



CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH
BIENNIAL REPORT AND STATISTICS ❖ 2014-2016

COMMITTED TO PUBLIC SERVICE EXCELLENCE





THE MISSION OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH
TO SERVE THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE
AND THE PUBLIC BY RESOLVING
MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT
IN A FAIR, TIMELY, EFFICIENT
AND OPEN MANNER.

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To the Governor, General Assembly and the Residents of the State of Connecticut:

I am pleased to present to you this Biennial Report on the Connecticut Judicial Branch for the years 2014-2016. We have titled this edition *Committed to Public Service Excellence* and have included photos of our dedicated employees, who every day help members of the public navigate our state courts.



Our judges and employees are on the front line as we continue to seek innovative and cost-effective ways of improving how we do business. One of our top priorities has been the re-engineering of how we handle civil cases, and we recently opened two mediation centers, one in Hartford and the other one in Waterbury. Recognizing that well over 90 percent of all civil cases settle before trial, we believe that it is imperative to offer effective alternative dispute resolution options that are cost-free to the parties, especially since the ultimate beneficiaries are the litigants seeking a resolution to their case.

The Judicial Branch's ongoing effort to improve the family court process also occurred during this biennium and has resulted in many significant changes. For example, the process of obtaining a divorce has been simplified for parties who meet certain criteria. In another area, we made significant improvements regarding the appointments of guardians ad litem and attorneys for the minor child. Additional changes will be noted in other sections of this biennial, and I am grateful to all of the individuals who have worked so hard to make both our civil and family processes better for those involved.

Year after year, our outstanding employees and judges rise to meet whatever challenge is ahead, and the entire state benefits from their commitment to public service excellence. We look forward to working with both the Legislative and Executive Branches as we move forward.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Chase T. Rogers". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letters of the first and last names being capitalized and prominent.

Chase T. Rogers
Chief Justice

To the Governor, General Assembly and the Residents of the State of Connecticut:

Under the leadership of Chief Justice Chase T. Rogers, the Judicial Branch continues to reshape the Judicial Branch so that it best meets the needs of the public in the 21st century. This task has become more difficult with the budgetary crises we have faced and continue to face. We have lost hundreds of dedicated employees through layoffs, retirements and other attrition. The Branch has also closed two courthouses and severely curtailed the hours of its law libraries throughout the state.

Nevertheless, we cannot retreat from our constitutional obligations. Our long-term strategic plan has served as an invaluable foundation as we seek ways to enhance access to justice. We have implemented hundreds of initiatives that have made a positive difference. Of special interest over the biennium has been the continued re-engineering of our civil and family dockets with particular emphasis on streamlining the process for parties.



Regarding civil re-engineering, I noted in my previous biennial letter that we had implemented individual calendaring in three locations. I'm pleased to report that individual calendaring has since been rolled out to all of our judicial districts. Our hope is that this process will provide consistency and predictability and that it will also reduce the cost of litigation. Currently, we are evaluating the program to assess its impact and to get feedback from counsel, self-represented parties and litigants.

Additionally, we are piloting individual calendaring in the Norwich Family Court, with the same goals of enhanced predictability and consistency and less cost to the parties. Under the pilot, each case on the regular family docket (excluding restraining orders unless specifically assigned to a judge) is assigned to a particular judge who will take responsibility for the case up to the time of trial and including pretrial. If a case does not settle before trial, the case will be assigned at the time of trial to another judge who will assume responsibility for that case from the time trial commences, through any post-judgment proceedings. It is contemplated that other family court locations, perhaps with slight variations in the model, will pilot individual calendaring in the near future.


We are excited about the initiatives I've highlighted and many others. We are also grateful to our judges and staff for their diligence in making these programs work. In closing, I can assure you that our efforts to improve the court system will continue, as we remain guided by our mission to resolve disputes in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Patrick L. Carroll III". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a small mark at the end.

Judge Patrick L. Carroll III
Chief Court Administrator

CONNECTICUT COURT STRUCTURE



SUPREME COURT



Front L-R: Justice Richard N. Palmer, Chief Justice Chase T. Rogers, Justice Peter T. Zarella

Back L-R: Justice Carmen E. Espinosa, Justice Andrew J. McDonald, Justice Dennis G. Eveleigh, Justice Richard A. Robinson, Senior Justice Christine S. Vertefeuille

The Supreme Court is the state's highest court. It consists of the chief justice, six associate justices and one senior justice.

The Supreme Court reviews rulings made in the Appellate and Superior Courts to determine if any errors have occurred. The court sits *en banc* – in panels of seven – in cases in which there are no disqualifications.

The Supreme Court goes “on circuit” annually and schedules actual arguments at a school, where students get a first-hand look at how an appellate level court works.

The sessions are held in the same way as they would be held in the Supreme Court's courtroom. Educators and students are supplied with advance materials, including the briefs filed. After the arguments, informational talks are held for the students with the counsel who argued the cases.

Over the biennium, the court visited Fairfield Warde High School in October 2014 and the University of Connecticut School of Law in October 2015.

NOTEWORTHY CASES HEARD BY THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE BIENNIUM



***Dan v. Dan*, 315 Conn. 1 (2014).**

The issue raised in this appeal was whether the trial court may modify a judgment rendered in accordance with a stipulated alimony award solely on the basis of an increase in the income of the supporting spouse. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Zarella, the court observed that the primary purposes of alimony awards are either to maintain the supported spouse's standard of living at the level he or she enjoyed during the marriage or to provide temporary support in order to allow the supported spouse to become self-sufficient. The court concluded that, when the sole change in circumstances is an increase in the income of the supporting spouse, and when the initial award was and continues to be sufficient to fulfill its intended purpose, the supported spouse is not entitled to a modification of the award based solely on the supporting spouse's increased income. When the initial award was not sufficient to fulfill its underlying purpose, however, an increase in the supporting spouse's salary, in and of itself, may justify an increase in the award.

***State v. Riley*, 315 Conn. 637 (2015).**

In *Miller v. Alabama*, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory sentencing schemes that impose a term of life imprisonment without parole on juvenile homicide offenders, thus precluding consideration of the offender's youth as a mitigating factor, violate the eighth amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The defendant in this case was convicted of murder and attempted murder and was sentenced to 100 years imprisonment, the effective equivalent of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court claiming that Connecticut's sentencing scheme was in violation of *Miller* even though it was discretionary because it does not require the sentencing court to consider the defendant's age. That court determined that, because *Miller* requires only that a defendant be afforded the opportunity to present mitigating evidence relating

to his age and that the court be permitted to impose a lesser sentence than life imprisonment without parole, Connecticut's discretionary sentencing scheme was constitutional. On appeal to this court, a majority of the court, in an opinion authored by Justice McDonald, concluded that *Miller* did not hold only that sentencing schemes that mandate life imprisonment for juveniles are unconstitutional, but also held that, if the sentencing scheme is discretionary, the sentencing court is required to consider the defendant's age and the hallmark features of that age. Because Connecticut's sentencing scheme did not impose such a requirement, and because there was no evidence that the sentencing court in fact adequately considered the defendant's age, the court concluded that the defendant's sentencing proceeding was unconstitutional and he was entitled to a new proceeding that conformed to the dictates of *Miller*. Justice Espinosa authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Zarella joined, arguing that, because the sentencing court is free to consider a juvenile defendant's age under a discretionary scheme, such schemes do not violate the eighth amendment.

***State v. Menditto*, 315 Conn. 861 (2015).**

In 2011, the legislature changed the penalty for possessing less than one-half ounce of marijuana from a potential term of imprisonment and/or a large fine to a fine of \$150 for a first offense and a fine of between \$200 and \$500 for subsequent offenses. Pursuant to another Connecticut statute, when any person has been convicted of an offense that was subsequently decriminalized, the convicted person may petition the Superior Court for an order directing that all public records pertaining to the conviction be destroyed. The issue in this case was whether the 2015 change in the penalty for possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana constituted a decriminalization of the offense for purposes of the erasure statute. In an opinion authored by Justice Espinosa, the court concluded that, for purposes of the erasure statute, the word "decriminalize" is not synonymous with the word "legalize," but means the replacement of criminal sanctions by civil fines. The court further concluded that the 2015 change in the

NOTEWORTHY CASES HEARD BY THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE BIENNIUM

punishment for possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana changed the status of the offense from a crime to a minor civil violation, which is not the type of conduct to which society attaches substantial moral opprobrium or that society takes into account when making important decisions, such as hiring employees. Accordingly, the court concluded that possessing less than one-half ounce of marijuana has been decriminalized for purposes of the erasure statute.

***Thiersaint v. Commissioner of Correction*, 316 Conn. 89 (2015).**

The petitioner in this case, who was a citizen of Haiti and a legal permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty in 2007 to possession of narcotics with intent to sell and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Immediately upon his release from prison, the federal government took him into custody and commenced deportation/removal proceedings against him. In 2010, the United States Supreme Court ruled in *Padilla v. Kentucky*, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010), that an attorney's failure to advise a client of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea constitutes constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming ineffective assistance of counsel under *Padilla* on the ground that his attorney had failed to advise him that his guilty plea and subsequent conviction would subject him to deportation. The habeas court granted the petition, and the respondent appealed. In an opinion authored by Justice Zarella, a majority of the court concluded that, as a matter of federal law, *Padilla* does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review; in determining the retroactivity of constitutional holdings under state law, the court applies the same standard as the federal courts; and, under that standard, the constitutional rule that the United States Supreme Court adopted in *Padilla* was a new rule in this state and, therefore, the rule does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. Accordingly, the majority reversed the judgment of the habeas court and directed that court to deny the petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Justice Palmer authored a dissenting opinion in

which he contended that *Padilla* is retroactive because it did not announce a new constitutional rule, but was merely an application of the well established standard governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Justice Eveleigh authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice McDonald joined, arguing that the court should not follow federal law in determining the retroactivity of constitutional holdings, but should adopt a more lenient standard. Justice Eveleigh further contended that, under that standard, *Padilla* applies retroactively.

***Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction*, 316 Conn. 225 (2015).**

The petitioner in this case was convicted of capital felony and arson murder, among other charges, in connection with the killing of his wife's grandmother. He subsequently filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in which he claimed that his counsel in a previous habeas proceeding had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to pursue a claim that the state had not disclosed certain exculpatory evidence that would have allowed the petitioner to present expert testimony in support of his alibi claim if it had been timely disclosed. The habeas court ultimately dismissed the claim on the ground that it was not reasonably probable that the jury at the petitioner's criminal trial would have credited the testimony of the petitioner's expert witnesses. On appeal, the Appellate Court concluded that the defendant was entitled to a new trial at which the jury would decide how much weight to give the testimony. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the habeas court, and the respondent appealed. In an opinion authored by Justice Palmer, a majority of the court concluded that, although a reviewing court ordinarily accords deference to the habeas court's credibility determinations, when that determination is not based on a witness's demeanor, conduct on the witness stand, untruthfulness, bias, poor memory or substandard powers of observation, but is based solely on the habeas court's evaluation of the foundational soundness of the witness's professional opinion, the reviewing court is as well situated as the habeas court to assess the testimony, and no deference is required. The majority

NOTEWORTHY CASES HEARD BY THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE BIENNIUM

further concluded that the jury reasonably could have credited the testimony of the petitioner's experts, and the testimony was material because it undermined confidence in the guilty verdict. Accordingly, the majority affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. Chief Justice Rogers authored a concurring opinion in which she criticized the majority's reliance on secondary materials postdating the petitioner's criminal trial as part of its assessment of the strength of the state's evidence. Chief Justice Rogers also emphasized that the majority's conclusion that it need not defer to the habeas court's credibility assessment should apply only under the narrow circumstances of this case. Justice Zarella authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Espinosa joined, contending that the court should defer to the credibility findings of the habeas court because it lacks constitutional authority to find facts. In addition, he contended that the issue of whether the court should defer to the habeas court's credibility determinations was unreviewable because it had not been raised by the parties. Justice Zarella further contended that, because the habeas court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous, its judgment should be affirmed. Justice Espinosa authored a dissenting opinion in which she contended that the majority had usurped the habeas court's fact-finding role, improperly raised issues sua sponte on appeal and acted as an advocate for the petitioner.

***In re Yasiel R.*, 317 Conn. 77 (2015).**

The issue in this case was whether the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution requires the trial court to canvass a parent subject to a parental termination proceeding about his or her decision not to contest the evidence and to waive his or her right to present a case at trial. In an opinion authored by Justice Eveleigh, a majority of the court concluded that parents have an important, constitutionally protected interest in retaining their parental rights; requiring the trial court to canvass parents prior to terminating their rights would not substantially decrease the risk of an erroneous deprivation of those

rights; and that the administrative interest in lessening the cost of termination proceedings and in ensuring a speedy and accurate resolution in order to promote the interests of the child weighed neither for nor against recognizing a right to a canvass. Balancing these considerations, the court concluded that constitutional due process principles do not require the trial court to canvass a respondent who is represented by counsel. The court also concluded, however, that public confidence in the integrity of the judicial system would be enhanced by a rule requiring a brief canvass of all parents immediately before a parental rights termination trial to ensure that the parents understand the trial process, their rights during the trial and the potential consequences. Accordingly, the court exercised its supervisory power to require such a canvass. Because the respondent parent in this case had not been canvassed, the court concluded that the judgment terminating her parental rights must be reversed and that she was entitled to a new termination proceeding. Justice Zarella authored a concurring and dissenting opinion in which he contended that the court's exercise of its supervisory authority in this case was unwarranted and that the court should never exercise its supervisory authority to reverse a judgment in the absence of independent grounds for reversal. Rather, supervisory rules should have only prospective application. Justice Espinosa authored a concurring and dissenting opinion in which she contended that the court should exercise its supervisory authority to adopt procedural rules with prospective application only when the proposed rule is central to safeguarding the interests implicated by an issue of vital importance to the perceived fairness of the judicial system and there are no significant countervailing interests. She further contended that such rules should be applied to the case in which the rule is announced only when doing so is justified by exceptional circumstances. Applying these standards to this case, Justice Espinosa concluded that the new supervisory rule was unwarranted and, even if it were warranted, there were no exceptional circumstances justifying the reversal of the judgment.

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THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE BIENNIUM

***Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.*, 317 Conn. 357 (2015).**

The plaintiff brought a civil action against the defendant, the Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, claiming that it had acted negligently and recklessly when it assigned a priest, who had previously admitted to molesting other boys, to serve as the priest-director of an elementary school in a different town, where he sexually abused the plaintiff from 1981 through 1983. The plaintiff's claim would have been barred by the statute of limitations for sexual abuse claims had the legislature not revived the claim when it extended the limitations period to thirty years from the date the plaintiff attained the age of majority. After a jury trial, the plaintiff received a verdict of more than \$1 million in damages. The defendant appealed, claiming that the retroactive application of those amendments to the statute of limitations to revive the lapsed claim violated its due process rights under article first, §§ 8 and 10 of the Connecticut constitution. In an opinion authored by Justice Robinson, a majority of the court concluded that the retroactive application of the extended statute of limitations to revive the plaintiff's otherwise time-barred claims did not violate the defendant's substantive due process rights under our state constitution. The court concluded that Connecticut's constitutional history did not support the defendant's claim that it should provide greater protection to the defendant than is provided under the United States constitution, which permits the revival of time-barred claims. The court also concluded that the legislature had a rational basis for reviving time-barred claims arising from sexual abuse, including the unique psychological and social factors that often result in delayed reporting of childhood sexual abuse, which frustrated the ability of victims to bring an action under earlier revisions of the statute of limitations. Justice Zarella authored a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the result, but suggested modifications to the framework for analyzing state constitutional claims announced in *State v. Geisler*, 222 Conn. 672, 684–85 (1992).

