

To Serve The Interests of Justice and The Public by Resolving Matters Brought Before it in a Fair, Timely, Efficient and Open Manner.



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**Cover photo by**: Catherine Sparano, Caseflow Coordinator, Stamford Judicial District **Photos above**: Employees at the Diversity Day Celebration; Law Day ceremony in the Supreme Court; Registration table during Dr. Livingston's presentation at Central Connecticut State University during Diversity Week, held from October 23 to 27, 2023; Luncheon for Experiential Learning Program workplace hosts; Middle School Mock Trial competition at the Appellate Court

#### To the Governor, General Assembly, and Residents of the State of Connecticut:



It is my pleasure to present to you the Connecticut Judicial Branch's 2022-2024 Biennial Report and Statistics. This biennial is my last to you, as I have retired before today's publication date. I am proud of the Branch's impactful initiatives and grateful for your support. We've been through a lot, not the least of which was a worldwide pandemic.

To the Executive and Legislative branches, thank you for the opportunities we had to work together. We may not have always agreed on an outcome, but we shared a common goal: to serve our respective constituencies. I am equally grateful for the work of the Bar,

our many stakeholders, and members of the community for their trust and confidence in our state judiciary.

To my fellow Supreme Court justices, thank you for your collegiality and dedication to the rule of law. I will always treasure our spirited discussions and your hard work regarding the important and sometimes difficult opinions we issued. And to the judges on the Appellate Court, thank you for your dedication as well – you too have an enormous role in preserving the rule of law and have always fulfilled that obligation with your opinions.

To Chief Court Administrator Elizabeth A. Bozzuto and Deputy Chief Court Administrator Anna M. Ficeto, thank you for keeping the day-to-day operations of the Judicial Branch working well and being responsive to those whom we serve. And to our Superior Court judges – truly the backbone of the Judicial Branch – I am proud to have started my career as a judge among you and am forever thankful for your daily efforts to ensure meaningful access to justice.

To Judicial Branch staff, at the Supreme, Appellate, and Superior court levels, in the field and in our administrative offices, thank you for making possible all that the Judicial Branch accomplishes. Even among the most difficult times, you inspired us to keep moving forward.

And finally, to my successor: you are leading one of the best state court systems in the nation. You will have many successes and challenges, and on occasion, things won't work out like you wanted. However, given the extraordinary team surrounding you, I am confident that you will always find a solution.

Best wishes to all,

Hon. Richard A. Robinson

#### To the Governor, General Assembly, and Residents of the State of Connecticut:

he State of Connecticut Judicial Branch is pleased to share with you its 2022-2024 Biennial Report and Statistics. This report summarizes the Branch's many accomplishments over the biennium, especially regarding our continued leveraging of technology to improve the court experience of those whom we serve.

We are especially excited about a new video remote interpreting system now in place in criminal, family, civil, juvenile, housing and family support magistrate matters. This service not only expedites assistance to the Branch's limited English proficient population, but it also allows our highly qualified interpreters to efficiently cover more assignments in a shorter period of time.



The Branch has also greatly expanded its use of technology regarding communications with law enforcement. One initiative is the Judicial Online Communication Exchange, a new platform that allows state and municipal police officers to electronically submit secure Probable Cause Determination requests and Risk Protection Order applications for a judge's review.

The Branch is immensely proud of its Diversity, Equity and Inclusion Unit, which it established in late 2022. The unit leads the Branch in its ongoing efforts to serve people from all cultural identities with respect, professionalism, integrity and fairness. So far, the unit has been instrumental in increasing education and training opportunities for judges, Branch employees and contractors.

We also initiated the very successful Judicial Branch Civics Academy during the biennium. Launched in 2023, the Civics Academy represents the Branch's most ambitious civics education initiative to date. The Academy's key component is its faculty: judges and attorneys visit upper-elementary classrooms, as a team, with a solid, interactive curriculum that educates, and inspires young minds as to their role in a democracy. This free and interactive program continues to grow and is a win-win for all.


We have many more achievements that are outlined further in the biennial, and I hope you will take the time to review them. As always, I am grateful to our judges, family support magistrates and staff for all that they do.

Thank you for your support, and we look forward to working with you.

Very truly yours,

Judge Elizabeth A. Bozzuto Chief Court Administrator

#### CONNECTICUT COURT STRUCTURE



#### SUPREME COURT



Seated from left to right: Justice Andrew J. McDonald, Chief Justice Richard A. Robinson and Justice Gregory T. D'Auria Standing from left to right: Justice Nora R. Dannehy, Justice Steven D. Ecker, Justice Raheem L. Mullins and Justice Joan K. Alexander

The Supreme Court is Connecticut's highest court, and it reviews rulings made in the Appellate and Superior courts to determine if errors occurred. The court does not decide questions of fact; rather, it decides issues of law, such as the interpretation of a statute or the constitutionality of the procedures used in presenting evidence at trial.

The chief justice and six justices comprise the Supreme Court. Generally, the court sits en banc – in panels of seven.

Parties who are dissatisfied with the judgment of the Appellate Court can ask the Supreme Court to review the legal issues at stake. Other appeals before the Supreme Court may result from a decision to transfer the case to itself instead of having the matter heard in the Appellate Court, or because of the law requiring that only the

Supreme Court hear appeals regarding certain cases – i.e., reapportionment of voting districts. All arguments are open to the public and are usually livestreamed by The Connecticut Network (CT-N).

A yearly highlight for the Supreme Court is its "On Circuit" program, whereby the court visits schools usually law schools and higher education colleges and/ or universities, but on occasion high schools as well. During these visits, students watch actual arguments before the court and have the opportunity afterward to ask questions of the attorneys who argued the cases. During the biennium, the Supreme Court visited Eastern Connecticut State University in Willimantic, Central Connecticut State University in New Britain and Watkinson School in Hartford.

<sup>\*</sup> Please note that the photo is of the Supreme Court as it was on June 30, 2024. Now-former Chief Justice Richard A. Robinson retired effective Sept. 6, 2024. The Hon. Raheem L. Mullins became chief justice effective Sept. 30, 2024.



#### Daley v. Kashmanian, 344 Conn. 464 (2022).

The defendant police officer was in an unmarked "soft car" and conducting surveillance on a group of individuals riding motorcycles and quads when he struck the back of the plaintiff's

motorcycle from behind, resulting in serious injuries. The plaintiff's personal injury action was tried to a jury, who returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the trial court granted the defendants' motion to set aside the verdict on the ground that the defendants were entitled to discretionary act immunity under General Statutes § 52-557n, as the court found that the surveillance involved discretionary police activity. On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the conclusion that the defendants were entitled to discretionary act immunity, and the Supreme Court, upon granting the plaintiff's petition for certification, reversed that judgment. After examining the legislative history, the court concluded that, in promulgating § 52-557n, the legislature "understood the operation of a motor vehicle to be a ministerial act" given that it is "a highly regulated activity governed by a panoply of state motor vehicle statutes." The Supreme Court found that the motor vehicle statutes at issue here impose ministerial duties and that, although the decision whether to use the soft car for surveillance was discretionary, "once the officers decided to operate a motor vehicle on public streets for the surveillance operation, they were legally bound to comply with the statutory rules of the road," unless the car was being operated as an emergency vehicle within the meaning of General Statutes § 14-283, which the defendants conceded was not the case. As a result, the court held that the defendants were not entitled to governmental immunity under § 52-557n for their ministerial acts and remanded the case with direction to reinstate the jury's verdict.

