

Minutes of the Annual Meeting Judges of the Superior Court June 15, 2012

A meeting of the Judges of the Superior Court was held, pursuant to notice, on Friday, June 15, 2012 commencing at 10:00 a.m. in the Jury Assembly Room of the Middlesex Judicial District Courthouse, Middletown, CT.

Present: Chief Justice Rogers; Justices Norcott, Zarella, Eveleigh, and Harper; Appellate Court Chief Judge DiPentima; Appellate Court Judges Lavine, Beach, R. Robinson, Bear, Espinosa and Sheldon; Superior Court Judges Abery-Wetstone, Abrams, Adelman, Alander, Arnold, Aurigemma, Baldini, Bentivegna, Berger, Blawie, Boland, Bozzuto, Brazzel-Massaró, Bright, Brown, Burgdorff, Burke, Calmar, Carbonneau, Carroll, Clifford, Cobb, Cohn, Cole-Chu, Comerford, Connors, Conway, Cosgrove, Crawford, Cremins, Cronan, D'Addabbo, Dannaher, Devine, Devlin, Doherty, Dolan, Domnarski, Dooley, Driscoll, Dubay, Dyer, Elgo, Emons, Epstein, Eschuk, Fasano, Ficeto, B. Fischer, J. Fischer, Frazzini, Frechette, Genuario, Gilligan, Ginocchio, Gleeson, Gold, Gould, Graham, Graziani, Hadden, Handy, Hauser, Heller, Hiller, Holden, Holzberg, Hudock, Iannotti, Jongbloed, Kahn, Kavanewsky, Keller, Klatt, Kwak, Lager, Malone, Marano, Markle, Maronich, Matasavage, McNamara, Miller, Mintz, Moore, Morgan, Mullins, Munro, Murphy, Newson, Olear, Oliver, Ozalis, Pavia, Peck, Pittman, Povodator, Prescott, Prestley, Quinn, Radcliffe, Randolph, S. Richards, Riley, Robaina, A. Robinson, Roche, Rodriguez, Rubinow, Santos, Schuman, Shaban, Shapiro, Sheridan, Shluger, Silbert, Simón, Solomon, Stevens, Suarez, Swienton, C. Taylor, M. Taylor, Tobin, Trombley, Turner, Tyma, Vacchelli, Vitale, Wahla, Wenzel, Westbrook, Wiese, Wilson, Winslow, Wolven, Woods, Young and Zemetis; Senior Judges: Frankel, Gallagher, Hartmere, Kaplan, O'Keefe, Resha, Scholl, Sferrazzo and Thim.

Judge Quinn, Chief Court Administrator, called the meeting to order and welcomed the judges to the annual meeting. The first item on the agenda was the approval of the minutes of the last annual meeting held on June 20, 2011. Upon motion made and duly seconded, the minutes of the meeting were approved unanimously.

Judge Quinn invited Chief Justice Rogers to the podium to speak to the judges. Following these remarks, Judge Quinn gave her remarks which included an update on the changes in the status of the members of the judiciary since the last annual meeting.

Judge Quinn recognized Justice Eveleigh who gave the report of the Rules Committee. Following his report, Justice Eveleigh made the following motion,

I move the adoption of the amendments to the Practice Book which were mailed to you for use at this meeting.

This motion was seconded and approved unanimously.

Justice Eveleigh then made the following motion,

I further move (a) that the amendments as just adopted, to Section 2-13 become effective on September 1, 2012, and that the requirement of Practice Book Section 1-9 that a rule not become effective less than sixty days after its promulgation be waived pursuant to the provisions of that section;

(b) that the rest of the amendments to the Practice Book as just adopted become effective on January 1, 2013; and

(c) that the Reporter of Judicial Decisions may make editorial changes to the amendments including changes in the section numbers.

The motion was seconded and approved unanimously. The Practice Book revisions adopted at this meeting are attached to these minutes as Appendix A.

Following Justice Eveleigh's report, Judge Quinn asked for a motion nominating four judges to serve on the Rules Committee for one year terms commencing July 1, 2012. A motion was made and seconded to nominate Judges Bright, Crawford, Keegan and Prescott. It was approved unanimously.

Judge Quinn then advised the judges that the next order of business was to adopt a list of names of judges which would be submitted to the Governor for appointment of one judge as a regular member of the Judicial Review Council for a term of four years commencing December 1, 2012 to replace Judge Ginocchio whose term is expiring. A motion was made and seconded nominating Judges Solomon and Gleeson. It was approved unanimously.

Judge Quinn also stated that the names of four judges had been recommended by the Judges Association to be placed on a list from which two would be submitted by the Governor for appointment as alternate members of the Judicial Review Council for terms of three years commencing December 1, 2012 to replace Judges Cohn and Matasavage. A motion was made and seconded nominating Judges Brown, Eschuk, Dubay and Nazzaro. It was approved unanimously.

The next agenda item was the report of the Executive Committee. Judge Quinn asked for a motion to approve all final actions taken by the Executive Committee as noted in the minutes of the May 10, 2012 meeting. The motion was made, seconded and approved unanimously.

Judge Quinn then asked for a motion to approve the recommendations made by the Executive Committee concerning annual appointments of certain Judicial Branch employees and individuals to serve on various panels and committees as set forth in Appendix C of the minutes of the May 10, 2012 meeting. In addition, she asked that the motion include the appointment of Hon. Nina F. Elgo to the State Bar Examining Committee for a three year term commencing September 1, 2012 and the designation of Attorney Frank J. Riccio II as Chair of the Statewide Grievance Committee and Attorney Noble Allen as vice-Chair of that committee. Such motion was made, seconded and approved unanimously. The approved recommendations for appointments and reappointments are included as Appendix B of these minutes.

There being no further business, the meeting adjourned at 10:50 a.m.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert D. Coffey
Secretary

RDC/jas

**Practice Book Revisions
Recommended by the
Rules Committee of the Superior Court**

**PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT**

Rule 1.10. Imputation of Conflicts of Interest: General Rule

(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9, unless

(1) the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the [prohibited] disqualified lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm; or

(2) the prohibition is based upon Rule 1.9 (a) or 1.9 (b) and arises out of the disqualified lawyer's association with a prior firm, and

(i) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom;

(ii) written notice is promptly given to any affected former client to enable the former client to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule, which shall include a description of the screening procedures employed; a statement of the firm's and of the screened lawyer's compliance with these Rules; a statement that review may be available before a tribunal; and an agreement by the firm to respond promptly to any written inquiries or objections by the former client about the screening procedures; and

(iii) certifications of compliance with these Rules and with the screening procedures are provided to the former client by the screened lawyer and by a partner of the firm, at reasonable

intervals upon the former client's written request and upon termination of the screening procedures.

(b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the firm, unless:

(1) The matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and

(2) Any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9 (2) that is material to the matter.

(c) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.

(d) The disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former or current government lawyers is governed by Rule 1.11.

COMMENTARY: Definition of "Firm." For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the term "firm" denotes lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization. See Rule 1.0 (d). Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. See Rule 1.0 and its Commentary.

Principles of Imputed Disqualification. The rule of imputed disqualification stated in subsection (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the

premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Subsection (a) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by Rules 1.9 (b) and 1.10 (b).

The Rule in subsection (a) does not prohibit representation where neither questions of client loyalty nor protection of confidential information are presented. Where one lawyer in a firm could not effectively represent a given client because of strong political beliefs, for example, but that lawyer will do no work on the case and the personal beliefs of the lawyer will not materially limit the representation by others in the firm, the firm should not be disqualified. On the other hand, if an opposing party in a case were owned by a lawyer in the law firm, and others in the firm would be materially limited in pursuing the matter because of loyalty to that lawyer, the personal disqualification of the lawyer would be imputed to all others in the firm.

The Rule in subsection (a) also does not prohibit representation by others in the law firm where the person prohibited from involvement in a matter is a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or legal secretary. Nor does subsection (a) prohibit representation if the lawyer is prohibited from acting because of events before the person became a lawyer, for example, work that the person did while a law student. Such persons, however, must be screened from any personal participation in the matter to avoid communication to others in the firm of confidential information that

both the nonlawyers and the firm have a legal duty to protect. See Rules 1.0 (k) and 5.3.

Rule 1.10 (b) operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9 (c).

Rule 1.10 (c) removes imputation with the informed consent of the affected client or former client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. The conditions stated in Rule 1.7 require the lawyer to determine that the representation is not prohibited by Rule 1.7 (b) and that each affected client or former client has given informed consent to the representation, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the risk may be so severe that the conflict may not be cured by client consent. For a discussion of the effectiveness of client waivers of conflicts that might arise in the future, see Rule 1.7 and its Commentary. For a definition of informed consent, see Rule 1.0 (f).

Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, imputation is governed by Rule 1.11 (b) and (c), not this Rule. Under Rule 1.11 (d), where a lawyer represents the government after having served clients in private

practice, nongovernmental employment or in another government agency, former-client conflicts are not imputed to government lawyers associated with the individually disqualified lawyer.

Where a lawyer is prohibited from engaging in certain transactions under Rule 1.8, subsection (k) of that Rule, and not this Rule, determines whether that prohibition also applies to other lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer.

AMENDMENT NOTE: The above change provides a screening mechanism that will permit law firms to avoid imputed conflicts of interest triggered by attorneys making lateral moves from one law firm to another.

Rule 5.5. Unauthorized Practice of Law

(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so. The practice of law in this jurisdiction is defined in Practice Book Section 2-44A. Conduct described in subsections (c) and (d) in another jurisdiction shall not be deemed the unauthorized practice of law for purposes of this paragraph (a).

(b) A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction, shall not:

(1) except as authorized by law, establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law; or

(2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.

(c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction which accords similar privileges to Connecticut lawyers in its jurisdiction, and provided that the lawyer is not disbarred or

suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction, that:

(1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;

(2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;

(3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential mediation or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, with respect to a matter that is substantially related to, or arises in, a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires *pro hac vice* admission; or

(4) are not within subdivisions (c) (2) or (c) (3) and arise out of or are substantially related to the legal services provided to an existing client of the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.

(d) A lawyer admitted to practice in another jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction that:

(1) [are provided to the lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates and the lawyer is an authorized house counsel as provided in Practice Book Section 2-15A;] the lawyer is authorized to provide pursuant to Practice Book Section 2-15A and the lawyer is an authorized house counsel as provided in that section; or

(2) the lawyer is authorized by federal or other law to provide in this jurisdiction.

(e) A lawyer not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and authorized by the provisions of this Rule to engage in providing legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction is thereby subject to the disciplinary rules of this jurisdiction with respect to the activities in this jurisdiction.

(f) A lawyer desirous of obtaining the privileges set forth in subsections (c) (3) or (4), (1) shall notify the statewide bar counsel as to each separate matter prior to any such representation in Connecticut, (2) shall notify the statewide bar counsel upon termination of each such representation in Connecticut, and (3) shall pay such fees as may be prescribed by the Judicial Branch.

COMMENTARY: A lawyer may practice law only in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice. A lawyer may be admitted to practice law in a jurisdiction on a regular basis or may be authorized by court rule or order or by law to practice for a limited purpose or on a restricted basis. Subsection (a) applies to unauthorized practice of law by a lawyer, whether through the lawyer's direct action or by the lawyer's assisting another person.

A lawyer may provide professional advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of the law; for example, claims adjusters, employees of financial or commercial institutions, social workers, accountants and persons employed in government agencies. Lawyers also may assist independent nonlawyers, such as paraprofessionals, who are authorized by the law of a jurisdiction to provide particular law-

related services. In addition, a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers who wish to proceed as self-represented parties.

Other than as authorized by law or this Rule, a lawyer who is not admitted to practice generally in this jurisdiction violates subsection (b) if the lawyer establishes an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law. Presence may be systematic and continuous even if the lawyer is not physically present here. Such a lawyer must not hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. See also Rules 7.1 (a) and 7.5 (b). A lawyer not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction who engages in repeated and frequent activities of a similar nature in this jurisdiction such as the preparation and/or recording of legal documents (loans and mortgages) involving residents or property in this state may be considered to have a systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction which would not be authorized by this Rule and could thereby be considered to constitute unauthorized practice of law.

There are occasions in which a lawyer admitted to practice in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction under circumstances that do not create an unreasonable risk to the interests of their clients, the public or the courts. Subsection (c) identifies four such circumstances. The fact that conduct is not so identified does not imply that the conduct is or is not authorized.

With the exception of subdivisions (d) (1) and (d) (2), this Rule does not authorize a lawyer to establish an office or other

systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction without being admitted to practice generally here.

There is no single test to determine whether a lawyer's services are provided on a "temporary basis" in this jurisdiction and may, therefore, be permissible under subsection (c). Services may be "temporary" even though the lawyer provides services in this jurisdiction for an extended period of time, as when the lawyer is representing a client in a single lengthy negotiation or litigation.

Subsection (c) applies to lawyers who are admitted to practice law in any United States jurisdiction, which includes the District of Columbia and any state, territory or commonwealth of the United States. The word "admitted" in subsection (c) contemplates that the lawyer is authorized to practice in the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted and excludes a lawyer who, while technically admitted, is not authorized to practice, because, for example, the lawyer is in an inactive status.

Subdivision (c) (1) recognizes that the interests of clients and the public are protected if a lawyer admitted only in another jurisdiction associates with a lawyer licensed to practice in this jurisdiction. For this subdivision to apply, however, the lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction must actively participate in and share responsibility for the representation of the client.

Lawyers not admitted to practice generally in a jurisdiction may be authorized by law or order of a tribunal or an administrative agency to appear before the tribunal or agency. This authority may be granted pursuant to formal rules governing admission *pro hac vice* or pursuant to informal practice of the tribunal or agency. Under subdivision (c) (2), lawyer does not violate this Rule when the lawyer appears before a tribunal or

agency pursuant to such authority. To the extent that a court rule or other law of this jurisdiction requires a lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction to obtain admission *pro hac vice* before appearing before a tribunal or administrative agency, this Rule requires the lawyer to obtain that authority.

Subdivision (c) (2) also provides that a lawyer rendering services in this jurisdiction on a temporary basis does not violate this Rule when the lawyer engages in conduct in anticipation of a proceeding or hearing in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice law or in which the lawyer reasonably expects to be admitted *pro hac vice*. Examples of such conduct include meetings with the client, interviews of potential witnesses, and the review of documents. Similarly, a lawyer admitted only in another jurisdiction may engage in conduct temporarily in this jurisdiction in connection with pending litigation in another jurisdiction in which the lawyer is or reasonably expects to be authorized to appear, including taking depositions in this jurisdiction.

When a lawyer has been or reasonably expects to be admitted to appear before a court or administrative agency, subdivision (c) (2) also permits conduct by lawyers who are associated with that lawyer in the matter, but who do not expect to appear before the court or administrative agency. For example, subordinate lawyers may conduct research, review documents, and attend meetings with witnesses in support of the lawyer responsible for the litigation.

Subdivision (c) (3) permits a lawyer admitted to practice law in another jurisdiction to perform services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction if those services are in or reasonably

related to a pending or potential mediation or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services are with respect to a matter that is substantially related to, or arises out of, a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice. The lawyer, however, must obtain admission *pro hac vice* in the case of a court-annexed arbitration or mediation or otherwise if court rules or law so require.

Subdivision (c) (4) permits a lawyer admitted in another jurisdiction to provide certain legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction if they arise out of or are substantially related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted but are not within subdivisions (c) (2) or (c) (3). These services include both legal services and services that nonlawyers may perform but that are considered the practice of law when performed by lawyers.

Subdivision (c) (3) requires that the services be with respect to a matter that is substantially related to, or arises out of, a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted. A variety of factors may evidence such a relationship. However, the matter, although involving other jurisdictions, must have a significant connection with the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice. A significant aspect of the lawyer's work might be conducted in that jurisdiction or a significant aspect of the matter may involve the law of that jurisdiction. The necessary relationship might arise when the client's activities and the resulting legal issues involve multiple jurisdictions. Subdivision (c) (4) requires that the services provided in this jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not admitted to practice be for (1) an existing client, i.e., one with whom the lawyer has a previous relationship and not arising solely out of a

Connecticut-based matter and (2) arise out of or be substantially related to the legal services provided to that client in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice. Without both, the lawyer is prohibited from practicing law in the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not admitted to practice.

Subdivision (d) (2) recognizes that a lawyer may provide legal services in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not licensed when authorized to do so by federal or other law, which includes statute, court rule, executive regulation or judicial precedent.

A lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant to subsections (c) or (d) or otherwise is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. See Rule 8.5 (a).

In some circumstances, a lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant to subsections (c) or (d) may have to inform the client that the lawyer is not licensed to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Subsections (c) and (d) do not authorize communications advertising legal services to prospective clients in this jurisdiction by lawyers who are admitted to practice in other jurisdictions.

AMENDMENT NOTE: The above change is pursuant to the revision to Section 2-15A, which permits authorized house counsel to participate in the provision of pro bono legal services in this state under certain circumstances.

Rule 7.2. Advertising

(a) Subject to the requirements set forth in Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through written, recorded or electronic communication, including public media.

(b) (1) A copy or recording of an advertisement or communication shall be kept for three years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used. An electronic advertisement or communication shall be copied once every three months on a compact disc or similar technology and kept for three years after its last dissemination.

(2) A lawyer shall comply with the mandatory filing requirement of Practice Book Section 2-28A.

(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may

(1) pay the reasonable cost of advertisements or communications permitted by this Rule;

(2) pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service. A qualified lawyer referral service is a lawyer referral service that has been approved by an appropriate regulatory authority;

(3) pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17.

(d) Any advertisement or communication made pursuant to this Rule shall include the name of at least one lawyer admitted in Connecticut responsible for its content. In the case of television advertisements, the name, address and telephone number of the lawyer admitted in Connecticut shall be displayed in bold print for fifteen seconds or the duration of the commercial, whichever is less, and shall be prominent enough to be readable.

(e) Advertisements on the electronic media such as television and radio may contain the same factual information and illustrations as permitted in advertisements in the print media.

(f) Every advertisement and written communication that contains information about the lawyer's fee, including those

indicating that the charging of a fee is contingent on outcome, or that no fee will be charged in the absence of a recovery, or that the fee will be a percentage of the recovery, shall disclose whether and to what extent the client will be responsible for any court costs and expenses of litigation. The disclosure concerning court costs and expenses of litigation shall be in the same print size and type as the information regarding the lawyer's fee and, if broadcast, shall appear for the same duration as the information regarding the lawyer's fee. If the information regarding the fee is spoken, the disclosure concerning court costs and expenses of litigation shall also be spoken.

(g) A lawyer who advertises a specific fee or range of fees for a particular service shall honor the advertised fee or range of fees for at least ninety days unless the advertisement specifies a shorter period; provided that, for advertisements in the yellow pages of telephone directories or other media not published more frequently than annually, the advertised fee or range of fees shall be honored for no less than one year following publication.

(h) No lawyers shall directly or indirectly pay all or part of the cost of an advertisement by a lawyer not in the same firm unless the advertisement discloses the name and address of the nonadvertising lawyer, and whether the advertising lawyer may refer any case received through the advertisement to the nonadvertising lawyer.

(i) The following information in advertisements and written communications shall be presumed not to violate the provisions of Rule 7.1:

(1) Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.3, the name of the lawyer or law firm, a listing of lawyers associated with the firm,

office addresses and telephone numbers, office and telephone service hours, fax numbers, website and e-mail addresses and domain names, and a designation such as "attorney" or "law firm."

(2) Date of admission to the Connecticut bar and any other bars and a listing of federal courts and jurisdictions where the lawyer is licensed to practice.

(3) Technical and professional licenses granted by the state or other recognized licensing authorities.

(4) Foreign language ability.

(5) Fields of law in which the lawyer practices or is designated, subject to the requirements of Rule 7.4, or is certified pursuant to Rule 7.4A.

(6) Prepaid or group legal service plans in which the lawyer participates.

(7) Acceptance of credit cards.

(8) Fee for initial consultation and fee schedule.

(9) A listing of the name and geographic location of a lawyer or law firm as a sponsor of a public service announcement or charitable, civic or community program or event.

(10) Nothing in this Rule prohibits a lawyer or law firm from permitting the inclusion in the law directories intended primarily for the use of the legal profession of such information as has traditionally been included in these publications.

(i) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (d), a lawyer and service may participate in an internet-based client to lawyer matching service provided the service otherwise complies with the Rules of Professional Conduct. If the service provides an exclusive referral to a lawyer or law firm for a particular practice

area in a particular geographical region, then the service must comply with subsection (d).

COMMENTARY: To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only through reputation but also through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising. Advertising involves an active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer should not seek clientele. However, the public's need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising. This need is particularly acute in the case of persons of moderate means who have not made extensive use of legal services. The interest in expanding public information about legal services ought to prevail over considerations of tradition. Nevertheless, advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are misleading or overreaching.