***Tilcon Connecticut, Inc. v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection*, 317 Conn. 628 (2015).**

This case required the court to determine the scope of the authority granted to the Department of Environmental Protection (department) under the Connecticut Water Diversion Policy Act (act), General Statutes § 22a-265 et seq. The plaintiff submitted to the department five applications for water diversion permits, one for each of its earth materials excavation and processing facilities. Three years later, the department requested comprehensive information about all of the plaintiff's excavation activities at the facilities for the twenty-five year duration of the permits. In response, the plaintiff contended that it was required to submit information only with regard to those portions of the properties that could reasonably be expected to be affected by a diversion of water and that it was unable to predict the extent of its operations twenty-five years in the future. In turn, the department told the plaintiff that it had jurisdiction over all activity at the plaintiff's facilities and requested still more information. The plaintiff then filed a petition for a declaratory ruling to the commissioner of the department seeking clarification of the scope of the department's authority. The commissioner concluded that all of the department's requests for information were authorized by the act. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the ruling in part and reversed it in part, and the plaintiff appealed. In an opinion authored by Justice Eveleigh, the court concluded that the act does not empower the department to request information to determine the extent and environmental effects of diversions other than those for which a permit is sought; the department had exceeded its authority in requesting a wetlands mitigation plan; and that the department was not authorized to delay processing the plaintiff's National Pollutant Elimination System permit due to a pending water diversion permit application. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court and directed that court to sustain the plaintiff's appeal.

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***State v. Santiago*, 318 Conn. 1 (2015).**

After the defendant in this case was sentenced to death, the legislature abolished the death penalty for any crimes committed after the effective date of the repealing legislation. On appeal, the defendant claimed, among other things, that executing him after the prospective repeal would deprive him of his due process right under the Connecticut constitution to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because the death penalty no longer comports with contemporary standards of decency and no longer serves any legitimate penological purpose. In an opinion authored by Justice Palmer, a majority of the court concluded that the legislature's prospective abolition of the death penalty reflected its belief that the death penalty no longer is an appropriate or necessary punishment and, therefore, it does not comport with this state's contemporary standards of decency. The majority further concluded that, in light of the prospective repeal, the death penalty no longer had any deterrent value, nor did it serve a meaningful retributive purpose. Accordingly, the majority concluded that the death penalty is unconstitutional. Justices Norcott and McDonald authored a concurring opinion expressing their concerns about persistent allegations of racial and ethnic discrimination in capital charging and sentencing decisions. Justice Eveleigh authored a concurring opinion in which he contended that executing the defendant following the prospective repeal of the death penalty would violate both the due process provisions of the state constitution and the eighth amendment of the United States constitution. Chief Justice Rogers authored a dissenting opinion in which she contended that, in reaching its decision, the majority had considered issues that the defendant had not raised and relied on extra-record materials that the parties had not reviewed. She further contended that, with respect to the issues that the defendant had raised, he had failed to establish that the death penalty was unconstitutional under either the state or the federal constitution. Justice Zarella authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Espinosa joined, contending that the majority had misapplied the law governing the interpretation of the state constitution and that, under a proper application of that law, the death

penalty is constitutional. Justice Espinosa authored a separate dissenting opinion in which she contended that the majority decision violated constitutional separation of powers principles by usurping the legislature's authority to determine the appropriate punishment for a crime.

***Lawrence v. O and G Industries, Inc.*, 318 Conn. 641 (2015).**

The issue in the case was whether construction companies owe a duty of care to workers employed on a job site who suffer purely economic harm, such as lost wages, as a result of an accident caused by the construction companies' negligence. The plaintiffs brought an action claiming that they were gainfully employed in various trades at a power plant construction site until a gas explosion allegedly caused by the defendants' negligence resulted in the termination of their employment. The trial court granted the defendants' motions to strike, concluding that the defendants owed the plaintiffs no duty of care, and the plaintiffs appealed. Justice Robinson authored an opinion in which the court concluded that, because the plaintiffs' economic losses were a remote and attenuated result of the defendants' alleged negligence, and because the plaintiffs had the statutory remedy of unemployment insurance, the parties had no reasonable expectation that the defendants would be liable for this type of injury. The court further concluded that recognizing such claims would cause an increase in litigation that would not be accompanied by a corresponding increase in safety, because parties like the defendants are already subject to extensive regulation and civil liability for a wide variety of claims. Finally, the court observed that a majority of federal and state courts have rejected claims like the plaintiffs' pursuant to the economic loss doctrine, under which defendants are shielded from unlimited liability for the purely economic consequences of their negligent acts because holding them liable would subject them to losses far out of proportion to their culpability. Accordingly, the court concluded that the defendants did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs and affirmed the judgments of the trial court.

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***Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC*, 319 Conn. 174 (2015).**

In this case, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut certified the following question to the court: “Does the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in *Garcetti v. Ceballos*, 547 U.S. 410, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689 (2006), i.e., that when employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for first amendment purposes, and the constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline, apply to a claim that an employer violated General Statutes § 31-51q by subjecting an employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by §§ 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the constitution of the state?” In an opinion authored by Justice Palmer, a majority of the court first addressed the question of whether the *Garcetti* standard, which applies to claims against a public employer pursuant to the first amendment of the federal constitution, was the proper standard for such claims under the state constitution or, instead, the more flexible test set forth in *Connick v. Myers*, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1983), and *Pickering v. Board of Education*, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968), under which employee speech is protected if it involves a matter of public concern and the employee’s interest in speaking outweighs the employer’s interest in promoting an efficient workplace, applies. The majority concluded that a modified form of the *Pickering/Connick* balancing test, under which employee speech pursuant to the employee’s official duties is protected from discipline by a public employer if it concerns certain matters of significant public interest, applies under the state constitution. The majority then concluded that this standard also applies to claims against private employers pursuant to § 31-51q. Accordingly, the majority concluded that the answer to the certified question was “no.” Justice Zarella authored a concurring opinion in which he contended that § 31-51q does not protect any employee speech by a private sector employee in a private workplace. Because that claim had not been raised by the parties, however, Justice Zarella concurred in the majority opinion.

***In re Gabriella A.*, 319 Conn. 775 (2015).**

The respondent, a citizen of Jamaica, gave birth to a child, Gabriella A., while on a visit to Connecticut in 2011. Approximately six weeks later, the respondent returned to Jamaica, leaving Gabriella, as well as Gabriella’s ten year old half-sister, Erica M., in the Connecticut home of an acquaintance. Thereafter, the Department of Children and Families (department) discovered evidence that Gabriella was being sexually and physically abused. The department filed a motion for an immediate order of temporary custody with respect to Erica and Gabriella, which the trial court granted, as well as a neglect petition. Ultimately, the trial court adjudicated Gabriella neglected and committed her to the care of the department. At the same time, the court ordered specific steps that the respondent should take to regain custody of Gabriella. As part of its reunification plan, the department referred the respondent to various therapists. During therapy, it was revealed that the respondent had suffered severe trauma as a child, including sexual abuse and abandonment. In 2013, the department filed a petition for termination of parental rights on behalf of Gabriella. During trial, one of the respondent’s therapists testified that the respondent may not have received the appropriate type of therapy, namely, trauma focused, cognitive behavioral therapy. The therapist also testified that the respondent’s belief that she did not need to change made it unlikely that she would benefit from any therapy. Based in large part on this testimony, the trial court granted the department’s petition for termination of parental rights, and the Appellate Court affirmed that judgment. On appeal to this court, the respondent contended that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that she would be unable to benefit from further reunification services, because her therapist testified that she had never received the appropriate therapeutic treatment. In an opinion authored by Justice Espinosa, a majority of the court concluded that the trial court was free to credit or to discredit any part of the therapist’s testimony, and that his testimony that the respondent likely would not benefit from any further therapy was sufficient to support the conclusion that she was unable

NOTEWORTHY CASES HEARD BY THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE BIENNIUM

to benefit from further reunification services. Justice Robinson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Zarella joined, contending that the department had not proved that it made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent and Gabriella because it had not provided trauma therapy until one year after the respondent started therapy, and then sought to terminate the respondent's parental rights without determining whether she had made progress in that therapy.

***State v. Berrios*, 320 Conn. 265 (2016).**

In this case, the court considered the continuing vitality of the presumption of prejudice in jury tampering cases articulated by the United States Supreme Court in *Remmer v. United States*, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S. Ct. 450, 98 L. Ed. 655 (1954). The question of whether *Remmer* was still good law in the wake of *Smith v. Phillips*, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S. Ct. 940, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78 (1982), and *United States v. Olano*, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993), had divided state and federal courts for more than thirty years. In an opinion authored by Justice Robinson, the court observed that the court in *Remmer*, which had involved a possible bribe to a juror, had held that, in a criminal case, any private communication, contact or tampering, directly or indirectly with a juror during trial about the matter pending before the jury was presumptively prejudicial and a heavy burden rested on the government to establish that the contact was harmless. In *Phillips*, one of the jurors had an application pending for a job with the office of the district attorney that was prosecuting the defendant. The court held in that case that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias. Finally, in *Olano*, which involved the presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations, the court held that, although there were cases in which a jury intrusion should be presumed prejudicial, a presumption of prejudice did not change the ultimate inquiry, namely, whether the intrusion affected the jury's deliberations and its verdict. After reviewing the federal and state cases that had attempted to reconcile the apparent conflict between these cases, the court concluded that *Phillips* and *Olano* were factually distinguishable from *Remmer*, and that the *Remmer* presumption is still good law with respect to

external interference with the jury's deliberative process via private communication, contact, or tampering with jurors that relates directly to the matter being tried. The burden is on the defendant, however, to show *prima facie* entitlement to the presumption by producing evidence of an improper intrusion.

***Lewis v. Clarke*, 320 Conn. 706 (2016).**

The issue in this case was whether tribal sovereign immunity barred an action against an individual defendant who was acting within the scope of his employment by an Indian tribe when the claim was brought against the defendant in his individual capacity. In an opinion authored by Justice Eveleigh, the court observed that it is well established that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity extends to individual tribal officials acting in their representative capacity and within the scope of their authority. Although at least one other court had concluded that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity did not bar claims against individual defendants when any damages would be paid by the individual, not by the tribal treasury, the court concluded that that case was distinguishable because it involved claims of gross negligence, which are deemed to be outside the scope of employment by the tribe and, therefore, are not subject to sovereign immunity. Because there was no claim that the defendant in this case was acting outside the scope of his employment by the tribe, the court concluded that the action was barred by the tribal sovereign immunity.

***Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 321 Conn. 172 (2016).**

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified the following question to the court: "Does the Restatement (Second), Torts, § 402A, comment (i), preclude a suit premised on a strict products liability against a cigarette manufacturer based on evidence that the defendant purposefully manufactured cigarettes to increase daily consumption without regard to the resultant increase in exposure to carcinogens, but in the absence of evidence of adulteration or contamination?" In an opinion authored by Justice

NOTEWORTHY CASES HEARD BY THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE BIENNIUM

McDonald, a majority of the court observed that, under existing law, there were three standards for establishing strict product liability in tort: (1) the ordinary consumer expectation test, derived from § 402A, comment (i), of the Restatement, under which the product must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by a consumer with the ordinary knowledge of the community regarding the product's characteristics; (2) the multifactor risk-utility balancing test; and (3) the modified consumer expectation test, under which the jury would weigh the product's risks and utility and then inquire whether a reasonable consumer would consider the product design unreasonably dangerous. This court previously had applied the first and third standards, without clearly explaining the circumstances in which each test should be applied. The majority clarified that the ordinary consumer expectation test is reserved for those few cases in which a product fails to meet a consumer's legitimate, commonly accepted minimum safety expectations. In all other cases, including the present case, the modified consumer expectation test applies. The majority then concluded that § 402A, comment (i) of the Restatement did not preclude recovery under the modified consumer expectation test if an ordinary consumer would be aware of the product's risks because, even if the risks would be obvious to an ordinary consumer, the manufacturer could be held liable if the risks could be reduced without significantly reducing the utility of the product. Accordingly, the majority answered the certified question in the negative. Justice Zarella authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Espinosa, in which he contended that, in light of problems with our existing design defect tests and subsequent developments in the law, this court should abandon those tests in favor of the risk-utility test from §§ 1, 2, and 4 of the Restatement (Third), Torts.

***State v. Dickson*, 322 Conn. 401 (2016).**

The issue raised in this case was whether a witness who has not successfully identified the defendant in a fair identification procedure prior to trial constitutionally may identify the defendant in court during trial. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rogers, a majority of the court concluded that, because first time in-court

identifications are extremely suggestive; mistaken eyewitness identifications are a significant source of erroneous convictions; in-court identifications are no less the result of state action than unnecessarily suggestive out-of-court identifications; and the rationale for excluding identifications that are the result of unnecessarily suggestive out-of-court procedures is equally applicable to in-court procedures, first time in-court identifications deprive defendants of their due process right to a fair trial. Accordingly, in cases in which the identity of the defendant is an issue, if the state intends to ask a witness to identify a defendant in court, the state must conduct a prior, out-of-court identification procedure in accordance with the statutory guidelines for such procedures. Justice Zarella authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Espinosa joined, arguing that, because first time in-court identifications take place in the presence of the judge, jury and defense counsel and are subject to cross-examination, argument and cautionary jury instructions, the jury is capable of determining the reliability of such identifications. Accordingly, he contended that first time, in-court identifications do not violate due process principles. Justice Espinosa authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Zarella joined, arguing that the supervision of identification procedures and the managing of evidence should be left to the trial court. Justice Robinson authored a concurring opinion in which he contended that, because the majority ultimately concluded that the improper admission of the in-court identification was harmless, the majority should not have reached the merits of the defendant's constitutional claim.

***Harrington v. Freedom of Information Commission*, 323 Conn. 1 (2016).**

This case required the court to determine the extent to which the attorney-client privilege covers communications relating to both nonlegal and legal advice. The plaintiff filed a freedom of information request with the defendant, Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority (CRRA), seeking disclosure of communications between the CRRA and Thomas Ritter, an attorney who was employed as the defendant's outreach consultant and community liaison, and communications between the CRRA and Peter Boucher,

NOTEWORTHY CASES HEARD BY THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE BIENNIUM

an attorney who provided legal services to the CRRA. Ritter and Boucher were also registered lobbyists. When CRRA failed to promptly produce the communications, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Freedom of Information Commission (FOIC). Thereafter, CRRA produced many of the requested communications, but withheld hundreds of others, claiming that they were exempt from disclosure because they were subject to the attorney-client privilege. A hearing officer reviewed the withheld documents in camera and recommended that the FOIC find that they were privileged. The FOIC accepted this recommendation and concluded that the documents were exempt from disclosure requirements. The FOIC's decision was affirmed by the Superior Court. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the documents were not exempt because Ritter and Boucher were not consistently acting in their capacity as attorneys for the defendant, but were providing business and legislative advice and lobbying services. In an opinion authored by Justice McDonald, the court concluded that communications between an attorney and a client are privileged only if the primary purpose of the consultation is to provide legal assistance. Because the FOIC had not applied this standard, the court concluded that the case must be remanded to the FOIC for further proceedings.