#### State v. Pan, 345 Conn. 92 (2022).

The defendant was charged with the murder of the victim, who was found lying in a New Haven street with multiple gunshot wounds. The trial court signed an arrest warrant

for the defendant shortly after the shooting and set his bond at \$5,000,000. A nationwide manhunt ensued to find the defendant, who was located in Alabama approximately three months later in an apartment that he had rented under an alias with \$19,000 in cash, multiple cell phones, and his father's passport. The defendant waived extradition and was arraigned in New Haven, at which time the trial court raised the defendant's bond to \$20,000,000. The defendant thereafter filed a petition for review of his bond under General Statutes § 54-63g in the Appellate Court, and the petition was transferred to the Supreme Court. While his petition for review was pending, the defendant filed a motion to modify his bond in the trial court. The Supreme Court denied the petition for review without prejudice to refiling it after the hearing on the defendant's motion to modify in the trial court and ordered the trial court to state "the factors considered ... and the correlation between the reasonableness of the amount of the bond to ensure that the defendant will appear in court and not threaten the safety of himself or another person." At the hearing, the trial court issued an oral decision holding that the \$20,000,000 bond was appropriate, citing to the seriousness of the charged crime, the strength of the state's case, the defendant's lack of ties to Connecticut, his flight and his family's assistance therewith, the \$19,000 in cash found with him during his apprehension, and his mental health. Defense counsel at the hearing asked the trial court if it would consider a 10 percent cash alternative to the bond, but the trial court concluded that the alternative was unavailable under the governing rule of practice. The defendant subsequently filed a second petition for review of his bond, claiming that his bond was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted the petition for review. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to modify his bond in light of the cited factors "indicat[ing] that this particular defendant present[ed] a uniquely significant flight risk, which [was] compounded by the violence of the crime with which he was charged and the lengths to which he went to avoid detection and apprehension." It also held, however, that the trial court incorrectly concluded that it lacked the authority to offer a 10 percent cash bail option under the governing rule of

practice. On that basis, the Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition and remanded the matter to the trial court so that it could exercise its discretion as to whether to allow a 10 percent cash bail option. The Supreme Court further decided "to clarify the procedures that our trial courts currently utilize in conducting bail modification hearings," given how "this case highlight[ed] the existence of several substantive and procedural issues concerning the information on which the judges of the Superior Court rely in setting reasonable bond amounts." The court determined that, if a defendant moves to modify a bond on the ground that it is unaffordable, the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating with evidence that they lack the financial resources to afford the bond, after which the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the bond is in fact reasonable. The trial court must then make a de novo determination about whether the bond is reasonable and articulate its findings and reasoning in a matter sufficient for any appellate review.

#### State v. Curet, 346 Conn. 306 (2023).

Police officers responded to a report of gunshots at the defendant's apartment building, and, upon arrival, one resident stated that he saw a man in a hooded shirt enter the building, heard loud banging on the defendant's door, and then saw an altercation in the hallway in front of the defendant's apartment. The altercation moved into the nearby laundry room before the resident reported that he heard gunshots and saw the man in the hooded shirt run out of the front door. The responding officers found evidence of a shooting in the laundry room, including a shell casing and blood stain, and that someone had attempted to break into the defendant's apartment. They received no response when they repeatedly knocked on the defendant's door, although the defendant's car was in the parking lot, and, concerned that someone inside might be injured, the officers forced their way into the defendant's apartment without first obtaining a warrant. No one was found in the apartment, and the officers

observed, in plain view, various drug paraphernalia. After obtaining a search warrant, a subsequent search yielded additional narcotics, and the defendant was charged with possession of narcotics with intent to sell. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from her apartment, and the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere, conditioned on her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's ruling denying the motion to suppress after concluding that neither the exigent circumstances doctrine nor the emergency aid doctrine justified the initial warrantless entry into the defendant's apartment. The Supreme Court granted the state's petition for certification to appeal and agreed with the Appellate Court that the warrantless entry was not supported by the exigent circumstances doctrine because the officers lacked probable cause to search the defendant's apartment for evidence or to make an arrest. The court, however, concluded that the warrantless entry was justified under the emergency aid doctrine and reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court clarified that the standard under the emergency aid doctrine is whether, based on the totality of the facts known to the police officers at the time, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that someone inside the defendant's apartment needed emergency medical assistance and that immediate entry into the apartment was necessary to protect life. The court specifically highlighted the initial report of gunshots, the evidence of a shooting including the blood stain in the laundry room and, finally, the resident's concern for the defendant's welfare because her car was in the parking lot but she was not answering her door.

#### Khan v. Yale University, 347 Conn. 1 (2023).

The plaintiff was a student at the defendant Yale University and was accused of sexual assault by the defendant Jane Doe, a fellow student. Yale stayed disciplinary proceedings pending the resolution of related criminal charges brought against the plaintiff. The

plaintiff was eventually tried before a jury and acquitted of the charges. At the hearing convened by the University-Wide Committee on Sexual Misconduct (UWC) on Doe's sexual assault complaint, Doe was not present and provided a statement via teleconference, the plaintiff was not permitted to be present in the room while the UWC hearing panel questioned her, the participation of the plaintiff's attorney was limited, and the plaintiff's request for a transcript was denied. The UWC panel decided after the hearing to expel the plaintiff. The plaintiff subsequently brought an action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut alleging in relevant part defamation against Doe. The District Court held as to the claim that the UWC proceeding was quasi-judicial in nature and that Doe therefore enjoyed absolute immunity for statements she made during the proceeding. The plaintiff appealed the District Court's judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and claimed that the UWC proceeding was not quasi-judicial and that Doe's statements made therein were thus not protected by absolute immunity. The Second Circuit certified four questions to the Supreme Court under General Statutes § 51-199b pertaining to (1) the requirements for a proceeding to qualify as quasi-judicial for purposes of affording absolute immunity to its participants, (2) whether the UWC proceeding was quasi-judicial, (3) if so, whether Doe was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for her statements during the proceeding, and (4) if not, whether Doe was entitled to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court determined as to the first certified question that "[a] quasi-judicial proceeding is an adjudicative one, in which the proceeding is specifically authorized by law, the entity conducting the proceeding applies the laws to the facts within a framework that contains procedural safeguards, and there is a sound public policy justification for affording proceeding participants absolute immunity." The court then determined as to the second certified question that the UWC proceeding was not quasi-judicial in nature because it lacked important procedural safeguards, namely that it failed to require complainants to testify

under oath or subject them to significant penalties for untruthfulness, to provide the plaintiff with meaningful cross-examination, to reasonably allow parties to call witnesses to testify, to provide the plaintiff with the opportunity to have his attorney actively participate, and to provide the plaintiff with a transcript of the proceeding that would assist him in seeking further review of the UWC's decision. The court therefore declined to answer the third certified question. Finally, the court determined as to the fourth certified question that, while "a qualified privilege is available to alleged victims of sexual assault who report their abuse to proper authorities at institutions of higher education," the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to defeat any qualified privilege claimed by Doe at the motion to dismiss stage.