This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning a lawyer's name or firm name, address and telephone number; the kinds of services the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the lawyer's fees are determined, including prices for specific services and payment and credit arrangements; whether and to what extent the client will be responsible for any court costs and expenses of litigation; lawyer's foreign language ability; names of references and, with their consent, names of clients regularly represented; and other information that might invite the attention of those seeking legal assistance.

Questions of effectiveness and taste in advertising are matters of speculation and subjective judgment. Some jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions against television advertising, against advertising going beyond specified facts about

a lawyer, or against "undignified" advertising. Television is now one of the most powerful media for getting information to the public, particularly persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television advertising, therefore, would impede the flow of information about legal services to many sectors of the public. Limiting the information that may be advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information that the public would regard as relevant.

Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3 prohibits communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation.

Record of Advertising. Subsection (b) requires that a record of the content and use of advertising be kept in order to facilitate enforcement of this Rule. It does not require that advertising be subject to review prior to dissemination. Such a requirement would be burdensome and expensive relative to its possible benefits, and may be of doubtful constitutionality.

Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer. A lawyer may pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service. A legal service plan is a prepaid or group legal service plan or a similar delivery system that assists prospective clients to secure legal representation. A lawyer referral service, on the other hand, is any organization that holds itself out to the public as a lawyer referral service. Such referral services are understood by laypersons to be consumer-oriented organizations that provide unbiased referrals to lawyers with appropriate experience in the subject matter of the representation and afford other client protections, such as complaint procedures or malpractice insurance requirements. Consequently, this Rule

only permits a lawyer to pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service. A qualified lawyer referral service is one that is approved by an appropriate regulatory authority as affording adequate protections for prospective clients. See, e.g., the American Bar Association's Model Supreme Court Rules Governing Lawyer Referral Services and Model Lawyer Referral and Information Service Quality Assurance Act (requiring that organizations that are identified as lawyer referral services [i] permit the participation of all lawyers who are licensed and eligible to practice in the jurisdiction and who meet reasonable objective eligibility requirements as may be established by the referral service for the protection of prospective clients; [ii] require each participating lawyer to carry reasonably adequate malpractice insurance; [iii] act reasonably to assess client satisfaction and address client complaints; and [iv] do not refer prospective clients to lawyers who own, operate or are employed by the referral service).

A lawyer who accepts assignments or referrals from a legal service plan or referrals from a lawyer referral service must act reasonably to assure that the activities of the plan or service are compatible with the lawyer's professional obligations. See Rule 5.3. Legal service plans and lawyer referral services may communicate with prospective clients, but such communication must be in conformity with these Rules. Thus, advertising must not be false or misleading, as would be the case if the communications of a group advertising program or a group legal services plan would mislead prospective clients to think that it was a lawyer referral service sponsored by a state agency or bar

association. Nor could the lawyer allow in-person, telephonic, or real-time contacts that would violate Rule 7.3.

AMENDMENT NOTE: The above change sets forth the circumstances under which a lawyer may participate in an internet-based client to lawyer matching service.

**PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE GENERAL PROVISIONS
OF THE
SUPERIOR COURT RULES**

[Sec. 1-11D. Pilot Program to Increase Public Access to Child Protection Proceedings

(a) Pursuant to this section, the chief court administrator shall establish a pilot program to increase public access to trial proceedings in juvenile matters in which a child is alleged to be uncared for, neglected, abused or dependent or is the subject of a petition for termination of parental rights, except as otherwise provided by law or as hereinafter precluded or limited, and subject to the limitations set forth in Sections 1-10B and 32a-7 and General Statutes § 46b-124. The pilot program shall be in a single district or session of the superior court for juvenile matters, to be chosen by the chief court administrator based on the following considerations:

(1) the age, size and ability of the courthouse facility to accommodate public access to available courtrooms, security and costs;

(2) the volume of cases at such facility and the assignment of judges to the juvenile district;

(3) the likelihood of the occurrence of significant proceedings of interest to the public in the juvenile district;

(4) the proximity of the juvenile district to the major media organizations and to the organizations or entities providing coverage; and

(5) the proximity of such facility to the Judicial Branch administrative offices.

(b) As used in this section, the term "trial proceeding" shall mean the final hearing on the merits of any juvenile matter not involving evidence or allegations of the sexual abuse of a child which concerns: (1) an order of temporary custody pursuant to Section 33a-7 (d) or (e); (2) a petition alleging a child to be uncared for, neglected, abused or dependent; or (3) a petition for termination of parental rights. A trial proceeding shall be deemed to include all courtroom proceedings on any contested motion for review of permanency plan, motion to revoke commitment or motion to transfer guardianship which has been consolidated with the underlying proceeding for the final hearing on the merits. A trial proceeding shall commence with the swearing in of the first witness.

(c) Except as provided in this section or as otherwise provided by law, all trial proceedings in the pilot program shall be presumed to be open to the public.

(d) Upon written motion of any party, guardian ad litem, witness or other interested person, or upon its own motion, the judicial authority may at any time, prior to or during a trial proceeding, order that public access to all or any portion of the trial proceeding be denied or limited if the judicial authority concludes that there is good cause for the issuance of such an

order. In determining if good cause has been shown to deny or limit public access to a trial proceeding under this section, the judicial authority shall consider the child's best interest, the safety, legal rights, and privacy concerns of any person which may be affected by the granting or denial of the motion, and the integrity of the judicial process. Where good cause has been shown, the court may, in fashioning its order, consider whether there is any reasonable alternative to the issuance of an order limiting or denying public access to protect the interest to be served. An agreement of the parties to deny or limit public access to the trial proceeding shall not constitute a sufficient basis for the issuance of such an order.

(e) The burden of proving that public access to any trial proceeding governed by this section should be denied or limited shall be on the person who seeks such relief. Accordingly, any person moving for such relief, other than the judicial authority when acting upon its own motion, shall support the motion with an accompanying memorandum of law stating all known grounds upon which it is claimed that such relief should be granted. The motion and memorandum shall be served on all parties of record and be filed with the court, where they shall become parts of the confidential record of the underlying proceeding pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-124. Absent good cause shown, such motion and memorandum shall be served and filed not less than fourteen days before the trial proceeding is scheduled to begin, except that if the trial proceeding concerns a contested order of temporary custody case, they shall be served and filed not less than two days before the trial proceeding is scheduled to begin.

(f) Upon the filing of any motion to deny or limit public access to a trial proceeding governed by this section, or upon the determination of the judicial authority, upon its own motion, that the ordering of such relief should be considered, the judicial authority shall schedule a hearing on the motion and shall, where practicable, post a notice of the hearing on the judicial website so that all interested persons can attend the hearing and present appropriate legal arguments in support of or in opposition to the motion. Such notice shall set forth the date, time, location and the general subject matter of the hearing, and shall identify the underlying proceeding solely by reference to the first name and first initial of the last name of the child who is the subject of the proceeding or, if the proceeding involves more than one child, by reference to the first name and first initial of the last name of the eldest of the children involved. All memoranda of law and other written submissions in support of or in opposition to the motion shall be served on all parties of record and be filed with the court, where they shall become part of the confidential record of the underlying proceeding pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-124.

(g) Notwithstanding the confidentiality of the motion to deny or limit public access, the accompanying memorandum, and all memoranda of law and other written submissions in support of or in opposition to the motion, the hearing on the motion shall be conducted in open court. Any person whose rights may be affected by the granting or denial of the motion, including any media representative, may attend and be heard at the hearing in the manner permitted by the judicial authority, but shall not be allowed intervening party status. The hearing shall be conducted by the judicial authority in a manner consistent with maintaining

the confidentiality of the records of the underlying proceeding and protecting the interests for which denial or limitation of public access has been sought. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judicial authority shall announce its ruling on the motion in open court. If and to the extent that the judicial authority determines that public access to the trial proceeding should be denied or limited in any way, it shall articulate the good cause upon which it finds that such relief is necessary, shall specify the facts upon which it bases that finding, and shall order that a transcript of its decision become a part of the confidential record of the underlying proceeding pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-124. If, however, and to the extent that it further determines that any such articulation of good cause or specification of factual findings would reveal information that any interested person is entitled to keep confidential, then the judicial authority shall make such articulation and specification in a signed writing, which shall be filed with the court and become part of the confidential record of the underlying proceeding pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-124. The decision shall be final.

(h) Prior to the commencement of any trial proceeding accessible to the public, the judicial authority shall hold a pretrial conference with counsel for all parties to anticipate, evaluate and resolve prospective problems with the conduct of an open proceeding and to ensure compliance with the protective provisions of subsection (d).

(i) The Rules Committee shall evaluate the efficacy of this section on or before December 31, 2010, and shall receive recommendations from the chief court administrator, the juvenile access pilot program advisory board and other sources.]

COMMENTARY: The repeal of the above rule is in light of Section 30 and 225 of Public Act 11-51, which repeal C.G.S. § 46b-122(b), which established the Juvenile Access Pilot Program and the Juvenile Access Pilot Program Advisory Board.

Sec. 2-13. Attorneys of Other Jurisdictions; Qualifications and Requirements for Admission

(a) Any member of the bar of another state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, who, after satisfying the state bar examining committee that his or her educational qualifications are such as would entitle him or her to take the examination in Connecticut [or would have entitled him or her to take the examination in Connecticut at the time of his or her admission to the bar of which he or she is a member], and that at least one jurisdiction in which he or she is a member of the bar is reciprocal to Connecticut in that it would admit a member of the bar of Connecticut to its bar without examination under provisions similar to those set out in this section, shall satisfy the state bar examining committee that he or she (1) is of good moral character, is fit to practice law, and has either passed an examination in professional responsibility administered under the auspices of the bar examining committee or has completed a course in professional responsibility in accordance with the regulations of the bar examining committee; (2) has been duly licensed to practice law before the highest court of a reciprocal state or territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia if reciprocal to Connecticut and (A) has lawfully engaged in the practice of law as the applicant's principal means of livelihood in reciprocal jurisdictions for at least five of the ten years immediately

preceding the date of the application and is in good standing, or (B) if the applicant has taken the bar examinations of Connecticut and failed to pass them, the applicant has lawfully engaged in the practice of law as his or her principal means of livelihood in such reciprocal jurisdiction for at least five of the ten years immediately preceding the date of the application and is in good standing, provided that such five years of practice shall have occurred subsequent to the applicant's last failed Connecticut examination; (3) is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully residing in the United States; (4) intends, upon a continuing basis, to practice law actively in Connecticut and/ or to supervise law students within a clinical law program at an accredited Connecticut law school while a member of the faculty of such school may be admitted by the court as an attorney without examination upon written application and the payment of such fee as the examining committee shall from time to time determine, upon compliance with the following requirements: Such application, duly verified, shall be filed with the administrative director of the bar examining committee and shall set forth his or her qualifications as hereinbefore provided. There shall be filed with such application the following affidavits: Affidavits from two attorneys who personally know the applicant certifying to his or her good moral character and fitness to practice law and supporting, to the satisfaction of the state bar examining committee, his or her practice of law as defined under (2) of this subsection; where applicable, an affidavit from the dean of the accredited Connecticut law school at which the applicant has accepted employment attesting to the employment relationship and term; affidavits from two members of the bar of Connecticut of at least

five years' standing, certifying that the applicant is of good moral character and is fit to practice law; and an affidavit from the applicant, certifying whether such applicant has a grievance pending against him or her, has ever been reprimanded, suspended, placed on inactive status, disbarred, or has ever resigned from the practice of law, and, if so, setting forth the circumstances concerning such action. Such an affidavit is not required if it has been furnished as part of the application form prescribed by the state bar examining committee.

(b) For the purpose of this rule, the "practice of law" shall include the following activities, if performed in a reciprocal jurisdiction after the date of the applicant's admission to that jurisdiction:

(1) representation of one or more clients in the practice of law;

(2) service as a lawyer with a state, federal, or territorial agency, including military services; however, such service for a federal agency, including military service, need not be performed in a reciprocal jurisdiction;

(3) teaching law at an accredited law school, including supervision of law students within a clinical program;

(4) service as a judge in a state, federal, or territorial court of record;

(5) service as a judicial law clerk; or

(6) any combination of the above.

(c) An attorney who, within the ten years immediately preceding the date of application, was engaged in the supervision of law students within a clinical law program of one or more accredited law schools in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions while

a member of the faculty of such school or schools, whether or not any such jurisdiction is a reciprocal jurisdiction, may apply such time toward the satisfaction of the requirement of subdivision (a) (2) (A) of this section. If such time is so applied, the attorney shall file with his or her application an affidavit from the dean of the law school or schools of each such other jurisdiction attesting to the employment relationship and the period of time the applicant engaged in the supervision of law students within a clinical program at such school.

COMMENTARY: The above change brings the educational qualifications for admission without examination in line with current Connecticut Bar Examining Committee standards for admission by examination.

Sec. 2-15A. —Authorized House Counsel

(a) Purpose

The purpose of this section is to clarify the status of house counsel as authorized house counsel as defined herein, and to confirm that such counsel are subject to regulation by the judges of the superior court. Notwithstanding any other section of this chapter relating to admission to the bar, this section shall authorize attorneys licensed to practice in jurisdictions other than Connecticut to be permitted to undertake these activities, as defined herein, in Connecticut without the requirement of taking the bar examination so long as they are exclusively employed by an organization.

(b) Definitions

(1) Authorized House Counsel. An "authorized house counsel" is any person who:

(A) is a member in good standing of the entity governing the practice of law of each state (other than Connecticut) or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia or any foreign jurisdiction in which the member is licensed;

(B) has been certified on recommendation of the bar examining committee in accordance with this section;

(C) agrees to abide by the rules regulating members of the Connecticut bar and submit to the jurisdiction of the statewide grievance committee and the superior court; and

(D) is, at the date of application for registration under this rule, employed in the state of Connecticut by an organization or relocating to the state of Connecticut in furtherance of such employment within three months of such application under this section and receives or shall receive compensation for activities performed for that business organization.

(2) Organization. An "organization" for the purpose of this rule is a corporation, partnership, association, or employer sponsored benefit plan or other legal entity (taken together with its respective parents, subsidiaries, and affiliates) that is not itself engaged in the practice of law or the rendering of legal services outside such organization, whether for a fee or otherwise, and does not charge or collect a fee for the representation or advice other than to entities comprising such organization for the activities of the authorized house counsel.

(c) Activities

(1) Authorized Activities. An authorized house counsel, as an employee of an organization, may provide legal services in the state of Connecticut to the organization for which a registration

pursuant to subsection (d) is effective, provided, however, that such activities shall be limited to:

(A) the giving of legal advice to the directors, officers, employees, trustees, and agents of the organization with respect to its business and affairs;

(B) negotiating and documenting all matters for the organization; and

(C) representation of the organization in its dealings with any administrative agency, tribunal or commission having jurisdiction; provided, however, authorized house counsel shall not be permitted to make appearances as counsel before any state or municipal administrative tribunal, agency, or commission, and shall not be permitted to make appearances in any court of this state, unless the attorney is specially admitted to appear in a case before such tribunal, agency, commission or court.

(2) **Disclosure.** Authorized house counsel shall not represent themselves to be members of the Connecticut bar or commissioners of the superior court licensed to practice law in this state. Such counsel may represent themselves as Connecticut authorized house counsel.

(3) **Limitation on Representation.** In no event shall the activities permitted hereunder include the individual or personal representation of any shareholder, owner, partner, officer, employee, servant, or agent in any matter or transaction or the giving of advice therefor unless otherwise permitted or authorized by law, code, or rule or as may be permitted by subsection (c) (1). Authorized house counsel shall not be permitted to prepare legal instruments or documents on behalf of anyone other than the organization employing the authorized house counsel.

(4) Limitation on Opinions to Third Parties. An authorized house counsel shall not express or render a legal judgment or opinion to be relied upon by any third person or party other than legal opinions rendered in connection with commercial, financial or other business transactions to which the authorized house counsel's employer organization is a party and in which the legal opinions have been requested from the authorized house counsel by another party to the transaction. Nothing in this subsection (c) (4) shall permit authorized house counsel to render legal opinions or advice in consumer transactions to customers of the organization employing the authorized house counsel.

(5) Pro Bono Legal Services. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this section, an authorized house counsel may participate in the provision of any and all legal services pro bono publico in Connecticut offered under the supervision of an organized legal aid society or state/local bar association project, or of a member of the Connecticut bar who is also working on the pro bono representation.

(d) Registration

(1) Filing with the Bar Examining Committee. The bar examining committee shall investigate whether the applicant is at least eighteen years of age and is of good moral character, consistent with the requirement of Section 2-8 (3) regarding applicants for admission to the bar. In addition, the applicant shall file with the bar examining committee, and the committee shall consider, the following:

(A) a certificate from each entity governing the practice of law of a state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia or any foreign jurisdiction in which the applicant is

licensed to practice law certifying that the applicant is a member in good standing;

(B) a sworn statement by the applicant:

(i) that the applicant has read and is familiar with the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys and Chapter 2 (Attorneys) of the Superior Court Rules, General Provisions, and will abide by the provisions thereof;

(ii) that the applicant submits to the jurisdiction of the statewide grievance committee and the superior court for disciplinary purposes, and authorizes notification to or from the entity governing the practice of law of each state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia in which the applicant is licensed to practice law of any disciplinary action taken against the applicant;

(iii) listing any jurisdiction in which the applicant is now or ever has been licensed to practice law; and

(iv) disclosing any disciplinary sanction or pending proceeding pertaining or relating to his or her license to practice law including, but not limited to, reprimand, censure, suspension or disbarment, or whether the applicant has been placed on inactive status;

(C) a certificate from an organization certifying that it is qualified as set forth in subsection (b) (2); that it is aware that the applicant is not licensed to practice law in Connecticut; and that the applicant is employed or about to be employed in Connecticut by the organization as set forth in subsection (b) (1) (D);

(D) an appropriate application pursuant to the regulations of the bar examining committee;

(E) remittance of a filing fee to the bar examining committee as prescribed and set by that committee; and

(F) an affidavit from each of two members of the Connecticut bar, who have each been licensed to practice law in Connecticut for at least five years, certifying that the applicant is of good moral character and that the applicant is employed or will be employed by an organization as defined above in subsection (b) (2).

(2) **Certification.** Upon recommendation of the bar examining committee, the court may certify the applicant as authorized house counsel and shall cause notice of such certification to be published in the Connecticut Law Journal.

(3) **Annual Client Security Fund Fee.** Individuals certified pursuant to this section shall comply with the requirements of Sections 2-68 and 2-70 of this chapter, including payment of the annual fee and shall pay any other fees imposed on attorneys by court rule.

(4) **Annual Registration.** Individuals certified pursuant to this section shall register annually with the statewide grievance committee in accordance with Sections 2-26 and 2-27 (d) of this chapter.

(e) Termination or Withdrawal of Registration

(1) **Cessation of Authorization to Perform Services.** Authorization to perform services under this rule shall cease upon the earliest of the following events:

(A) the termination or resignation of employment with the organization for which registration has been filed, provided, however, that if the authorized house counsel shall commence employment with another organization within thirty days of the

termination or resignation, authorization to perform services under this rule shall continue upon the filing with the bar examining committee of a certificate as set forth in subsection (d) (1) (C);

(B) the withdrawal of registration by the authorized house counsel;

(C) the relocation of an authorized house counsel outside of Connecticut for a period greater than 180 consecutive days; or

(D) the failure of authorized house counsel to comply with any applicable provision of this rule.

Notice of one of the events set forth in subsections (e) (1) (A) through (C) or a new certificate as provided in subsection (e) (1) (A) must be filed with the bar examining committee by the authorized house counsel within thirty days after such action. Failure to provide such notice by the authorized house counsel shall be a basis for discipline pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys.

(2) Notice of Withdrawal of Authorization. Upon receipt of the notice required by subsection (e) (1), the bar examining committee shall forward a request to the statewide bar counsel that the authorization under this chapter be revoked. Notice of the revocation shall be mailed by the statewide bar counsel to the authorized house counsel and the organization employing the authorized house counsel.

(3) Reapplication. Nothing herein shall prevent an individual previously authorized as house counsel to reapply for authorization as set forth in subsection (d).

(f) Discipline

(1) Termination of Authorization by Court. In addition to any appropriate proceedings and discipline that may be imposed

by the statewide grievance committee, the superior court may, at any time, with cause, terminate an authorized house counsel's registration, temporarily or permanently.

(2) **Notification to Other States.** The statewide bar counsel shall be authorized to notify each entity governing the practice of law in the state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, in which the authorized house counsel is licensed to practice law, of any disciplinary action against the authorized house counsel.

(g) **Transition**

(1) **Preapplication Employment in Connecticut.** The performance of an applicant's duties as an employee of an organization in Connecticut prior to the effective date of this rule shall not be grounds for the denial of registration of such applicant if application for registration is made within six months of the effective date of this rule.

(2) **Immunity from Enforcement Action.** An authorized house counsel who has been duly registered under this rule shall not be subject to enforcement action for the unlicensed practice of law for acting as counsel to an organization prior to the effective date of this rule.