***Doe v. Boy Scouts of America Corp.*, 232 Conn. 303 (2016).**

The plaintiff in this case brought an action against the defendant, the Boy Scouts of America, claiming, among other things, that he had been sexually abused by a fellow member of the Boy Scouts in the mid-1970s and the defendant was liable for his injuries because it had negligently or recklessly failed to take adequate steps to prevent them. The defendant contended that it had no duty to protect the plaintiff from the intentional misconduct of a third party; that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendant had caused his injuries; and that the plaintiff's claim was barred either by the three year statute of limitations for torts or by the two year statute of limitations for actions for injury to persons caused

by negligence or misconduct. The trial court concluded that the thirty year statute of limitations applicable to actions for injury to a minor caused by sexual abuse applied to the plaintiff's claim. At trial, the trial court denied the defendant's request to instruct the jury that the defendant could not be held liable for the intentional misconduct of the perpetrator of the sexual abuse unless the jury found that the defendant's conduct created or increased the risk that the plaintiff would be harmed by such intentional misconduct and the defendant failed to take appropriate precautions to protect him. Instead, the court gave a standard negligence instruction to the jury. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rogers, a majority of the court concluded that the trial court had improperly denied the defendant's requested jury instruction because it was an accurate statement of the governing law. Accordingly, the majority concluded that the judgment must be reversed. The majority also concluded that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case under the proper standard and the case should, therefore, be remanded for a new trial. Finally, the majority concluded that the trial court properly concluded that the thirty year statute of limitations for injury to a minor caused by sexual abuse did not apply exclusively to actions against the perpetrator of the sexual abuse, but also applied to actions against persons whose negligent conduct legally caused the abuse. Justice Eveleigh authored a concurring and dissenting opinion, in which Justice McDonald joined, contending that the trial court's improper denial of the defendant's request for a jury instruction was harmless and the judgment in favor of the plaintiff should, therefore, be affirmed. Justice Zarella authored a concurring and dissenting opinion, in which Justices Espinosa and Robinson joined, contending that the thirty year statute of limitations for injury to a minor caused by sexual abuse applies exclusively to actions against the perpetrators of the abuse and the action against the defendant was barred by the two year statute of limitations applicable to actions for injury to a person caused by negligence.

APPELLATE COURT



Front, L-R: Judge Robert E. Beach, Jr., Judge F. Herbert Gruendel, Chief Judge Alexandra D. DiPentima, Judge Douglas S. Lavine, Judge Bethany J. Alvord
Back, L-R: Judge Eliot D. Prescott, Judge Michael R. Sheldon, Judge Christine E. Keller, Judge Raheem L. Mullins

The Appellate Court reviews decisions of the Superior Court to determine if errors of law have occurred. There are nine Appellate Court judges, one of whom is designated by the chief justice to be the chief judge.

Generally, three judges hear and decide a case. The court may, however, sit *en banc*, which means that the entire court participates in the ruling. After an appeal has been decided by the Appellate Court, the Supreme Court can certify it for further review, upon the petition of an aggrieved party or by the Appellate Court panel that decided the case, if three justices of the Supreme Court vote for certification.

The Appellate Court also goes “on circuit” annually and schedules actual arguments at a school, where students get a first-hand look at how an appellate level court works. The sessions are held in the same way as they would be held in the Appellate Court’s courtroom. Teachers and students are supplied with advance materials, including the briefs filed. After the arguments, informational talks are held for the students with the counsel who argued the cases.

Over the biennium, the court visited Bridgeport’s Fairchild Wheeler Interdistrict Magnet School in October 2014, the University of Connecticut School of Law in April 2015 and Litchfield’s Tapping Reeve Law School in October 2015.

NOTEWORTHY CASES HEARD BY THE APPELLATE COURT DURING THE BIENNIUM



***Farren v. Farren*, 162 Conn. App. 51 (2015).**

The plaintiff (wife) filed a personal injury action against the defendant (husband), seeking damages for injuries she suffered as a result of a brutal beating by the defendant. After four years of litigation, the defendant failed to appear on a scheduled trial date due to an involuntary commitment and the trial court entered default judgment against him. Following a jury trial, a verdict on the issue of damages was entered for the plaintiff and the defendant moved to open the judgment. The trial court denied the defendant's motion.

The defendant appealed from both the denial of his motion to open and the entry of default judgment. He claimed that the trial court erred by misunderstanding the law in relation to involuntary commitments under General Statutes § 17a-502 when it failed to conclude that his involuntary commitment was a reasonable cause for not attending trial. The defendant further claimed that his due process rights were violated when the trial court continued the personal injury trial during the pendency of his collateral criminal proceeding.

In an opinion consolidating the two appeals, the Appellate Court held that an involuntary commitment does not necessarily constitute reasonable cause, and that a trial court is not required to find reasonable cause from an involuntary commitment standing alone, but can consider surrounding circumstances such as a pattern of dilatory tactics. It further held that the defendant's due process rights were not violated by the trial court's refusal to continue the personal injury trial until the completion of a collateral criminal proceeding as the defendant failed to attend trial and was not forced to choose between his constitutional rights and presenting a defense in the civil action.

***Verrillo v. Zoning Board of Appeals*, 155 Conn. App. 657 (2015).**

The defendant property owners filed an application with the defendant Zoning Board of Appeals requesting variances from the regulations in order to expand an

existing nonconforming structure. With respect to hardship, the application noted that the property "is a preexisting legal nonconforming lot, upon which is located a legal preexisting nonconforming residence. The lot is substantially undersized (1605 sq. ft. in a zone requiring 4000 sq. ft.), leaving very little room for horizontal expansion and thereby requiring vertical expansion to improve the property by making it safer, more code compliant and provide reasonable and adequate living and storage space, parking and mechanical equipment." Following a public hearing, the board unanimously voted to grant the variances. The plaintiff, an abutting property owner, appealed the board's decision to the Superior Court, which sustained the appeal. The Appellate Court thereafter granted the defendants' petition for certification to appeal and this appeal followed.

On appeal, the Appellate Court conducted a comprehensive review of the law governing the granting of variances in this state. It concluded, *inter alia*, that none of the hardship allegations asserted at the public hearing provided a proper basis for granting the requested variances to expand the nonconformity of the existing structure. Specifically, the Appellate Court held that the existence of a legally existing nonconformity cannot, in itself, justify the granting of variances to expand that nonconformity. The Appellate Court further held that neither the applicants' personal desire to expand their existing nonconforming structure to obtain additional, more comfortable space nor their desire to modernize that structure constitute legal hardship under our law. In rejecting the claim that the scope of the variances sought was minimal, the Appellate Court noted that this was not a valid basis for granting a variance; it further noted that the administrative record did not support a finding that the requested variances were *de minimis* in scope. The Appellate Court held that the administrative record did not substantiate a finding that the hardship arose from an inability to comply with any fire or building codes and rejected the claim that the existence of an easement gave rise to a claim of hardship. The Appellate Court further concluded that the record did not substantiate the claim that the applicants were being completely or almost completely deprived of the use of the value of that land

NOTEWORTHY CASES HEARD BY THE APPELLATE COURT DURING THE BIENNIUM

and, therefore, a denial of the variances did not amount to a practical confiscation, nor was it tantamount to confiscation. Although the defendants did not allege that application of the regulations to the property destroyed the value of the property for all reasonable uses, they argued that a more reasonable use existed – namely, an expanded and modernized residential structure. In rejecting this argument, the Appellate Court noted that the preference of, and convenience to, a particular property owner is irrelevant to the hardship question and that disappointment in the use of the property does not constitute hardship under our law. Finally, the Appellate Court held that the small buildable area on the property that resulted from the application of the regulations was an affliction shared by several other properties in the district and, therefore, was not a unique hardship warranting exercise of the variance power.

***State of Connecticut v. George Michael Leniart*, 166 Conn. App. 142 (2016).**

The defendant drove the fifteen year old victim and her friend, another teenager, to a secluded area in the woods and sexually assaulted the victim. After dropping the victim's friend off, the defendant forced the victim to run into the woods with him, where he killed her and disposed of her body in an unknown location. The victim's remains have never been found. The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction of murder and capital felony, claiming, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was dead because the only evidence of her death was the testimony of four of the state's witnesses that the defendant separately confessed to each of them that he had killed the victim and disposed of her body. Under those circumstances, the defendant argued that the common-law corpus delicti rule prevented him from being convicted of murder and capital felony solely on the basis of his uncorroborated confessions and in the absence of independent extrinsic evidence of the fact of the death of the alleged victim. In rejecting this claim, the Appellate Court, in an opinion authored by Judge Prescott, reviewed the purpose, history and scope of the corpus delicti rule in Connecticut. It then concluded that the corpus delicti rule is an evidentiary rule regarding the

admissibility of confessions rather than a substantive rule of criminal law to be applied in reviewing the sufficiency of the state's evidence. Accordingly, because the defendant did not challenge the admission of the confessions, the Appellate Court held that it may consider the confessions in analyzing the sufficiency of the state's evidence without reference to the corpus delicti rule. The Appellate Court further held that, even if the defendant was permitted to raise the corpus delicti rule as part of his insufficiency of the evidence claim, the sufficiency claim failed because substantial evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, was admitted at trial to corroborate both the trustworthiness of his confessions and the fact of the victim's death.

The Appellate Court next considered the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly excluded from evidence a videotape of an interview that the police conducted of the victim's friend immediately prior to his taking a polygraph examination. The defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the videotape of the pretest interview because the videotape contained relevant evidence of the friend's bias and motive for testifying for the state. The state countered that the pretest interview was an inseparable component of the polygraph examination, and, therefore, the court properly excluded the videotape in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in *State v. Porter*, which reaffirmed Connecticut's per se ban on the admissibility of polygraph evidence. The Appellate Court disagreed that the video of the pretest interview was "polygraph evidence" as used by the court in *Porter*, and agreed with the defendant that, by excluding the tape on that basis, the court improperly excluded relevant evidence of bias. Because this evidentiary error pertained to the veracity of a crucial state's witness, it was harmful and, therefore, reversible error.

The issue regarding the exclusion of the videotape was dispositive of the defendant's appeal. Nevertheless, because they were likely to arise again on remand, the Appellate Court also considered the defendant's claims that the court improperly admitted prior misconduct evidence and improperly precluded the defendant from presenting expert testimony concerning the reliability of jailhouse informants. With regard to the admission

NOTEWORTHY CASES HEARD BY THE APPELLATE COURT DURING THE BIENNIUM

of certain evidence, the Appellate Court held that the challenged evidence was properly admitted. With regard to the exclusion of expert testimony, the defendant claimed that, because the case against him depended heavily upon the testimony of jailhouse informants, some if not all of whom benefitted from cooperating with the state, the court should have permitted him to present expert testimony to the jury concerning the general unreliability of such evidence. The defendant argued that the information he sought to present was not within the knowledge of the average juror, nor was it supplied to them through other evidence or by the court's instructions. The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion by precluding expert testimony offered by the defendant and held that expert testimony concerning the reliability of informant testimony should be admitted if the court on remand determines that the expert is qualified and the proffered testimony is relevant to the specific issues in the case.

Judge Flynn authored a separate opinion concurring in the result. Although agreeing with the majority that there was sufficient independent evidence of the victim's death, Judge Flynn dissented from that portion of the opinion that held that the corpus delicti rule was merely evidentiary and that independent proof of death was unnecessary in a murder case.

***State of Connecticut v. Tauren Williams-Bey*, 167 Conn. App. 744 (2016).**

The defendant, Tauren Williams-Bey, appealed from the judgment of the trial court, in which it dismissed his motion to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the court erred by concluding that it did not have jurisdiction over his motion after it determined that his sentence did not violate the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution and article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Constitution of Connecticut. The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court improperly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendant's motion, but properly concluded that the defendant's federal and state constitutional rights were not violated.

On January 4, 2000, the defendant pleaded guilty to murder as an accessory in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-54a and General Statutes § 53a-48. On February 25, 2000, the court sentenced the defendant to thirty-five years in prison. At the time of sentencing, the crime of which the defendant was convicted made him ineligible for parole. If he were to serve the full sentence, the defendant would not be released until he was fifty-two years old.

The defendant filed an amended motion to correct an illegal sentence on April 2, 2014, asserting that his sentence violated the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution as explicated in *Graham v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and *Miller v. Alabama*, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). The defendant claimed that his sentence violated the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution because "the sentence and the manner in which it is imposed fail to provide for a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation" Following oral argument, the court issued a written memorandum of decision on July 29, 2014, concluding that because the defendant was not serving a mandatory life without parole sentence, *Graham* and *Miller* were inapplicable. It, therefore, dismissed the motion, concluding that "the defendant's case did not fall within the narrow confines of *Graham* or *Miller*, and the relief sought exceeded the jurisdiction of this court."

At the time the trial court ruled, neither *State v. Riley*, 315 Conn. 637 (2015), nor *Casino v. Commissioner of Correction*, 317 Conn. 52 (2016), Connecticut's leading cases on juvenile sentencing, had been decided. *Riley* and *Casino* applied *Miller* retroactively to discretionary life without parole sentences and term of years sentences that are the functional equivalent of life sentences.

The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court properly determined that the defendant's sentence did not violate the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted by *Miller v. Alabama*, supra, 132 S. Ct. 2469. Furthermore, it concluded that even if the sentence violated the eighth amendment pursuant to *Miller*, in light of the United States Supreme Court's

NOTEWORTHY CASES HEARD BY THE APPELLATE COURT DURING THE BIENNIUM

decision in *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, U.S. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), which held that conferring parole eligibility on a juvenile offender is a constitutionally adequate remedy for a sentence that violates *Miller's* teachings upon retroactive application, and the fact that the defendant will be parole eligible under § 1 of No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts (Public Act 15-84), codified at General Statutes § 54-125a (f), the defendant and those similarly situated have been provided with a constitutionally adequate remedy.

As to the court's jurisdiction to consider the defendant's motion to correct, the Appellate Court held that the motion challenged the manner in which the sentence was imposed, namely, that the court did not consider the *Miller* factors during sentencing and whether the defendant was entitled to a later meaningful opportunity for the release. Because the motion to correct challenged the manner in which the sentence was imposed, rather than the legality of the sentence, the defendant's claim was properly raised by a motion to correct pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22. The court's conclusion that it could not provide the defendant a remedy did not implicate the court's authority to determine whether the sentence had been imposed in an illegal manner. The form of the judgment, therefore, was improper. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case with direction to deny the motion to correct an illegal sentence.

William Francini v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC et al., 164 Conn. App. 279 (2016).

The plaintiff owned a parcel of land in East Haddam. The parcel's only access to a public highway was over an abutting property, owned by the defendant. The defendant took title to its property by warranty deed in 1999 subject to a right-of-way easement enjoyed by the plaintiff as well as several of the plaintiff's neighbors, landowners who also owned land abutting the defendant's property. In 2001, the defendant entered an agreement with several of the plaintiff's neighbors, who also shared the plaintiff's right-of-way across the defendant's property, to allow the neighbors to improve the right-of-way by installing and maintaining a utility distribution system under the

existing right-of-way easement. As a result, a commercial utility system was constructed under the existing right-of-way and provides electricity to the plaintiff's neighbors. In exchange for the utility easement, each of the plaintiff's neighbors paid the defendant \$7500. The plaintiff and the defendant never reached an agreement regarding the utility easement. Without an agreement, the plaintiff, whose house is powered by a generator, does not enjoy an easement for commercial utilities and his property is currently landlocked from access to commercial electricity.

The plaintiff commenced this declaratory judgment action seeking an easement by necessity for access to commercial utilities across the same right-of-way that he already owned and that already provided his neighbors with commercial electric power. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and concluded, as a matter of law, that easements by necessity may not be granted for any purpose other than to provide physical access to a landlocked property. On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that easements by necessity may provide not only physical access to landlocked property, but a property landlocked from commercial utilities may likewise receive an easement by necessity to access utility services. The Appellate Court noted that easements by necessity are not artifacts of a more ancient era and must serve their intended purpose, to render land useful, in the present day as beneficial use of land conforms to modern innovations and needs. The Appellate Court further concluded that access to utilities is reasonably necessary to the reasonable use and enjoyment of property, especially, as in this case, residential property.

Villages, LLC v. Longhi, 166 Conn. App. 685 (2016).