### *Mills* v. *Hartford Healthcare Corp.*, 347 Conn. 524 (2023).

After the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Governor Lamont issued Executive Order 7V in April, 2020, which conferred "immunity from suit for civil liability for any injury or death alleged to have been sustained because of ... acts or omissions undertaken in good faith while providing health care services in support of the [s]tate's COVID-19 response." The decedent, who had been suspected of having either a heart attack or non-lifethreatening myocarditis, died at the defendant hospital after her admission to the cardiac catheterization lab was deferred, in accordance with the hospital's recently updated protocols, pending the results of her COVID test, which was negative. The plaintiff administrator of the decedent's estate brought the underlying action against the defendants alleging that the decedent had been misdiagnosed as having myocarditis. The defendants filed several motions to dismiss claiming that they were immune under the executive order and the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act, which confers immunity for injuries sustained as a result of using certain pandemic countermeasures, including COVID-19 diagnostic tests. Under both the executive

order and the PREP Act, the trial court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the claims concerning acts or omissions that occurred before their receipt of the decedent's negative test result, finding that the defendants had been providing health care services in support of the state's response to the pandemic until that time. The parties filed cross appeals, which the Supreme Court transferred to itself and consolidated. That court, applying the usual principles of statutory construction, found that the executive order was ambiguous and looked to the circumstances surrounding its promulgation at the beginning of the pandemic, which included a compelling need to keep health care facilities open as well as uncertainty surrounding the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of the novel disease. The court interpreted the executive order as conferring immunity when the acts or omissions complained of are "connected to" the health care provider's services in support of the state's COVID-19 response, even when the provider is not treating a patient for COVID. In this case, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff failed to rebut the defendants' evidence that they were supporting the state's COVID-19 response, as the evidence showed that the decedent's COVID-19 status was a material factor in the defendants' treatment plan, which was based on their good faith belief that the decedent's symptoms were caused by COVID-19. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the defendant was entitled to immunity under the executive order. The court also agreed that the immunity did not apply to acts or omissions after receipt of the decedent's negative COVID-19 test result, as the negative test result broke any meaningful connection between the decedent's treatment and the defendants' support of the state's COVID-19 response. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the judgment of dismissal under the PREP Act after finding that the defendants' alleged gross negligence did not arise out of the administration or use of the COVID-19 diagnostic test because the protocols or policies implemented to stem the spread of COVID-19 do not arise out of the administration or use of the COVID-19 diagnostic test within the meaning of the PREP Act.

#### Tilsen v. Benson, 347 Conn. 758 (2023).

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment dissolving his marriage to the defendant to challenge certain financial orders and the denial of his motion to enforce the parties' "ketubah," which is a contract governing marriage under Jewish law. The trial court denied plaintiff's request that the financial orders be entered in accordance with Jewish law based on the ketubah's choice of law provision, concluding that enforcement of the ketubah would violate the establishment clause of the first amendment. Following the judgment of dissolution, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, and the Supreme Court transferred the appeal to itself. The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the ketubah was enforceable in the dissolution action after applying the "neutral principles of law" doctrine, which permits a civil court to decide a dispute in a religious context so long as it can be resolved solely by applying secular legal analysis without implicating religious doctrine or practice. The Supreme Court found that the ketubah was facially silent as to each party's support obligations, and, therefore, the trial court would have had to rely on external sources, such as the conflicting opinions of the parties' expert witnesses, to determine each party's obligations under Jewish law, which would result in "a textbook entanglement into religious matters" and violate the establishment clause. The Supreme Court also rejected the plaintiff's claim that not enforcing the ketubah violated his rights under the free exercise clause of the first amendment because enforcing the ketubah would have risked violating the defendant's free exercise rights in the name of protecting the plaintiff's rights and also because the trial court did not penalize the plaintiff for his religious beliefs but rather decided that the action would be governed by this state's generally applicable equitable distribution and alimony laws. The court also rejected the plaintiff's claim that the financial orders were based on a clearly erroneous factual finding regarding his earning capacity, as the trial court properly based its award on the plaintiff's earning capacity and net available income, and his claim that the trial court erred in awarding the

defendant 25 percent of future distributions stemming from the plaintiff's ownership interest in a real estate asset, as the parties had stipulated that such distributions were property subject to equitable distribution.

### Drumm v. Freedom of Information Commission, 348 Conn. 565 (2024).

A filmmaker submitted a request to the Madison Police Department under the Freedom of Information Act seeking disclosure of certain documents contained in the department's files related to the 2010 unsolved murder of Barbara Hamburg. The department denied the request on the ground that the documents were exempt from disclosure pursuant to the law enforcement exception in General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (3) (D), which permits the police to refuse to disclose records that contain "information to be used in a prospective law enforcement action if prejudicial to such action." As a result, the filmmaker filed a complaint with the Freedom of Information Commission, which ordered the respondents, the town of Madison, its chief of police, and the department, to provide the filmmaker with copies of those documents. The respondents appealed to the trial court, which upheld the commission's decision, and the respondents appealed to the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court transferred the appeal to itself and agreed with the trial court that, in order to satisfy their burden of showing that the law enforcement exception applies, the respondents were required to demonstrate that a future law enforcement action was a "reasonable possibility." The court found that this interpretation was supported by the legislative history and was the most reasonable reading of the law enforcement exception when balancing the competing public interests of fostering openness and transparency with protecting important governmental functions that demand a degree of confidentiality. Because the application of this newly adopted reasonable possibility standard is "fact intensive," the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the commission to determine whether some prospective law enforcement action remains a reasonable possibility here.

#### State of Connecticut v. Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2838, AFL-CIO, 349 Conn. 148 (2024).

During a domestic dispute, Christopher Dukes allegedly threatened to kill his wife and children, which led to an armed standoff with the police for several hours. Ultimately, the resulting child protection matters and criminal charges were disposed of in favor of Dukes. While those investigations were pending, however, Dukes was terminated from his job as the director of student conduct at a state university, which required him to work closely with students, the faculty, and the local police. An arbitrator concluded that there was no just cause for Dukes' termination and issued an arbitration award ordering him reinstated. The plaintiff filed an application to vacate that award in the trial court, and the trial court granted the plaintiff's application on the ground that the award violated public policy. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, and the Supreme Court transferred the appeal to itself. A majority of the Supreme Court, which assumed that the arbitration award implicated the public policies of protecting victims of domestic violence and preventing interference with the police, held that the award did not violate those public policies in light of the four factors in Burr Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199, 316 Conn. 618 (2015), and reversed the trial court's judgment. The majority determined that the first factor weighed against vacating the award because there was no statute, regulation, or case law that mandated Dukes' firing. The majority also found that the third and fourth factors weighed against vacating the award because Dukes' conduct was not so egregious that public policy required his firing and there was no finding that he was incorrigible. The majority found that the second factor, whether the public safety or public trust is implicated, was neutral because, although Dukes' job did implicate the public trust, the majority could not conclude that reinstating him would impair the public trust. A dissenting opinion contended that all four factors weighed in favor of vacating the award. The dissent,

noting that the arbitration award "unconditionally reinstated" Dukes to his position without any reprimand, reasoned that Dukes was "tasked with investigating and prosecuting violations of the student code of conduct" and that his conduct during the domestic dispute "strikes at the core of [his] job duties" such that the award reinstating him unconditionally violates the "well-defined and dominant public policies against armed resistance to arrest, of preserving the peace, and of noninterference with the police."