COMMENTARY: The above change permits authorized house counsel to participate in the provision of pro bono legal services in this state under certain circumstances.

Sec. 2-32. Filing Complaints against Attorneys; Action; Time Limitation

(a) Any person, including disciplinary counsel, or a grievance panel on its own motion, may file a written complaint, executed under penalties of false statement, alleging attorney

misconduct whether or not such alleged misconduct occurred in the actual presence of the court. Complaints against attorneys shall be filed with the statewide bar counsel. Within seven days of the receipt of a complaint the statewide bar counsel shall review the complaint and process it in accordance with subdivisions (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection as follows:

(1) forward the complaint to a grievance panel in the judicial district in which the respondent maintains his or her principal office or residence, provided that, if the respondent does not maintain such an address in this state, the statewide bar counsel shall forward the complaint to any grievance panel; and notify the complainant and the respondent, by certified mail with return receipt, of the panel to which the complaint was sent. The notification to the respondent shall be accompanied by a copy of the complaint. The respondent shall respond within thirty days of the date notification is mailed to the respondent unless for good cause shown such time is extended by the grievance panel. The response shall be sent to the grievance panel to which the complaint has been referred. The failure to file a timely response shall constitute misconduct unless the respondent establishes that the failure to respond timely was for good cause shown;

(2) refer the complaint to the chair of the statewide grievance committee or an attorney designee of the chair and to a nonattorney member of the committee, and the statewide bar counsel in conjunction with the chair or attorney designee and the nonattorney member, shall if deemed appropriate, dismiss the complaint on one or more of the following grounds:

(A) the complaint only alleges a fee dispute and not a clearly excessive or improper fee;

(B) the complaint does not allege facts which, if true, would constitute a violation of any provision of the applicable rules governing attorney conduct;

(C) the complaint does not contain sufficient specific allegations on which to conduct an investigation;

(D) the complaint is duplicative of a previously adjudicated complaint;

(E) the complaint alleges that the last act or omission constituting the alleged misconduct occurred more than six years prior to the date on which the complaint was filed;

(i) Notwithstanding the period of limitation set forth in this subparagraph, an allegation of misconduct that would constitute a violation of Rule 1.15, 8.1 or 8.4 (2) through (6) of the Rules of Professional Conduct may still be considered as long as a written complaint is filed within one year of the discovery of such alleged misconduct.

(ii) Each period of limitation in this subparagraph is tolled during any period in which: (1) the alleged misconduct remains undiscovered due to active concealment; (2) the alleged misconduct would constitute a violation of Rule 1.8 (c) and the conditions precedent of the instrument have not been satisfied; (3) the alleged misconduct is part of a continuing course of misconduct; or (4) the aggrieved party is under the age of majority, insane, or otherwise unable to file a complaint due to mental or physical incapacitation.

(F) the complaint alleges misconduct occurring in a superior court, appellate court or supreme court action and the court has been made aware of the allegations of misconduct and

has rendered a decision finding misconduct or finding that either no misconduct has occurred or that the allegations should not be referred to the statewide grievance committee;

(G) the complaint alleges personal behavior outside the practice of law which does not constitute a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct;

(H) the complaint alleges the nonpayment of incurred indebtedness;

(I) the complaint names only a law firm or other entity and not any individual attorney, unless dismissal would result in gross injustice. If the complaint names a law firm or other entity as well as an individual attorney or attorneys, the complaint shall be dismissed only as against the law firm or entity;

(J) the complaint alleges misconduct occurring in another jurisdiction in which the attorney is also admitted and in which the attorney maintains an office to practice law, and it would be more practicable for the matter to be determined in the other jurisdiction. If a complaint is dismissed pursuant to this subdivision, it shall be without prejudice and the matter shall be referred by the statewide bar counsel to the jurisdiction in which the conduct is alleged to have occurred.

(3) If a complaint alleges only a fee dispute within the meaning of subsection (a) (2) (A) of this section, the statewide bar counsel in conjunction with the chairperson or attorney designee and the nonattorney member may stay further proceedings on the complaint on such terms and conditions deemed appropriate, including referring the parties to fee arbitration. The record and result of any such fee arbitration shall be filed with the statewide bar counsel and shall be dispositive of the complaint. A party who

refuses to utilize the no cost fee arbitration service provided by the Connecticut Bar Association shall pay the cost of the arbitration.

(b) The statewide bar counsel, chair or attorney designee and nonattorney member shall have fourteen days from the date the complaint was filed to determine whether to dismiss the complaint. If after review by the statewide bar counsel, chair or attorney designee and nonattorney member it is determined that the complaint should be forwarded to a grievance panel for investigation in accordance with subsections (f) through (j) of this section, the complaint shall be so forwarded in accordance with subsection (a) (1) of this section within seven days of the determination to forward the complaint.

(c) If the complaint is dismissed by the statewide bar counsel in conjunction with the chair or attorney designee and nonattorney member, the complainant and respondent shall be notified of the dismissal in writing. The respondent shall be provided with a copy of the complaint with the notice of dismissal. The notice of dismissal shall set forth the reason or reasons for the dismissal. The complainant shall have fourteen days from the date notice of the dismissal is mailed to the complainant to file an appeal of the dismissal. The appeal shall be in writing setting forth the basis of the appeal and shall be filed with the statewide bar counsel who shall forward it to a reviewing committee for decision on the appeal. The reviewing committee shall review the appeal and render a decision thereon within sixty days of the filing of the appeal. The reviewing committee shall either affirm the dismissal of the complaint or order the complaint forwarded to a grievance panel for investigation in accordance with subsections (f) through (j) of this section. The decision of the reviewing committee shall be

in writing and mailed to the complainant. The decision of the reviewing committee shall be final.

(d) The statewide bar counsel shall keep a record of all complaints filed. The complainant and the respondent shall notify the statewide bar counsel of any change of address or telephone number during the pendency of the proceedings on the complaint.

(e) If for good cause a grievance panel declines, or is unable pursuant to Section 2-29 (d), to investigate a complaint, it shall forthwith return the complaint to the statewide bar counsel to be referred by him or her immediately to another panel. Notification of such referral shall be given by the statewide bar counsel to the complainant and the respondent by certified mail with return receipt.

(f) The grievance panel, with the assistance of the grievance counsel assigned to it, shall investigate each complaint to determine whether probable cause exists that the attorney is guilty of misconduct. The grievance panel may, upon the vote of a majority of its members, require that a disciplinary counsel pursue the matter before the grievance panel on the issue of probable cause.

(g) Investigations and proceedings of the grievance panel shall be confidential unless the attorney under investigation requests that such investigation and proceedings be public.

(h) On the request of the respondent and for good cause shown, or on its own motion, the grievance panel may conduct a hearing on the complaint. The complainant and respondent shall be entitled to be present at any proceedings on the complaint at which testimony is given and to have counsel present, provided,

however, that they shall not be entitled to examine or cross-examine witnesses unless requested by the grievance panel.

(i) The panel shall, within one hundred and ten days from the date the complaint was referred to it, unless such time is extended pursuant to subsection (j), do one of the following: (1) If the panel determines that probable cause exists that the respondent is guilty of misconduct, it shall file the following with the statewide grievance committee and with the disciplinary counsel: (A) its written determination that probable cause exists that the respondent is guilty of misconduct, (B) a copy of the complaint and response, (C) a transcript of any testimony heard by the panel, (D) a copy of any investigatory file and copies of any documents, transcripts or other written materials which were available to the panel. These materials shall constitute the panel's record in the case. (2) If the panel determines that no probable cause exists that the respondent is guilty of misconduct, it shall dismiss the complaint unless there is an allegation in the complaint that the respondent committed a crime. Such dismissal shall be final and there shall be no review of the matter by the statewide grievance committee, but the panel shall file with the statewide grievance committee a copy of its decision dismissing the complaint and the materials set forth in subsection (i) (1) (B), (C) and (D). In cases in which there is an allegation in the complaint that the respondent committed a crime, the panel shall file with the statewide grievance committee and with disciplinary counsel its written determination that no probable cause exists and the materials set forth in subsection (i) (1) (B), (C) and (D). These materials shall constitute the panel's record in the case.

(j) The panel may file a motion for extension of time not to exceed thirty days with the statewide grievance committee which may grant the motion only upon a finding of good cause. If the panel does not complete its action on a complaint within the time provided in this section, the statewide grievance committee shall inquire into the delay and shall order that the panel take action on the complaint forthwith, or order that the complaint be forwarded to and heard by another panel or a reviewing committee designated by the statewide grievance committee. [The panel shall not make a probable cause determination based, in full or in part, on a claim of misconduct not alleged in the complaint without first notifying the respondent that it is considering such action and affording the respondent the opportunity to be heard.]

(k) The panel shall notify the complainant, the respondent, and the statewide grievance committee of its determination. The determination shall be a matter of public record if the panel determines that probable cause exists that the respondent is guilty of misconduct.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of the changes to Section 2-35 which allow Disciplinary Counsel to add additional allegations of misconduct to grievance complaints.

Sec. 2-34A. Disciplinary Counsel

(a) There shall be a chief disciplinary counsel and such disciplinary counsel and staff as are necessary. The chief disciplinary counsel and the disciplinary counsel shall be appointed by the judges of the superior court for a term of one year commencing July 1, except that initial appointments shall be from such date as the judges determine through the following June 30. In the event that a vacancy arises in any of these

positions before the end of a term, the executive committee of the superior court may appoint a qualified individual to fill the vacancy for the balance of the term. The chief disciplinary counsel and disciplinary counsel shall be assigned to the office of the chief court administrator for administrative purposes and shall not engage in the private practice of law. The term "disciplinary counsel" as used in the rules for the superior court shall mean the chief disciplinary counsel or any disciplinary counsel.

(b) In addition to any other powers and duties set forth in this chapter, disciplinary counsel shall:

(1) Investigate each complaint which has been forwarded, after a determination that probable cause exists that the respondent is guilty of misconduct, by a grievance panel to the statewide grievance committee for review pursuant to Section 2-32 (i) and pursue such matter before the statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee. When, after a determination of no probable cause by a grievance panel, a complaint is forwarded to the statewide grievance committee because it contains an allegation that the respondent committed a crime, and the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee determines that a hearing shall be held concerning the complaint pursuant to Section 2-35 (c), the disciplinary counsel shall present the matter to such committee.

(2) Pursuant to Section 2-82, discuss and may negotiate a disposition of the complaint with the respondent or, if represented by an attorney, the respondent's attorney, subject to the approval of the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee or the court.

(3) Remove irrelevant information from the complaint file and thereafter permit discovery of information in the file.

(4) Pursuant to Section 2-35, add additional allegations of misconduct to the grievance panel's determination that probable cause exists that the respondent is guilty of misconduct.

[(4)] (5) Have the power to subpoena witnesses for any hearing before a grievance panel, a reviewing committee or the statewide grievance committee convened pursuant to these rules.

[(5)] (6) In his or her discretion, recommend dispositions to the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee after the hearing on a complaint is concluded.

[(6)] (7) At the request of the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee, prepare and file complaints initiating presentment proceedings in the superior court, whether or not the alleged misconduct occurred in the actual presence of the court, and prosecute same.

[(7)] (8) At the request of a grievance panel made pursuant to Section 2-29, pursue the matter before the grievance panel on the issue of probable cause.

[(8)] (9) Investigate and prosecute complaints involving the violation by any person of General Statutes § 51-88.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of the changes to Section 2-35 which allow Disciplinary Counsel to add additional allegations of misconduct to grievance complaints.

Sec. 2-35. Action by Statewide Grievance Committee or Reviewing Committee

(a) Upon receipt of the record from a grievance panel, the statewide grievance committee may assign the case to a

reviewing committee which shall consist of at least three members of the statewide grievance committee, at least one third of whom are not attorneys. The statewide grievance committee may, in its discretion, reassign the case to a different reviewing committee. The committee shall regularly rotate membership on reviewing committees and assignments of complaints from the various grievance panels. An attorney who maintains an office for the practice of law in the same judicial district as the respondent may not sit on the reviewing committee for that case.

(b) The statewide grievance committee and the reviewing committee shall have the power to issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear before it to testify in relation to any matter deemed by the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee to be relevant to the complaint and to produce before it for examination any books or papers which, in its judgment, may be relevant to such complaint. Any such testimony shall be on the record.

(c) If the grievance panel determined that probable cause exists that the respondent is guilty of misconduct, the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee shall hold a hearing on the complaint. If the grievance panel determined that probable cause does not exist, but filed the matter with the statewide grievance committee because the complaint alleges that a crime has been committed, the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee shall review the determination of no probable cause, take evidence if it deems it appropriate and, if it determines that probable cause does exist, shall take the following action: (1) if the statewide grievance committee reviewed the grievance panel's determination, it shall hold a hearing concerning

the complaint or assign the matter to a reviewing committee to hold the hearing; or (2) if a reviewing committee reviewed the grievance panel's determination, it shall hold a hearing concerning the complaint or refer the matter to the statewide grievance committee which shall assign it to another reviewing committee to hold the hearing. [At least two of the same members of a reviewing committee shall be physically present at all hearings held by such reviewing committee. Unless waived by the disciplinary counsel and the respondent, the remaining member of the reviewing committee shall obtain and review the transcript of each such hearing and shall participate in the committee's determination. The review by the statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee of a grievance panel determination that probable cause exists shall not be limited to the grievance panel determination. The statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee may review the entire record and determine whether any allegation in the complaint, or any issue arising from the review of the record or arising during any hearing on the complaint, supports a finding of probable cause of misconduct. If either the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee determines that probable cause does exist, it shall issue a written notice which shall include but not be limited to the following: (i) a description of the factual allegation or allegations that were considered in rendering the determination; and (ii) for each such factual allegation, an identification of the specific provision or provisions of the applicable rules governing attorney conduct considered in rendering the determination. The statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee shall not make a probable cause determination based, in full or in part, on a claim

of misconduct not alleged in the complaint without first notifying the respondent that it is contemplating such action and affording the respondent the opportunity to be heard. All hearings following a determination of probable cause shall be public and on the record, except for contemplated probable cause hearings which shall be confidential unless the respondent requests that such hearing be public.]

(d) Disciplinary counsel may add additional allegations of misconduct to the grievance panel's determination that probable cause exists in the following circumstances:

(1) Prior to the hearing before the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee, disciplinary counsel may add additional allegations of misconduct arising from the record of the grievance complaint or its investigation of the complaint.

(2) Following commencement of the hearing before the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee, disciplinary counsel may only add additional allegations of misconduct for good cause shown and with the consent of the respondent and the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee. Additional allegations of misconduct may not be added after the hearing has concluded.

(e) If disciplinary counsel determines that additional allegations of misconduct exist, it shall issue a written notice to the respondent and the statewide grievance committee which shall include but not be limited to the following: (i) a description of the factual allegation or allegations that were considered in rendering the determination; and (ii) for each such factual allegation, an identification of the specific provision or provisions of the

applicable rules governing attorney conduct considering in rendering the determination.

(f) Respondent shall be entitled to a period of not less than 30 days before being required to appear at a hearing to defend against any additional charges of misconduct filed by the disciplinary counsel.

(g) At least two of the same members of a reviewing committee shall be physically present at all hearings held by the reviewing committee. Unless waived by the disciplinary counsel and the respondent, the remaining member of the reviewing committee shall obtain and review the transcript of each such hearing and shall participate in the committee's determination. All hearings following a determination of probable cause shall be public and on the record.

[(d)] (h) The complainant and respondent shall be entitled to be present at all hearings and other proceedings on the complaint at which testimony is given and to have counsel present. At all hearings, the respondent shall have the right to be heard in the respondent's own defense and by witnesses and counsel. The disciplinary counsel shall pursue the matter before the statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee. The disciplinary counsel and the respondent shall be entitled to examine or cross-examine witnesses. At the conclusion of the evidentiary phase of a hearing, the complainant, the disciplinary counsel and the respondent shall have the opportunity to make a statement, either individually or through counsel. The statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee may request oral argument.

[(e)] (i) Within ninety days of the date the grievance panel filed its determination with the statewide grievance committee pursuant to Section 2-32 (i), the reviewing committee shall render a final written decision dismissing the complaint, imposing sanctions and conditions as authorized by Section 2-37 or directing the disciplinary counsel to file a presentment against the respondent in the superior court and file it with the statewide grievance committee. Where there is a final decision dismissing the complaint, the reviewing committee may give notice in a written summary order to be followed by a full written decision. The reviewing committee's record in the case shall consist of a copy of all evidence it received or considered, including a transcript of any testimony heard by it, and its decision. The record shall also be sent to the statewide grievance committee. The reviewing committee shall forward a copy of the final decision to the complainant, the disciplinary counsel, the respondent, and the grievance panel to which the complaint was forwarded. The decision shall be a matter of public record if there was a determination by a grievance panel, a reviewing committee or the statewide grievance committee that there was probable cause that the respondent was guilty of misconduct. The reviewing committee may file a motion for extension of time not to exceed thirty days with the statewide grievance committee which shall grant the motion only upon a showing of good cause. If the reviewing committee does not complete its action on a complaint within the time provided in this section, the statewide grievance committee shall, on motion of the complainant or the respondent or on its own motion, inquire into the delay and determine the appropriate course of action. Enforcement of the final decision,

including the publication of the notice of a reprimand pursuant to Section 2-54, shall be stayed for thirty days from the date of the issuance to the parties of the final decision. In the event the respondent timely submits to the statewide grievance committee a request for review of the final decision of the reviewing committee, such stay shall remain in full force and effect pursuant to Section 2-38 (b).

[(f)] (j) If the reviewing committee finds probable cause to believe the respondent has violated the criminal law of this state, it shall report its findings to the chief state's attorney.

[(g)] (k) Within thirty days of the issuance to the parties of the final decision by the reviewing committee, the respondent may submit to the statewide grievance committee a request for review of the decision. Any request for review submitted under this section must specify the basis for the request including, but not limited to, a claim or claims that the reviewing committee's findings, inferences, conclusions or decision is or are: (1) in violation of constitutional, rules of practice or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the authority of the reviewing committee; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion and the specific basis for such claim or claims. For grievance complaints filed on or after January 1, 2004, the respondent shall serve a copy of the request for review on disciplinary counsel in accordance with Sections 10-12 through 10-17. Within fourteen days of the respondent's submission of a request for review, disciplinary counsel may file a response.

Disciplinary counsel shall serve a copy of the response on the respondent in accordance with Sections 10-12 through 10-17. No reply to the response shall be allowed.

[(h)] (l) If, after its review of a complaint pursuant to this section that was forwarded to the statewide grievance committee pursuant to Section 2-32 (i) (2), a reviewing committee agrees with a grievance panel's determination that probable cause does not exist that the attorney is guilty of misconduct and there has been no finding of probable cause by the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee, the reviewing committee shall have the authority to dismiss the complaint within the time period set forth in subsection (e) of this section without review by the statewide grievance committee. The reviewing committee shall file its decision dismissing the complaint with the statewide grievance committee along with the record of the matter and shall send a copy of the decision to the complainant, the respondent, and the grievance panel to which the complaint was assigned.

[(i)] (m) If the statewide grievance committee does not assign a complaint to a reviewing committee, it shall have one hundred and twenty days from the date the panel's determination was filed with it to render a decision dismissing the complaint, imposing sanctions and conditions as authorized by Section 2-37 or directing the disciplinary counsel to file a presentment against the respondent. The decision shall be a matter of public record. The failure of a reviewing committee to complete its action on a complaint within the period of time provided in this section shall not be cause for dismissal of the complaint. If the statewide grievance committee finds probable cause to believe that the

respondent has violated the criminal law of this state, it shall report its findings to the chief state's attorney.

COMMENTARY: The above changes allow Disciplinary Counsel to add additional allegations of misconduct to grievance complaints.

Sec. 2-37. Sanctions and Conditions Which May Be Imposed by Committees

(a) A reviewing committee or the statewide grievance committee may impose one or more of the following sanctions and conditions in accordance with the provisions of Sections 2-35 and 2-36:

- (1) reprimand;
- (2) restitution;
- (3) assessment of costs;
- (4) an order that the respondent return a client's file to the client;
- (5) a requirement that the respondent attend continuing legal education courses, at his or her own expense, regarding one or more areas of substantive law or law office management;
- (6) an order to submit to fee arbitration;
- (7) [with the respondent's consent,] in any grievance complaint where there has been a finding of a violation of Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct or Practice Book §2-27, an order to submit to periodic audits and supervision of the attorney's trust accounts to insure compliance with the provisions of Section 2-27 and the related Rules of Professional Conduct. Any alleged misconduct discovered as the result of such audit

shall be alleged in a separate grievance complaint filed pursuant to these rules;

(8) with the respondent's consent, a requirement that the respondent undertake treatment, at his or her own expense, for medical, psychological or psychiatric conditions or for problems of alcohol or substance abuse.

(b) In connection with subsection (a) (6), a party who refuses to utilize the no cost fee arbitration service provided by the Connecticut Bar Association shall pay the cost of the arbitration.

