so.” Comment (2) to Rule 1.3 notes that a judge “may provide a reference or recommendation for an individual based on the judge’s personal knowledge.”

Rule 2.11 (Disqualification) states that a judge “shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” including, but not limited to, when the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party’s lawyer.

Rule 3.1 (Extrajudicial Activities in General) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

A judge may engage in extrajudicial activities, except as prohibited by law. However, when engaging in extrajudicial activities, a judge shall not:

(1) participate in activities that will interfere with the proper performance of the judge’s judicial duties; …

Rule 3.4 (Appointments to Governmental Positions) provides that “[a] judge shall not accept appointment to a governmental committee, board, commission or other governmental position, unless it is one that concerns the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.”

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-39a (Use of judicial office for financial gain prohibited) states that “[n]o judge of the Supreme Court, Appellate Court or Superior Court or any family support magistrate shall use his judicial office or any confidential information received through his holding judicial office to obtain financial gain for himself, his spouse, child, child's spouse, parent, brother or sister or a business with which he is associated.”

Relevant Judicial Ethics Decisions:



No prior Connecticut Judicial Ethics Committee (“JEC”) opinions are directly on point regarding a JO’s service on a federal Merit Selection Committee. However, past JEC opinions have general relevance to this issue, and ethics opinions from other jurisdictions provide guidance as well.

First, in JE 2014-23, the JEC concluded that it was not ethically permissible for a Judicial Official to serve on the interview panel tasked with selecting a municipal corporation counsel. The JEC cited a number of relevant prior opinions before making its determination. First, it stated under Rule 3.4 that in order for a governmental committee or commission to qualify as one that concerns the law, the legal system or the administration of justice, ‘there must be a direct nexus between what a governmental commission does and how the court system meets its statutory and constitutional responsibilities – in other words, how the courts go about their business.' JE 2014-23 citing JE 2011-02 . The JEC later concluded that the planned interview panel for municipal corporation counsel did not meet this standard.

Next, in the absence of prior determinations regarding the propriety of a Judicial Official’s service on an interview panel, the JEC reviewed past opinions on the propriety of a JO providing a reference, letter of recommendation, or performance evaluation under Rule 1.3. The Committee considered and distinguished these prior opinions from the present inquiry, noting that under the facts of this case, the final candidate recommendation is made by the Merit Selection Committee rather than by an individual Judicial Official.

The JEC ultimately advised the JO that serving on the interview panel for a municipal corporation counsel was inconsistent with Rules 1.2 and 1.3, since the JO lacked personal knowledge of all applicants and the municipality had a significant number of pending cases in state court. The JEC also stated the interview panel was not considered a governmental commission concerned with the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.

In JE 2014-05 , a Judicial Official inquired whether it was permissible to continue serving on a search committee of a governmental organization which was interviewing applicants for the position of Executive Director. In its analysis, the JEC stated:

The propriety of the Judicial Official’s participation on the board of directors of the governmental organization depends on the answers to two questions: (1) does the work of the organization [under Rule 3.4] concern "the improvement of the law, the legal system, or administration of justice"? and, if so, (2) would participation on the organization undermine a judge’s independence, integrity, or impartiality [under Rule 1.2]?

The Committee then determined that the board service failed to fall within the scope of the legal system-related exception to Rule 3.4, given that the governmental organization used state funds to provide grants to historical societies, museums, and other cultural organizations in order to support the humanities. Although this determination precluded the Committee from reaching the second question, the Committee noted that the Judicial Official’s continued participation in this grant-making organization could potentially violate Rules 1.2 or 3.1 (routine meeting attendance during court hours.)

Two other opinions of the JEC provide examples of whether a governmental entity concerns the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice. In JE 2011-15 , the JEC determined a Judicial Official could not serve on the board of directors of a non-profit corporation which was affiliated with a Connecticut Executive Branch agency. In JE 2011-03 , the JEC in a majority vote determined that a Judicial Official may not serve on a statutorily created advisory committee to an Executive Branch official. The official’s department or agency provided services for mentally ill and emotionally disturbed clients, established work programs, performed data collection, auditing and outreach, as well as provided services to persons involved with the courts.

Outside Connecticut, two opinions were located in other jurisdictions in which a state judge was permitted to participate on a federal Merit Selection Panel for U.S. Magistrate Judges (Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion 2002-03 and NY Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics 02-13 ) . In the Maryland opinion, the panel evaluated the applicants, received comments from the public, interviewed applicants and made recommendations to the judges of the District Court. Under the Maryland Code of Judicial Ethics, the Maryland Committee determined the panel was an appropriate “governmental advisory board” that was purely advisory in nature and did not exercise any of the appointment authority of the U.S. District Court. According to the Maryland Committee, the panel would perform important governmental service in aid of the improvement of the law, the legal system and the administration of justice. In conclusion, the Maryland Committee also noted the judge’s services would not unduly interfere with the performance of their responsibilities.