#### State v. Andres C., 349 Conn. 300 (2024).

At the defendant's trial on charges of sexual assault in the third degree and risk of injury to a child, the victim revealed for the first time that she had written about her relationship with the defendant and the abuse he inflicted in journals that she created in connection with therapy she received after the assaults. The trial court ordered the prosecutors to review the journals to determine if they contained "statements" concerning the charged offenses that a defendant may obtain from the state pursuant to Practice Book § 40-13A or information favorable to the defense that the prosecutors were required to disclose under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The prosecutors enlisted a Spanish-speaking investigator employed by the state's attorney's office to review the journals because they were written in Spanish. The prosecutors informed the trial court that the investigator was instructed as to what type of information must be disclosed and that, based on the investigator's review, there was no information in the journals that must be disclosed. The defendant was convicted and appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that he was entitled to disclosure of the journals under § 40-13A and that the prosecutors violated their obligation under Brady to personally review the journals for material that must be disclosed. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment, and the Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal. A majority of the Supreme Court held that the journals did not constitute statements

that are discoverable under § 40-13A because the victim did not approve or adopt them as accurate statements of the events in question for which she could be held accountable in court. The majority also held that, based on the limited case law available, the prosecutors did not violate their obligations under Brady by delegating the task of reviewing the journals to a non-lawyer and declined the defendant's request to adopt a rule requiring prosecutors to personally review material for disclosable information when the material first comes to light during trial. The majority perceived no significant risk that, in the absence of such a rule, constitutional rights would be violated and emphasized that prosecutors bear the ultimate responsibility for complying with Brady's disclosure requirements and are accountable for any individual to whom they delegate that responsibility. A concurring opinion noted that, although the defendant did not raise the claim, the journals may have been discoverable following a request under Practice Book § 40-11 for books, tangible objects, papers, or documents in the possession of the prosecution that are material to the preparation of the defense. Two justices wrote separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part in which they asserted that the case should be remanded to the trial court with direction to order that the journals be translated into English and to conduct further proceedings to determine whether the journals contain information that should be disclosed.

### *Tatum* v. *Commissioner of Correction*, 349 Conn. 733 (2024).

In 1990, the petitioner was convicted after a jury trial of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim. He appealed and claimed that the trial court improperly admitted unduly suggestive identifications of him as the shooter by two eyewitnesses who had previously identified a third party as the shooter but recanted those identifications and, more than one year after the shooting, identified the petitioner as the shooter during his probable cause hearing. His claim was

rejected, however, and his conviction was upheld in State v. Tatum, 219 Conn. 721 (1991). In 2012, the Supreme Court decided State v. Guilbert, 306 Conn. 218 (2012), where it addressed the evolving science undermining the reliability of eyewitness identifications and held that expert testimony on eyewitness identification can be admissible and does not invade the fact-finding province of the jury. The Supreme Court later developed upon Guilbert in State v. Dickson, 322 Conn. 410 (2016), to hold that, "when identity is an issue, in-court identifications that are not preceded by a successful identification in a nonsuggestive identification procedure implicate due process principles and, therefore, must be prescreened by the trial court." In so holding, the Supreme Court overruled its decision in the petitioner's direct criminal appeal on the eyewitness identification issue. The petitioner thereafter filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming (1) that the admission of the eyewitness identification evidence in his case violated his due process rights and that Guilbert and Dickson should be applied retroactively and (2) advances in the science of eyewitness identification highlighted the unreliability of the eyewitness identification evidence and undermined the validity of his conviction. The habeas court dismissed the claims after concluding that Guilbert and Dickson did not apply retroactively, and the Appellate Court affirmed the habeas court's judgment. In the petitioner's certified appeal from the Appellate Court's judgment, however, the Supreme Court held that *Dickson* applied retroactively to the petitioner's claims. The Supreme Court set forth the standards for the retroactive application of new law to cases on collateral review, such as the petitioner's pursuit of postconviction relief. It then determined that Guilbert did not apply retroactively because it was evidentiary and not constitutional in nature but that Dickson did apply retroactively because it was constitutional in nature and established a "watershed rule of criminal procedure." The Supreme Court noted that the "watershed rule of criminal procedure" standard for retroactivity no longer applies under federal law but also observed that it was not bound by such law and could conduct its

own independent analysis regarding the applicability of the standard. It concluded that the "watershed rule" standard remains viable under Connecticut law and that "a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure must be applied retroactively on collateral review if the rule was a result of developments in science that persuaded us to reevaluate fundamental procedures underlying judicial procedures, the rule significantly improves the accuracy of a conviction, and the petitioner advocated for the rule in the direct proceedings or in an earlier habeas petition." The Supreme Court then applied the criteria to the petitioner's case and, deeming them satisfied, reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court with direction that the case be remanded to the habeas court so that a trial could be held on the petitioner's eyewitness identification claims and Dickson could be applied to them.

### Wihbey v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Pine Orchard Assn., 350 Conn. 87 (2024).

Since 2005, the plaintiff has offered for short-term rental a residence that he owns in the Pine Orchard Association (Pine Orchard), an incorporated borough of the town of Branford. The zoning regulations in effect in 2005 (1994 regulations) provided for several permitted uses, including use as "[a] single-family dwelling." In 2018, Pine Orchard amended its zoning regulations (2018 regulations) to prohibit the rental of a singlefamily dwelling for less than thirty days. In 2019, Pine Orchard's zoning enforcement officer issued the plaintiff a letter ordering him to cease and desist from renting his property to short-term overnight guests in violation of the 2018 regulations. The plaintiff appealed to the defendant, the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Pine Orchard Association (board), claiming that his use of the property was a protected nonconforming use under the 1994 regulations. The board determined that shortterm rentals had never been permitted under the 1994 regulations and therefore upheld the cease-and-desist order. The plaintiff further appealed to the trial court, which reversed the board's decision. The board and two

intervening defendants in turn appealed to the Appellate Court, which concluded that the trial court correctly had determined that the 1994 regulations permitted short-term rentals. The defendants were then granted certification to appeal to the Supreme Court. On appeal, although the defendants agreed that the 1994 regulations permit long-term rentals, they argued that the language defining a "single family dwelling" as a dwelling "occupied exclusively as a home or residence for not more than one family" unambiguously prohibited rentals of less than thirty days. A majority of the Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that the language was ambiguous and reasonably could be interpreted as permitting the erection of houses or dwellings that are designed for occupation and use by only one family at any given time, without any temporal occupation requirement. In so concluding, the court determined that dictionary definitions of the terms "residence" and "home" did not necessarily imply a degree of permanency, as they reasonably could be read as focusing not on the length of time that a particular family occupies the structure but on the nature and use of the structure at any given time. Noting that ambiguous zoning regulations must be construed against a restriction of a property owner's common-law rights, the Supreme Court held that the Appellate Court had determined correctly that the 1994 regulations permit short-term rentals. A dissenting opinion agreed with the defendants' interpretation of "home" and "residence" and faulted the majority's interpretation for suggesting that both terms can refer to transient uses of the property, noting that the word "home" was consistently defined as a place that is fixed. The dissent took the position that interpreting the 1994 regulations as prohibiting shortterm rentals was more in keeping with the purpose of the regulations, which was to promote the general welfare of the community. The dissent also found significant the fact that the 1994 regulations specifically excluded "roomer[s], boarder[s] or lodger[s]" from the definition of "family," suggesting that the regulations did not intend to allow for short-term, transient uses of the property.