(c) Failure of the respondent to comply with any sanction or condition imposed by the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee may be grounds for presentment before the superior court.

COMMENTARY: This amendment eliminates the need for a respondent's consent before the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee can impose a sanction of an audit and supervision of a lawyer's trust accounts. The potential severity of harm to clients and the public arising from a lawyer's failure to properly maintain a clients' funds account demonstrates the need for the statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee to be able to impose this sanction unconditionally.

Sec. 2-52. Resignation and Waiver of Attorney Facing Disciplinary Investigation

(a) The superior court may, under the procedure provided herein, permit [the resignation of] an attorney to submit his or her resignation from the bar with or without the waiver of right to apply for readmission to the bar at any time in the future if the attorney's conduct [whose conduct] is the subject of an investigation or

proceeding by a grievance panel, a reviewing committee, [or] the statewide grievance committee, the disciplinary counsel or the court [or against whom a presentment for misconduct under Section 2-47 is pending].

(b) Concurrently with the written resignation, the attorney shall submit an affidavit stating the following:

1. that he or she desires to resign and that the resignation is knowingly and voluntarily submitted, the attorney is not being subjected to coercion or duress, and is fully aware of the consequences of submitting the resignation;

2. the attorney is aware that there is currently pending an investigation or proceeding concerning allegations that he or she has been guilty of misconduct, the nature of which shall be specifically set forth in the affidavit;

3. either (i) that the material facts of the allegations of misconduct are true, or (ii) if the attorney denies some or all of the material facts of the allegations of misconduct, that the attorney acknowledges that there is sufficient evidence to prove such material facts of the allegations of misconduct by clear and convincing evidence;

4. the attorney waives the right to a hearing on the merits of the allegations of misconduct, as provided by these rules, and acknowledges that the court will enter a finding that he or she has engaged in the misconduct specified in the affidavit concurrently with the acceptance of the resignation.

(c) If the written resignation is accompanied by a waiver of the right to apply for readmission to the bar, the affidavit required in (b) shall also state that the attorney desires to resign and waive

his or her right to apply for readmission to the bar at any time in the future.

[(b)] (d) Any [Such] resignation submitted in accordance with this section shall be in writing, signed by the attorney, and filed in sextuplicate with the clerk of the superior court in the judicial district in which the attorney resides, or if the attorney is not a resident of this state, [to] with the clerk of the superior court in Hartford. The clerk shall forthwith send one copy to the grievance panel, one copy to the statewide bar counsel, one copy to disciplinary counsel, one copy to the state's attorney, and one copy to the standing committee on recommendations for admission to the bar. Such resignation shall not become effective until accepted by the court after a hearing, at which the court has accepted [following] a report by the statewide grievance committee, [whether or not the attorney seeking to resign shall, in the resignation, waive the privilege of applying for readmission to the bar at any future time] made a finding of misconduct based upon the respondent's affidavit, and made a finding that the resignation is knowingly and voluntarily made.

(e) Acceptance by the court of an attorney's resignation from the bar without the waiver of right to apply for readmission to the bar at any time in the future shall not be a bar to any other disciplinary proceedings based on conduct occurring before or after the acceptance of the attorney's resignation.

COMMENTARY: The amendments require an attorney seeking to resign from the bar in the face of a disciplinary investigation or proceeding to submit an affidavit with the resignation that either admits to the alleged misconduct or denies the alleged misconduct but acknowledges that there is clear and

convincing evidence to prove the allegations. The amendments also require the court to make a finding of misconduct before it can accept the resignation. This amendment is necessary to assure that lawyers who resign and waive here in Connecticut will be subject to a finding of misconduct, which will be useful to disciplinary authorities in other jurisdictions where the attorney is admitted or may seek admission. Currently, some states do not consider a resignation and waiver without a finding of misconduct as the imposition of discipline. As a result, attorneys who have resigned and waived here in the face of allegations of very serious misconduct have been allowed to retain their licenses in other states, such as New York.

Sec. 2-53. Reinstatement after Suspension, Disbarment or Resignation

(a) No application for reinstatement or readmission shall be considered by the court unless the applicant, [inter alia] among other things, states under oath in the application that he or she has successfully fulfilled all conditions imposed on him or her as a part of the applicant's discipline. However, if an applicant asserts that a certain condition is impossible to fulfill, he or she may apply, stating that assertion and the basis therefor. It is the applicant's burden to prove at the hearing on reinstatement or readmission the impossibility of the certain condition. Any application for reinstatement or readmission to the bar shall contain a statement by the applicant indicating whether such applicant has previously applied for reinstatement or readmission and if so, when. The application shall be referred, by the court to which it is brought, to the standing committee on recommendations for admission to the bar that has jurisdiction over the judicial district court location in

which the applicant was suspended or disbarred or resigned, and notice of the pendency of such application shall be given to the state's attorney of that judicial district, the chair of the grievance panel whose jurisdiction includes that judicial district court location, the statewide grievance committee, the office of the chief disciplinary counsel, the attorney or attorneys appointed by the court pursuant to Section 2-64, and to all complainants whose complaints against the attorney resulted in the discipline for which the attorney was disbarred or suspended or resigned, and it shall also be published in the Connecticut Law Journal.

(b) The standing committee on recommendations shall investigate the application, hold hearings pertaining thereto and render a report with its recommendations to the court. It shall take all testimony at its hearings under oath and shall include in its report subordinate findings of facts and conclusions as well as its recommendation. The standing committee shall have a record made of its proceedings which shall include a copy of the application for reinstatement or readmission, a transcript of its hearings thereon, any exhibits received by the committee, any other documents considered by the committee in making its recommendations, and copies of all notices provided by the committee in accordance with this section.

(c) The court shall thereupon inform the chief justice of the supreme court of the pending application and report, and the chief justice shall designate two other judges of the superior court to sit with the judge presiding at the session. Such three judges, or a majority of them, shall determine whether the application should be granted.

(d) The standing committee shall notify the presiding judge, no later than fourteen days prior to the court hearing, if the committee will not be represented by counsel at the hearing and, upon such notification, the presiding judge may appoint, in his or her discretion, an attorney to review the issue of reinstatement and report his or her findings to the court. The attorney so appointed shall be compensated in accordance with a fee schedule approved by the executive committee of the superior court.

(e) The applicant shall pay to the [clerk of the superior court] bar examining committee \$200 and shall submit proof of such payment to the clerk of the superior court at the time [his or her] the application is filed with the court. This sum shall be expended in the manner provided by Section 2-22 of these rules. If the petition for readmission or reinstatement is denied, the reasons therefor shall be stated on the record or put in writing. The attorney may not reapply for six months following the denial.

(f) An attorney who has been suspended from the practice of law in this state for a period of one year or more shall be required to apply for reinstatement in accordance with this section, unless the court that imposed the discipline specifically provided in its order that such application is not required. An attorney who has been suspended for less than one year need not file an application for reinstatement, unless otherwise ordered by the court at the time the discipline was imposed.

(g) In no event shall an application for reinstatement by an attorney disbarred pursuant to the provisions of Section 2-47A be considered until after twelve years from the date of the order disbarring the attorney. No such application may be granted

unless the attorney provides satisfactory evidence that full restitution has been made of all sums found to be knowingly misappropriated.

COMMENTARY: The revisions to this rule require that notice of the pendency of an application for reinstatement or readmission be given to the office of the chief disciplinary counsel in addition to the various other entities and individuals listed. The revisions also streamline the process for payment of the fee for such application. Currently, the applicant must pay the fee to the clerk of the superior court at the time the application is filed with the court. The clerk collects the fee and forwards it to the bar examining committee. Under the rule as revised, the fee would be paid directly to the bar examining committee by the applicant, a receipt for such fee would be issued to the applicant by the bar examining committee and the applicant would submit the receipt along with the application to the clerk of the court when the application is filed.

Sec. 2-70. —Client Security Fund Fee

(a) The judges of the superior court shall assess an annual fee in an amount adequate for the proper payment of claims and the provision of crisis intervention and referral assistance under these rules and the costs of administering the client security fund. Such fee, which [the judges of the superior court have set at \$110] shall be \$75.00, shall be paid by each attorney admitted to the practice of law in this state and each judge, judge trial referee, state referee, family support magistrate, family support referee and workers' compensation commissioner in this state. Notwithstanding the above, an attorney who is disbarred, retired, resigned, or serving on active duty with the armed forces of the

United States for more than six months in such year shall be exempt from payment of the fee, and an attorney who does not engage in the practice of law as an occupation and receives less than \$450 in legal fees or other compensation for services involving the practice of law during the calendar year shall be obligated to pay one-half of such fee. No attorney who is disbarred, retired or resigned shall be reinstated pursuant to Sections 2-53 or 2-55 until such time as the attorney has paid the fee due for the year in which the attorney retired, resigned or was disbarred.

(b) An attorney or family support referee who fails to pay the client security fund fee in accordance with this section shall be administratively suspended from the practice of law in this state pursuant to Section 2-79 of these rules until such payment, along with a reinstatement fee of \$75.00, has been made. An attorney or family support referee who is under suspension for another reason at the time he or she fails to pay the fee, shall be the subject of an additional suspension which shall continue until the fee and reinstatement fee [is] are paid.

(c) A judge, judge trial referee, state referee, family support magistrate or workers' compensation commissioner who fails to pay the client security fund fee in accordance with this section shall be referred to the judicial review council.

COMMENTARY: The above change would reduce the Client Security Fund fee to \$75.00 and require that an additional \$75.00 fee be paid by an attorney who was administratively suspended pursuant to Section 2-79 (a) before the attorney may be reinstated.

Sec. 2-79. —Enforcement of Payment of Fee

(a) The client security fund committee shall send a notice to each attorney who has not paid the client security fund fee pursuant to Section 2-70 of these rules that the attorney's license to practice law in this state may be administratively suspended unless within sixty days from the date of such notice the client security fund committee receives from such attorney proof that he or she has either paid the fee or is exempt from such payment. If the client security fund committee does not receive such proof within the time required, it shall cause a second notice to be sent to the attorney advising the attorney that he or she will be referred to the superior court for an administrative suspension of the attorney's license to practice law in this state unless within thirty days from the date of the notice proof of the payment of the fee or exemption is received. The client security fund committee shall submit to the clerk of the superior court for the Hartford Judicial District a list of attorneys who did not provide proof of payment or exemption within thirty days after the date of the second notice. Upon order of the court, the attorneys so listed and referred to the clerk shall be deemed administratively suspended from the practice of law in this state until such time as payment of the fee and the reinstatement fee assessed pursuant to Section 2-70 is made, which suspension shall be effective upon publication of the list in the Connecticut Law Journal. An administrative suspension of an attorney for failure to pay the client security fund fee shall not be considered discipline, but an attorney who is placed on administrative suspension for such failure shall be ineligible to practice law as an attorney admitted to practice in this state, and shall not be considered in good standing pursuant to Section 2-65

of these rules until such time as the fee and reinstatement fee [is] are paid. An attorney aggrieved by an order placing the attorney on administrative suspension for failing to pay the client security fund fee may make an application to the superior court to have the order vacated, by filing the application with the superior court for the Hartford Judicial District within thirty days of the date that the order is published, and mailing a copy of the same by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the office of the client security fund committee. The application shall set forth the reasons why the application should be granted. The court shall schedule a hearing on the application, which shall be limited to whether good cause exists to vacate the suspension order.

(b) If a judge, judge trial referee, state referee, family support magistrate or workers' compensation commissioner has not paid the client security fund fee, the office of the chief court administrator shall send a notice to such person that he or she will be referred to the judicial review council unless within sixty days from the date of such notice the office of the chief court administrator receives from such person proof that he or she has either paid the fee or is exempt from such payment. If the office of the chief court administrator does not receive such proof within the time required, it shall refer such person to the judicial review council.

(c) Family support referees shall be subject to the provisions of subsection (a) herein until such time as they come within the jurisdiction of the judicial review council, when they will be subject to the provisions of subsection (b).

(d) The notices required by this section shall be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested or with electronic delivery

confirmation to the last address registered by the attorney pursuant to Section 2-26 and Section 2-27 (d), and to the home address of the judge, judge trial referee, state referee, family support magistrate, family support referee or workers' compensation commissioner.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made in light of the proposed revisions to Section 2-70.

Sec. 3-4. Filing Appearance

Appearances shall be filed with the clerk of the court location where the matter is pending.

(a) Whenever an appearance is filed in any civil or family action, including appearances filed in addition to or in place of another appearance, a copy shall be mailed or delivered to all counsel and self-represented parties of record.

(b) Whenever an appearance is filed in summary process actions, including appearances filed in addition to or in place of another appearance, the attorney for the defendant, or, if there is no such attorney, the defendant himself or herself, shall mail or deliver a copy of the appearance to the attorney for the plaintiff, or if there is no such attorney, to the plaintiff himself or herself.

(c) Whenever an appearance is filed in delinquency, family with service needs or youth in crisis proceedings, including appearances filed in addition to or in place of another appearance, the attorney or guardian ad litem for the respondent, or for any other interested party, shall mail or deliver a copy of [their] the appearance to the prosecutorial official and all other counsel and self-represented parties of record; in child protection proceedings, the attorney or guardian ad litem for the child, respondent, or any

other interested party, shall mail or deliver a copy of [their] the appearance to the attorney for the petitioner and to all other counsel and self-represented parties of record.

(d) Whenever an appearance is filed in criminal cases, including appearances filed in addition to or in place of another appearance, the attorney for the defendant shall mail or deliver a copy of the appearance to the prosecuting authority.

COMMENTARY: The above changes are made for clarity.

Sec. 3-8. Appearance for Represented Party

Whenever an attorney files an appearance for a party, or the party files an appearance for himself or herself, and there is already an appearance of an attorney or party on file for that party, the attorney or party filing the new appearance shall state thereon whether such appearance is in place of or in addition to the appearance or appearances already on file. [If the new appearance is stated to be in place of any appearance or appearances on file, the party or attorney filing that new appearance shall serve, in accordance with Sections 10-12 through 10-17, a copy of that new appearance on any attorney or party whose appearance is to be replaced by the new appearance. Unless a written objection is filed within ten days after the filing of an in-lieu-of appearance, the appearance or appearances to be replaced by the new appearance shall be deemed to have been withdrawn and the clerk shall make appropriate entries for such purpose on the file and docket.] The provisions of this section regarding parties filing appearances for themselves do[es] not apply to criminal cases.

COMMENTARY: This revision eliminates the ten day limit for a party or attorney to file an objection to being replaced when a new appearance is filed. A party or attorney should not be limited to only ten days to file an objection. The requirement to serve a copy of the new appearance on the party or attorney being replaced has been removed from this section because it has been added to Section 3-4.

Sec. 3-9. Withdrawal of Appearance; Duration of Appearance

(a) An attorney or party whose appearance has been filed shall be deemed to have withdrawn such appearance upon failure to file a written objection within ten days after written notice has been given or mailed to such attorney or party that a new appearance has been filed in place of the appearance of such attorney or party in accordance with Section 3-8. An attorney or party whose appearance is deemed to have been withdrawn may file an appearance for the limited purpose of filing an objection to the in-lieu-of appearance.

(b) An attorney may withdraw his or her appearance for a party or parties in any action after the appearance of other counsel representing the same party or parties has been entered. An application for withdrawal in accordance with this subsection shall state that such an appearance has been entered and that such party or parties are being represented by such other counsel at the time of the application. Such an application may be granted by the clerk as of course, if such an appearance by other counsel has been entered.

(c) All appearances of counsel shall be deemed to have been withdrawn 180 days after the entry of judgment in any action

seeking a dissolution of marriage or civil union, annulment, or legal separation, provided no appeal shall have been taken. In the event of an appeal or the filing of a motion to open a judgment within such 180 days, all appearances of counsel shall be deemed to have been withdrawn after final judgment on such appeal or motion or within 180 days after the entry of the original judgment, whichever is later. Nothing herein shall preclude or prevent any attorney from filing a motion to withdraw with leave of the court during that period subsequent to the entry of judgment. In the absence of a specific withdrawal, counsel will continue of record for all postjudgment purposes until 180 days have elapsed from the entry of judgment or, in the event an appeal or a motion to open a judgment is filed within such 180 day period, until final judgment on that appeal or determination of that motion, whichever is later.

(d) Except as provided in subsections (a), (b) and (c), no attorney shall withdraw his or her appearance after it has been entered upon the record of the court without the leave of the court.

(e) All appearances in juvenile matters shall be deemed to continue during the period of delinquency probation, family with service needs supervision, or any commitment to the commissioner of the department of children and families or protective supervision. An attorney appointed by the chief public defender to represent a parent in a pending neglect or uncared for proceeding shall continue to represent the parent for any subsequent petition to terminate parental rights if the parent appears at the first hearing on the termination petition and qualifies for appointed counsel, unless the attorney files a motion to withdraw pursuant to Section 3-10 that is granted by the judicial

authority or the parent requests a new attorney. The attorney shall represent the client in connection with appeals, subject to Section 35a-20, and with motions for review of permanency plans, revocations or postjudgment motions and shall have access to any documents filed in court. The attorney for the child shall continue to represent the child in all proceedings relating to the child, including termination of parental rights and during the period until final adoption following termination of parental rights.

COMMENTARY: The above changes are made to be consistent with the change in Section 3-8 that eliminates the ten day limit for a party or attorney to file an objection to being replaced by an in lieu of appearance.

Sec. 4-7. Personal Identifying Information to Be Omitted or Redacted from Court Records in Civil and Family Matters

(a) As used in this section, "personal identifying information" means: an individual's date of birth; mother's maiden name; motor vehicle operator's license number; Social Security number; other government issued identification number except for juris, license, permit or other business-related identification numbers that are otherwise made available to the public directly by any government agency or entity; health insurance identification number; or any financial account number, security code or personal identification number (PIN). For purposes of this section, a person's name is specifically excluded from this definition of personal identifying information.

(b) Persons who file documents with the court shall not include personal identifying information, and if any such personal identifying information is present, shall redact it from any

documents filed with the court, whether filed in electronic or paper format, unless otherwise required by law or ordered by the court. The party filing the redacted documents shall retain the original unredacted documents throughout the pendency of the action, any appeal period, and any applicable appellate process.

(c) The responsibility for omitting or redacting personal identifying information rests solely with the person filing the document. The court or the clerk of the court need not review any filed document for compliance with this rule.

COMMENTARY: The above change makes clear that the unredacted original of a redacted document filed with the court must be retained by the filer in case the redacted information becomes an issue.

Sec. 6-3. —Preparation; When; By Whom; Filing

(a) Judgment files in civil, criminal, family and juvenile cases shall be prepared when: (1) an appeal is taken; (2) a party requests in writing that the judgment be incorporated into a judgment file; (3) a judgment has been entered involving the granting of a dissolution of marriage or civil union, a legal separation, an annulment, injunctive relief, or title to property (including actions to quiet title but excluding actions of foreclosure), except in those instances where judgment is entered in such cases pursuant to Section 14-3 and no appeal has been taken from the judicial authority's judgment; (4) a judgment has been entered in a juvenile matter involving allegations that a child has been neglected, abused, or uncared for, [dependent,] or involving termination of parental rights, commitment of a delinquent child or commitment of a child from a family with

service needs; (5) in criminal cases, sentence review is requested; or (6) ordered by the judicial authority.

(b) Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority, the judgment file in juvenile cases shall be prepared by the clerk and in all other cases, in the clerk's discretion, by counsel or the clerk. As to judgments of foreclosure, the clerk's office shall prepare a certificate of judgment in accordance with a form prescribed by the chief court administrator only when requested in the event of a redemption.

(c) Judgment files in family cases shall be filed within sixty days of judgment.

COMMENTARY: The revisions to the chapter heading for Chapters 32a, 34a and 35a, and the revisions to Sections 6-3, 26-1, 32a-1, 33a-2, 35a-1 and 35a-3 are consistent with the changes made to the General Statutes affected by Section 2 of Public Act 11-240 concerning juvenile matters.

Sec. 7-11. —Judgments on the Merits—Stripping and Retention

(a) With the exception of actions which affect the title to land and actions which have been disposed of pursuant to Section 7-10, the files in civil, family and juvenile actions in which judgment has been rendered may be stripped and destroyed pursuant to the schedule set forth in subsection (d) below, except that requests relating to discovery, responses and objections thereto may be stripped after the expiration of the appeal period.

(b) When a file is to be stripped, all papers in the file shall be destroyed except:

(1) The complaint, including any amendment thereto, substituted complaint or amended complaint;

- (2) All orders of notice, appearances and officers' returns;
- (3) All military or other affidavits;
- (4) Any cross complaint, third-party complaint, or amendment thereto;
- (5) All responsive pleadings;
- (6) Any memorandum of decision;
- (7) The judgment file or notation of the entry of judgment, and all modifications of judgment;
- (8) All executions issued and returned.