This appeal concerns the immunity afforded a member of a planning and zoning commission who engages in ex parte communication with respect to applications pending before the commission. In 2009, the plaintiff landowner filed applications for a special use permit and to develop a residential subdivision in the town of Enfield. The town planning and zoning commission

NOTEWORTHY CASES HEARD BY THE APPELLATE COURT DURING THE BIENNIUM

denied both applications, and the plaintiff appealed to the trial court. In its appeal, the plaintiff alleged that its applications were denied because the commission illegally and arbitrarily predetermined the outcome of the hearing due to the bias and personal animus of the defendant, who was a member of the commission. Following a trial, the trial court, Hon. Richard M. Rittenband, found that the defendant had played a significant role in the commission's deliberations, had a personal bias against one of the plaintiff's principals, and had engaged in an *ex parte* communication regarding the applications. The court sustained the plaintiff's appeal on the basis of the defendant's *ex parte* communication and concluded that the commission's acts in denying the plaintiff's applications were not honest, legal, and fair. The commission appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff thereafter commenced the present action against the defendant, alleging intentional fraudulent misrepresentation and intentional tortious interference with business expectancy. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action asserting that she was entitled to absolute immunity because she was acting in an administrative capacity and performing a quasi-judicial function when she voted on the plaintiff's applications. The trial court, *Wiese, J.*, granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the commission was a quasi-judicial body acting in a quasi-judicial capacity when it considered the plaintiff's applications. The court concluded that the members of the commission were protected by the litigation privilege, a subset of absolute immunity, and granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court.

On appeal, the plaintiff claimed, among other things, that the defendant's liability was grounded not on her statements made during the commission's deliberations, but on her internal bias and *ex parte* communication. The Appellate Court agreed that the trial court should not have dismissed the plaintiff's case on the basis of absolute

immunity or the litigation privilege. It found that absolute immunity and the litigation privilege were not implicated by the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint. The trial court and the defendant had conflated the immunity provided to those who make statements before quasi-judicial boards and the immunity provided to members of municipal agencies for exercising their decision-making responsibilities. The issue is controlled by General Statutes § 52-557n (c).

Section 52-557n (c) provides in relevant part that any person serving as an uncompensated member of a municipal commission shall not be personally liable for damage or injury resulting from any act, error or omission made in the exercise of such person's policy or decision-making responsibilities "if such person was acting in good faith . . . and was not acting in violation of any state, municipal or professional code of ethics regulating the conduct of such person The provisions of this subsection shall not apply if such damage or injury was caused by the *reckless, wilful or wanton misconduct of such person.*" The Appellate Court, therefore, concluded that the statute provides uncompensated members of municipal commissions with qualified immunity because it excepts from its purview conduct that is not undertaken in good faith, violates any state, municipal or professional code of ethics, or is reckless, wilful or wanton.

The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendant had engaged in *ex parte* communication with respect to its applications. Connecticut law prohibits a municipal agency from using information that has been supplied to it by a party to a contested hearing on an *ex parte* basis. Given the allegations of *ex parte* communication by the defendant in the plaintiff's complaint, the Appellate Court stated that the trial court should have considered § 52-557n (c), not the common-law litigation privilege, when adjudicating the defendant's motion to dismiss. The Appellate Court concluded that the motion to dismiss was improperly granted and reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

SUPERIOR COURT



Judge Patrick L. Carroll III
Chief Court Administrator



Judge Elliot N. Solomon
Deputy Chief Court Administrator

Chief Court Administrator

The chief justice appoints the chief court administrator, who oversees the administration of the Judicial Branch.

The duties and powers of the chief court administrator are outlined in Section 51-5a of the *General Statutes of Connecticut*.

In part, the statute requires that the chief court administrator "... shall be responsible for the efficient operation of the department, the prompt disposition of cases and the prompt and proper administration of judicial business."

Deputy Chief Court Administrator

The deputy chief court administrator assists the chief court administrator in fulfilling the responsibilities outlined in Section 51-5a of the *General Statutes of Connecticut*.

In addition to assisting the chief court administrator, the deputy chief court administrator represents the Judicial Branch on numerous commissions and committees affecting various aspects of Connecticut's judicial system. These include the: Task Force to Improve Access to Legal Counsel in Civil Matters; Access to Justice Commission (co-chair); Attorney Assistance Advisory Commission (chair); Judicial-Media Committee; Bar Examining Committee; Civil Commission; Court Security Committee; Minimum Continuing Legal Education Commission (co-chair); Education Committee-Connecticut Center for Judicial Education; and Federal State Council.

CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES – 2014-2016 BIENNIUM




Hon. Robert J. Devlin, Jr.
Criminal Division



Hon. Bernadette Conway
Juvenile Division



Hon. Elizabeth A. Bozzuto
Family Division



Hon. William H. Bright, Jr.
Civil Division



Hon. John E. Colella
Chief Family Support Magistrate

Under the direction of the chief court administrator, the chief family support magistrate supervises the Family Support Magistrate Division, performs other duties as provided by state statute and submits an annual report to the chief court administrator.

The chief court administrator appoints chief administrative judges to oversee the following Superior Court divisions: criminal, juvenile, family and civil.

They have the following responsibilities:

- ❖ To represent the chief court administrator on matters of policy affecting their respective divisions.
- ❖ To solicit advice and suggestions from judges and others on matters affecting their respective divisions, including legislation, and to advise the chief court administrator on such matters.
- ❖ To advise and assist administrative judges in the implementation of policies and caseflow programs.

ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES – 2014-2016 BIENNIUM



Ansonia-Milford
Hon. Frank A. Iannotti



Danbury
Hon. Dan Shaban



Fairfield
Hon. Barbara N. Bellis



Hartford
Hon. Julia DiCocco Dewey



Litchfield
Hon. John A. Danaher III



Middlesex
Hon. David P. Gold



New Britain
Hon. Joan K. Alexander



New Haven
Hon. Angela C. Robinson



New London
Hon. Emmet L. Cosgrove



Stamford-Norwalk
Hon. Gary J. White



Tolland
Hon. William H. Bright, Jr.



Waterbury
Hon. Mark H. Taylor



Windham
Hon. Edward C. Graziani

ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES

The chief court administrator appoints administrative judges to oversee operations in each of the 13 judicial districts.

They have the following responsibilities:

- ❖ To represent the chief court administrator in the efficient management of their respective judicial districts in matters affecting the fair administration of justice and the disposition of cases.
- ❖ To implement and execute programs and methods for disposition of cases and administrative matters within their respective judicial districts in accordance with the policies and directives of the chief court administrator.
- ❖ When required, to order that the trial of any case be held in any courthouse facility within the judicial district.
- ❖ To assign judges within the judicial district as necessary.
- ❖ To oversee the daily assignment of a judge to address jurors.



COMMITTED TO PUBLIC SERVICE EXCELLENCE



As with each biennium, the past two years have been a time of great change for the Connecticut Judicial Branch. Significant budgetary reductions have affected the Branch deeply, but also strengthened its resolve to achieve its mission: to serve the interest of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.

The Branch's goals would be impossible to reach, however, without the commitment to public service excellence by its judges and employees. Their efforts and hard work have been especially important as the Branch continues to re-engineer how it processes civil and family cases. In addition, the Branch has continued to focus on ways to enhance meaningful access to justice through ongoing collaboration with the Connecticut Bar Association and local and affinity bar associations. The sum total of these efforts has ultimately benefited the public the most.

The Branch in January 2016 completed the statewide rollout of the individual calendaring program for civil matters. With this program, cases are divided into two categories based upon the degree of judicial intervention that is most effective in leading to an efficient and timely resolution. But regardless of the category to which a case is assigned initially, the individual calendaring program

provides the judge to which the case is assigned with the flexibility to manage the cases as required from initiation to disposition.

Another successful civil re-engineering initiative has been the opening of two mediation centers, one on the fourth floor of the Waterbury courthouse at 400 Grand St. and the other on the fourth floor of the Hartford Judicial District courthouse at 95 Washington St. These mediation centers are open to all civil judges who may want to schedule an alternative dispute resolution event.

Other achievements in the area of civil matters include:

- ❖ Housing sessions began e-filing on March 1, 2016.
- ❖ In September 2015, the Workgroup of Libraries and the Access to Justice Commission held a "Justice Fair" focusing on access to justice issues that face Connecticut's self-represented population.
- ❖ In addition to the Branch's existing volunteer attorney programs in foreclosure and small claims (the latter in conjunction with the Connecticut Bar Association), five new volunteer attorney programs were established in March 2016 for contract collections cases in the Bridgeport, Hartford, New Haven, New London and Waterbury judicial districts.

- ❖ An e-services inbox has been developed through the e-filing system that will allow attorneys and parties to receive their court notices electronically. The Branch expects to roll out this convenient case management feature in early 2017.

Litigants in family matters have benefited from numerous enhancements as well. This ongoing effort includes the following achievements over the biennium:

- ❖ As a result of a legislative proposal from the Judicial Branch, state law now allows parties who meet certain criteria to file a joint petition for nonadversarial divorce. This is a simplified process whereby the joint petitioners will not have to appear in court and their divorce will be finalized in approximately 30 days.
- ❖ State law also was amended to allow parties to attest, under oath, that they have an agreement as to all terms of their divorce or legal separation and that they would like to waive the waiting periods required.

As a result of a legislative proposal from the Judicial Branch, state law now allows parties who meet certain criteria to file a joint petition for nonadversarial divorce.

- ❖ The Judicial Branch implemented improvements to the law regarding the appointment process of guardians ad litem and attorneys for minor children in family matters. In addition, a Practice Book rule taking effect in January 2017 authorizes the chief court administrator to form a standing committee to handle such things as eligibility and qualifications to be a GAL or AMC and the training requirements.
- ❖ In 2015, the Court Support Services Division's Family Services developed two new case management interventions for family civil court matters. The goal of these innovative services is to provide judges with additional options to assist families with ongoing parenting disputes. Intensive Case Management was rolled out in several phases beginning in 2015 and will be fully implemented in all courts at the end of 2016. General Case Management has been offered statewide since December 2015. Early outcomes for both services are positive: of the Intensive Case Management cases that were closed with an agreement in 2015, 82 percent have not returned to court for child-related motions. For General Case Management, more than 300 cases were resolved without the need for additional court hearings. A series of research initiatives are under way to study the long-term effectiveness of these programs.
- ❖ In response to the Legislature's Public Act 16-105, CSSD's Family Services enhanced and modified current practice regarding the restraining order extension hearing process. Specifically, Family Services will review relevant records including existing or prior orders of protection, pending criminal cases, prior convictions for a violent crime, outstanding warrants, pending or disposed Family Court matters and the outcome of a risk assessment. A formal report will be made available to both the applicant and respondent for review, and is provided to the judge as directed prior to a hearing. The judge has the discretion to consider the information gathered by Family Services when determining the extension of a restraining order.
- ❖ Also as a result of Public Act 16-105, the Judicial Branch created new forms and enhanced others, making them more user-friendly for restraining order applicants in family court. In addition, a new restraining order forms packet with a one-page plain language instruction helps guide applicants through the process.
- ❖ The Family Volunteer Attorney Program continues to be offered based on the availability of volunteer attorneys in Hartford, Waterbury and Stamford. This program offers individuals who are not represented by an attorney to meet with a volunteer attorney for advice with their family matters case.
- ❖ A form has been implemented for use anytime an order of supervised visitation is made in a family case. The form has been used since July 1, 2015, and allows the Branch to track when supervised visitation orders are entered either with or absent an agreement of the parties. It also allows the Judicial Branch to track whether the supervised visitation is ordered to take place at a visitation center.
- ❖ Family e-filing began in December 2014 and was expanded in 2016 to include additional case types.



ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES DIVISION


COURT SUPPORT SERVICES DIVISION

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OPERATIONS DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION



ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES DIVISION

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Joyce P. Santoro

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Ronald J. Macchio

**Director
Fiscal Administration**
Thomas N. Sitaro

**Director
Human Resource Management**
Elizabeth K. Graham

**Director
Materials Management**
Cortez G. White

The Administrative Services Division provides centralized services to assist judges and Judicial Branch employees. Such services include: management and analysis of the Branch's General Fund budget; payroll administration; revenue and expenditure accounting and payment of the Branch's financial obligations; coordination of personnel and labor relations functions and employee benefits administration; capital budget development and oversight; facilities planning; design and repair; materials management; purchasing and warehousing; and internal auditing.

Highlights of the biennium include:

- ❖ The Department of Construction Services completed a major project at the Danbury Judicial District/Geographical Area No. 3 Courthouse, replacing the window system in the glass-walled facility. The \$2.6 million project was completed in late winter 2015.
- ❖ During the biennium, the 1970s Fairfield Judicial District Courthouse saw the completion of two major projects: the rebuilding of the ramp accessing the underground parking garage; and the redesign and renovation of the front entry stairs and plaza.
- ❖ Exterior building façade repairs were completed in October 2015 at Hartford Community Court. This \$581,000 project repaired the exterior of the 1930s-era building.
- ❖ The State Bond Commission approved \$71 million of funding in May 2014 for the Litchfield Judicial District Courthouse at Torrington. Construction on the new 174,000-square-foot facility began in early 2015. Occupancy is expected to occur during the spring of 2017.
- ❖ At the Middlesex Judicial District/Geographical Area No. 9 Courthouse, repairs to correct deteriorating concrete in the parking garage and sidewalks were completed in October 2015.
- ❖ Obsolete mechanical systems in all seven elevators located in the nine-story New Haven Judicial District Courthouse were replaced with upgraded units. The Department of Construction Services administered the \$1.9 million project.
- ❖ The Judicial Branch continued to submit project requests to the "Lead by Example" program administered by the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection. Two lighting fixture replacement projects at a total cost of \$500,000 were completed in the Fairfield Judicial District – one at the Fairfield Judicial District Courthouse on Main Street and the other at the Geographical Area No. 2 Courthouse on Golden Hill Street.

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES DIVISION

In addition, a utility-sponsored energy conservation project was completed at New Britain Superior Court. With substantial costs funded through the utility's "Retro Commissioning" program, occupancy sensors for lighting were installed and significant changes were made to the HVAC and energy management systems.

- ❖ The Facilities Unit administered the replacement of fire panels in: Danielson's Geographical Area No. 11 Courthouse; the Hartford Juvenile Detention Center; and the Middletown Judicial District/Geographical Area No. 9 Courthouse. In addition, energy management controls were upgraded at: the Danielson G.A. Courthouse, the Fairfield Judicial District Courthouse; the Hartford Juvenile Detention Center; the State Supreme Court/State Library; and the Appellate Court. Other HVAC associated equipment – including air handlers, rooftop units, heat pumps and a cooling tower – were replaced in Litchfield, Norwalk and Norwich.
- ❖ Access control equipment was installed to restrict specific floor access via the Fairfield Judicial District court's public elevators. Overhead doors or sliding gates also were replaced at: the Bridgeport Juvenile Detention Center; the Commission on Official Legal Publications at Enfield's Geographical Area No. 13 Courthouse; Hartford's Geographical Area No. 14 Courthouse; and Milford's Geographical Area No. 22 Courthouse. During the biennium, numerous security upgrades, additions and replacements were implemented at various court locations statewide. These upgrades/enhancements included the purchase of new walk-through and hand-held weapon detection devices, as well as the installation of new video surveillance systems, duress alarm systems, intrusion alarm systems and electronic guard tour systems.
- ❖ In the area of property accounting, the Materials Management Unit completed the development, testing and implementation of an application for online equipment transfers among office supervisors. Originally designed with help from the Information Technology Division, this user-friendly application allows supervisors to document temporary or permanent equipment transfers. The new system will in part replace paper transfers that had to be signed and scanned by the participating supervisors and then transmitted to the Property Accounting Office via email. Often, there were delays in the receipt and matching up of the paper transfers. By eliminating delays, it is anticipated that the automation effort will improve documentation for more than 4,000 equipment moves in the Judicial Branch each fiscal year.
- ❖ The Human Resource Management Unit assumed full fiscal responsibility for the Workers' Compensation Program effective July 1, 2015, with the introduction of a new line item in the Judicial Branch budget. The unit is now involved in fiscal decisions and settlement negotiations in order to responsibly administer these funds.
- ❖ The HR unit initiated and completed several information technology improvements that produced significant labor savings. One of the technical improvements allows HR staff to quickly generate an individualized packet for every Family Medical Leave Act applicant. Another example is the automation of the monthly vacancy report, used internally to track variations in the Judicial Branch workforce.
- ❖ The HR unit also partnered with the Information Technology Division in the review of technical job applications in order to expedite the recruitment process. The knowledge and expertise provided by ITD increased the accuracy and speed with which qualified candidates could be identified.