#### State v. Outlaw, 350 Conn. 251 (2024).

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of murder and firearm offenses stemming from the shooting death of the victim. On the night of the shooting, the defendant was in the parking lot of a hotel at which he was staying when he learned that the victim, a member of a rival gang, was in the vicinity. In response, the defendant had his girlfriend, Cheenisa Rivera, drive him toward the victim, and, as they approached, he fired a pistol out of the passenger window, killing the victim. At trial, Rivera testified for the state pursuant to a cooperation agreement whereby she agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit murder and to hindering a prosecution. Loretta Martin, who had booked the hotel room for the defendant and Rivera shortly before the shooting, also testified for the state pursuant to a cooperation agreement. During a recess on the first day of evidence, the court informed counsel that one of the jurors had appeared to be asleep for approximately one hour earlier in the day and advised defense counsel to monitor the juror. At the end of the day, the prosecutor remarked that the juror had again been asleep during testimony, and defense counsel concurred that the juror had appeared to be nodding off. The court ultimately decided not to take any further action, however, after defense counsel voiced concern that removing the juror would alter the racial composition of the jury. On direct appeal following the defendant's conviction, a majority of the Supreme Court affirmed. The majority first rejected the defendant's claim that the trial court had improperly failed to take any action regarding the apparently sleeping juror, concluding that the trial court's response was sufficient to satisfy its obligations under prior caselaw to conduct an inquiry into all allegations of juror misconduct. In so concluding, the majority acknowledged that the trial court's "wait and see" approach was not ideal but noted that the court had solicited the parties' input, considered the relevant factors, including defense counsel's emphatic preference for retaining the juror, proposed a plan to monitor the juror, to which the parties agreed, and later confirmed that the juror had not been seen sleeping again. The majority

next rejected the defendant's claim that the trial court had improperly admitted evidence related to Rivera's and Martin's placements in witness protection, concluding that, although the evidence should not have been admitted, the defendant had not demonstrated prejudice. The majority also disagreed with the defendant's claim that the trial court had improperly permitted Rivera to testify regarding her guilty plea, concluding that any error in the admission of this evidence was harmless. Finally, the majority found unpersuasive the defendant's claim that the prosecutor had violated his right to a jury trial by remarking in closing argument that Rivera had taken responsibility for her actions by pleading guilty. Two separate opinions were filed that took issue with the majority's resolution of the defendant's first claim. One of the separate opinions posited that, when a juror sleeps through an hour of evidence, the trial court must do more than simply monitor the juror and discuss the matter with counsel. Nevertheless, the opinion concluded that the trial court's error had not rendered the trial unfair and therefore agreed with the majority's ultimate rejection of the claim. The second separate opinion, however, would have reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the serious possibility that a juror may have been asleep during important testimony can never be considered harmless.

#### State v. King, 350 Conn. 303 (2024).

When a defendant who is charged with a crime that is punishable by life imprisonment waives the right to a jury trial and elects to be tried by the court, state statutes mandate that the court be composed of a panel of three judges. This statutory scheme, which is unique to Connecticut, not only expands the traditional court trial from a single judge to a three-judge panel, but it also departs from the requirement of a unanimous verdict, which is a hallmark of the right to a criminal trial throughout the nation, by allowing for a conviction when only two of the three judges find the defendant guilty. Larise King waived her right to a jury trial and

elected to be tried before a three-judge panel on charges of conspiracy to commit murder and accessory to murder. A majority of the panel found her guilty of the charges, and she appealed from her conviction directly to the Supreme Court. Among the defendant's claims on appeal was that her waiver of her right to a jury trial was constitutionally invalid because the trial court judge who accepted her waiver failed to explain to her that the panel did not have to reach a unanimous decision. The Supreme Court invoked its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to adopt a rule requiring that trial courts question defendants who choose to be tried before a three-judge panel to ensure that they understand that, although a jury must be unanimous in reaching a guilty verdict, the panel can properly arrive at a guilty verdict after a decision by only a majority of the judges. The Supreme Court noted that, although counsel is more than capable of explaining the basic differences between a jury trial and a court trial, Connecticut's unique statutory scheme exists in a national landscape where a unanimous jury verdict is part and parcel of a defendant's right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court decided that, given this context, it could not categorize the lack of unanimity requirement specifically permitted in three-judge panel cases as a basic difference that could be left to counsel to explain to a defendant. The Supreme Court held that the failure of the trial court to explain that critical difference to King required reversal of her conviction and a remand for a new trial. Although King's conviction was reversed, the Supreme Court went on to address her additional claim that the panel violated her due process rights by beginning its deliberations before the close of evidence, as the claim was likely to arise at a new trial. The Supreme Court recognized that prior caselaw established a constitutional prohibition against jury deliberations until the close of evidence but declined to extend that rule to cases involving three-judge panels, noting that judges are held to a higher standard and serve a different role as compared with jurors.

#### APPELLATE COURT



Seated from left to right: Judge Ingrid L. Moll, Judge Bethany J. Alvord, Chief Judge William H. Bright, Jr., Judge Nina F. Elgo and Judge Melanie L. Cradle Standing from left to right: Judge Dawne G. Westbrook, Judge Robert W. Clark, Judge José A. Suarez, Judge Hope Seeley and Senior Judge Eliot D. Prescott \* Please note that the photo is of the Appellate Court as it was on June 30, 2024

he Appellate Court reviews decisions of the Superior Court, and its jurisdiction is broad. Basically, every appeal from a final judgment or order that does not go directly to the Supreme Court is filed in the Appellate Court. Except for matters brought under its original jurisdiction under the constitution, the Supreme Court also may, and does, transfer cases to the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court also, either on its own initiative or by party motion, may transfer a case from the Appellate Court to its own docket.

There are nine Appellate Court judges, one of whom is designated by the chief justice to be the chief judge. Generally, three judges hear and decide a case. The court may at times sit en banc, which means that the entire court participates in the ruling. After the Appellate Court decides an appeal, the Supreme Court can certify it for further review, upon the petition of an aggrieved party, if three justices vote for certification.

Voters in November 1982 approved a constitutional amendment to establish an Appellate Court, which heard its first cases on Oct. 4, 1983. As such, the Appellate Court on Oct. 4, 2023, turned 40 years old.

As with the Supreme Court, a yearly highlight for the Appellate Court is its "On Circuit" program, whereby the court visits law schools, colleges, universities and high schools. During these visits, students watch actual arguments before the court and have the opportunity afterward to ask questions of the attorneys who argued the cases. During the biennium, the Appellate Court visited Branford High School, Shepaug Valley School in Washington, Norwich Free Academy, and CREC Academy of International Studies in Bloomfield.



Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation v. Factory Mutual Insurance Company, 224 Conn. App. 429 (2024)

The plaintiff, Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, is a federally recognized Indian Tribe that operates several

businesses, including the Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, doing business as Foxwoods Resort Casino, a resort and casino complex that includes multiple casinos, hotels, theaters and restaurants. The defendant, Factory Mutual Insurance Company, issued the plaintiff an "all risk" insurance policy that covered the plaintiff's listed property against all risks of physical loss or damage and business interruptions (time element loss) up to \$1,655,000,000 per occurrence. The coverages in the policy were triggered by the physical loss or damage to covered property, but this threshold language was not defined in the policy. The policy included coverage for a response to communicable disease and communicable disease interruption loss. It also contained an exclusion to covered costs due to a virus.

The plaintiff submitted a claim under the policy claiming that, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, it had suffered direct physical loss and damage to locations and properties insured under the policy. Following the denial of this claim by the defendant, the plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to recover for damages caused to the plaintiff's properties and loss of business caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiff alleged that the presence of COVID-19 fell within several of the coverages contained in the policy that the defendant had issued to the plaintiff. The plaintiff further claimed that the policy's exclusion of contamination due to a virus did not apply. The trial court granted, in part, the defendant's motion to strike, concluding that although the plaintiff purchased an "all risk" policy, COVID-19 was a virus, the virus was considered contamination and contamination by virus was not covered by the policy.