(c) Upon the expiration of the stripping date, or at any time if facilities are not available for local retention, the file in any action set forth in subsection (d) may be transferred to the records center or other proper designated storage area, where it shall be retained for the balance of the retention period. Files in actions concerning dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation, or annulment may, upon agreement with officials of the state library, be transferred to the state library at the expiration of their retention period.

(d) The following is a schedule which sets forth when a file may be stripped and the length of time the file shall be retained. The time periods indicated below shall run from the date judgment is rendered except receivership actions or actions for injunctive relief which shall run from the date of the termination of the receivership or injunction.

	Type of Case	Stripping Date	Retention Date
(1)	Administrative appeals		3 years
(2)	Contracts (where money damages are not awarded)	1 year	20 years

(3)	Eminent domain (except as provided in Section 7-12)		10 years
(4)	Family		
	-Dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation, annulment and change of name	5 years	75 years
	-Delinquency		Until subject is 25 years of age
	-Family with service needs		Until subject is 25 years of age
	-Termination of parental rights		Permanent
	-Neglect and uncared for		75 years
	-Emancipation of minor		5 years
	-Orders in relief from physical abuse (General Statutes § 46b-15)		5 years
	-Other		75 years
(5)	Family support magistrate matters		75 years
	-Uniform reciprocal enforcement of support (General Statutes §§ 46b-180 through 46b- 211)		6 years after youngest child reaches majority age or after activity ceases, whichever is shorter, subject to federal law on filing an amended tax

			return
	-Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (General Statutes §§ 46b-212 through [46b-213v] 46b-213w)		6 years after youngest child reaches majority age or after activity ceases, whichever is shorter, subject to federal law on filing an amended tax return
(6)	Landlord/Tenant		
	-Summary process		3 years
	-Housing code enforcement (General Statutes § 47a-14h)		5 years
	-Contracts/Leases (where money damages are not awarded)	1 year	20 years
	-Money damages (except where a satisfaction of judgment has been filed)	1 year	26 years
(7)	Miscellaneous		
	-Bar discipline		50 years
	-Money damages (except where a satisfaction of judgment has been filed)	1 year	26 years
	-Mandamus, habeas corpus, arbitration, petition for new trial, action for an		10 years

	accounting, interpleader		
	-Injunctive relief (where no other relief is requested)		5 years
(8)	Property (except as provided in Section 7- 12)	5 years	26 years
(9)	Receivership		10 years
(10)	Small Claims		15 years
(11)	Torts (except as noted below)	1 year	26 years
	-Money damages if the judgment was rendered in an action to recover damages for personal injury caused by sexual assault where the party at fault was convicted under General Statutes § 53a-70 or § 53a-70a (except where a satisfaction of judgment has been filed)		Permanent
(12)	Wills and estates		10 years
(13)	Asset forfeiture (General Statutes § 54- 36h)		10 years
(14)	Alcohol and drug commitment (General Statutes § 17a-685)		10 years
(15)	All other civil actions (except as provided in		75 years

COMMENTARY: The change to this section corrects the statutory citation to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA).

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CIVIL RULES

Sec. 10-13. —Method of Service

Service upon the attorney or upon a self-represented party, except service pursuant to Section 10-12 (c), may be by delivering a copy or by mailing it to the last known address of the attorney or party. Delivery of a copy within this section means handing it to the attorney or to the party; or leaving it at the attorney's office with a person in charge thereof; or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the usual place of abode. Delivery of a copy within this rule may also mean electronic delivery to the last known electronic address of the attorney or party, provided that electronic delivery was consented to in writing by the person served. An attorney or self-represented party who files a document electronically with the court must serve it electronically on any attorney or self-represented party who consented in writing to electronic delivery under this section. Service by mail is complete upon mailing. Service by electronic delivery is complete upon sending the electronic notice unless the party making service learns that the attempted service did not reach the electronic address of the person to be served. Service pursuant to Section 10-12 (c) shall be made in the same manner as an original writ and complaint is served or as ordered by the judicial authority.

COMMENTARY: Under this revision, attorneys and parties that have consented to accept delivery electronically must be served by electronic means whenever an attorney or party files a document with the court electronically. This change is intended to address the situation where a document is electronically filed with the court, but delivered by mail to the opposing party, which may result in the opposing party receiving the document much later than it was received by the court.

Sec. 10-29. Exhibits as Part of Pleading

(a) Any plaintiff, except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) in connection with a plaintiff in the housing division as defined in Section 1-7, desiring to make a copy of any document a part of the complaint [may, without reciting it or annexing it,] shall refer to it as Exhibit A, B, C, etc., as fully as if it had been set out at length; but in such case the plaintiff shall serve a copy of such exhibit or exhibits on each other party to the action forthwith upon receipt of notice of the appearance of such party and file the original or a copy of such exhibit or exhibits in court with proof of service on each appearing party]. No later than the return date, the plaintiff shall file the original or a copy of such exhibit or exhibits in court. The plaintiff shall serve a copy of such exhibit or exhibits on each party no later than ten days after receipt of notice of the appearance of such party, in the manner provided in Sections 10-12 through 10-17, and shall file proof of service on each appearing party with the court. [Where such copy or copies exceed in all two pages in length, if the plaintiff annexes them to, or incorporates them in, the complaint at full length,] Except as required by statute, the plaintiff shall not annex the document or documents referred to as exhibits to the complaint, or

incorporate them in the complaint, at full length, and if the plaintiff does so the plaintiff shall not be allowed in costs for such part of the fees of the officer for copies of such complaint left in service, as are chargeable for copying such [instrument or instruments,] document or documents referred to as exhibits [except to the extent of two pages].

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall apply to a plaintiff in the housing division, as defined in Section 1-7, desiring to make a copy of any document a part of the complaint, except that the plaintiff shall serve on each party who has appeared a copy of such exhibit or exhibits at the first court session of the matter or no later than seven days after receipt of notice of the appearance of such party, whichever is earlier.

[(b)] (c) When either the plaintiff or the defendant in any pleading subsequent to the complaint desires to make a copy of any document a part of his or her pleading, such party may, without reciting it therein, either annex it thereto, or refer to it therein, and shall serve it and file it in court with proof of service in the manner provided in Sections 10-12 through 10-17.

COMMENTARY: The purpose of the above changes is to clarify that documents may be referred to as exhibits in a complaint but should not be attached to the complaint or incorporated in it, but rather filed separately by the plaintiff and served on each appearing defendant in the same manner as the service of any other document subsequent to the service of the original complaint. A provision is added to require the exhibits to be filed with the court by no later than the return date so that the public record is complete. The provisions of this section do not apply to certificates of good faith required by Section 52-190a of

the General Statutes which must be attached to the complaint or to any other documents required by statute to be attached to the complaint.

Sec. 11-1. Form of Motion and Request

Every motion, request, application or objection directed to pleading or procedure, unless relating to procedure in the course of a trial, shall be in writing. A motion to extend time to plead, ~~respond to written discovery, object to written discovery, or~~ respond to requests for admissions shall state the date through which the moving party is seeking the extension.

(a) For civil matters, with the exception of housing, family and small claims matters, when any motion, application or objection is filed either electronically or on paper, no order page should be filed unless an order of notice and citation is necessary.

(b) For family, juvenile, housing and small claims matters, when any motion, application or objection is filed in paper format, an order shall be annexed to the filing until such cases are incorporated into the Judicial Branch's electronic filing system. Once these case types are incorporated into such electronic filing system, no order page should be filed unless an order of notice and citation is necessary.

(c) Whether filed under subsection (a) or (b), such motion, request, application or objection shall be served on all parties as provided in Sections 10-12 through 10-17 and, when filed, the fact of such service shall be endorsed thereon.

COMMENTARY: The above change is made for clarity.

Sec. 13-4. —Experts

(a) A party shall disclose each person who may be called by that party to testify as an expert witness at trial, and all documents that may be offered in evidence in lieu of such expert testimony, in accordance with this section. The requirements of Section 13-15 shall apply to disclosures made under this section.

(b) A party shall file with the court and serve upon counsel a disclosure of expert witnesses which identifies the name, address and employer of each person who may be called by that party to testify as an expert witness at trial, whether through live testimony or by deposition. In addition, the disclosure shall include the following information:

(1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, the field of expertise and the subject matter on which the witness is expected to offer expert testimony; the expert opinions to which the witness is expected to testify; and the substance of the grounds for each such expert opinion. Disclosure of the information required under this subsection may be made by making reference in the disclosure to, and contemporaneously producing to all parties, a written report of the expert witness containing such information. The parties shall not file the expert's written report with the court.

(2) If the witness to be disclosed hereunder is a health care provider who rendered care or treatment to the plaintiff, and the opinions to be offered hereunder are based upon that provider's care or treatment, then the disclosure obligations under this section may be satisfied by disclosure to the parties of the medical records and reports of such care or treatment. A witness disclosed under this subsection shall be permitted to offer expert opinion

testimony at trial as to any opinion as to which fair notice is given in the disclosed medical records or reports. Expert testimony regarding any opinion as to which fair notice is not given in the disclosed medical records or reports must be disclosed in accordance with subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of this section. The parties shall not file the disclosed medical records or disclosed medical reports with the court.

(3) Except for an expert witness who is a health care provider who rendered care or treatment to the plaintiff, or unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority or agreed upon by the parties, the party disclosing an expert witness shall, upon the request of an opposing party, produce to all other parties all materials obtained, created and/ or relied upon by the expert in connection with his or her opinions in the case within fourteen days prior to that expert's deposition or within such other time frame determined in accordance with the Schedule for Expert Discovery prepared pursuant to subsection (g) of this section. If any such materials have already been produced to the other parties in the case, then a list of such materials, made with sufficient particularity that the materials can be easily identified by the parties, shall satisfy the production requirement hereunder with respect to those materials. If an expert witness otherwise subject to this subsection is not being compensated in that capacity by or on behalf of the disclosing party, then that party may give written notice of that fact in satisfaction of the obligations imposed by this subsection. If such notice is provided, then it shall be the duty of the party seeking to depose such expert witness to obtain the production of the requested materials by subpoena or other lawful means.

(4) Nothing in this section shall prohibit any witness disclosed hereunder from offering nonexpert testimony at trial.

(c) (1) Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority upon motion, a party may take the deposition of any expert witness disclosed pursuant to subsection (b) of this section in the manner prescribed in Section 13-26 et seq. governing deposition procedure generally. Nothing contained in subsection (b) of this section shall impair the right of any party from exercising that party's rights under the rules of practice to subpoena or to request production of any materials, to the extent otherwise discoverable, in addition to those produced under subsection (b) of this section, in connection with the deposition of any expert witness, nor shall anything contained herein impair the right of a party to raise any objections to any request for production of documents sought hereunder to the extent that a claim of privilege exists.

(2) Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority for good cause shown, or agreed upon by the parties, the fees and expenses of the expert witness for any such deposition, excluding preparation time, shall be paid by the party or parties taking the deposition. Unless otherwise ordered, the fees and expenses hereunder shall include only (A) a reasonable fee for the time of the witness to attend the deposition itself and the witness' travel time to and from the place of deposition; and (B) the reasonable expenses actually incurred for travel to and from the place of deposition and lodging, if necessary. If the parties are unable to agree on the fees and expenses due under this subsection, the amount shall be set by the judicial authority, upon motion.

(d) (1) A party shall file with the court a list of all documents or records that the party expects to submit in evidence pursuant to

any statute or rule permitting admissibility of documentary evidence in lieu of the live testimony of an expert witness. The list filed hereunder shall identify such documents or records with sufficient particularity that they shall be easily identified by the other parties. The parties shall not file with the court a copy of the documents or records on such list.

(2) Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority upon motion, a party may take the deposition of any expert witness ~~whose records are disclosed pursuant to subdivision (1) of~~ subsection (d) of this section in the manner prescribed in Section 13-26 et seq. governing deposition procedure generally. Nothing contained in subsection (d) of this section shall impair the right of any party from exercising that party's rights under the rules of practice to subpoena or to request production of any materials, to the extent otherwise discoverable, in addition to those produced under subsection (d), in connection with the deposition of any expert witness.

(3) Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority for good cause shown, or agreed upon by the parties, the fees and expenses of the expert witness for any such deposition, excluding preparation time, shall be paid by the party or parties taking the deposition. Unless otherwise ordered, the fees and expenses hereunder shall include only (A) a reasonable fee for the time of the witness to attend the deposition itself and the witness' travel time to and from the place of deposition; and (B) the reasonable expenses actually incurred for travel to and from the place of deposition and lodging, if necessary. If the parties are unable to agree on the fees and expenses due under this subsection, the amount shall be set by the judicial authority, upon motion.

(e) If any party expects to call as an expert witness at trial any person previously disclosed by any other party under subsection (b) hereof, the newly disclosing party shall file a notice of disclosure: (1) stating that the party adopts all or a specified part of the expert disclosure already on file; and (2) disclosing any other expert opinions to which the witness is expected to testify and the substance of the grounds for any such expert opinion. Such notice shall be filed within the time parameters set forth in subsection (g).

(f) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who had been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial only as provided in Section 13-11 or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.

(g) Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority, or otherwise agreed by the parties, the following schedule shall govern the expert discovery required under subsections (b), (c), (d) and (e) of this section.

(1) Within 120 days after the return date of any civil action, or at such other time as the parties may agree or as the court may order, the parties shall submit to the court for its approval a proposed Schedule for Expert Discovery which, upon approval by the court, shall govern the timing of expert discovery in the case. This schedule shall be submitted on a "Schedule for Expert Discovery" form prescribed by the office of the chief court administrator. The deadlines proposed by the parties shall be realistic and reasonable, taking into account the nature and

relative complexity of the case, the need for predicate discovery and the estimated time until the case may be exposed for trial. If the parties are unable to agree on discovery deadlines, they shall so indicate on the proposed Schedule for Expert Discovery, in which event the court shall convene a scheduling conference to set those deadlines.

(2) If a party is added or appears in a case after the proposed Schedule for Expert Discovery is filed, then an amended ~~proposed Schedule for Expert Discovery shall be prepared and~~ filed for approval by the court within sixty days after such new party appears, or at such other time as the court may order.

(3) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, disclosure of any expert witness under subsection (e) hereof shall be made within thirty days of the event giving rise to the need for that party to adopt the expert disclosure as its own (e.g., the withdrawal or dismissal of the party originally disclosing the expert).

(4) The parties, by agreement, may modify the approved Schedule for Expert Discovery or any other time limitation under this section so long as the modifications do not interfere with an assigned trial date. A party who wishes to modify the approved Schedule for Expert Discovery or other time limitation under this section without agreement of the parties may file a motion for modification with the court stating the reasons therefor. Said motion shall be granted if (i) the requested modification will not cause undue prejudice to any other party; (ii) the requested modification will not cause undue interference with the trial schedule in the case; and (iii) the need for the requested modification was not caused by bad faith delay of disclosure by the party seeking modification.

(h) A judicial authority may, after a hearing, impose sanctions on a party for failure to comply with the requirements of this section. An order precluding the testimony of an expert witness may be entered only upon a finding that (1) the sanction of preclusion, including any consequence thereof on the sanctioned party's ability to prosecute or to defend the case, is proportional to the noncompliance at issue, and (2) the noncompliance at issue cannot adequately be addressed by a less severe sanction or combination of sanctions.

(i) The revisions to this rule adopted by the judges of the superior court in June, 2008, effective on January 1, 2009, and the revisions to this rule adopted by the judges of the superior court in June, 2009, and March, 2010, shall apply to cases commenced on or after January 1, 2009. The version of this rule in effect on December 31, 2008, shall apply to cases commenced on or before that date.

COMMENTARY: The above revision makes clear that experts' written reports, including medical reports and reports involving trade secrets, for example, are not to be attached to the experts' disclosure.

Sec. 17-14A. —Alleged Negligence of Health Care Provider

In the case of any action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death, whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, an offer of compromise pursuant to Section 17-14 [shall state with specificity all damages then known to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney upon which the action is based] may be filed not earlier than three

hundred sixty-five days after service of process is made upon the defendant in such action and, if the offer of compromise is not accepted within sixty days and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court, the offer of compromise shall be considered rejected and not subject to acceptance unless refiled. [At least sixty days prior to filing such an offer, the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney shall provide the defendant or the defendant's attorney with an authorization to disclose medical records that meets the privacy provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-191) (HIPAA), as amended from time to time, or regulations adopted thereunder, and disclose any and all expert witnesses who will testify as to the prevailing professional standard of care. The plaintiff shall file with the court a certification that the plaintiff has provided each defendant or such defendant's attorney with all documentation supporting such damages.]

COMMENTARY: The revision to this section is based on 2011 Public Act number 11-77 which amended C.G.S. § 52-192a in a similar fashion.

Sec. 17-20. Motion for Default and Nonsuit for Failure to Appear

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), if no appearance has been entered for any party to any action on or before the second day following the return day, any other party to the action may make a motion that a nonsuit or default be entered for failure to appear.

(b) In an action commenced by a mortgagee prior to July 1, [2012] 2014, for the foreclosure of (i) a mortgage on residential real property consisting of a one to four-family dwelling occupied

as the primary residence of the mortgagor, with a return date on or after July 1, 2008, or (ii) a mortgage on real property owned by a religious organization with a return date during the period from October 1, 2011, to June 30, 2014, inclusive. if no appearance has been entered for the mortgagor on or before the fifteenth day after the return day or, if the court has extended the time for filing an appearance and no appearance has been entered on or before the date ordered by the court, any other party to the action may make a motion that a default be entered for failure to appear.

(c) It shall be the responsibility of counsel filing a motion for default for failure to appear to serve the defaulting party with a copy of the motion. Service and proof thereof may be made in accordance with Sections 10-12, 10-13 and 10-14. Upon good cause shown, the judicial authority may dispense with this requirement when judgment is rendered.

(d) Except as provided in Sections 17-23 through 17-30, motions for default for failure to appear shall be acted on by the clerk not less than seven days from the filing of the motion and shall not be printed on the short calendar. The motion shall be granted by the clerk if the party who is the subject of the motion has not filed an appearance. The provisions of Section 17-21 shall not apply to such motions, but such provisions shall be complied with before a judgment may be entered after default. If the defaulted party files an appearance in the action prior to the entry of judgment after default, the default shall automatically be set aside by operation of law. A claim for a hearing in damages shall not be filed before the expiration of fifteen days from the entry of a default under this subsection, except as provided in Sections 17-23 through 17-30.

(e) A motion for nonsuit for failure to appear shall be placed on the short calendar. If it is proper to grant the motion, the judicial authority shall grant it without the need for the moving party to appear at the short calendar.

(f) The granting of a motion for nonsuit for failure to appear or a motion for judgment after default for failure to appear shall be subject to the provisions of Sections 9-1 and 17-21. Such motion shall contain either (1) a statement that a military affidavit is attached thereto or (2) a statement, with reasons therefore, that it is not necessary to attach a military affidavit to the motion.

COMMENTARY: The amendment to subsection (b) reflects the extension of the foreclosure mediation program by P.A. 11-201.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FAMILY RULES

Sec. 25-60A. Court-Ordered Private Evaluations

(a) If the court orders [an] a private evaluation of any party or any child in a family proceeding where custody, visitation or parental access is at issue, a state licensed mental health professional shall conduct such evaluation.

(b) Notice of any orders relating to the evaluation ordered shall be communicated to the evaluator by the guardian ad litem or, where there is no guardian ad litem, by court personnel.

(c) Until a court-ordered evaluation is filed with the clerk pursuant to Section 25-60 (b), counsel for the parties shall not initiate contact with the evaluator, unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority.

(d) The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of Section 25-60 shall apply to completed private court-ordered evaluations.

COMMENTARY: This section clarifies that the judicial authority oversees the initiation and completion of court-ordered private evaluations and further clarifies the evaluation procedure.

**PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FAMILY SUPPORT
MAGISTRATE RULES**

Sec. 25a-3. Withdrawal of Appearance; Duration of Appearance

(a) An attorney or party whose appearance has been filed shall be deemed to have withdrawn such appearance upon failure to file a written objection within ten days after written notice has been given or mailed to such attorney or party that a new appearance has been filed in place of the appearance of such attorney or party in accordance with Section 3-8.

(b) An attorney may withdraw his or her appearance for a party or parties in any action after the appearance of other counsel representing the same party or parties has been entered. An application for withdrawal in accordance with this subsection shall state that such an appearance has been entered and that such party or parties are being represented by such other counsel at the time of the application. Such an application may be granted by the clerk as of course, if such an appearance by other counsel has been entered.

(c) All appearances of counsel shall be deemed to have been withdrawn 180 days after the entry of judgment in any action seeking a dissolution of marriage or civil union, annulment, or legal separation, provided no appeal shall have been taken. In the event of an appeal or the filing of a motion to open a judgment within such 180 days, all appearances of counsel shall be deemed to have been withdrawn after final judgment on such appeal or

motion or within 180 days after the entry of the original judgment, whichever is later. Nothing herein shall preclude or prevent any attorney from filing a motion to withdraw with leave of the court during that period subsequent to the entry of judgment. In the absence of a specific withdrawal, counsel will continue of record for all postjudgment purposes until 180 days have elapsed from the entry of judgment or, in the event an appeal or a motion to open a judgment is filed within such 180 day period, until final judgment on that appeal or determination of that motion, whichever is later.