COURT SUPPORT SERVICES DIVISION

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Director
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Deputy Director
Family Services
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Deputy Director
Juvenile Probation Services
Tasha Hunt

Deputy Director
Juvenile Residential Services
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Celia Siefert

The Court Support Services Division (CSSD) oversees pretrial services, family services and probation supervision of adults and juveniles as well as juvenile detention services. CSSD also prepares presentence investigation reports, which judges may order for use when sentencing defendants. In addition, CSSD administers a network of statewide contracted community providers that deliver services to court-ordered clients.

Highlights of the biennium include:

- ❖ In the spring of 2015, Bail Services – in collaboration with judges, prosecutors, public defenders, the Department of Correction and a community treatment provider – implemented a pilot program in the Bridgeport court called the Treatment Pathway Program. The program is designed to provide eligible defendants entering the criminal justice system at arraignment with the opportunity to obtain an immediate clinical assessment. The assessment's focus is on clients with alcohol and opiate dependencies who would be better served by a treatment diversion option rather than being held in jail. To date, the program has been very successful and has accepted approximately 155 clients as a court-ordered condition of release at arraignment. Of that number, 122 were placed in the regional network of programs within 24 hours. Most promising is that 75 percent of the defendants in the program did not receive a period of incarceration when their case was disposed. Expansion of this diversionary program is in the planning stage for the New London Geographical Area No. 10 Courthouse.

Pursuant to Public Act 14-27, Adult Probation began issuing Certificates of Employability in January 2015 to probation applicants in good standing (compliant with probation conditions).

- ❖ Pursuant to Public Act 14-27, Adult Probation began issuing Certificates of Employability in January 2015 to probation applicants in good standing (compliant with probation conditions). The goal of the legislation is to promote the public policy of rehabilitation through employment of individuals with criminal convictions. When CSSD issues the certificate, it indicates to potential and current employers and/or licensing agencies that CSSD believes the individual's prior convictions should not prevent that person from getting a job or professional license. During 2015, CSSD reviewed 123 applications for the certificate and granted 73, for a 60 percent grant rate. Through the first six months of 2016, CSSD reviewed 52 applications and granted 34 of them, for a 65 percent grant rate.

In 2015, CSSD began developing an in-house training program for all adult probation officers in consultation with Central Connecticut State University.

- ❖ CSSD's Adult Probation, Bail and Family Services units implemented a notification process that provides clients with an opportunity to receive an automated reminder, either by text message or telephone call, of an upcoming court date or other appointment. All clients have the option of opting in or out of the notification service. If the client opts in, he or she selects the method of delivery that best suits his or her situation.
 - ❖ The *Case Data Record*, which is Connecticut's pretrial bail decision risk assessment, was revalidated in 2015 by Central Connecticut State University (CCSU). CCSU initially validated the tool in 2003 based solely upon the statutory requirement that the least restrictive conditions of release be set to ensure a defendant's appearance in court. The Legislature in 2012 added a second prong, community safety, to the bail decision-making process, and CSSD subsequently revised its uniform weighted release criteria to include criteria specific to public safety. CSSD in 2015 again contracted with CCSU to revalidate the *Case Data Record* for both appearances in court and community safety. Following a rigorous analysis of bail data, CCSU Professor Jennifer Hedlund found that the uniform weighted release criteria were predictive of appearance in court and public safety. Dr. Hedlund also recommended that certain criteria be weighted differently to better predict appearance and safety, and CSSD will implement these recommendations in 2017.
 - ❖ In 2015, CSSD began developing an in-house training program for all adult probation officers in consultation with CCSU. The training program is the result of a grant that CSSD, CCSU and the University of Southern Maine received in 2012 from the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The grant sought to enhance the supervision skills of probation officers through a Forensic Cognitive Behavioral Therapy Training Program (FCBT), which is based on the premise that altering a probationer's cognitive processing can modify imbalances in their emotions and behavior and change criminal thinking patterns that affect recidivism. Under the grant, CCSU professors provided training and staff from the University of Southern Maine evaluated whether probationer recidivism rates decreased for probation officers who received the training. Evaluators noted that officers who completed the training had lower recidivism rates compared with their pre-training rates. Moreover, officers from the first group of trainees who demonstrated the most proficiency with FCBT supervision services had much lower recidivism rates compared with others who completed the training.
 - ❖ During the biennium, CSSD staff participated extensively in the subcommittees and working groups of the legislatively mandated Juvenile Justice Policy and Oversight Committee (Connecticut General Statutes, 56b-121n). This work led to the adoption of Public Act 16-147, which made significant changes to the juvenile justice process in Connecticut. The implementation of these changes required substantial effort, and CSSD staff worked to ensure that these changes would be
- Nine officers from the first group of trainees were chosen to serve as coaches and assist in training the second group. In addition, CSSD in 2015 promoted one of the coaches to oversee the training initiative and to work with CCSU in developing the in-house program. CSSD also implemented regular booster sessions for FCBT program graduates and near the end of 2015 applied for a second federal grant to further develop and enhance the program. In September 2016, CSSD learned it had been selected to receive an additional three-year federal grant to once again partner and collaborate with CCSU and other criminal justice experts to fully implement the program in the delivery of adult probation supervision services.

COURT SUPPORT SERVICES DIVISION

implemented by their effective dates. Most significant among the changes was narrowing the grounds upon which a child can be held in a juvenile detention center, and the development of the Detention Risk Screen required by the legislation. The legislation will also lead to changes in the types of contracted programs that will be needed, and CSSD engaged in the process of redesigning and rebidding those contracts.

- ❖ During the biennium, CSSD worked on enhancing a family engagement pilot program in the Hartford Juvenile Detention Center to provide support and advocacy training to “difficult to engage” families. CSSD partnered with AFCAMP (family advocacy organization in Hartford) to pilot the use of a family empowerment specialist to engage parents who were historically difficult for probation to engage. The parents either had children involved with multiple systems and other related stressors, or were very mistrustful of the court system. The key to program success was the family empowerment specialist meeting with the family on the day of court and engaging the family to understand that the specialist was offering support and not more demands. The specialists were successful in supporting the parents such that 33 out of 35 families successfully discharged from the program. From August 2014 through April 2016, the 33 parents reported increased collaboration with Probation (92 percent), with DCF (80 percent), with school (79 percent) and with the Court (73 percent) to achieve better outcomes for their children and themselves.
- ❖ CSSD also improved room confinement procedures at both the Hartford and Bridgeport Juvenile Detention centers to reduce the amount of time juveniles spend in their rooms. The adoption of the Positive Intervention and Support (PBIS) system, a nationally recognized, research-based, systems approach to improve school climate and create safer and more effective schools, has led to both a decrease in room confinement and elimination of prone restraints at the detention centers. This initiative was highlighted at the Northeast PBIS Forum.



- ❖ CSSD’s implementation of a trauma-informed model in youth detention, and the model’s subsequent success, was highlighted in the Winston Churchill Memorial Trust Fellowship report from Australia. CSSD has been using the TARGET model, a psychoeducational group curriculum developed by Dr. Julian Ford at UCONN Health Center, Department of Psychiatry, to teach youth about the biological effects of trauma, trauma reaction triggers, and skills to regulate emotions and responses. Participating youth have demonstrated an improved ability to control their emotions and behaviors, which has led to significant decreases in disciplinary incidents and the use of room time.
- ❖ CSSD is working with the Department of Children and Families on the Anti-Trafficking Response Team as part of a multi-agency effort through the Governor’s Task Force on Justice for Abused Children to combat human trafficking. CSSD staff has been trained on human trafficking and work to identify client victims and refer them for services. Additionally, CSSD offers in its detention centers an education prevention curriculum developed by LOVE 146 for at-risk youth.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION

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**Program Manager
Experiential Learning Programs**
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The mission of the External Affairs Division is to promote public trust and confidence in the Judicial Branch by fostering relationships with the Legislative and Executive Branches, the media and the community at large; informing students, community groups, professional organizations and the public about the role and mission of the Judicial Branch; and providing high school and college students with the opportunity to explore careers within the Judicial Branch through its Experiential Learning Program.


Legislative/Government Relations

During the 2015 and 2016 legislative sessions, representatives from External Affairs worked to ensure that the Judicial Branch's voice was heard by members of the General Assembly by carefully reviewing all proposed legislation and submitting testimony on dozens of bills. As in years past, External Affairs collaborated with legislators, the Governor's office and numerous other agencies to ensure that the concerns of the Judicial Branch were addressed in a wide array of legislation affecting the court system. While the state's fiscal crisis took up much of the Legislature's agenda during the past two sessions, External Affairs also shepherded the Branch's own proposals through the legislative process. These included *An Act Concerning Court Operations* in both 2015 and 2016, and *An Act Concerning A Nonadversarial Dissolution of Marriage* in 2015.

While the state's fiscal crisis took up much of the Legislature's agenda during the past two sessions, External Affairs also shepherded the Branch's own proposals through the legislative process.

During the course of the previous two legislative sessions, External Affairs also assisted with nearly 50 judicial reappointments.

Furthermore, since the beginning of 2016, External Affairs has begun producing weekly Legislative Updates during the session, and has worked with legislators, the Office of Legislative Research and other agencies to resolve over 100 constituent issues.



Media Relations

Over the past two fiscal years, the External Affairs Division responded to more than 4,000 requests from the media, including camera requests.

Camera Requests

From July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2016, the division handled 1,341 requests from the media to take photographs or to videotape a court proceeding. Of those numbers, judges approved 1,223 requests, which represent 91 percent of all requests. The majority of the denials were because the requests did not comply with the rules outlined in the Connecticut Practice Book.

From July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2016, the division handled 1,341 requests from the media to take photographs or to videotape a court proceeding.

Social Media

In 2013, External Affairs established a YouTube page for the Judicial Branch. The page, which the division manages, currently hosts 50 videos, which are split into eight playlists. In addition, the Twitter account managed by the division continues to grow, with more than 2,800 followers.

Judges Speakers Bureau

The Speakers Bureau is the Branch's primary outreach effort to civic organizations, senior groups and other community groups. In FY 15, 52 justices, judges and family support magistrates participated in the Judicial Branch's Speakers Bureau, speaking at 73 events and to more than 3,100 people. In FY 16, 68 judges, justices and magistrates spoke at 118 events to more than 5,000 people.

The Speakers Bureau is the Branch's primary outreach effort to civic organizations, senior groups and other community groups.

Read Across America, a national celebration of reading held annually on March 2, Dr. Seuss' birthday, is very popular among students, teachers and the justices and judges. Twenty-five justices and judges visited schools in 2015 as part of *Read Across America*. Those judges read to about 2,000 students in 26 schools. In 2016, 43 judges, justices and family support magistrates read to more than 3,100 students in 43 schools throughout the state.

Supreme Court Tours

External Affairs offers tours of the historic Supreme Court courtroom and an explanation of the appellate process. External Affairs provided 83 tours of the Supreme Court courtroom to 3,300 people in FY 15 and 91 tours to 3,000 people in FY 16.

Publications

Throughout the biennium, External Affairs oversaw the design and production of 195 projects, including the 2012-2014 Biennial Report, the Judicial Branch Experiential Learning Program's three-panel display, the Emergency Preparedness Quick Reference Guide, artwork and templates for the District Liaison initiative and posters for the Office of Victim Services regarding victim compensation and victims' rights.

Judicial Branch Experiential Learning Programs

The External Affairs Division, through its Judicial Branch Experiential Learning Programs, offers students from high school to law school a variety of meaningful placement opportunities to gain valuable experience as well as develop skills appropriate to their career path.



Job Shadow Program

The External Affairs Division also manages the Job Shadow Program, which is designed to provide an opportunity for high school students to explore career interests and vocational skills by “shadowing” a Judicial Branch employee during a workday. Students are matched with a mentor at a location as near as possible to their school. This program allows students ample time to explore their areas of interest and receive one-on-one instruction. The Job Shadow Program is offered annually from February 1st to April 30th.

During 2015, 347 students successfully completed their internships and in 2016, 339 interns successfully completed their internships.

Internship Program

In January 2014, External Affairs implemented changes to its intern program to enhance an intern’s placement experience as well as to align the program with the principles of experiential learning.

Enhancements included: (1) offering seminars and trainings during the semester; (2) actively supervising interns in the field; (3) requiring the interns to submit journal entries; and (4) implementing a new database and intern portal by which interns submit necessary paperwork.

During 2015, 347 students successfully completed their internships and in 2016, 339 interns successfully completed their internships.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DIVISION

**Director
Information Systems**
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**Deputy Director
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Mary K. Sitaro

**Deputy Director
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Diana Varese

The Information Technology Division (ITD) is dedicated to providing state-of-the-art data processing and publication services to the Judicial Branch and its customers in the legal community, outside agencies and the public.

ITD helps the Judicial Branch fulfill its mission through the design, development and maintenance of a sophisticated, secure and reliable network, computing and printing infrastructure. This infrastructure provides for the gathering, transmission, storage, retrieval, backup, display and publication of data and information processed most often through automated systems developed in-house and deployed to support the Branch's operating and administrative divisions. This includes providing public information access, enhanced "self-service" support for self-represented parties, as well as access to interactive forms, technological improvements in courtrooms and an improved ability to interact with the courts remotely.

Highlights of the 2014 – 2016 biennium include:

❖ **Judicial Branch Data Centers:** With minimal impact or interruption to the court system, the Judicial Branch's primary Data Center was relocated in 2015 from East Hartford to Groton. The successful result was the product of an intense six-month effort involving ITD staff from several disciplines along with support from the Materials Management, Facilities and Fiscal Administration units. The effort also involved close cooperation with the Executive Branch Bureau of Enterprise and Systems Technology (BEST). The move required the design, acquisition, installation and testing of new network and data storage equipment in Groton and an upgrade of equipment in the secondary Data Center in Waterbury.

With minimal impact or interruption to the court system, the Judicial Branch's primary Data Center was relocated in 2015 from East Hartford to Groton.

High speed redundant fiber optic connections link the two data centers in a "ring" topology so the connection cannot be interrupted by a cable cut along the route. The two data centers are designed to share the Branch's IT workload, but either is capable of serving all of the Branch's workload in an emergency or for planned maintenance.

All courthouses and Judicial Branch offices are connected via wide area network to both data centers and both maintain up-to-the-second exact copies of all Branch data to prevent loss. In the event of a disaster that renders one of the data centers inoperable, all processing can be shifted to the surviving data center in a matter of minutes.

❖ **Appellate e-filing Applications:** In September 2014, attorneys were provided the capability to file briefs for Supreme and Appellate Court matters electronically using e-Briefs Upload. Since that time, 8,604 brief filings have been submitted.

On January 1, 2016, e-filing by attorneys for Supreme and Appellate Court matters was released to production. Throughout the first half of 2016, additional releases provided a few necessary enhancements and laid the groundwork for the third quarter 2016 release of e-filing by self-represented parties for Supreme and Appellate Court matters.

During its first six months of operation – January 1 to June 30, 2016 – there were 13,798 Supreme and Appellate Court electronic filing transactions with 14,242 electronic documents filed and 394 payments processed.

❖ **Civil/Family/Housing e-filing:** This development added the ability for attorneys and self-represented parties to electronically file many family case types including dissolution of marriage, legal separation, annulment and civil union. Other improvements include:

- Documents can now be viewed electronically by parties involved in the case;
- The ability for Support Enforcement Services to file documents on these cases where applicable; and
- The addition of e-filing capability to housing case types for attorneys and self-represented parties for most courts and housing sessions.