On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed that it had sufficiently and specifically pleaded that COVID-19 physically altered its property, and that the policy expressly recognized the presence of a communicable disease as a physical loss or damage. The defendant countered that the plain language of the policy, specifically, the contamination exclusion, expressly barred coverage for "any condition of property due to the actual or suspected presence of ... any virus." The defendant further argued that, pursuant to our Supreme Court's decisions in Connecticut Dermatology Group, PC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 346 Conn. 33, 288 A.3d 187 (2023) (CT Dermatology) and Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Moda, LLC, 346 Conn. 64, 288 A.3d 206 (2023) (Moda), both of which were released subsequent to the trial court's decision in the present case, the alleged presence of COVID-19 did not trigger a physical loss or damage, the necessary trigger for coverage under this type of insurance policy.

The Appellate Court concluded, on the basis of its review of the relevant policy language and case law, that the plaintiff's claims did not fall within the grant of coverage for physical loss or damage or time element loss, and additionally, were subject to the contamination exclusion in the policy. Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded that the physical loss or damage language in the present policy was sufficiently similar to the language of the policies in CT Dermatology and Moda. In accordance with those cases, the Appellate Court stated that in order to obtain coverage, the plaintiff must allege facts showing some physical, tangible alteration to or deprivation of the property that renders it physically unusable or inaccessible. In the plaintiff's operative complaint, however, it alleged in a conclusory fashion that COVID-19 had caused a physical, tangible alteration to property, but it failed to allege facts showing the manner in which this alteration occurred. Additionally, the plaintiff failed to allege that COVID-19 resulted in the deprivation of property that rendered it physically unusable or inaccessible. The Appellate Court further

noted that a substantial number of decisions from state and federal courts had concluded that the presence of COVID-19 did not constitute physical damage or loss to trigger coverage under insurance policies identical to or akin to the policy in the present case.

The Appellate Court, therefore, determined that the trial court properly concluded that the contamination exclusion applied and defeated the plaintiff's claims for coverage under the property damage and time element coverages, and, therefore, properly granted the defendant's motion to strike.

# O'Reggio v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 219 Conn. App. 1 (2023), aff'd, 350 Conn. 182 (2024)

The plaintiff, Tenisha O'Reggio, began working for the Department of Labor (department) in 2009. In 2012, she was promoted to the position of adjudicator in the unemployment unit of the Bridgeport office, where she reported to Diane Krevolin, the program services coordinator. In 2016, the plaintiff, who is Black, filed an internal complaint with the department's Human Resources team alleging that Krevolin had made several upsetting and racially biased statements to her or in her presence. Following completion of two investigations, the department's commissioner, weighing Krevolin's lengthy career at the department with an unblemished record, issued a one day suspension to Krevolin and required her to attend diversity training.

While the department's investigations were ongoing, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the named defendant, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), alleging that the department had subjected her to a hostile work environment based on her race and color in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 46a-51 et seq. Following a hearing, the presiding human rights referee (referee)

concluded that, although Krevolin, whom the referee referred to as the plaintiff's "supervisor," had created a hostile work environment, the department acted promptly and reasonably to remedy the situation and, therefore, was not negligent. As a result, the referee held that the department was not vicariously liable for Krevolin's actions. The trial court thereafter affirmed the commission's decision, concluding that, for liability to be imputed to the department based on a supervisor theory of liability, Krevolin must have been a supervisor as that term had been defined by the United States Supreme Court in Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. 421, 424, 133 S. Ct. 2434, 186 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2013), for purposes of the CFEPA's federal counterpart, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Pursuant to this definition, a supervisor was someone "empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions" against the plaintiff. Although the court acknowledged that the referee's decision was ambiguous as to Krevolin's status as a supervisor under Vance, it reasoned that a remand was unnecessary because the plaintiff's counsel had conceded that Krevolin's responsibilities did not satisfy that definition.

The plaintiff thereafter appealed to the Appellate Court, contending that the Vance definition of "supervisor" for Title VII purposes does not apply to hostile work environment claims brought under the CFEPA. She urged the Appellate Court to adopt a broader definition of the term for CFEPA purposes that would include employees like Krevolin who could not "take tangible employment actions" but nonetheless controlled the day-to-day conditions of their subordinate's work. In considering the plaintiff's claims on appeal, the Appellate Court assumed, without deciding, that the framework for determining when an employer can be held liable for the creation of a hostile work environment by its employees for purposes of claims brought under Title VII of federal law applied to claims brought under CFEPA. Under this framework, if the employee was the plaintiff's coworker, then the employer can be held directly liable only if the plaintiff can

show that the employer was negligent. If, however, the employee was the plaintiff's supervisor, then the employer will be vicariously liable, regardless of whether the harassment resulted in a "tangible employment action," unless the employer satisfies an affirmative defense. The Appellate Court concluded that the Vance definition of "supervisor" as used by the courts in Title VII cases is the appropriate definition for distinguishing between the coworker and supervisor theories of liability for hostile work environment claims brought under the CFEPA. Accordingly, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court properly had applied the Vance test to the plaintiff's CFEPA claim. It, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Our Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, affirmed the decision of the Appellate Court, agreeing that the definition of employer under Vance applied to bar the plaintiff's claim.

### *Townsend* v. *Commissioner of Correction*, 226 Conn. App. 313 (2024)

The petitioner was arrested and charged with murder, carrying a pistol without a permit, criminal possession of a weapon, and criminal possession of a pistol or revolver based on events that transpired in 2000. In 2002, the petitioner entered a guilty plea to one count of murder pursuant to *North Carolina* v. *Alford*, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), in exchange for a sentence of twenty-five years of incarceration. Following a canvass of the petitioner, the trial court accepted the petitioner's plea and sentenced him to twenty-five years of incarceration in accordance with the agreement. The state thereafter nolled the additional weapons charges. The petitioner did not file a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction.

The petitioner thereafter filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his guilty plea was obtained in violation of his due process rights because he was not canvassed about the requirement – not yet in effect –that he register, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-280a (a) (1), as an offender on the Deadly Weapon Offender Registry

(DWOR) upon his release. That statute, which became effective on January 1, 2014, provides that "[a]ny person who has been convicted ... of an offense committed with a deadly weapon and is released into the community on or after January 1, 2014, shall ... following such release ... register ..., with the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection ... " (Emphasis added.) The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, admitted in his return the petitioner's allegation that the petitioner would be subject to the requirements of § 54-280a upon his release. The habeas court denied the petition, concluding in part that the failure to advise the petitioner of a collateral consequence that did not exist at the time he entered the plea did not violate due process.

On appeal, the petitioner argued, for the first time, that the trial court improperly denied his operative petition because § 54-280a did not apply to him, and he sought a judgment declaring that he was not subject to the DWOR on the basis of his underlying conviction. The respondent, despite having admitted the petitioner's allegation that he would have to register on the DWOR upon release, deferred on appeal to the interpretation of the statute by the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (DESPP), the agency tasked with establishing and maintaining the DWOR. According to the respondent, the DESPP took the position that § 54-280a did not apply to the petitioner.

Exercising its supervisory authority to review the petitioner's claim, the Appellate Court concluded that the plain and unambiguous language of the statute expressly limits the registration requirements set forth therein to offenders of eligible crimes who are both "convicted ... of an offense committed with a deadly weapon and released into the community on or *after January 1, 2014* ... ." (Emphasis added.) This reading of the statute was consistent with the DESPP's interpretation of the statute, as represented to the Appellate Court through the respondent's counsel on appeal. The habeas court did not have the benefit of this representation when it made its

determination. The Appellate Court, therefore, concluded that the habeas court improperly denied the petitioner's operative petition because the entire premise of the habeas court's decision, that § 54-280a was applicable to the petitioner's 2002 conviction, was incorrect.