(d) Except as provided in subsections (a), (b) and (c), no attorney shall withdraw his or her appearance after it has been entered upon the record of the court without the leave of the court.

(e) [All appearances of the chief child protection attorney appointed pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-123c shall continue until a motion to withdraw has been granted.

(f)] All appearances entered on behalf of parties for matters involving Title IV-D child support matters shall be deemed to be for those matters only.

[(g)] (f) All appearances entered on behalf of parties in the family division of the superior court shall not be deemed appearances for any matter involving a Title IV-D child support matter unless specifically so designated.

COMMENTARY: Subsection (e) has been deleted because General Statutes Section 46b-123c was repealed by Section 223 of Public Act 11-51, the position of the Chief Child Protection Attorney has been eliminated and the functions of that office have been transferred to the Chief Public Defender.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE JUVENILE RULES

Sec. 26-1. Definitions Applicable to Proceedings on Juvenile Matters

In these definitions and in the rules of practice and procedure on juvenile matters, the singular shall include the plural and the plural, the singular where appropriate.

(a) The definitions of the terms "child," "youth," "youth in crisis," "abused," "mentally deficient," "delinquent," "delinquent act," ["dependent,"] "neglected," "uncared for," "alcohol-dependent child," "family with service needs," "drug-dependent child," "serious juvenile offense," "serious juvenile offender," and "serious juvenile repeat offender" shall be as set forth in General Statutes § 46b-120. The definition of "victim" shall be as set forth in General Statutes § 46b-122.

(b) "Commitment" means an order of the judicial authority whereby custody and/or guardianship of a child or youth are transferred to the commissioner of the department of children and families.

(c) "Complaint" means a written allegation or statement presented to the judicial authority that a child's or youth's conduct as a delinquent or situation as a child from a family with service needs or youth in crisis brings the child or youth within the jurisdiction of the judicial authority as prescribed by General Statutes § 46b-121.

(d) "Detention" means a secure building or staff secure facility for the temporary care of a child who is the subject of a delinquency complaint.

(e) "Family support center" means a community-based service center for children and families involved with a complaint

that has been filed with the Superior Court under General Statutes § 46b-149, that provides multiple services, or access to such services, for the purpose of preventing such children and families from having further involvement with the court as families with service needs.

(f) "Guardian" means a person who has a judicially created relationship with a child or youth which is intended to be permanent and self sustaining as evidenced by the transfer to the caretaker of the following parental rights with respect to the child or youth: protection, education, care and control of the person, custody of the person and decision making.

(g) "Hearing" means an activity of the court on the record in the presence of a judicial authority and shall include (1) "Adjudicatory hearing": A court hearing to determine the validity of the facts alleged in a petition or information to establish thereby the judicial authority's jurisdiction to decide the matter which is the subject of the petition or information; (2) "Contested hearing on an order of temporary custody" means a hearing on an ex parte order of temporary custody or an order to appear which is held not later than ten days from the day of a preliminary hearing on such orders. Contested hearings shall be held on consecutive days except for compelling circumstances or at the request of the respondent; (3) "Dispositive hearing": The judicial authority's jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter which is the subject of the petition or information having been established, a court hearing in which the judicial authority, after considering the social study or predispositional study and the total circumstances of the child or youth, orders whatever action is in the best interests of the child, youth or family and, where applicable, the community. In the

discretion of the judicial authority, evidence concerning adjudication and disposition may be presented in a single hearing.

(4) "Preliminary hearing" means a hearing on an ex parte order of temporary custody or an order to appear or the first hearing on a petition alleging that a child or youth is uncared for, abused, or neglected[, or dependent]. A preliminary hearing on any ex parte custody order or order to appear shall be held not later than ten days from the issuance of the order. (5) "Plea hearing" is a hearing at which (i) A parent or guardian who is a named respondent in a neglect, uncared for or dependency petition, upon being advised of his or her rights admits, denies, or pleads nolo contendere to allegations contained in the petition; or (ii) a child or youth who is a named respondent in a delinquency petition or information enters a plea of not guilty, guilty, or nolo contendere upon being advised of the charges against him or her contained in the information or petition, or a hearing at which a child or youth who is a named respondent in a family with service needs or youth in crisis petition admits or denies the allegations contained in the petition upon being advised of the allegations.

(h) "Indian child" means an unmarried person under age eighteen who is either a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe or is eligible for membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe, and is involved in custody proceedings, excluding delinquency proceedings.

(i) "Parent" means a biological mother or father or adoptive mother or father except a biological or adoptive mother or father whose parental rights have been terminated; or the father of any child or youth born out of wedlock, provided at the time of the filing

of the petition (1) he has been adjudicated the father of such child or youth by a court which possessed the authority to make such adjudication, or (2) he has acknowledged in writing to be the father of such child or youth, or (3) he has contributed regularly to the support of such child, or (4) his name appears on the birth certificate, or (5) he has filed a claim for paternity as provided under General Statutes § 46b-172a, or (6) he has been named in the petition as the father of the minor child or youth by the mother.

(j) "Parties" includes: (1) The child or youth who is the subject of a proceeding and those additional persons as defined herein; (2) "Legal party": Any person, including a parent, whose legal relationship to the matter pending before the judicial authority is of such a nature and kind as to mandate the receipt of proper legal notice as a condition precedent to the establishment of the judicial authority's jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter pending before it; and (3) "Intervening party": Any person who is permitted to intervene in accordance with Section 35a-4.

(k) "Permanency plan" means a plan developed by the commissioner of the department of children and families for the permanent placement of a child or youth in the commissioner's care. Permanency plans shall be reviewed by the judicial authority as prescribed in General Statutes §§ 17a-110 (b), 17a-111b (c), 46b-129 (k), 46b-141, and 46b-149(j).

(l) "Petition" means a formal pleading, executed under oath, alleging that the respondent is within the judicial authority's jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter which is the subject of the petition by reason of cited statutory provisions and seeking a disposition. Except for a petition for erasure of record, such

petitions invoke a judicial hearing and shall be filed by any one of the parties authorized to do so by statute.

(m) "Information" means a formal pleading filed by a prosecutor alleging that a child or youth in a delinquency matter is within the judicial authority's jurisdiction.

(n) "Probation" means a legal status created in delinquency cases following conviction whereby a respondent child is permitted to remain in the home or in the physical custody of a relative or other fit person subject to supervision by the court through the court's probation officers and upon such terms as the judicial authority determines, subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the judicial authority.

(o) "Respondent" means a person who is alleged to be a delinquent or a child from a family with service needs, or a youth in crisis, or a parent or a guardian of a child or youth who is the subject of a petition alleging that the child is uncared for, abused, neglected, [or dependent] or requesting termination of parental rights.

(p) "Specific steps" means those judicially determined steps the parent or guardian and the commissioner of the department of children and families should take in order for the parent or guardian to retain or regain custody of a child or youth.

(q) "Staff secure facility" means a residential facility (1) that does not include construction features designed to physically restrict the movements and activities of juvenile residents who are placed therein, (2) that may establish reasonable rules restricting entrance to and egress from the facility, and (3) in which the movements and activities of individual juvenile residents may, for

treatment purposes, be restricted or subject to control through the use of intensive staff supervision.

(r) "Supervision" includes: (1) "Nonjudicial supervision": A legal status without the filing of a petition or a court conviction or adjudication but following the child's admission to a complaint wherein a probation officer exercises supervision over the child with the consent of the child and the parent; (2) "Protective supervision": A disposition following adjudication in neglected, ~~abused or uncared for~~ [or dependent] cases created by an order of the judicial authority requesting a supervising agency other than the court to assume the responsibility of furthering the welfare of the family and best interests of the child or youth when the child's or youth's place of abode remains with the parent or any suitable or worthy person, or when the judicial authority vests custody or guardianship in another suitable and worthy person, subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court; and (3) "Judicial supervision": A legal status similar to probation for a child adjudicated to be from a family with service needs or subject to supervision pursuant to an order of suspended proceedings under General Statutes § 46b-133b or § 46b-133e.

(s) "Take into Custody Order" means an order by a judicial authority that a child be taken into custody and immediately turned over to a detention superintendent where probable cause has been found that the child has committed a delinquent act, there is no less restrictive alternative available, and the child meets the criteria set forth in Section 31a-13.

COMMENTARY: The revisions to the chapter heading for Chapters 32a, 34a and 35a, and the revisions to Sections 6-3, 26-1, 32a-1, 33a-2, 35a-1 and 35a-3 are consistent with the changes

made to the General Statutes affected by Section 2 of Public Act 11-240 concerning juvenile matters.

Sec. [30a-6A. —]26-2 Persons in Attendance at Hearings

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
[A]ny judge hearing a juvenile matter, may during such hearing, exclude from the courtroom in which such hearing is held any person whose presence is, in the court's opinion, not necessary, except that in delinquency proceedings, any victim shall not be excluded unless, after hearing from the parties and the victim and for good cause shown, which shall be clearly and specifically stated on the record, the judge orders otherwise.

(b) Any judge hearing a juvenile matter, in which a child is alleged to be uncared for, neglected or abused or in which a child is the subject of a petition for termination of parental rights, may permit any person whom the court finds has a legitimate interest in the hearing or the work of the court to attend such hearing. Such person may include a party, foster parent, relative related to the child by blood or marriage, service provider or any person or representative of any agency, entity or association, including a representative of the news media. The court may, as a condition of participation, for the child's safety and protection and for good cause shown, prohibit any person or representative of any agency, entity or association, including a representative of the news media, who is present in court from further disclosing any information that would identify the child, the custodian or caretaker of the child or the members of the child's family involved in the hearing.

COMMENTARY: The above revisions are made so that the rule is consistent with § 30 of P.A. 11-51.

Because the above revision broadens the scope of the rule, it has been given a new number so that it will appear in Chapter 26 of the juvenile rules. The title of that chapter will be changed from "Definitions" to "General Provisions."

(NEW) Sec. 30a-9. Appeals in Delinquency and Family With Service Needs Proceedings

The rules governing other appeals shall, so far as applicable, be the rules for all proceedings in delinquency and family with service needs appeals.

COMMENTARY: The above change clarifies that the regular appellate rules apply to appeals from delinquency and family with service needs matters, as those are not defined as child protection matters in new Chapter 79a of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

**CHAPTER 32a
RIGHTS OF PARTIES
NEGLECTED, ABUSED AND UNCARED FOR [AND
DEPENDENT] CHILDREN AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS**

COMMENTARY: The revisions to the chapter heading for Chapters 32a, 34a and 35a, and the revisions to Sections 6-3, 26-1, 32a-1, 33a-2, 35a-1 and 35a-3 are consistent with the changes made to the General Statutes affected by Section 2 of Public Act 11-240 concerning juvenile matters.

Sec. 32a-1. Right to Counsel and to Remain Silent

(a) At the first hearing in which the parents or guardian appear, the judicial authority shall advise and explain to the parents or guardian of a child or youth their right to silence and to counsel.

(b) The child or youth has the rights of confrontation and cross-examination and shall be represented by counsel in each and every phase of any and all proceedings in child protection matters, including appeals. The judicial authority before whom a juvenile matter is pending shall notify the chief public defender who shall assign an attorney to represent the child or youth.

(c) The judicial authority on its own motion or upon the motion of any party, may appoint a separate guardian ad litem for the child or youth upon a finding that such appointment is necessary to protect the best interest of the child or youth. An attorney guardian ad litem shall be appointed for a child or youth who is a parent in a termination of parental rights proceeding or any parent who is found to be incompetent by the judicial authority.

(d) The parents or guardian of the child or youth have the rights of confrontation and cross-examination and may be represented by counsel in each and every phase of any and all proceedings in child protection matters, including appeals. The judicial authority shall determine if the parents or guardian of the child or youth are eligible for counsel. Upon a finding that such parents or guardian of the child or youth are unable to afford counsel, the judicial authority shall notify the chief public defender of such finding, and the chief public defender shall assign an attorney to provide representation.

(e) If the judicial authority, even in the absence of a request for appointment of counsel, determines that the interests of justice require the provision of an attorney to represent the child's or youth's parent or parents or guardian, or other party, the judicial authority may appoint an attorney to represent any such party and shall notify the chief public defender, who shall assign an attorney to represent any such party. For the purposes of determining eligibility for appointment of counsel, the judicial authority shall cause the parents or guardian of a child or youth to complete a written statement under oath or affirmation setting forth the parents' or guardian's liabilities and assets, income and sources thereof, and such other information as the Public Defender Services Commission shall designate and require on forms adopted by said commission.

(f) Where under the provisions of this section, the judicial authority so appoints counsel for any such party who is found able to pay, in whole or in part, the cost thereof, the judicial authority shall assess as costs on the appropriate form against such parents, guardian or custodian, including any agency vested with the legal custody of the child or youth, the expense so incurred and paid for by the chief public defender in providing such counsel, to the extent of their financial ability to do so, in accordance with the rates established by the Public Defender Services Commission for compensation of counsel. Reimbursement to the appointed attorney of unrecovered costs shall be made to that attorney by the chief public defender upon the attorney's certification of his or her unrecovered expenses to the chief public defender.

(g) Notices of initial hearings on petitions shall contain a statement of the respondent's right to counsel and that if the respondent is unable to afford counsel, counsel will be appointed to represent the respondent, that the respondent has a right to refuse to make any statement and that any statement the respondent makes may be introduced in evidence against him or her.

(h) Any confession, admission or statement, written or oral, ~~made by the parent or parents or guardian of the child or youth~~ after the filing of a petition alleging such child or youth to be neglected, abused or uncared for [or dependent], shall be inadmissible in any proceeding held upon such petition against the person making such admission or statement unless such person shall have been advised of the right to retain counsel, and that if such person is unable to afford counsel, counsel will be assigned to provide representation, that such person has a right to refuse to make any statement and that any statements such person makes may be introduced in evidence against such person.

COMMENTARY: The revisions to the chapter heading for Chapters 32a, 34a and 35a, and the revisions to Sections 6-3, 26-1, 32a-1, 33a-2, 35a-1 and 35a-3 are consistent with the changes made to the General Statutes affected by Section 2 of Public Act 11-240 concerning juvenile matters.

Sec. 33a-2. Service of Summons, Petitions and Ex Parte Orders

(a) A summons accompanying a petition alleging that a child or youth is neglected, abused or uncared for [or dependent], along with the summary of facts, shall be served by the petitioner

on the respondents and provided to the office of the attorney general at least fourteen days before the date of the initial plea hearing on the petition, which shall be held not more than forty-five days from the date of filing the petition.

(b) A summons accompanying a petition for termination of parental rights, along with the summary of facts, shall be served by the petitioner on the respondents and provided to the office of the attorney general at least ten days prior to the date of the initial plea hearing on the petition, which shall be held not more than thirty days after the filing of the petition except in the case of a petition for termination of parental rights based on consent, which shall be held not more than twenty days after the filing of the petition.

(c) A summons accompanying simultaneously filed coterminous petitions, along with the summary of facts, shall be served by the petitioner on the respondents and provided to the office of the attorney general at least ten days prior to the date of the initial plea hearing on the petition, which shall be held not more than thirty days after the filing of the petitions, except in the case of a petition for termination of parental rights based on consent, which shall be held not more than twenty days after the filing of the petition.

(d) A summons accompanying any petition filed with an application for order of temporary custody shall be served by the petitioner on the respondents and provided to the office of the attorney general as soon as practicable after the issuance of any ex parte order or order to appear, along with such order, any sworn statements supporting the order, the summary of facts, the

specific steps provided by the judicial authority, and the notice required by Section 33a-6.

(e) Whenever the commissioner of the department of children and families obtains an ex parte order of temporary custody or an order to appear and show cause from the judicial authority, he or she shall provide the clerk with a sealed envelope marked "Attention: Counsel for Child(ren)" containing the following information: the name, phone number and e-mail of the investigation social worker; the name, phone number and e-mail of the treatment supervisor or social worker, if known; and the child(ren)'s placement or home address and phone number, and name of a placement contact person. The clerk shall ensure that counsel assigned to the child is provided with said envelope at the time his or her appearance is filed. In the event the placement information changes prior to the preliminary hearing, the commissioner of the department of children and families shall notify counsel for the child immediately.

COMMENTARY: The revisions to the chapter heading for Chapters 32a, 34a and 35a, and the revisions to Sections 6-3, 26-1, 32a-1, 33a-2, 35a-1 and 35a-3 are consistent with the changes made to the General Statutes affected by Section 2 of Public Act 11-240 concerning juvenile matters.

Sec. 33a-7. Preliminary Order of Temporary Custody or First Hearing; Actions by Judicial Authority

(a) At the preliminary hearing on the order of temporary custody or order to appear, or at the first hearing on a petition for neglect, uncared for, dependency, or termination of parental rights, the judicial authority shall:

(1) first determine whether the necessary parties are present and that the rules governing service on or notice to nonappearing parties, and notice to grandparents, foster parents, relative caregivers and pre-adoptive parents, as applicable, have been complied with, and should note these facts for the record, and may proceed with respect to the parties who (i) are present and have been properly served; (ii) are present and waive any defects in service; and (iii) are not present, but have been properly served. As to any party who has not been properly served, the judicial authority may continue the proceedings with respect to such party for a reasonable period of time for service to be made and confirmed;

(2) inform the respondents of the allegations contained in all petitions and applications that are the subject of the hearing;

(3) inform the respondents of their right to remain silent;

(4) ensure that an attorney, and where appropriate, a separate guardian ad litem, has been assigned to represent the child or youth by the chief public defender, in accordance with General Statutes §§ [46b-123e,] 46b-129a (2), 46b-136, Public Act 11-51 and Section 32a-1 of these rules;

(5) advise the respondents of their right to counsel and their right to have counsel assigned if they are unable to afford representation, determine eligibility for state paid representation and notify the chief public defender to assign an attorney to represent any respondent who is unable to afford representation, as determined by the judicial authority;

(6) advise the respondents of the right to a hearing on the petitions and applications, to be held not later than ten days after

the date of the preliminary hearing if the hearing is pursuant to an ex parte order of temporary custody or an order to appear;

(7) notwithstanding any prior statements acknowledging responsibility; inquire of the custodial respondent in neglect, uncared for and dependency matters, and of all respondents in termination matters, whether the allegations of the petition are presently admitted or denied;

(8) make any interim orders, including visitation, that the judicial authority determines are in the best interests of the child or youth, and order specific steps the commissioner and the respondents shall take for the respondents to regain or to retain custody of the child or youth;

(9) take steps to determine the identity of the father of the child or youth, including, if necessary, inquiring of the mother of the child or youth, under oath, as to the identity and address of any person who might be the father of the child or youth and ordering genetic testing, if necessary and appropriate, and order service of the amended petition citing in the putative father and notice of the hearing date, if any, to be made upon him;

(10) if the person named as the putative father appears, and admits that he is the biological father, provide him and the mother with the notices which comply with General Statutes § 17b-27 and provide them with the opportunity to sign a paternity acknowledgment and affirmation on forms which comply with General Statutes § 17b-27, which documents shall be executed and filed in accordance with General Statutes § 46b-172 and a copy delivered to the clerk of the superior court for juvenile matters;

(11) in the event that the person named as a putative father appears and denies that he is the biological father of the child or youth, advise him that he may have no further standing in any proceeding concerning the child or youth, and either order genetic testing to determine paternity or direct him to execute a written denial of paternity on a form promulgated by the office of the chief court administrator. Upon execution of such a form by the putative father, the judicial authority may remove him from the case and afford him no further standing in the case or in any subsequent proceeding regarding the child or youth until such time as paternity is established by formal acknowledgment or adjudication in a court of competent jurisdiction; and

(12) identify any person or persons related to the child or youth by blood or marriage residing in this state or out of state who might serve as licensed foster parents or temporary custodians, and order the commissioner of the department of children and families to investigate and determine the appropriateness of placement of the child or youth with such relative or relatives pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129 (c) and provide a written report to the court no later than thirty days from the date of the preliminary hearing and notify all counsel of record or set a reasonable date for such a report if a relative lives outside the state.

(b) At the preliminary hearing on the order of temporary custody or order to appear, the judicial authority may provide parties an opportunity to present argument with regard to the sufficiency of the sworn statements.

(c) If any respondent fails, after proper service, to appear at the preliminary hearing, the judicial authority may enter or sustain an order of temporary custody.

(d) Upon request, or upon its own motion, the judicial authority shall schedule a hearing on the order for temporary custody or the order to appear to be held as soon as practicable but not later than ten days after the date of the preliminary hearing. Such hearing shall be held on consecutive days except for compelling circumstances or at the request of the respondents.