Of note: there were 1,967,812 Civil/Family/Housing documents e-filed during the biennium. Over the last two years, 15,485 self-represented parties registered for e-filing.

❖ **Edison/Clara (statistics tracking):** Since July 2014, six major releases of the internal software Edison and Clara were implemented. Edison is for use by judges, caseload and staff for monitoring electronic civil, family and housing cases. Major features of these releases include the ability to view up to three documents simultaneously

on the “View the File” page. It also provides an indicator if a document is sealed, if it was filed by a state agency or if a financial affidavit is sealed.

There were **1,967,812 Civil/Family/Housing documents e-filed during the biennium.**

❖ **Criminal Rewrite:** ITD began work on a major Criminal Rewrite initiative – part of a Federal NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) grant – that will make the system more efficient and effective. A SQL data model was implemented and loaded with pertinent information to report to the Protection Order Registry Adjudication Reporting Module (POR-ARM). This will help prevent an additional 15,000 felons from possessing firearms. The transmission of data is being automated to the POR-ARM system and will speed up the reporting process.



INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DIVISION



Additionally, work began on a new criminal web system that allows data to be replicated to the web from the legacy Criminal Motor Vehicle System (CRMVS) and then sent back to the CRMVS after processing through the new website.

- ❖ **State Marshals Tracking Application:** ITD designed and developed an application that allows state marshals to submit service of process information online for restraining orders and civil protection orders using a computer or mobile device. The application incorporates changes pursuant to Public Act 16-34 that required additional reporting data on served orders.
- ❖ **Child Protection e-filing:** The Department of Children and Families may now e-file child protection documents, such as Orders of Temporary Custody, directly from its office, eliminating the need to drive to the court. Additionally, information flows directly from the electronic documents into the child protection database, and there is no need to re-enter data.
- ❖ **Judicial Branch website:** The division designed and developed new Supreme and Appellate Court, Victim Services and Law Libraries websites with improved navigation for all related court information. All sites are mobile friendly.
- ❖ **Detention Center Medical Records:** In April 2016, ITD approved the application architecture presented by the Court Support Services Division (CSSD) and configured the necessary hardware and software to support a new electronic Medical Records Application for the Juvenile Detention centers in Bridgeport and Hartford.
- ❖ **Security Awareness Training:** Implemented Branch-wide SANS Security Awareness Training – mandatory for all Judicial Branch staff – to help protect the integrity of Judicial Branch data and to reduce the incidents of PC infection or the theft of Personally Identifiable Information.
- ❖ **For the Record (FTR):** FTR is now in 270-plus courtrooms statewide with 50 rolling carts – at least one per courthouse – to ensure business continuity in the event of equipment failure. Other enhancements include:
 - Rolled out handheld digital recording technology (Philips Digital Recorders) to various jury assembly rooms statewide;
 - Deployed ancillary units for court monitors to use for remote proceedings in each judicial district;
 - Expanded FTR to include certain types of special proceedings typically covered by court reporters; and
 - Enhanced the FTR eCourt website to offer new categorization of cases, improved search capabilities and the ability to track transcript production.
- ❖ **Digital Signage Prototype:** Launched a Digital Signage Prototype at the geographical area No. 19 courthouse in Rockville. A large television monitor connected to a computer in the lobby displays civil and family case information to be heard on that day. The prototype, intended to provide members of the public with enhanced access to case information, went live in October 2015.

SUPERIOR COURT OPERATIONS DIVISION

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**Director
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**Director
Court Operations Unit**
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**Director
Support Enforcement
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**Director
Office of Victim Services**
Linda J. Cimino

**Director
Judicial Marshal Services**
O'Donovan Murphy

**Director
Staff Development Unit**
Michael Kokoszka


The Superior Court Operations Division assists the Judicial Branch in the administration of justice by providing quality services and information to the Court, its users and the community in an effective, professional and courteous manner. The division, the largest in the Judicial Branch, also provides judges and support staff with the resources needed to process cases in a timely and efficient manner. In addition, the division coordinates the Judicial Branch's implementation of the Judicial Branch's strategic plan.

Highlights of the past two years include:

- ❖ The Sandy Hook Workers Assistance Program, administered by the Office of Victim Services, statutorily ended on Aug. 31, 2015, with more than \$272,000 being disbursed to applicants since its establishment on April 1, 2013. The program assisted certain professionals who suffered a mental or emotional impairment as a result of their response or scheduled response to the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting.
- ❖ The Sexual Assault Forensic Examiners (SAFE) Program celebrated its 5th anniversary of providing sexual assault forensic examining services to sexual assault victims who go to a participating hospital. During this biennium, the program responded to 431 cases of sexual assault at participating hospitals with 86 percent of the victims consenting to a forensic exam and evidence collection.



SUPERIOR COURT OPERATIONS DIVISION



- ❖ Nearly 70 percent of all infractions issued are being transmitted electronically to the Judicial Branch's Centralized Infractions Bureau from the Connecticut State Police, the Department of Motor Vehicles and 55 local law enforcement agencies. A new citation form was introduced and enforcement efforts have been expanded to include written warnings and the collection of racial profiling information. Interfaces with the Department of Motor Vehicles and Central Connecticut State University were developed to facilitate the transmission of data related to written warnings and racial profiling.
- ❖ Support Enforcement Services (SES) developed a new, five-year strategic plan with measurable performance goals and performance indicators. SES created management and production reports to help staff focus on goals and to incorporate them into staff evaluations. By the close of Year 2, child support collection rates increased more than 3.3 percentage points (to 61.3 percent).
- ❖ SES fully implemented a 2011 law authorizing judicial marshals to execute child support capias warrants within courthouses. Judicial marshals executed 17 percent of child support capias executions in FY 15 and 33 percent of all child support capias executions in FY 16, saving the state up to \$239,000. The backlog of capiases dropped to 2,337, compared with more than 3,000 at the start of the biennium.
- ❖ SES developed and piloted in Bridgeport a customer satisfaction survey in Family Support Magistrate Court. Ninety-one percent of all parties responded that they were treated professionally. Ninety-three percent responded that they were treated with respect by SES staff.
- ❖ SES enrolled two staff members in a nine-month cultural competency training program offered by the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services; offered a half-day curriculum on the *Culture of Poverty* and *Transgender Basics* as part of the Judicial Branch's Diversity Week; and made regular bimonthly appearances on Spanish-language radio shows and other community presentations through CULTURA, the Hispanic outreach team at SES.

SUPERIOR COURT OPERATIONS DIVISION

- ❖ The Pillars of Excellence Program, under the direction of the Staff Development Unit, continues to offer workshops to employees of the Supreme and Appellate courts and all divisions of the Branch, furthering the Branch's commitment to public service as demonstrated by the four core values of integrity, fairness, respect and professionalism. Since the last biennial report, more than 1,400 employees have participated in the core-value focused workshops that were uniquely designed for two distinct audiences: managers/supervisors and frontline staff.
 - ❖ The Judicial Branch's Judge Support Services Unit continued to provide quality educational opportunities for judges and family support magistrates. A significant continuing education accomplishment was the facilitation of a judicial training program by Dr. Jacquelyn Campbell, a nationally renowned leader in domestic violence research and advocacy, and the foremost expert in determining dangerousness and lethality in such situations. Dr. Campbell provided training for the judges on lethality factors and the practical application of a lethality assessment when ruling on restraining orders, protective orders and civil orders of protection in family, criminal and civil courts. Judges attending the full-day training program participated in exercises and scenarios.
 - ❖ More than 45 programs were held for judges and family support magistrates during the biennium. These education programs included divisional programs; domestic violence programs and roundtables; computer technology and e-filing programs; diversity awareness and sexual harassment programs; and foreclosure roundtables.
 - ❖ The Legal Services Unit provided counsel to numerous Branch committees and commissions, including but not limited to:
 - The Rules Committee, as it recommended and the judges adopted various rules, including mandatory continuing legal education;
 - The Jury Communications Committee, which reviews, revises and updates all jury notices that are used in communicating with the public, including the jury summons, request for postponements, etc. online;
 - The Code of Evidence Oversight Committee of the Supreme Court, which is charged with making recommendations to the Supreme Court for the orderly development of evidence law in Connecticut; and
 - The Committee of Judicial Ethics, which has held 25 meetings and issued 48 advisory opinions.
 - ❖ Interpreters assisted with 40,806 court appearances and interviews in fiscal year 2015 and 41,850 court appearances and interviews the following fiscal year. Telephonic interpretations totaled 14,324 in FY 15 and 16,140 in FY 16. Also in FY 15, there were a total of 159 translations, 91 of which were evidentiary. Evidentiary translations are related to case-specific information that must be translated before a matter goes forward – a victim's statement for example. The remaining 68 translations involved vital documents such as Branch forms, brochures, pamphlets and intranet pages. In FY 16, there were 85 evidentiary translations and 98 vital documents translations.
- Between July 1, 2014 and June 30, 2016, the Judicial Branch received at least 1,395 requests for ADA accommodations.**
- ❖ Between July 1, 2014 and June 30, 2016, the Judicial Branch received at least 1,395 requests for ADA accommodations. These accommodations included vendor-provided services, such as sign language interpretation and real-time transcription, and those that involve more complicated requests for assistance.
 - ❖ The Branch received \$60,000 in two annual grants of \$30,000 in 2014 and 2015, from the federally funded State Justice Institute to present training on interacting with people with hidden disabilities and vicarious trauma. Some 1,520 staff members from all five divisions attended these trainings during the biennium.

SUPERIOR COURT OPERATIONS DIVISION

- ❖ The Branch in 2016 purchased software for the creation of an online training program on service animals, which is being developed by staff with information from the U.S. Department of Justice. Additionally, 725 employees received this training in person from Branch staff.
- ❖ A Juror Accessibility Study was conducted at the state's 18 oldest courthouses. The study, which was completed in March 2016, will require the expenditure of several million dollars to improve accessibility to jury assembly rooms, common areas, restrooms and juror boxes. The Branch will focus its immediate efforts on improving ADA access to jury assembly areas and restrooms in six locations – Bridgeport, Danbury, Hartford, New Haven, New London and Waterbury. The Branch is seeking \$2.5 million annually from the state budget to continue improving juror accessibility.
- ❖ Judicial Marshal Services, in an effort to assist in combating the growing opioid epidemic and to ensure continued public safety of Judicial Branch courthouses, has conducted training in the use and administration of Intranasal Naloxone. All Judicial Marshals have received education and training in the use and administration of Intranasal Naloxone. Each Judicial Branch courthouse has a minimum of two Intranasal Naloxone doses per facility.

Judicial Marshal Services, in an effort to assist in combating the growing opioid epidemic and to ensure continued public safety of Judicial Branch courthouses, has conducted training in the use and administration of Intranasal Naloxone.


- ❖ The Judicial Marshal Academy continues to provide professional education and training to Judicial Marshal Services and agencies internal and external of the Judicial Branch. Charter Oak State University conducted a review of the Judicial Marshal Academy pre-service education and training program. The faculty assessment team members reviewed the academy's application, resources and materials to ensure the program materials were inclusive of all key theories, topics and concepts. The faculty assessors were very impressed with the quality of the training and the significant enhancements since their initial review in 2005. Charter Oak State University's assessment team certified, approved and awarded the Judicial Marshal Academy 17 academic credits.




SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION

13 Judicial Districts and 20 Geographical Areas

Connecticut Judicial Districts




Judicial Branch Geographical Areas



11 Juvenile Districts

Connecticut Juvenile Matters Courts*



* Please note that the Danbury Juvenile Court closed effective September 30, 2016.



STATISTICAL OVERVIEW

CT JUDICIAL BRANCH BASIC FACTS

SUPREME & APPELLATE COURT MATTERS

❖ MOVEMENT OF CASELOAD

SUPERIOR COURT

❖ JUVENILE MATTERS

- DELINQUENCY
- FAMILY WITH SERVICE NEEDS
- CHILD PROTECTION PETITIONS

JUDICIAL DISTRICT LOCATIONS

❖ CRIMINAL MATTERS

GEOGRAPHICAL AREA LOCATIONS

❖ CRIMINAL MATTERS

CIVIL MATTERS

CENTRALIZED SMALL CLAIMS

FAMILY MATTERS

HOUSING SESSION

ADULT PROBATION/CONTRACTED SERVICES

Please note that underlined words are “hyperlinked” to statistics pages in this biennial report.

CT Judicial Branch

BASIC FACTS

Courts

Supreme Court
Appellate Court
Superior Court

Number of Judgeships

201 including the justices of the Supreme Court, and the judges of the Appellate and Superior Courts

Method of Appointment

Nomination by the Governor from a list compiled by the Judicial Selection Commission; appointment/reappointment by the General Assembly

Term in Office

Eight years

Added Cases 2014 - 2016

Summary

Total Cases Added For the Superior Court Division

		FY 2014-2015	FY 2015-2016
Criminal	Total Criminal	94,678	94,972
	Judicial District	2,891	2,919
	Geographical Area	91,787	92,053
Motor Vehicle		188,828	178,917
Civil		51,205	52,430
Small Claims		40,561	45,530
Family		32,439	31,462
Juvenile	Total Juvenile	25,103	25,862
	Delinquency	10,527	9,833
	Family With Service Needs	4,269	3,862
	Child Protection	10,307	12,167
Housing Session (Summary Process)		22,739	22,191
Total Cases Added		455,553	451,364

CT Judicial Branch

BASIC FACTS *-continued*

General Fund Expenditures

FY 2014-2015

\$536,008,063

FY 2015-2016

\$555,151,275

Permanent full-time employment positions (including judges)

FY 2014-2015

4,329

FY 2015-2016

4,329

Total Cases Added During The Biennium 2014-2016

Supreme Court Cases
289

Appellate Court Cases
2,360

Superior Court Cases
906,917

Disposed Cases 2014 - 2016

Summary

Total Cases Disposed For the Superior Court Division

		FY 2014-2015	FY 2015-2016
Criminal	Total Criminal	92,271	93,373
	Judicial District	2,805	2,906
	Geographical Area	89,466	90,467
Motor Vehicle		177,869	190,730
Civil		66,599	59,695
Small Claims		41,955	43,644
Family		33,980	32,578
Juvenile	Total Juvenile	26,406	25,755
	Delinquency	11,208	9,890
	Family With Service Needs	4,595	4,298
	Child Protection	10,603	11,567
Housing Session (Summary Process)		22,205	22,369
Centralized Infractions Bureau Tickets Paid		200,829	186,202
Total Cases Disposed		662,114	654,346

Supreme Court

July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015

FY15	Pending, Start of Period	Added	Disposed						Pending, End of Period	Change Pending
			opinion	court motion	party motion	transferred	withdrawn	other		
Civil ¹	152	64	103	2	6	11	11	1	82	(70)
Criminal	126	57	49	3	2	27	1	0	101	(25)
Total	278	121	152	5	8	38	12	1	183	(95)

July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016

FY16	Pending, Start of Period	Added	Disposed						Pending, End of Period	Change Pending
			opinion	court motion	party motion	transferred	withdrawn	other		
Civil ¹	82	107	79	4	5	20	6	2	73	(9)
Criminal	101	61	49	0	0	37	7	0	69	(32)
Total	183	168	128	4	5	57	13	2	142	(41)

¹ Civil category includes: Civil, Family, and Juvenile cases

Appellate Court

July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015

FY15	Pending, Start of Period	Added	Disposed						Pending, End of Period	Change Pending
			opinion	court motion	party motion	transferred	withdrawn	other		
Civil ¹	756	970	383	178	98	44	190	6	827	71
Criminal	241	128	109	16	5	10	15	0	214	(27)
Total	997	1,098	492	194	103	54	205	6	1,041	44