#### Lafferty v. Jones, 225 Conn. App. 552 (2024)

The plaintiff in error, Norman A. Pattis, a Connecticut attorney and counsel of record for the defendant, Alex Emric Jones, and several other defendants in the underlying consolidated tort actions arising out of the mass shooting at the Sandy Hook Elementary School, filed a writ of error challenging the order of the trial court suspending him from the practice of law for six months after determining that he had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. In the underlying actions, the plaintiffs, who include immediate family members of those who were killed in the shooting, alleged that Jones used his Internet and radio platforms to spread the message that the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School was a staged event. During the trial, the court issued a protective order allowing the plaintiffs' medical and/or mental health records to be designated as confidential and limiting the use of this confidential information to counsel of record and others involved in the litigation of the underlying actions. At Pattis' direction and approval, however, the plaintiffs' confidential information was disseminated to two attorneys in Texas who were involved in the representation of Jones and the related defendants in Texas. One of the Texas attorneys later inadvertently disclosed the confidential material to the lead attorney for the plaintiffs in the Texas case. The court thereafter issued an order requiring Pattis to show cause as to whether he should be referred to disciplinary authorities or sanctioned by the court directly regarding the purported release of the plaintiffs' confidential medical records. Following a hearing, the court determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that Pattis had violated sections 1.1,

1.15 (b), 3.4 (3), 5.1 (b), 5.1 (c), and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Accordingly, the court suspended Pattis from the practice of law for a period of six months. Pattis then filed a writ of error with the Appellate Court.

In its opinion, the Appellate Court first concluded that the trial court did not violate Pattis' procedural due process rights by initiating, sua sponte, disciplinary proceedings against him on the basis of conduct that occurred outside of its presence. Next, the Appellate Court concluded that Pattis had failed to demonstrate that the trial judge had abused her discretion in denying his motion to disqualify her from presiding over the disciplinary proceedings.

The Appellate Court next addressed Pattis' claims that the trial court improperly determined that he had violated several provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Appellate Court first considered Pattis' contention that the trial court had incorrectly applied rule 1.1, titled "Competence," because (1) the rule refers to an attorney's representation of a client and makes no mention of an attorney's duty to other persons, and (2) the conduct at issue concerned the release of the plaintiffs' confidential records to unauthorized individuals, thereby falling outside of the ambit of the rule. The Appellate Court disagreed with Pattis and concluded that, to provide competent representation to a client in accordance with the rule, an attorney must responsibly engage in discovery and safeguard sensitive discovery materials, whether provided by the client or produced by an opposing party.

The Appellate Court next held that the trial court incorrectly determined that Pattis had violated subsection (b) of rule 1.15, titled "Safekeeping Property." The vast majority of the provisions of rule 1.15, along with the lengthy commentary to the rule, expressly address, in whole or in part, matters that are financial in nature. Reading the rule in context, the Appellate Court concluded that discovery materials, like the plaintiffs' confidential records, are not included within the phrase "other property" in rule 1.15 (b).

The Appellate Court agreed with Pattis that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's determination that he violated subsection (3) of rule 3.4, titled "Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel." Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded that the record did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that Pattis knowingly – that is, with actual knowledge – violated the protective order.

The Appellate Court agreed with the trial court that Pattis violated subsections (b) and (c) of rule 5.1, titled "Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers," insofar as Pattis exercised supervisory authority over the associate attorney who transmitted the confidential material, at Pattis' direction, to an attorney in Texas. However, the Appellate Court further concluded that the trial court improperly determined that Pattis violated rule 5.1 (c) to the extent that Pattis acted as the sponsoring attorney for one of the Texas attorneys in Connecticut. Specifically, the evidence did not support Pattis having any involvement in the Texas attorney's later disclosure of the confidential material.

Finally, the Appellate Court determined that Pattis' misconduct in permitting the disclosure to unauthorized individuals of the plaintiffs' personal and sensitive information unilaterally imposed a significant cost on the plaintiffs in their attempt to obtain justice in this matter. Accordingly, the Appellate Court held that Pattis' mishandling of the plaintiffs' confidential records fell within the expansive range of misconduct encompassed by subsection (4) of rule 8.4, titled "Misconduct."

In light of the Appellate Court's conclusion that the trial court improperly determined, in whole or in part, that Pattis had violated rules 1.15 (b), 3.4 (3), and 5.1 (c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the disciplinary

order, which was not predicated on Pattis' violation of any particular rule, could not stand. Accordingly, the Appellate Court remanded this case with direction (1) to vacate the trial court's findings that Pattis had violated the aforementioned rules, as well as the court's disciplinary order, and (2) to conduct a new hearing on sanctions before a different judge.

### Olson v. Olson, 214 Conn. App. 4, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 918 (2022)

In this appeal the Appellate Court considered whether the Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over a motion to modify a spousal support decree that was issued in the United Kingdom.

The parties, who are United States citizens, were married in 1998 in Pennsylvania. The parties thereafter moved to the United Kingdom where, in 2009, a court of the United Kingdom dissolved the parties' marriage, incorporating the parties' consent order into its final judgment. The consent order was based on a separation agreement that provided for the distribution of the parties' property and assets and for the payment of spousal and child support. In or around 2010, the parties moved back to the United States. The plaintiff (wife) relocated to Connecticut and the defendant (husband) moved to New York. On April 5, 2020, the plaintiff filed the United Kingdom divorce decree with the trial court in Connecticut under principles of comity. In 2011, the plaintiff filed a motion for modification of alimony in the Connecticut Superior Court. In 2012, the defendant similarly sought a modification of the spousal support order in the same court as the plaintiff's filing. The court denied these motions because of a failure of supporting evidence and procedural defects in the plaintiff's motion. The court did not deny these motions based on a lack of jurisdiction.

On August 19, 2019, the defendant filed a new motion for modification of alimony based on the plaintiff's cohabitation. On September 11, 2019, the plaintiff filed her own motion to modify alimony and child support seeking an increase of both. Shortly before the motions were scheduled to be heard, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the defendant's motion, arguing for the first time that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the judgment. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to modify the parties' foreign spousal support order. The defendant thereafter appealed to the Appellate Court.

The majority opinion considered whether the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UNIFSA), General Statutes § 46b-301 et seq., divested the court of subject matter jurisdiction to modify the United Kingdom spousal support order at issue. Specifically, the majority opinion considered General Statutes considered § 46b-321 (b), which provides: "A tribunal of this state may not modify a spousal support order issued by a tribunal of another state or foreign country having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over that order under the law of that state or foreign country." In light of this statute, the Appellate Court considered whether the United Kingdom, under its laws, had continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify the spousal support order in question.

In its decision, the majority of the Appellate Court panel disagreed with the plaintiff and the trial court that a United Kingdom statutory instrument, the Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders (United States of

America) Order 2007 (REMO) made clear that the United Kingdom had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the spousal support order. Assuming, without deciding, that the provisions of the REMO were applicable to the circumstances of this case, the Appellate Court noted that nowhere in the context of the REMO was it manifest that the United Kingdom retained exclusive, rather than concurrent, jurisdiction to modify the spousal support order at issue. Moreover, the Appellate Court stated, although the trial court relied on an explanatory note published at the end of the REMO to support its conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction, the explanatory note was not part of the order and should not have been considered. Finally, the Appellate Court noted that it had found no other United Kingdom authority that made clear that the United Kingdom retained exclusive jurisdiction over the spousal support order at issue. In light of the foregoing and considering the maxim that every presumption in favor of jurisdiction should be indulged, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the defendant's motion to modify alimony. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court.