(e) Subject to the requirements of Section 33a-7 (a) (6), upon motion of any party or on its own motion, the judicial authority may consolidate the hearing, on the order of temporary custody or order to appear with the adjudicatory phase of the trial on the underlying petition. At a consolidated order of temporary custody and neglect adjudication hearing, the judicial authority shall determine the outcome of the order of temporary custody based upon whether or not continued removal is necessary to ensure the child's or youth's safety, irrespective of its findings on whether there is sufficient evidence to support an adjudication of neglect or uncared for. Nothing in this subsection prohibits the judicial authority from proceeding to disposition of the underlying petition immediately after such consolidated hearing if the social study has been filed and the parties had previously agreed to sustain the order of temporary custody and waived the ten day hearing or the parties should reasonably be ready to proceed.

COMMENTARY: The reference to Section 46b-123e in subdivision (4) of subsection (a) has been deleted because it was repealed by Public Act 11-51. The appropriate new statutory reference to Public Act 11-51 has been added.

CHAPTER 34a
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND DISCOVERY NEGLECTED,
ABUSED AND UNCARED FOR [AND DEPENDENT] CHILDREN
AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

COMMENTARY: The revisions to the chapter heading for Chapters 32a, 34a and 35a, and the revisions to Sections 6-3, 26-1, 32a-1, 33a-2, 35a-1 and 35a-3 are consistent with the changes made to the General Statutes affected by Section 2 of Public Act 11-240 concerning juvenile matters.

CHAPTER 35a
HEARINGS CONCERNING NEGLECTED, ABUSED AND
UNCARED FOR [AND DEPENDENT] CHILDREN AND
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

COMMENTARY: The revisions to the chapter heading for Chapters 32a, 34a and 35a, and the revisions to Sections 6-3, 26-1, 32a-1, 33a-2, 35a-1 and 35a-3 are consistent with the changes made to the General Statutes affected by Section 2 of Public Act 11-240 concerning juvenile matters.

Sec. 35a-1. Adjudication upon Acceptance of Admission or Written Plea of Nolo Contendere

(a) Notwithstanding any prior statements acknowledging responsibility, the judicial authority shall inquire whether the allegations of the petition are presently admitted or denied. This inquiry shall be made of the parent(s) or guardian in neglect, abuse or uncared for [or dependent] matters; and of the parents in termination matters.

(b) An admission to allegations or a written plea of nolo contendere signed by the respondent may be accepted by the

judicial authority. Before accepting an admission or plea of nolo contendere, the judicial authority shall determine whether the right to trial has been waived, and that the parties understand the content and consequences of their admission or plea. If the allegations are admitted or the plea accepted, the judicial authority shall make its adjudicatory finding as to the validity of the facts alleged in the petition and may proceed to a dispositional hearing. Where appropriate, the judicial authority may permit a noncustodial parent or guardian to stand silent as to the entry of an adjudication.

COMMENTARY: The revisions to the chapter heading for Chapters 32a, 34a and 35a, and the revisions to Sections 6-3, 26-1, 32a-1, 33a-2, 35a-1 and 35a-3 are consistent with the changes made to the General Statutes affected by Section 2 of Public Act 11-240 concerning juvenile matters.

Sec. 35a-3. Coterminous Petitions

When coterminous petitions are filed, the judicial authority first determines by a fair preponderance of the evidence whether the child or youth is neglected, abused or uncared for [or dependent]; if so, then the judicial authority determines whether statutory grounds exist to terminate parental rights by clear and convincing evidence; if so, then the judicial authority determines whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child or youth by clear and convincing evidence. If the judicial authority determines that termination grounds do not exist or termination of parental rights is not in the best interests of the child or youth, then the judicial authority may consider by a fair preponderance of the evidence any of the dispositional

alternatives available under the neglect, abuse or uncared for [or dependent] petition.

COMMENTARY: The revisions to the chapter heading for Chapters 32a, 34a and 35a, and the revisions to Sections 6-3, 26-1, 32a-1, 33a-2, 35a-1 and 35a-3 are consistent with the changes made to the General Statutes affected by Section 2 of Public Act 11-240 concerning juvenile matters.

Sec. 35a-21. Appeals in Child Protection Matters

(a) Unless a different period is provided by statute, [A]ppeals from final judgments or decisions of the superior court in [juvenile] child protection matters shall be taken within twenty days from the issuance of notice of the rendition of the judgment or decision from which the appeal is taken or within twenty days from the granting of any extension to appeal pursuant to Section 66-1 (a) [in the manner provided by the rules of appellate procedure].

(b) If an indigent party, child or youth wishes to appeal a final decision, the trial [counsel] attorney shall [immediately request an expedited transcript from the court reporter, the cost of which shall be billed to the Public Defender Services Commission. Trial counsel shall either file the appeal within twenty days or file a timely motion to extend time in which to take an appeal and request the appointment of counsel to review the matter for purposes of appeal] file an appeal or seek review by an appellate review attorney in accordance with the rules for appeals in child protection matters in Chapter 79a. [If t]The reviewing attorney determin[es]ing whether there is a nonfrivolous ground for appeal, [such attorney] shall file a[n] limited "in addition to" appearance with the trial court for purposes of reviewing the merits of an

appeal. If the reviewing attorney determines there is merit to an appeal, such attorney shall file a limited "in addition to" appearance for the appeal with the appellate court. The trial attorney shall remain in the underlying juvenile matters case in order to handle ongoing procedures before the local or regional juvenile court. [Counsel] Any attorney who file[d the]s an appeal or file[d]s an appearance in the appellate court after [the] an appeal [was] has been filed shall be deemed to have appeared in the trial court for the limited purpose of prosecuting or defending the appeal. [If the reviewing attorney determines that there is no merit to an appeal, such attorney shall make this known to the judicial authority as soon as practicable, and the party will be informed by the clerk forthwith that the party has the balance of the extended time to appeal.]

(c) Unless a new appeal period is created pursuant to Section 79a-2 (a), [T]he time to take an appeal shall not be extended past forty days, (the original twenty days plus one twenty day extension for appellate review), from the date of the issuance of notice of the rendition of the judgment or decision.

COMMENTARY: The above changes are made in light of new Sections 79a-2 and 79a-3 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE CRIMINAL RULES

Sec. 37-11. —[Role of Clerk] Notice to Defendant when Information in Two Parts

Prior to the time the defendant enters a guilty plea or, if the defendant pleads not guilty, prior to the commencement of trial, the [clerk] court shall notify the defendant[, in the absence of the

judicial authority,] of the contents of the second part of the information. The clerk shall enter on the docket the time and place of the giving of such notification and, where necessary, shall include entry thereof in the judgment file.

COMMENTARY: The trial judge should know about the second part of the information prior to trial. The above change provides for this.

Sec. 38-4. —Release by Judicial Authority

(a) When any defendant is presented before a judicial authority, such authority shall, in bailable offenses, promptly order the release of such person upon the first of the following conditions of release found sufficient reasonably to assure the person's appearance in court and, when the crimes charged or the facts and circumstances brought to the attention of the judicial authority suggest that the defendant may pose a risk to the physical safety of any person, that the safety of any person will not be endangered:

(1) The defendant's execution of a written promise to appear without special conditions;

(2) The defendant's execution of a written promise to appear with nonfinancial conditions;

(3) The defendant's execution of a bond without surety in no greater amount than necessary;

(4) The defendant's deposit with the clerk of the court of an amount of cash equal to 10 percent of the amount of the surety bond set, pursuant to Section 38-8;

(5) The defendant's execution of a bond with surety in no greater amount than necessary;

(6) The defendant's execution of a cash bond and his or her deposit with the clerk of the court of cash in the amount of the bond set by the judicial authority in no greater amount than necessary.

In addition to or in conjunction with any of the conditions of release enumerated in this subsection, the judicial authority may impose one or more nonfinancial conditions of release pursuant to subsection (d).

~~(b) The judicial authority may, in determining what~~ conditions of release will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant in court, consider factors (1) through (7) below, and, when the crimes charged or the facts and circumstances brought to the attention of the judicial authority suggest that the defendant may pose a risk to the physical safety of any person, the judicial authority may also consider factors (8) through (10) below:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense, including the weight of the evidence against the defendant;

(2) The defendant's record of previous convictions;

(3) The defendant's past record of appearance in court after being admitted to bail;

(4) The defendant's family ties;

(5) The defendant's employment record;

(6) The defendant's financial resources, character, and mental condition;

(7) The defendant's community ties;

(8) The defendant's history of violence;

(9) Whether the defendant has previously been convicted of similar offenses while released on bond; and

(10) The likelihood based upon the expressed intention of the defendant that he will commit another crime while released.

(c) In addition to or in conjunction with any of the conditions enumerated in subdivisions (1) to (6) of subsection (a), the judicial authority may, when it has reason to believe that the defendant is drug-dependent and where necessary, reasonable and appropriate, order the person to submit to a urinalysis drug test and to participate in a program of periodic drug testing and treatment. The results of any such drug test shall not be admissible in any criminal proceeding concerning such defendant.

(d) If the judicial authority determines that a nonfinancial condition of release should be imposed in addition to or in conjunction with any of the conditions enumerated in subdivisions (1) to (6) of subsection (a) of this section, the judicial authority shall order the pretrial release of the defendant subject to the least restrictive condition or combination of conditions that the judicial authority determines will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant in court and, when the crimes charged or the facts and circumstances brought to the attention of the judicial authority suggest that the defendant may pose a risk to the physical safety of any person, that the safety of any person will not be endangered, which conditions may include an order that he or she do one or more of the following:

(1) Remain under the supervision of a designated person or organization;

(2) Comply with specified restrictions on his or her travel, association or place of abode;

(3) Not engage in specified activities, including the use or possession of a dangerous weapon, an intoxicant or a controlled substance;

(4) [Participate in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program established under General Statutes § 53a-39d;

(5)] Provide sureties of the peace pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56f under supervision of a designated bail commissioner;

~~[(6)]~~ (5) Avoid all contact with an alleged victim of the crime and with a potential witness who may testify concerning the offense;

~~[(7)]~~ (6) Maintain employment or, if unemployed, actively seek employment;

~~[(8)]~~ (7) Maintain or commence an educational program;

~~[(9)]~~ (8) Be subject to electronic monitoring; or

~~[(10)]~~ (9) Satisfy any other condition that is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the defendant in court and that the safety of any other person will not be endangered.

(e) The judicial authority shall state on the record its reasons for imposing any such nonfinancial condition.

(f) The judicial authority may require that the defendant subject to electronic monitoring pursuant to subsection (d) of this section pay directly to the electronic monitoring service provider a fee for the cost of such electronic monitoring services. If the judicial authority finds that the defendant subject to electronic monitoring is indigent and unable to pay the costs of electronic monitoring services, it shall waive such costs.

COMMENTARY: The revisions to this section are made because General Statutes § 53a-39d, which established the zero-

tolerance drug supervision program as one of the possible non-financial conditions of release that could be required by the judicial authority, was repealed by Section 43 of Public Act 10-43.

Sec. 42-8. —Communications between Parties and Jurors

(a) No party, and no attorney, employee, representative or agent of any party or attorney, shall contact, communicate with or interview any juror or alternate juror, or any relative, friend or associate of any juror or alternate juror concerning the deliberations or verdict of the jury or of any individual juror or alternate juror in any action;

(1) during trial until the jury has returned a verdict and/or the jury has been dismissed by the judicial authority, except upon leave of the judicial authority, which shall be granted only upon [the] a showing of good cause[. A violation of this section may be treated as a contempt of court, and may be punished accordingly.]; or

(2) in any manner after trial which subjects the juror to harassment, misrepresentation, duress or coercion.

(b) After trial jurors have no obligation to speak to any person about any case and may refuse all interviews or requests to discuss the case, except as ordered by the court. However, jurors shall report to the court any extraneous prejudicial information improperly brought to the jury's attention, any outside influence improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or whether the verdict reported was the result of a clerical mistake.

(c) A violation of subsection (a) may, where appropriate, be treated as a contempt of court, and may be punished accordingly.

The judicial authority shall have continuing supervision over communications with jurors, even after a trial has been completed.

COMMENTARY: The above revisions have been added to provide additional protection of juror privacy. The revised language is taken from United States District Court District of Connecticut Local Rules of Civil Procedure 83.5 (1)(b) and (d) and 83.5 (4).

CLERKS FOR JUDICIAL DISTRICTS AND FOR GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS

(Section 51-51v of the General Statutes. Terms of office are for one year commencing July 1, 2012 for Judicial District Chief Clerks , Deputy Chief Clerks for JD Matters, First Assistant Clerks, Deputy Chief Clerks for GA Matters, and the Clerk of C.I.B.)

ANSONIA-MILFORD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

James F. Quinn

Judicial District Chief Clerk

G.A. 5 at DERBY

Lisa C. Groody

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

G.A. 22 at MILFORD

Jill A. Driscoll

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

DANBURY JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Louis A. Pace, Jr.

Judicial District Chief Clerk

Robin Johnson Smith

Deputy Chief Clerk for JD Matters

G.A. 3 at DANBURY

Geoffrey W. Stowell

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

FAIRFIELD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Donald J. Mastrony

Judicial District Chief Clerk

Pasquale V. Spinelli

Deputy Chief Clerk for JD Matters

CLERKS FOR JUDICIAL DISTRICTS AND FOR GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS

G.A. 2 at BRIDGEPORT

Marcella I. Young

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

HARTFORD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Robin C. Smith

Judicial District Chief Clerk

Joanne K. Murley

Deputy Chief Clerk for JD Matters

Delinda C. Walden

Deputy Chief Clerk for JD Matters

Karen G. Picker

First Assistant Clerk

G.A. 12 at MANCHESTER

Antonio D'Addeo

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

G.A. 13 at ENFIELD

Maria L. Reed-Cook

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

G.A. 14 at HARTFORD

Loreen Canter

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

Lorin Himmelstein

First Assistant Clerk

LITCHFIELD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Brandon E. Pelegano

Judicial District Chief Clerk

Mark Shea

Deputy Chief Clerk for JD Matters

G.A. 18 at BANTAM

Eric Groody

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

CLERKS FOR JUDICIAL DISTRICTS AND FOR GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS

MIDDLESEX JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Michael Kokoszka

Judicial District Chief Clerk

Jonathan W. Field

Deputy Chief Clerk for JD Matters

G.A. 9 at MIDDLETOWN

Robert P. Burke

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

NEW BRITAIN JUDICIAL DISTRICT

JD at NEW BRITAIN

Cynthia A. DeGoursey

Judicial District Chief Clerk

Patricia K. Lindlauf

Deputy Chief Clerk for JD Matters

G.A. 15 at NEW BRITAIN

Ralph C. Dagostine

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

G.A. 17 at BRISTOL

Laura Leigh

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

NEW HAVEN JUDICIAL DISTRICT

JD at NEW HAVEN

William Sadek

Judicial District Chief Clerk

Louis P. Fagnani, Jr.

Deputy Chief Clerk for JD Matters

Vacant

Deputy Chief Clerk for JD Matters

John A. Dziekan

First Assistant Clerk

Nancy Bauer

First Assistant Clerk

CLERKS FOR JUDICIAL DISTRICTS AND FOR GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS

G.A. 23 at NEW HAVEN

Kathleen Naumann

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

JD at MERIDEN

Robert A. Axelrod

Judicial District Chief Clerk

Vacant

Deputy Chief Clerk for JD Matters

G.A. 7 at MERIDEN

Gerri P. Duggan

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

NEW LONDON JUDICIAL DISTRICT

David S. Gage

Judicial District Chief Clerk

Vacant

Deputy Chief Clerk for JD Matters

Vacant

Deputy Chief Clerk for JD Matters

G.A. 10 at NEW LONDON

Linda S. Worobey

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

G.A. 21 at NORWICH

Cara C. Parkinson

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

CLERKS FOR JUDICIAL DISTRICTS AND FOR GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS

STAMFORD-NORWALK JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Ann-Margaret Archer

Judicial District Chief Clerk

Norman A. Roberts

Deputy Chief Clerk for JD Matters

G.A. 1 at STAMFORD

Helen Kalmanides

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

G.A. 20 at NORWALK

Cynthia Dillon

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

TOLLAND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Roy Smith

Judicial District Chief Clerk

Stephen J. Santoro

Deputy Chief Clerk for JD Matters

G.A. 19 at ROCKVILLE

Janice Dagostino

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

William J. Salvatore

First Assistant Clerk

WATERBURY JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Philip Groth

Judicial District Chief Clerk

Richard L. Haas

Deputy Chief Clerk for JD Matters

G.A. 4 at WATERBURY

William M. Hoey

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

CLERKS FOR JUDICIAL DISTRICTS AND FOR GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS

WINDHAM JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Karen Berris

Judicial District Chief Clerk

Debora Kaszuba-Neary

Deputy Chief Clerk for JD Matters

G.A. 11 at DANIELSON

Gina Pickett

Deputy Chief Clerk for GA Matters

CENTRALIZED INFRACTIONS BUREAU

Stacey B. Manware

Clerk

CHIEF CLERK AND CLERKS FOR HOUSING MATTERS

(Section 51-51v of the General Statutes. Terms of office are for one year commencing July 1, 2012)

STATEWIDE

Suzanne Colasanto

Chief Clerk

HARTFORD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Jeffery S. Hammer

Deputy Chief Clerk for Housing Matters

NEW BRITAIN JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Vacant

Deputy Chief Clerk for Housing Matters

FAIRFIELD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Natale George Papallo

Deputy Chief Clerk for Housing Matters

NEW HAVEN JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Suzanne Colasanto

Chief Clerk for Housing Matters

STAMFORD-NORWALK JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Edmond A. O'Garro

Deputy Chief Clerk for Housing Matters

WATERBURY JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Dana M. Guiliano

Deputy Chief Clerk for Housing Matters

LOCAL GRIEVANCE PANELS

(Section 2-29 of the Practice Book. Terms shall commence on July 1, 2012 and appointments shall be for terms of three years. No person shall serve for more than two consecutive three-year terms. **ONLY THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHOSE NAMES ARE UNDERLINED ARE BEING CONSIDERED FOR APPOINTMENT OR REAPPOINTMENT.**)

		First Commenced Service On Grievance Panel	<u>Term</u>
<u>ANSONIA-MILFORD JUDICIAL DISTRICT</u>			
Jay Pinto	20 Elaine Road Milford, CT 06460	07/30/10	07/01/11-14
<u>Atty. Howard I. Gemeiner</u>	132 Temple Street 2 nd Fl New Haven, CT 06510	07/01/12	<u>07/01/12-15</u>
Atty. Neil A. Lieberthal	21 New Britain Ave Rocky Hill, CT 06067	07/01/10	07/01/10-13
Atty. C. Christian Young (Alternate)	350 Fairfield Avenue, 7 th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604	07/01/07	07/01/10-13
<u>DANBURY JUDICIAL DISTRICT</u>			
Mary Jane Wood	152 Limekiln Road Redding, CT 06896	07/01/08	07/01/11-14
Vacant			<u>07/01/12-15</u>
Atty. Matthew L. Brovender (Alternate)	60 Long Ridge Road Suite 200 Stamford, CT 06902	07/01/10	07/01/10-13
Atty. James M. Lamontagne	Office of the Public Defender 17 Belden Avenue Norwalk, CT 06850	02/08/08	07/01/10-13

<u>FAIRFIELD JUDICIAL DISTRICT</u>		<u>First Commenced Service On Grievance Panel</u>	<u>Term</u>
Paul Hughes	282 Brooklawn Terrace Fairfield, CT 06825	01/15/10	07/01/11-14
<u>Atty. Michael R. Corsillo</u>	10 Byington Place Norwalk, CT 06850	07/01/07	<u>07/01/12-15</u>
Atty. Steven Kulas (Alternate)	12 Bank Street Seymour, CT 06483	07/01/10	07/01/10-13
Atty. Heidi Avila	396 Orange Street Suite 2 New Haven, CT 06511	07/01/07	07/01/10-13
<u>HARTFORD JUDICIAL DISTRICT</u>			
<u>For G.A.13 and the city of Hartford</u>			
Atty. Daniel Adelman	27 Elm Street New Haven, CT 06510	07/01/11	07/01/11-14
<u>Frank Barrett</u>	33 Colony Road West Hartford, CT 06117	07/01/12	<u>07/01/12-15</u>
Atty. Charles Filardi, Jr. (Alternate)	Filardi Law Offices 65 Trumbull Street 2 nd Fl New Haven, CT 06510	07/01/11	07/01/11-14
Atty. Robert M. Brennan	Carter & Civitello One Bradley Road Woodbridge, CT 06525	07/01/10	07/01/10-13

**First
Commenced
Service On
Grievance
Panel Term**

**NEW BRITAIN JUDICIAL DISTRICT and the
HARTFORD JUDICIAL DISTRICT for G.A. 12
AND THE TOWNS OF AVON, BLOOMFIELD,
CANTON, FARMINGTON AND WEST HARTFORD**