July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016

FY16	Pending, Start of Period	Added	Disposed						Pending, End of Period	Change Pending
			opinion	court motion	party motion	transferred	withdrawn	other		
Civil ¹	827	1,126	417	164	117	60	212	12	971	144
Criminal	214	136	106	18	1	12	33	1	179	(35)
Total	1,041	1,262	523	182	118	72	245	13	1,150	109

¹ Civil category includes: Civil, Family, and Juvenile cases

Delinquency

July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015

FY15

	Pending, Start of Period				Added	Disposed	Pending, End of Period				Change Pending
	0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total			0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total	
Bridgeport	259	17	0	276	1,220	1,346	135	14	1	150	(126)
Danbury	64	10	2	76	437	394	95	20	4	119	43
Hartford	502	67	29	598	1,634	1,777	373	63	19	455	(143)
Middletown	163	24	6	193	600	633	117	30	13	160	(33)
New Britain	190	20	1	211	1,052	1,049	188	19	7	214	3
New Haven	486	118	67	671	1,600	1,807	404	44	16	464	(207)
Rockville	160	35	2	197	615	638	147	24	3	174	(23)
Stamford	136	38	5	179	470	530	89	24	6	119	(60)
Torrington	98	10	7	115	362	393	69	15	0	84	(31)
Waterbury	366	87	6	459	1,305	1,377	288	71	28	387	(72)
Waterford	263	51	6	320	789	848	215	35	11	261	(59)
Willimantic	121	30	4	155	443	416	117	46	19	182	27
Total	2,808	507	135	3,450	10,527	11,208	2,662	472	109	2,769	(681)

Delinquency

FY16

July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016

	Pending, Start of Period				Added	Disposed	Pending, End of Period				Change Pending
	0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total			0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total	
Bridgeport	135	14	1	150	1,226	1,186	179	8	3	190	40
Danbury	95	20	4	119	507	477	106	30	13	149	30
Hartford	373	63	19	455	1,519	1,505	339	92	38	469	14
Middletown	117	30	13	160	508	520	95	43	10	148	(12)
New Britain	188	19	7	214	986	987	171	33	9	213	(1)
New Haven	404	44	16	464	1,563	1,571	364	79	13	456	(8)
Rockville	147	24	3	174	553	556	124	37	10	171	(3)
Stamford	89	24	6	119	501	474	115	27	4	146	27
Torrington	69	15	0	84	317	325	53	20	3	76	(8)
Waterbury	288	71	28	387	1,062	1,098	273	64	14	351	(36)
Waterford	215	35	11	261	755	797	182	24	13	219	(42)
Willimantic	117	46	19	182	336	394	76	26	22	124	(58)
Total	2,237	405	127	2,769	9,833	9,890	2,077	483	152	2,712	(57)

Family with Service Needs

FY15

July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015

	Pending, Start of Period				Added	Disposed	Pending, End of Period				Change Pending
	0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total			0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total	
Bridgeport	218	21	2	241	743	832	148	1	3	152	(89)
Danbury	14	2	0	16	262	270	6	2	0	8	(8)
Hartford	146	23	68	237	671	710	145	21	32	198	(39)
Middletown	51	12	4	67	272	307	23	4	5	32	(35)
New Britain	36	4	1	41	440	466	15	0	0	15	(26)
New Haven	104	31	107	242	496	511	203	21	3	227	(15)
Rockville	29	1	0	30	219	242	7	0	0	7	(23)
Stamford	48	4	1	53	226	222	48	9	0	57	4
Torrington	23	1	0	24	141	163	2	0	0	2	(22)
Waterbury	61	4	0	65	354	397	22	0	0	22	(43)
Waterford	66	17	4	87	279	276	75	14	1	90	3
Willimantic	47	4	0	51	166	199	15	1	2	18	(33)
Total	843	124	187	1,154	4,269	4,595	709	73	46	828	(326)

Family with Service Needs

FY16

July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016

	Pending, Start of Period				Added	Disposed	Pending, End of Period				Change Pending
	0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total			0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total	
Bridgeport	148	1	3	152	590	679	59	2	2	63	(89)
Danbury	6	2	0	8	213	208	13	0	0	13	5
Hartford	145	21	32	198	682	773	73	1	33	107	(91)
Middletown	23	4	5	32	191	208	13	2	0	15	(17)
New Britain	15	0	0	15	391	393	12	1	0	13	(2)
New Haven	203	21	3	227	371	527	66	1	4	71	(156)
Rockville	7	0	0	7	170	174	2	1	0	3	(4)
Stamford	48	9	0	57	207	199	55	9	1	65	8
Torrington	2	0	0	2	137	138	1	0	0	1	(1)
Waterbury	22	0	0	22	384	394	11	1	0	12	(10)
Waterford	75	14	1	90	308	388	8	0	2	10	(80)
Willimantic	15	1	2	18	218	217	18	1	0	19	1
Total	709	73	46	828	3,862	4,298	331	19	42	392	(436)

Child Protection Petitions¹

FY15

July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015

	Pending, Start of Period				Added	Disposed	Pending, End of Period				Change Pending
	0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total			0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total	
Bridgeport	176	25	7	208	1,060	1,041	203	19	5	227	19
Danbury	68	21	0	89	474	447	88	25	3	116	27
Hartford	330	43	28	401	1,663	1,746	271	38	9	318	(83)
Middletown	134	10	0	144	658	677	111	10	4	125	(19)
New Britain	188	47	17	252	848	882	174	34	10	218	(34)
New Haven	263	28	16	307	1,344	1,407	195	14	35	244	(63)
Rockville	106	20	2	128	530	551	102	4	1	107	(21)
Stamford	65	23	1	89	236	263	40	18	4	62	(27)
Torrington	66	12	18	96	360	380	53	19	4	76	(20)
Waterbury	291	35	4	330	1,352	1,354	300	17	11	328	(2)
Waterford	252	31	12	295	985	1,041	194	33	12	239	(56)
Willimantic	207	26	0	233	797	814	193	23	0	216	(17)
Total	2,146	321	105	2,572	10,307	10,603	1,924	254	98	2,276	(296)

¹ Petition Types Include:

Neglect
Neglect, Uncared For
Neglect, Abused
Neglect, Uncared For, Abused
Uncared For
Uncared For, Abused

Abused
Emancipation
Contested Application Removal of Guardian
Contested Petition for Terminated Rights
Appeal from Probate
Revocation

Termination of Parental Rights
Motion for Review of Permanency Plan
Administrative Appeal
Reinstate Parent As Guardian
Adoption
OTC

Child Protection Petitions¹

FY16

July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016

	Pending, Start of Period				Added	Disposed	Pending, End of Period				Change Pending
	0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total			0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total	
Bridgeport	203	19	5	227	1,201	1,208	202	10	8	220	(7)
Danbury	88	25	3	116	551	514	119	28	6	153	37
Hartford	271	38	9	318	1,673	1,623	307	39	22	368	50
Middletown	111	10	4	125	724	710	136	3	0	139	14
New Britain	174	34	10	218	1,038	941	267	43	5	315	97
New Haven	195	14	35	244	1,688	1,591	301	32	8	341	97
Rockville	102	4	1	107	665	588	175	5	4	184	77
Stamford	40	18	4	62	306	285	64	15	4	83	21
Torrington	53	19	4	76	389	373	82	10	0	92	16
Waterbury	300	17	11	328	1,742	1,637	392	38	3	433	105
Waterford	194	33	12	239	1,208	1,151	244	47	5	296	57
Willimantic	193	23	0	216	982	946	220	28	4	252	36
Total	1,924	254	98	2,276	12,167	11,567	2,509	298	69	2,876	600

¹ Petition Types Include:

Neglect
Neglect, Uncared For
Neglect, Abused
Neglect, Uncared For, Abused
Uncared For
Uncared For, Abused

Abused
Emancipation
Contested Application Removal of Guardian
Contested Petition for Terminated Rights
Appeal from Probate
Revocation

Termination of Parental Rights
Motion for Review of Permanency Plan
Administrative Appeal
Reinstate Parent As Guardian
Adoption
OTC

Judicial District Criminal

July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015

FY15

	Pending, Start of Period	Added	Disposed			Pending, End of Period	Change Pending
			Without Trial	With Trial	Total		
Ansonia/Milford	127	116	59	7	66	177	50
Danbury	750	396	448	3	451	695	(55)
Fairfield	476	350	309	15	324	502	26
Hartford	501	464	408	53	461	504	3
New Britain	253	166	158	9	167	252	(1)
Litchfield	219	211	179	5	184	246	27
Middlesex	125	86	86	7	93	118	(7)
New Haven	469	304	227	43	270	503	34
New London	236	177	142	9	151	262	26
Stamford	334	134	137	7	144	324	(10)
Tolland	88	77	55	4	59	106	18
Waterbury	358	293	305	10	315	336	(22)
Windham	206	117	116	4	120	203	(3)
Total	4,142	2,891	2,629	176	2,805	4,228	86

Judicial District Criminal

July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016

FY16

	Pending, Start of Period	Added	Disposed			Pending, End of Period	Change Pending
			Without Trial	With Trial	Total		
Ansonia/Milford	177	165	123	9	132	210	33
Danbury	695	394	410	8	418	671	(24)
Fairfield	502	324	299	26	325	501	(1)
Hartford	504	348	359	44	403	449	(55)
New Britain	252	156	187	6	193	215	(37)
Litchfield	246	214	214	5	219	241	(5)
Middlesex	118	77	69	3	72	123	5
New Haven	503	250	248	38	286	467	(36)
New London	262	213	184	14	198	277	15
Stamford	324	222	156	3	159	387	63
Tolland	106	103	77	3	80	129	23
Waterbury	336	309	266	14	280	365	29
Windham	203	144	139	2	141	206	3
Total	4,228	2,919	2,731	175	2,906	4,241	13

Judicial District Criminal

July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015

FY15

	Pending, Start of Period				Median Age of Cases (in months)	Cases for Confined Defendants	
	Active	Inactive	Awaiting Disposition	Total		6-12 months	12+ months
Ansonia/Milford	106	46	25	177	7.0	24	16
Danbury	201	460	34	695	6.8	11	19
Fairfield	285	150	67	502	6.8	59	32
Hartford	309	119	76	504	4.9	50	37
New Britain	172	47	33	252	6.3	29	43
Litchfield	143	74	29	246	7.4	23	14
Middlesex	74	29	15	118	5.3	10	4
New Haven	297	150	56	503	7.6	44	48
New London	171	64	27	262	4.2	12	22
Stamford	154	124	46	324	17.9	19	25
Tolland	74	30	2	106	6.3	10	13
Waterbury	199	109	28	336	6.6	36	29
Windham	124	49	30	203	9.9	20	22
Total	2,309	1,451	468	4,228	6.7	347	324

Judicial District Criminal

July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016

FY16

	Pending, Start of Period				Median Age of Cases (in months)	Cases for Confined Defendants	
	Active	Inactive	Awaiting Disposition	Total		6-12 months	12+ months
Ansonia/Milford	129	58	23	210	5.4	30	11
Danbury	186	447	38	671	4.3	12	8
Fairfield	267	154	80	501	6.9	35	38
Hartford	261	136	52	449	6.1	65	42
New Britain	136	42	37	215	6.8	26	27
Litchfield	140	68	33	241	3.3	10	5
Middlesex	74	36	13	123	4.5	6	5
New Haven	246	158	63	467	8.4	39	45
New London	202	61	14	277	7.4	28	14
Stamford	239	125	23	387	6.9	23	41
Tolland	97	24	8	129	4.5	18	5
Waterbury	241	90	34	365	7.0	52	32
Windham	117	60	29	206	7.5	23	10
Total	2,335	1,459	447	4,241	6.4	367	283

Geographical Area Criminal

FY15

July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015

	Pending, Start of Period				Added	Transfer ¹	Disposed	Pending, End of Period			
	Active	Inactive	Rearrest	Total				Active	Inactive	Rearrest	Total
Bantam	601	1,129	232	1,962	3,145	214	2,942	567	1,183	201	1,951
Bridgeport	1,402	3,340	1,812	6,554	7,073	378	6,853	1,018	3,495	1,883	6,396
Bristol	639	1,205	535	2,379	3,077	41	2,829	693	1,352	541	2,586
Danbury	520	1,269	909	2,698	2,602	396	2,149	541	1,294	920	2,755
Danielson	1,026	1,646	552	3,224	2,809	129	2,981	781	1,529	613	2,923
Derby	621	1,235	337	2,193	2,310	54	2,123	637	1,367	322	2,326
Enfield	529	1,044	489	2,062	2,468	50	2,453	470	1,054	503	2,027
Hartford	2,408	3,565	1,833	7,806	11,321	332	11,451	1,958	3,509	1,877	7,344
Manchester	1,504	1,621	565	3,690	4,341	100	4,256	1,331	1,745	599	3,675
Meriden	983	1,399	386	2,768	5,393	98	5,254	917	1,486	406	2,809
Middletown	1,277	1,204	447	2,928	3,462	90	3,571	1,144	1,240	345	2,729
Milford	887	991	400	2,278	2,971	65	3,168	731	924	361	2,016
New Britain	1,056	2,806	628	4,490	6,805	135	6,120	1,048	3,495	497	5,040
New Haven	2,438	3,076	2,209	7,723	10,543	211	10,608	2,197	3,032	2,218	7,447
New London	686	1,890	1,606	4,182	3,907	120	3,805	711	1,881	1,572	4,164
Norwalk	674	2,397	1,277	4,348	2,699	58	2,675	771	2,222	1,321	4,314
Norwich	855	1,571	513	2,939	3,933	87	3,822	756	1,707	500	2,963
Rockville	609	1,118	298	2,025	2,966	71	2,649	692	1,242	337	2,271
Stamford	995	2,349	1,922	5,266	2,782	89	3,111	786	2,126	1,936	4,848
Waterbury	1,947	2,161	1,363	5,471	7,180	320	6,646	2,015	2,382	1,288	5,685
Total	21,657	37,016	18,313	76,986	91,787	3,038	89,466	19,764	38,265	18,240	76,269

¹Transfer to JD includes MV matters

Geographical Area Criminal

FY16

July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016

	Pending, Start of Period				Added	Transfer ¹	Disposed	Pending, End of Period			
	Active	Inactive	Rearrest	Total				Active	Inactive	Rearrest	Total
Bantam	567	1,183	201	1,951	3,146	219	2,822	596	1,217	243	2,056
Bridgeport	1,018	3,495	1,883	6,396	7,200	343	6,549	1,439	3,331	1,934	6,704
Bristol	693	1,352	541	2,586	3,055	30	3,269	675	1,321	346	2,342
Danbury	541	1,294	920	2,755	2,769	394	2,274	520	1,374	962	2,856
Danielson	781	1,529	613	2,923	2,634	149	2,646	658	1,475	629	2,762
Derby	637	1,367	322	2,326	2,378	64	2,184	673	1,443	340	2,456
Enfield	470	1,054	503	2,027	2,196	24	2,463	461	815	460	1,736
Hartford	1,958	3,509	1,877	7,344	11,293	248	11,031	2,292	3,071	1,995	7,358
Manchester	1,331	1,745	599	3,675	4,349	79	4,246	1,260	1,791	648	3,699
Meriden	917	1,486	406	2,809	5,270	65	4,890	1,136	1,669	319	3,124
Middletown	1,144	1,240	345	2,729	3,276	83	3,409	936	1,229	348	2,513
Milford	731	924	361	2,016	2,703	109	2,686	726	832	366	1,924
New Britain	1,048	3,495	497	5,040	6,916	133	7,879	1,263	2,125	556	3,944
New Haven	2,197	3,032	2,218	7,447	11,130	201	11,599	1,854	2,670	2,253	6,777
New London	711	1,881	1,572	4,164	4,425	118	3,887	924	2,008	1,652	4,584
Norwalk	771	2,222	1,321	4,314	2,477	87	2,480	645	2,260	1,319	4,224
Norwich	756	1,707	500	2,963	3,779	100	4,005	717	1,408	512	2,637
Rockville	692	1,242	337	2,271	3,016	106	2,762	699	1,402	318	2,419
Stamford	786	2,126	1,936	4,848	2,637	154	2,664	718	1,977	1,972	4,667
Waterbury	2,015	2,382	1,288	5,685	7,404	336	6,722	2,266	2,410	1,355	6,031
Total	19,764	38,265	18,240	76,269	92,053	3,042	90,467	20,458	35,828	18,527	74,813