Similarly, the New York Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics (the “NY Committee”), also determined that a Merit Selection Panel to recommend and evaluate qualified candidates for the position of U.S. Magistrate Judge directly related to the “improvement of the legal system and the administration of justice.”NY Opinion 02-113. The only conditions on participation set by the NY Committee were that the state judge must be sure to avoid any appearance of political activity and not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance another’s private interests.

Finally, an additional ethics opinion also located in New York supports the position that a judge may serve on a county panel in an advisory role established for the appointment of a public defender at the county level. In NY Opinion 08-16, the NY Committee determined that a full-time judge may serve with other county officials on a screening panel that would receive resumes, interview and screen candidates for selection to the position of County Public Defender by the County Legislature. The panel would then send to the County Legislature the names of qualified candidates for the position of Public Defender.

The NY Committee found that the judge’s activities satisfied the rule that such governmental service must be related to “… the improvement of the law, the legal system or the administration of justice.” The NY Committee additionally noted the important role that judges play in ensuring adequate representation for indigent criminal defendants.

Discussion:



Applying the facts of this inquiry to the relevant ethics decisions and the CT Rules, there is support for the position that the JO’s service on the Merit Selection Committee is permissible.

First, the role of the Merit Selection Committee, and the responsibilities of the JO, will be to interview and vet candidates for the Federal Public Defender. This latter position has supervisory oversight over the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants in the federal court system and ensures the constitutional right of representation is met. There appears to be clear evidence that there is a “direct nexus” between the work of the Merit Selection Committee and “how the court system meets its statutory and constitutional responsibilities – in other words, how the courts go about their business.” JE 2014-23 citing JE 2011-02 .

Specifically, judges play a vital role in ensuring adequate representation of indigent criminal defendants and the proposed activities will assist with meeting that responsibility in the federal court system. See NY Opinion 08-16. There is a clear distinction between the function of the Merit Selection Committee in this inquiry and past opinions of the JEC, which primarily described activities unrelated to the legal system. The JO’s appointment to the committee therefore meets the exception under Rule 3.4 that the governmental committee concerns the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.

Consideration must also be given under Rule 1.2 as to whether participation in the Federal Selection Committee would undermine the JO’s independence, integrity, or impartiality, or create any appearance of impropriety. Based on the facts, there is no indication that service on the Merit Selection Committee would cause future disqualifications or recusals of the JO in Superior Court. The Federal Public Defender, and the attorneys under their oversight, are restricted to representation of defendants in federal criminal courts only and do not appear in state courts. Therefore, there is little to no risk that the candidate recommended by the Merit Selection Committee will appear in state court and implicate the disqualification rules. See Rule 2.11.

Further there is little risk under Rule 1.2 of violating the test of impropriety, i.e., “whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that reflects adversely on the judge’s honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge.” In contrast, relevant ethics decisions highlight that a JO is a very suitable individual to serve on such interview panels. See, e.g., Maryland Opinion 2002-03, NY Opinion 08-16 . The New York Committee has stated that a judge’s role on a similar county panel for the appointment of a county public defender is, “consistent with a judge’s important role in ensuring the adequacy of indigent criminal defense services.” Accordingly, the JO’s service on the Merit Selection Committee appears to comply with Rule 1.2.

In addition, the JO’s activities on the Merit Selection Committee do not create any significant risk of non-compliance with rules on a JO providing a reference, letter of recommendation, or performance evaluation. Rule 1.3, Comment 2. Although the JO’s relationship with the interview candidates may not be in the same context as one in which the JO is asked to provide an employment reference or letter of recommendation, the application materials, vetting, and interview process should be viewed as sufficient for the JO to recommend a Federal Public Defender candidate to the Circuit Court.

Finally, the information provided by the JO about the scope of their activities on the Merit Selection Committee does not indicate that the role will interfere with their full-time duties as a judicial official. Accordingly, although the JO should monitor the time expended during their appointment for potential reevaluation, service on the Merit Selection Panel does not appear to infringe on the proper performance of judicial duties under Rule 3.1.

Recommendation:



Based on the facts presented and the foregoing discussion of the Connecticut Rules and the relevant ethics decisions, the Committee determined that the JO may serve on a Merit Selection Committee that evaluates applications and interviews qualified candidates for the Federal Public Defender position. This recommendation is subject to the following conditions:
  1. The JO shall not use or attempt to use the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the JO or others or allow others to do so under Rule 1.3.

  2. The JO shall continue to monitor and evaluate the time required for participation in the Merit Selection Committee so that said activities that will not interfere with the proper performance of the JO’s judicial duties under Rule 3.1.

  3. The JO shall not participate in any interviews that involve a relative within the mearing of the Rules or General Statutes§ 51-39a.

Committee on Judicial Ethics

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