<u>Atty. Sheila Hayre</u>	New Haven Legal Assistance 426 State Street New Haven, CT 06510-2018	07/01/12	<u>07/01/12-15</u>
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Atty. Peter W. Gillies (Alternate)	429 Ridge Road Middletown, CT 06457	07/23/10	07/01/10-13
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P. Dale Brown	158 Johnnycake Mt. Road Burlington, CT 06013	07/01/11	07/01/11-14
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Atty. Elizabeth C. Foran	62 Hyde Avenue Vernon, CT 06066-4503	08/18/06	07/01/10-13
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LITCHFIELD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

J. Thomas Bouchard	P.O. Box 1855 Litchfield, CT 06759	07/01/08	07/01/11-14
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<u>Atty. Jennifer E. Davis</u>	141 Dowd Avenue, 2 nd Floor P. O. Box 286 Canton, CT 06019	07/01/12	<u>07/01/12-15</u>
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Atty. Sharon Wicks Dornfield (Alternate)	70 North Street Suite 104 Danbury, CT 06810-5609	07/07/07	07/01/10-13
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Atty. Mary E. Reid	17 Belden Avenue Norwalk, CT 06852	08/11/06	07/01/10-13
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**First
Commenced
Service On
Grievance
Panel**

Term

MIDDLESEX JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Michael J. Cubeta, Jr.	1203 Arbutus Street Middletown, CT 06457	07/01/11	07/01/11-14
<u>Atty. Maureen O'Connor</u>	The Travelers Companies One Tower Square MS4A Hartford, CT 06183-1050	07/01/09	<u>07/01/12-15</u>
Atty. Tucker McWeeny (Alternate)	Szilagyi and Daly 118 Oak Street Hartford, CT 06106	07/01/11	07/01/10-13
Attorney Susan L. Miller (Alternate)	433 South Main Street Suite 305 West Hartford, CT 06110	07/01/07	07/01/10-13

NEW HAVEN JUDICIAL DISTRICT

For the towns of Bethany, New Haven and Woodbridge

Dr. Vinata Parkash	551 Amity Road Woodbridge, CT 06525	07/01/06	07/01/11-14
<u>Atty. John Mager</u> (Alternate)	Mager & Mager 87 River Street Milford, CT 06460	07/01/12	<u>07/01/10-13</u>
Atty. William M. Bloss	350 Fairfield Avenue Bridgeport, CT 06604	07/01/10	07/01/10-13
<u>Atty. Thomas Lynch</u>	64 Cherry Street P. O. Box 453 Milford, CT 06460	07/01/11	<u>07/01/12-15</u>

**First
Commenced
Service On
Grievance
Panel**

Term

NEW HAVEN JUDICIAL DISTRICT

**For G.A. 7 and the towns of Branford, East Haven,
Guilford, Madison and North Branford.**

Francis Walsh, Jr.	34 Totoket Road Branford, CT 06405	07/01/08	07/01/11-14
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Atty. Desi Imetovski	2 Enterprise Drive #303 Shelton, CT 06484	07/01/10	07/01/10-13
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<u>Atty. Brian E. Spears</u>	33 Riverside Avenue Westport, CT 06880	07/01/09	<u>07/01/12-15</u>
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Atty. Timothy Patrick Brady (Alternate)	1 Hartford Plaza T-6-93 Hartford, CT 06115	07/01/10	07/01/10-13
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NEW LONDON JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Dr. Donald Amaro	40 East Shore Drive Niantic, CT 06357	11/05/10	07/01/11-14
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<u>Atty. Richard Paladino</u>	Paladino and Welsh 33 Main St. Suite P Old Saybrook, CT 06475	07/01/12	<u>07/01/12-15</u>
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Atty. Robert B. Young	559 Hartford Pike, #206 Dayville, CT 06241-2153	07/01/06	07/01/10-13
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Atty. Lisa A. Faccadio (Alternate)	547 Main Street Middletown, CT 06457-2806	07/01/07	07/01/10-13
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<u>STAMFORD-NORWALK JUDICIAL DISTRICT</u>		<u>First Commenced Service On Grievance Panel</u>	<u>Term</u>
Thomas McKiernan	Abercrombie, Burns & McKiernan 581 Post Road Darien, CT 06820	07/01/08	07/01/11-14
<u>Atty. Frank O'Reilly</u>	167 Old Post Road Southport, CT 06890	07/01/12	<u>07/01/12-15</u>
Atty. Raymond Kelly	2452 Black Rock Turnpike Fairfield, CT 06825-2407	07/01/07	07/01/10-13
Atty. Neal Moskow (Alternate)	883 Black Rock Turnpike Fairfield, CT 06825	07/01/07	07/01/10-13
<u>TOLLAND JUDICIAL DISTRICT</u>			
Rev. Charles Erickson	14 Watrous Road Bolton, CT 06043	07/01/08	07/01/11-14
<u>Atty. Jeffrey Mickelson</u>	433 South Main Street Suite 313 West Hartford, CT 06110	07/01/09	<u>07/01/12-15</u>
Atty. Carol A. Brigham	69 Broad Street Danielson, CT 06239	07/01/07	07/01/10-13
Atty. Milton I. Walsh (Alternate)	Office of the Public Defender 410 Center Street Manchester, CT 06040	07/01/07	07/01/10-13

**First
Commenced
Service On
Grievance
Panel**

Term

WATERBURY JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Christopher Metcalf	108 Main St. North 2 nd Floor Southbury, CT 06488	7/01/11	7/01/11-14
<u>Atty. Kathleen Allsup</u>	25 Audubon Lane Shelton, CT 06484	07/01/09	<u>07/01/12-15</u>
Atty. Michael S. McKenna	9 South Main Street New Milford, CT 06776-0786	07/01/07	07/01/10-13

Atty. Helen D. Murphy (Alternate)	234 Church Street 5 th Floor New Haven, CT 06510-1881	07/01/10	07/01/10-13
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WINDHAM JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Peter Barbone	108 Valley Street Willimantic, CT 06226	07/01/11	07/01/11-14
<u>Atty. Christopher P. Anderson</u>	82 Chelsea Harbor Drive Norwich, CT 06360	07/01/12	<u>07/01/12-15</u>
Atty. Beth Steele (Alternate)	811 Boswell Avenue Norwich, CT 06360	07/01/07	07/01/10-13
Atty. Douglas K. Manion	45 Hartford Turnpike P. O. Box 3811 Vernon, CT 06066	07/01/07	07/01/10-13

STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

(* - indicates this person is a non-attorney)

(Section 2-33 of the Practice Book. Terms shall commence on July 1, 2012 and appointments shall be for terms of three years. One member shall be designated as chair and another as vice chair. No member shall serve for more than two consecutive three year terms excluding any appointments for less than a full term. **ONLY THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHOSE NAMES ARE UNDERLINED ARE BEING CONSIDERED FOR APPOINTMENT OR REAPPOINTMENT.**)

<u>Member</u>	<u>Address</u>	<u>Judicial District</u>	<u>First Commenced Service Under 7/1/86 Rules</u>	<u>Term</u>
Atty. Howard C. Eckenrode	P.O. Box 507 86 Cherry Street Milford, CT 06460	Ansonia/ Milford	07/01/10	07/01/10-13
Atty. Frank J. Riccio II (Chair)	P.O. Box 491 Bridgeport, CT 06601	Danbury	03/13/09	07/01/10-13
* Patrick Sheridan	45 Redwood Drive Bethel, CT 06801	Danbury	03/11/11	07/01/10-13
<u>Atty. J. Kevin Golger</u>	McNamara and Kenney 815 Main St. 2 nd Fl Bridgeport, CT 06604	Fairfield	07/01/12	<u>07/01/12-15</u>
Atty. Christopher T. Goulden	1000 Bridgeport Avenue Suite 102 Shelton, CT 06484	Fairfield	07/01/10	07/01/10-13
* Rev. Simon Castillo	555 Maplewood Avenue Bridgeport, CT 06604	Fairfield	07/01/10	07/01/10-13
<u>Atty. William J. O'Sullivan</u>	100 Great Meadow Road Suite 100 Wethersfield, CT 06109-2355	Hartford	09/04/09	<u>07/01/12-15</u>
<u>Atty. Noble Allen</u> (Vice-Chair)	20 Church Street 18 th Floor Hartford, CT 06103	Hartford	09/04/09	<u>07/01/12-15</u>

STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

(* - indicates this person is a non-attorney)

<u>Member</u>	<u>Address</u>	<u>Judicial District</u>	<u>First Commenced Service Under 7/1/86 Rules</u>	<u>Term</u>
* Joan Gill	P. O. Box 952 Litchfield, CT 06759	Litchfield	10/14/11	07/01/11-14
Atty. Sue A. Cousineau	516 Main Street Suite 25 Middletown, CT 06457	Middlesex	07/01/11	07/01/11-14
Atty. Joseph D. Foti	700 West Johnson Avenue Suite 207 Cheshire, CT 06410	New Britain	07/01/10	07/01/10-13
<u>Atty. Thomas J. Sansone</u>	Carmody & Torrance 195 Church Street P. O Box 1950 New Haven, CT 06509	New Haven	07/01/12	<u>07/01/12-15</u>
* Dr. Romeo A. Vidone	880 Race Brook Road Orange, CT 06477	New Haven	07/01/06	07/01/11-14
* <u>Robert Myers</u>	11 Binney Road New London, CT 06320	New London	07/01/12	<u>07/01/12-15</u>
Atty. Donna E. Woviotis	Superior Court 70 Huntington Street New London, CT 06320	New London	07/01/10	07/01/10-13
* Judith Freedman	17 Crawford Road Westport, CT 06880	Stamford/ Norwalk	07/01/10	07/01/10-13
Atty. Thomas Maxwell, Jr.	850 Main Street Bridgeport, CT 06604	Stamford/ Norwalk	07/01/07	07/01/10-13

STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

(* - indicates this person is a non-attorney)

<u>Member</u>	<u>Address</u>	<u>Judicial District</u>	<u>First Commenced Service Under 7/1/86 Rules</u>	<u>Term</u>
Atty. Evelyn Gryk Frolich	333 East Center Street Manchester, CT 06040	Tolland	07/01/07	07/01/10-13
*Vincent Mauro, Jr.	24 Kneeland Road New Haven, CT 06512	Waterbury	02/10/12	07/01/11-14
Atty. David Channing	Div of Public Defenders 20 Park Street Rockville, CT 06066	Waterbury	01/14/05	07/01/10-13
Atty. Nancy E. Fraser	P.O. Box 166 Putnam, CT 06260	Windham	07/01/08	07/01/11-14

STATEWIDE BAR COUNSEL

(Section 2-34 of the Practice Book provides for the appointment of a statewide bar counsel and such additional attorneys to act as assistant bar counsel for a term of one year commencing July 1, 2012.)

Attorney Michael P. Bowler, Statewide Bar Counsel

Attorney Christopher G. Blanchard, First Assistant Bar Counsel

Attorney Christopher L. Slack, First Assistant Bar Counsel

Attorney Frances Mickelson-Dera, First Assistant Bar Counsel

Attorney Darlene F. Reynolds, Assistant Bar Counsel

Attorney Cathy A. Dowd, Assistant Bar Counsel

Attorney Maureen A. Horgan, Assistant Bar Counsel

Attorney Elizabeth M. Rowe, Assistant Bar Counsel

Attorney Kerry Johnson O'Connell, Assistant Bar Counsel

Any other lawyer in the Legal Services Division, except Disciplinary Counsel, to act as Assistant Bar Counsel.

BAR COUNSEL
FOR LOCAL GRIEVANCE PANELS

(Section 2-30 of the Practice Book. Terms are for one year commencing July 1, 2012. Appointees may serve any grievance panel. Panels to be principally served by each counsel are noted below.)

BAR COUNSEL

<u>Name</u>	<u>Address</u>	
Vacant		J.D. of Fairfield
<u>Atty. John J. Quinn</u>	248 Hudson Street Hartford, 06106-1777	J.D. of Hartford (for G.A.13 and the city of Hartford)
<u>Atty. Richard T. Florentine</u>	407 Old Toll Road Madison, CT 06443	J.D.'s of New Britain, Tolland and Hartford (for G.A. 12 and the towns of Avon, Bloomfield Canton, Farmington and West Hartford)
<u>Atty. Michael A. Georgetti</u>	67 Russ Street Hartford, CT 06106	J.D. of New Haven (for the towns of Bethany, New Haven and Woodbridge)
<u>Attorney Jose Adrian Rebollo</u>	44 Lyon Terrace Bridgeport, CT 06604	J.D.'s of Ansonia-Milford and New Haven (for G.A. 7 and the towns of Branford, East Haven, Guilford, Madison and North Branford)
<u>Atty. Gail S. Kotowski</u>	397 Church Street Guilford, CT 06437-0037	J.D.'s of Danbury, Litchfield and Waterbury
<u>Atty. Gregory A. Benoit</u>	P.O. Box 270 Waterford, CT 06385	J.D.'s of Middlesex, New London and Windham
<u>Eugene J. Riccio</u>	P.O. Box 9118 Bridgeport, CT 06604	J.D. of Stamford-Norwalk

**BAR COUNSEL AND INVESTIGATORS
FOR LOCAL GRIEVANCE PANELS**

**INVESTIGATORS
(Statewide Duties)**

Paul J. Piasecki, Jr., C.P.A.
Piasecki and Company/Suite 203
53 Old Kings Highway North
Darien, CT 06820

CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL AND DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL

(Section 2-34A of the Practice Book provides for the appointment of a chief disciplinary counsel and such disciplinary counsel as are necessary, for a term of one year commencing July 1, 2012)

Attorney Patricia King, Chief Disciplinary Counsel

Vacant First Assistant Chief Disciplinary Counsel

Attorney Suzanne B. Sutton, Assistant Chief Disciplinary Counsel

Attorney Karyl L. Carrasquilla, Assistant Chief Disciplinary Counsel

Attorney Beth L. Baldwin, Assistant Chief Disciplinary Counsel

STATE BAR EXAMINING COMMITTEE, SUPERIOR COURT

(Section 2-3 of the Practice Book provides the term of office of each member, one of whom must be a judge, shall be three years from the first day of September succeeding his appointment, and terms shall be continued to be arranged so that those of eight members shall expire annually. Vacancies shall be filled by the judges for unexpired terms only. **ONLY THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHOSE NAMES ARE UNDERLINED ARE BEING CONSIDERED FOR APPOINTMENT OR REAPPOINTMENT.**)

<u>Name</u>		<u>Initial Appointment</u>	<u>3-Year Term</u>
<u>FAIRFIELD COUNTY</u>			
Atty. Frederic S. Ury	Bridgeport	09/01/10	09/01/11 – 08/31/14
<u>Atty. Edward Gavin</u>	Bridgeport	09/01/11	<u>09/01/12 - 08/31/15</u>
<u>Atty. Karen L. Karpie</u>	Bridgeport	09/01/09	<u>09/01/12 - 08/31/15</u>
Atty. Eric M. Gross	Bridgeport	09/01/07	09/01/10 - 08/31/13
<u>HARTFORD COUNTY</u>			
<u>Hon. Nina F. Elgo</u>	Hartford, CT	09-01-12	<u>9/01/12 - 08/31/15</u>
<u>Atty. Matthew Wax Krell</u>	Hartford	09/01/06	<u>09/01/12 - 08/31/15</u>
<u>Atty. Michael J. Whelton</u>	E. Hartford	10/25/84	<u>09/01/12 - 08/31/15</u>
Atty. Denise Martino Phelan	Hartford	09/01/92	09/01/10 - 08/31/13
Atty. Richard Banbury	Hartford	09/01/80	09/01/10 - 08/31/13
Atty. Deborah L. Bradley	Hartford	03/15/94	09/01/11 - 08/31/14
Atty. Robert D. Silva	Hartford	09/01/11	09/01/11 - 08/31/14

STATE BAR EXAMINING COMMITTEE, SUPERIOR COURT

<u>Name</u>		<u>Initial Appointment</u>	<u>3-Year Term</u>
<u>LITCHFIELD COUNTY</u>			
Atty. David A. Moraghan	Torrington	09/01/91	09/01/11 - 08/31/14
Atty. Anne C. Dranginis	Litchfield	09/21/78	09/01/10 - 08/31/13
<u>MIDDLESEX COUNTY</u>			
Atty. Sharon A. Peters	Portland	09/01/97	<u>09/01/12 - 08/31/15</u>
Hon. Barbara M. Quinn	Chester	06/23/86	09/01/11 - 08/31/14
Hon. C. Ian McLachlan	Chester	06/05/07	09/01/11 - 08/31/14
<u>NEW HAVEN COUNTY</u>			
Atty. Adam Mantzaris	Wallingford	09/01/91	<u>09/01/12 - 08/31/15</u>
Atty. Alix Simonetti	New Haven	10/02/00	<u>09/01/12 - 08/31/15</u>
Atty. Gail E. McTaggart	Waterbury	09/01/89	09/01/10 - 08/31/13
Atty. Irving H. Perlmutter	New Haven	09/01/83	09/01/10 - 08/31/13
Atty. Earl F. Dewey, II	Wallingford	09/27/00	09/01/10 - 08/31/13

STATE BAR EXAMINING COMMITTEE, SUPERIOR COURT

<u>Name</u>		<u>Initial Appointment</u>	<u>3-Year Term</u>
<u>NEW LONDON COUNTY</u>			
<u>Atty. Raymond L. Baribeault</u>	New London	09/28/11	<u>09/01/10 - 08/31/13</u>
<u>TOLLAND COUNTY</u>			
<u>Atty. Susan Boyan</u>	Vernon	04/22/09	<u>09/01/11- 08/31/14</u>
<hr/>			
<u>WINDHAM COUNTY</u>			
<u>Atty. Kevin C. Connors</u>	Willimantic	09/01/05	<u>09/01/11 - 08/31/14</u>

**STANDING COMMITTEE ON RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR, SUPERIOR COURT**

(Section 2-12 of the Practice Book provides there shall be in each county a standing committee on recommendations for admission, consisting of not less than three nor more than seven members of the bar of that county, who shall be appointed by the judges of the superior court to hold office for three years and until successors are appointed. **ONLY THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHOSE NAMES ARE UNDERLINED ARE BEING CONSIDERED FOR APPOINTMENT OR REAPPOINTMENT.**)

County

Term: 3 Years

FAIRFIELD COUNTY

<u>Atty. Douglas P. Mahoney</u>	<u>07/01/12 - 15</u>
Atty. Carolyn R. Linsey	07/01/10 - 13
<u>Atty. Edward F. Czepiga</u>	<u>07/01/12 - 15</u>
Atty. Robert W. Lotty	07/01/10 - 13
Atty. Cindy L. Robinson	07/01/10 - 13
Atty. Auden Grogins	07/01/11 - 14

HARTFORD COUNTY

<u>Atty. Rene Rosado</u>	<u>07/01/12- 15</u>
Atty. Gary Friedle	07/01/10 - 13
Atty. Richard R. Brown	07/01/10 - 13
Atty. Monica Lafferty Harper	07/01/10 - 13
Atty. Vincent L. Diana	07/01/10 - 13
Atty. Thomas P. FitzGerald	07/01/11 - 14
Atty. David Curry	07/01/11 - 14

**STANDING COMMITTEE ON RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR, SUPERIOR COURT**

County

Term: 3 Years

LITCHFIELD COUNTY

<u>Atty. Jill Brakeman</u>	<u>07/01/12 - 15</u>
Atty. Louise F. Brown	07/01/10 - 13
Atty. Frank H. Finch, Jr.	07/01/10 - 13

MIDDLESEX COUNTY

Atty. William Howard	07/01/10 - 13
Atty. Deborah Shapiro	07/01/11 - 14
Atty. Linda T. Douglas	07/01/11 - 14

NEW HAVEN COUNTY

<u>Atty. Donald J. Zehnder, Jr.</u>	<u>07/01/12 - 15</u>
<u>Atty. Dennis W. Gillooly</u>	<u>07/01/12 - 15</u>
Atty. Howard K. Levine	07/01/10 - 13
Atty. John R. Donovan	07/01/10 - 13
Atty. Steven J. Errante	07/01/11 - 14
<u>Atty. Timothy P. Dillon</u>	<u>07/01/12 - 15</u>
<u>Atty. Cynthia C. Bott</u>	<u>07/01/12 - 15</u>

**STANDING COMMITTEE ON RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR, SUPERIOR COURT**

County

Term: 3 Years

NEW LONDON COUNTY

Atty. Kerin M. Woods	07/01/10 - 13
Atty. Beth Steele	07/01/10 - 13
Atty. Lonnie Braxton	07/01/11 - 14

TOLLAND COUNTY

<u>Atty. Timothy J. Johnston</u>	<u>07/01/12 - 15</u>
<u>Atty. Caryl E. Balskus</u>	<u>07/01/12 - 15</u>
Atty. Kerry Tarpey	07/01/11 - 14

WINDHAM COUNTY

Atty. B. Paul Kaplan	07/01/11 - 14
Atty. Gina Mancini Pickett	07/01/11 - 14
Atty. Rachel L. Sarantopoulos	07/01/11 - 14

MISCELLANEOUS

The Executive Committee is empowered to make any appointments which may have been inadvertently omitted from the lists submitted herein.