¹Transfer to JD includes MV matters

Geographical Area Motor Vehicle

FY15

July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015

	Pending, Start of Period	Added	Disposed	Pending, End of Period	Change Pending
Bantam	804	7,912	7,520	1,196	392
Bridgeport	2,665	14,209	13,238	3,636	971
Bristol	351	2,075	2,055	371	20
Danbury	3,204	10,000	9,231	3,973	769
Danielson	2,168	7,347	7,203	2,312	144
Derby	1,668	7,802	7,828	1,642	(26)
Enfield	306	2,144	2,095	355	49
Hartford	1,688	6,432	6,985	1,135	(553)
Manchester	1,246	3,792	4,080	958	(288)
Meriden	1,986	11,187	10,661	2,512	526
Middletown	2,307	11,688	11,670	2,325	18
Milford	1,110	4,912	5,136	886	(224)
New Britain	4,540	26,020	21,414	9,146	4,606
New Haven	2,657	17,905	16,823	3,739	1,082
New London	562	2,863	2,751	674	112
Norwalk	1,146	6,482	6,071	1,557	411
Norwich	1,399	11,490	10,846	2,043	644
Rockville	1,424	17,042	15,188	3,278	1,854
Stamford	1,678	7,523	7,523	1,678	0
Waterbury	1,754	10,003	9,551	2,206	452
Total	34,663	188,828	177,869	45,622	10,959

Geographical Area Motor Vehicle

FY16

July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016

	Pending, Start of Period	Added	Disposed	Pending, End of Period	Change Pending
Bantam	1,196	7,330	7,480	1,046	(150)
Bridgeport	3,636	12,576	12,666	3,546	(90)
Bristol	371	1,891	1,897	365	(6)
Danbury	3,973	9,709	10,792	2,890	(1,083)
Danielson	2,312	6,648	6,864	2,096	(216)
Derby	1,642	7,613	7,727	1,528	(114)
Enfield	355	2,152	2,175	332	(23)
Hartford	1,135	5,625	5,418	1,342	207
Manchester	958	4,298	4,119	1,137	179
Meriden	2,512	12,332	12,696	2,148	(364)
Middletown	2,325	10,459	11,445	1,339	(986)
Milford	886	3,868	4,071	683	(203)
New Britain	9,146	22,769	29,436	2,479	(6,667)
New Haven	3,739	18,249	18,982	3,006	(733)
New London	674	2,929	2,893	710	36
Norwalk	1,557	5,457	5,836	1,178	(379)
Norwich	2,043	11,053	11,550	1,546	(497)
Rockville	3,278	17,818	18,360	2,736	(542)
Stamford	1,678	6,072	6,571	1,179	(499)
Waterbury	2,206	10,069	9,752	2,523	317
Total	45,622	178,917	190,730	33,809	(11,813)

Civil Case Movement

July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015

FY15

	Pending ¹ , Start of Period	Added			Disposed			Pending ¹ , End of Period
		New Filings	Other ²	Total	With Trial	Other	Total	
Ansonia/Milford	4,986	2,313	198	2,511	279	3,754	4,033	3,464
Bridgeport	8,947	6,596	489	7,085	399	8,051	8,450	7,582
Danbury	3,413	2,647	91	2,738	153	3,436	3,589	2,562
Hartford	12,549	9,328	284	9,612	577	11,406	11,983	10,178
Litchfield	2,072	1,471	172	1,643	49	2,137	2,186	1,529
Meriden	1,440	1,412	32	1,444	121	1,586	1,707	1,177
Middlesex	2,781	2,229	133	2,362	99	2,764	2,863	2,280
New Britain	5,483	3,889	101	3,990	268	4,526	4,794	4,679
New Haven	11,044	7,611	522	8,133	565	8,420	8,985	10,192
New London ³	5,623	3,785	122	3,907	226	4,383	4,663	4,867
Rockville ⁴	1,128	946	22	968	125	520	645	1,451
Stamford	5,629	2,867	177	3,044	373	4,462	4,835	3,838
Tolland	1,198	1,736	45	1,781	43	1,969	2,012	967
Waterbury	5,549	3,343	175	3,518	201	4,287	4,488	4,579
Windham	1,181	1,032	89	1,121	42	1,324	1,366	936
Total	73,023	51,205	2,652	53,857	3,520	63,079	66,599	60,281

¹ Pending adjusted to reflect reopened and transferred cases

² Other added includes net reopened and transferred cases

³ New London includes Norwich

⁴ Rockville consists of habeas corpus cases

Civil Case Movement

July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016

FY16

	Pending ¹ , Start of Period	Added			Disposed			Pending ¹ , End of Period
		New Filings	Other ²	Total	With Trial	Other	Total	
Ansonia/Milford	3,473	2,343	141	2,484	143	2,882	3,025	2,932
Bridgeport	7,571	6,678	511	7,189	346	7,874	8,220	6,540
Danbury	2,576	2,654	68	2,722	227	2,906	3,133	2,165
Hartford	10,190	9,593	243	9,836	409	9,241	9,650	10,376
Litchfield	1,534	1,484	123	1,607	58	1,765	1,823	1,318
Meriden	1,180	1,257	8	1,265	280	1,323	1,603	842
Middlesex	2,289	2,219	92	2,311	252	2,386	2,638	1,962
New Britain	4,666	4,176	108	4,284	179	4,478	4,657	4,293
New Haven	10,213	7,685	409	8,094	446	7,795	8,241	10,066
New London ³	4,858	4,176	113	4,289	199	4,968	5,167	3,980
Rockville ⁴	1,455	819	18	837	115	615	730	1,562
Stamford	3,841	2,983	158	3,141	212	3,460	3,672	3,310
Tolland	972	1,703	56	1,759	203	1,506	1,709	1,022
Waterbury	4,591	3,569	132	3,701	153	3,997	4,150	4,142
Windham	942	1,091	75	1,166	17	1,260	1,277	831
Total	60,351	52,430	2,255	54,685	3,239	56,456	59,695	55,341

¹ Pending adjusted to reflect reopened and transferred cases

² Other added includes net reopened and transferred cases

³ New London includes Norwich

⁴ Rockville consists of habeas corpus cases

Small Claims Housing

July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015

FY15

	Pending, Start of Period	Added	Disposed	Pending, End of Period
Bantam	17	54	58	13
Bridgeport	50	178	173	55
Danbury	29	67	59	37
Danielson	28	54	57	25
Derby	20	54	60	14
Hartford	93	436	399	130
Manchester	27	52	63	16
Meriden	1	0	0	1
Middletown	46	152	157	41
Milford	17	63	61	19
New Britain	59	221	227	53
New Haven	85	205	218	72
New London	49	138	144	43
Norwalk	54	143	136	61
Stamford	7	12	9	10
Waterbury	34	158	147	45
Total	616	1,987	1,968	635

Small Claims Housing

July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016

FY16

	Pending, Start of Period	Added	Disposed	Pending, End of Period
Bantam	13	63	56	20
Bridgeport	55	165	159	61
Danbury	37	68	76	29
Danielson	25	54	50	29
Derby	14	57	51	20
Hartford	130	417	430	117
Manchester	16	83	75	24
Meriden	1	1	1	1
Middletown	41	158	152	47
Milford	19	49	55	13
New Britain	53	181	182	52
New Haven	72	179	180	71
New London	43	161	150	54
Norwalk	61	160	161	60
Stamford	10	1	3	8
Waterbury	45	117	122	40
Total	635	1,914	1,903	646

Small Claims Non-Housing

July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015

FY15

	Pending, Start of Period	Added	Disposed	Pending, End of Period
Bantam	482	1,961	2,109	334
Bridgeport	528	2,820	2,913	435
Danbury	1,183	5,516	5,922	777
Danielson	276	1,137	1,177	236
Derby	250	1,226	1,275	201
Hartford	6	21	20	7
Manchester	1,755	8,139	8,337	1,557
Meriden	14	0	1	13
Middletown	665	3,454	3,603	516
Milford	274	1,274	1,272	276
New Britain	624	3,065	3,168	521
New Haven	476	2,490	2,497	469
New London	658	2,809	2,969	498
Norwalk	195	964	959	200
Stamford	257	1,087	1,120	224
Waterbury	511	2,611	2,645	477
Total	8,154	38,574	39,987	6,741

Small Claims Non-Housing

July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016

FY16

	Pending, Start of Period	Added	Disposed	Pending, End of Period
Bantam	334	2,359	2,245	448
Bridgeport	435	3,396	3,140	691
Danbury	777	5,988	5,660	1,105
Danielson	236	1,291	1,234	293
Derby	201	1,297	1,254	244
Hartford	7	25	27	5
Manchester	1,557	8,922	8,710	1,769
Meriden	13	0	0	13
Middletown	516	3,914	3,725	705
Milford	276	1,462	1,357	381
New Britain	521	3,724	3,523	722
New Haven	469	2,726	2,689	506
New London	498	3,075	2,984	589
Norwalk	200	1,050	1,022	228
Stamford	224	1,272	1,238	258
Waterbury	477	3,115	2,933	659
Total	6,741	43,616	41,741	8,616

Family Case Movement

July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015

FY15

	Pending, Start of Period	Added			Disposed			Pending, End of Period
		New Filings	Other ¹	Total	With Trial	Other	Total	
Ansonia/Milford	522	1,475	37	1,512	745	817	1,562	472
Bridgeport	1,054	3,306	42	3,348	1,827	1,471	3,298	1,104
Danbury	535	1,303	11	1,314	795	587	1,382	467
Hartford	1,578	5,824	58	5,882	3,256	2,748	6,004	1,456
Litchfield	421	1,032	13	1,045	621	539	1,160	306
Meriden	269	970	21	991	519	487	1,006	254
Middlesex	383	1,163	18	1,181	683	600	1,283	281
New Britain	813	2,486	42	2,528	888	1,666	2,554	787
New Haven	1,631	4,554	40	4,594	2,346	2,542	4,888	1,337
Norwich ²	1,113	2,869	24	2,893	1,550	1,541	3,091	915
Stamford	866	2,009	36	2,045	1,337	764	2,101	810
Tolland	462	1,416	6	1,422	731	692	1,423	461
Waterbury	834	2,570	52	2,622	1,417	1,257	2,674	782
Windham	474	1,462	22	1,484	691	863	1,554	404
Total	10,955	32,439	422	32,861	17,406	16,574	33,980	9,836

¹ Other added includes net reopened and transferred cases

² Norwich includes New London

Family Case Movement

FY16

July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016

	Pending, Start of Period	Added			Disposed			Pending, End of Period
		New Filings	Other ¹	Total	With Trial	Other	Total	
Ansonia/Milford	472	1,373	21	1,394	727	770	1,497	369
Bridgeport	1,100	3,189	23	3,212	1,729	1,576	3,305	1,007
Danbury	470	1,243	9	1,252	729	587	1,316	406
Hartford	1,458	5,784	53	5,837	3,031	2,524	5,555	1,740
Litchfield	306	970	7	977	546	478	1,024	259
Meriden	257	1,002	14	1,016	479	515	994	279
Middlesex	278	1,095	19	1,114	531	583	1,114	278
New Britain	766	2,597	48	2,645	1,007	1,758	2,765	646
New Haven	1,333	4,237	40	4,277	2,015	2,394	4,409	1,201
Norwich ²	910	2,626	48	2,674	1,454	1,454	2,908	676
Stamford	817	2,065	29	2,094	1,381	834	2,215	696
Tolland	473	1,360	13	1,373	731	718	1,449	397
Waterbury	776	2,483	29	2,512	1,382	1,167	2,549	739
Windham	412	1,438	13	1,451	698	780	1,478	385
Total	9,828	31,462	366	31,828	16,440	16,138	32,578	9,078

¹ Other added includes net reopened and transferred cases

² Norwich includes New London

Housing Session - Summary Process

July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015

FY15

	Pending, Start of Period	Added	Disposed	Pending, End of Period
Bridgeport	468	2,924	2,894	498
Hartford	278	4,779	4,709	348
Meriden	79	528	542	65
New Britain	253	1,963	1,895	321
New Haven	505	3,727	3,546	686
Norwalk	231	1,328	1,287	272
Waterbury	274	2,261	2,294	241
Total	2,088	17,510	17,167	2,431

Housing Session - Summary Process

July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016

FY16

	Pending, Start of Period	Added	Disposed	Pending, End of Period
Bridgeport	498	2,700	2,713	485
Hartford	348	4,756	4,620	484
Meriden	65	455	472	48
New Britain	321	1,889	1,931	279
New Haven	686	3,728	3,775	639
Norwalk	272	1,437	1,409	300
Waterbury	241	2,340	2,251	330
Total	2,431	17,305	17,171	2,565

Non-Housing Session - Summary Process

July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015

FY15	Pending, Start of Period	Added	Disposed	Pending, End of Period
Bantam (GA18)	190	546	530	206
Danbury (GA3)	169	525	552	142
Danielson (GA11)	89	644	651	82
Derby (GA5)	170	527	482	215
Middletown (GA9)	87	595	555	127
New London (GA10)	74	977	968	83
Norwich (GA21)	69	874	774	169
Tolland JD	61	541	526	76
Total	909	5,229	5,038	1,100

Non-Housing Session - Summary Process

July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016

FY16	Pending, Start of Period	Added	Disposed	Pending, End of Period
Bantam (GA18)	206	547	682	71
Danbury (GA3)	142	528	596	74
Danielson (GA11)	82	609	627	64
Derby (GA5)	215	475	522	168
Middletown (GA9)	127	546	558	115
New London (GA10)	83	890	912	61
Norwich (GA21)	169	877	861	185
Tolland JD	76	414	440	50
Total	1,100	4,886	5,198	788

Adult Probation Summary of Clients

July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015

FY15

	Total Incoming		Total Outgoing		Probation at Start		Probation at End	
	Clients	Cases	Clients	Cases	Clients	Cases	Clients	Cases
Summary	23,409	25,069	23,115	24,327	42,608	46,293	41,567	45,368
Accelerated Rehabilitation	7,557	7,562	7,337	7,342	7,965	7,972	8,016	8,025
Drug Dependency	132	143	84	87	165	172	172	188
Youtful Offender	106	107	355	363	754	755	481	492
Total	7,795	7,812	7,776	7,792	8,884	8,899	8,669	8,705

July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016

FY16

	Total Incoming		Total Outgoing		Probation at Start		Probation at End	
	Clients	Cases	Clients	Cases	Clients	Cases	Clients	Cases
Summary	22,856	24,528	22,247	23,563	41,609	45,412	40,725	44,571
Accelerated Rehabilitation	7,183	7,189	7,373	7,381	8,039	8,048	7,531	7,539
Drug Dependency	137	145	88	92	173	189	188	205
Youtful Offender	96	94	201	208	479	490	357	363
Total	7,416	7,428	7,662	7,681	8,691	8,727	8,076	8,107

Contracted Services

FY15
FY16

Adult Programs		
Adult Behavioral Health Services	20,129	20,691
Alternative in the Community	14,863	15,783
Residential Services	4,736	5,171
Sex Offender Services	615	725
Women and Children Services	260	264
Drug Intervention Program	36	38
Family Services		
Domestic Violence-Evolve	624	536
Domestic Violence-Explore	1,652	2,022
Family Violence Education Program (FVEP)	4,791	4,962
Bridgeport Domestic Violence Intervention Services	194	150
Community Service Programs		
Community Court	6,727	6,520



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