The dissenting opinion concluded that the trial court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the spousal support decree due to the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. Thereafter, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal the Appellate Court's decision.

#### SUPERIOR COURT



Judge Elizabeth A. Bozzuto, Chief Court Administrator and Judge Anna M. Ficeto Deputy Chief **Court Administrator** 

Photo by Isabel Chenoweth

#### **Chief Court Administrator**

The chief justice appoints the chief court administrator, who oversees the administration of the Judicial Branch.

The duties and powers of the chief court administrator are outlined in Section 51-5a of the General Statutes of Connecticut.

In part, the statute requires that the chief court administrator "... shall be responsible for the efficient operation of the department, the prompt disposition of cases and the prompt and proper administration of judicial business."

#### **Deputy Chief Court Administrator**


The deputy chief court administrator assists the chief court administrator in fulfilling the responsibilities outlined in Section 51-5a of the General Statutes of Connecticut.

In addition, the deputy chief court administrator represents the Judicial Branch on commissions and committees including: the Minimum Continuing Legal Education Commission; the Attorney Assistance Advisory Committee; the Judges' Education Committee (ex-officio); and the Judicial-Media Committee (ex-officio).

#### CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES - 2022-2024 BIENNIUM



Hon. Barbara N. Bellis Civil Division



Hon. Leo V. Diana **Family Division** 



Hon. David P. Gold **Criminal Division** 



Hon. Tammy T. Nguyen-O'Dowd Juvenile Division

The chief court administrator appoints chief administrative judges to oversee the following Superior Court divisions: civil, family, criminal and juvenile.

They have the following responsibilities:

- \* To represent the chief court administrator on matters of policy affecting their respective divisions.
- \* To solicit advice and suggestions from judges and others on matters affecting their respective divisions, including legislation, and to advise the chief court administrator on such matters.
- To advise and assist administrative judges in the implementation of policies and caseflow programs.




Hon. Michael L. Ferguson **Chief Family Support Magistrate** 

Under the direction of the chief court administrator, the chief family support magistrate supervises the Family Support Magistrate Division and performs other duties as provided by state statute.


#### ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES - 2022-2024 BIENNIUM



Ansonia-Milford Hon. Kevin S. Russo



**Danbury** Hon. Maximino Medina



**Fairfield** Hon. Thomas J. Welch



**Hartford** Hon. Susan Quinn Cobb



**Litchfield** Hon. Andrew W. Roraback



**Middlesex** Hon. Laura F. Baldini



**New Britain** Hon. Lisa K. Morgan



**New Haven** Hon. Barbara Bailey Jongbloed



**New London** Hon. John M. Newson



**Stamford-Norwalk** Hon. John F. Blawie



**Tolland** Hon. Jennifer Macierowski



**Waterbury** Hon. John L. Cordani

The chief court administrator appoints administrative judges to oversee operations in each of the 13 judicial districts.

They have the following responsibilities:

- To represent the chief court administrator in the efficient management of their respective judicial districts in matters affecting the fair administration of justice and the disposition of cases.
- To implement and execute programs and methods for disposition of cases and administrative matters within their respective judicial districts in accordance with the policies and directives of the chief court administrator.
- When required, to order that the trial of any case be held in any courthouse facility within the judicial district.
- \* To assign judges within the judicial district as necessary.
- To oversee the daily assignment of a judge to address jurors.



**Windham** Hon. Ernest Green, Jr.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS


Administrative Services Division

Court Support Services Division


External Affairs Division

Information Technology Division

Superior Court Operations Division



#### ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION





Middlesex Judicial District courthouse jury assembly room

#### ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES DIVISION

Executive Director
Administrative Services
Brian J. Hill

**Director Financial Services**Ronald Woodard

Director Facilities Unit Laura Jovino

Director Human Resource Management Unit Gary Biesadecki, Esq.

Director

Materials Management Unit

Dawn M. Ashley

**Director Internal Audit Unit** Stacey S. Franklin

Director
Diversity, Equity
and Inclusion Unit
Troy M. Brown

Director
Employee Education
and Development Unit
Janice Calvi-Ruimerman, Esq.

The Administrative Services Division provides centralized services to assist judges and Judicial Branch employees. Such services include: management and analysis of the Branch's General Fund budget; payroll administration; revenue and expenditure accounting and payment of the Branch's financial obligations; coordination of personnel and labor relations functions, and employee benefits administration; capital budget development and oversight; daily operation of state-owned courthouses statewide; facilities planning; design and repair; materials management; purchasing and warehousing; internal auditing; employee education; and diversity, equity and inclusion training.

Highlights of the biennium include:

#### Establishment of the Diversity, Equity and Inclusion Unit

Monthslong planning by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator to create the Branch's first Diversity, Equity and Inclusion Unit came to fruition in December 2022, when the Connecticut Supreme Court established a position for a director to lead the unit. Less than six months later, the Branch filled the position.

The DEI Unit leads the Branch's ongoing efforts to foster a diverse, equitable, and inclusive court system that serves all cultural identities with respect, professionalism, integrity and fairness, such that the individual dignity of each person is recognized.

The DEI Unit works in consultation with the long-established Advisory Committee on Cultural Competency and is responsible for the development, advancement, implementation, and analysis of existing and new DEI activities, such as training, consultation, policy administration, data collection and reporting, and strategic planning. The unit also organizes the annual Diversity Week, in collaboration with the committee.



Chief Justice Richard A. Robinson – Diversity Week 2023, Opening Ceremony Keynote

#### ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES DIVISION



Islam/Muslim Mosque Visit

In its first 18 months, the DEI Unit has been instrumental in increasing education and DEI training opportunities for judges, Branch employees and contractors; publishing an LGBTQI+ language guidebook; and beginning a comprehensive analysis of workforce data. Future plans include initiating a branch-wide survey followed by focus groups around the state to better understand the needs of the Branch in areas of diversity, equity and inclusion.

#### First Employee Wellness Institute

The Judicial Branch recognized the need to prioritize employee well-being and, from June 12-14, 2024, hosted the inaugural Employee Wellness Institute.

Aligned with the Branch's Strategic Plan II, the Institute aimed to create a thriving workplace by fostering a culture of wellness among employees.

The event offered a comprehensive approach to well-being, encompassing the six dimensions outlined by the National Wellness Institute: emotional, physical, intellectual, occupational, spiritual, and social wellness. By addressing these interconnected areas, the Institute empowered employees to achieve optimal balance and fulfillment.

The Wellness Institute was made possible through the collaborative efforts of the Branch's Professional Development Advisory Committee and the Judicial Branch Employee Education and Development Unit, which successfully recruited engaging speakers and facilitators without incurring any expense to the Branch.

The Wellness Institute is more than just a one-time event; it served as a catalyst for cultivating a culture of wellness within the Judicial Branch. By prioritizing employee well-being, the Branch aims to create a more positive, supportive, and productive work environment.



**Unleash Your Body Potential** 



Laugh Yoga with Branch Employees

#### COURT SUPPORT SERVICES DIVISION

Executive Director Court Support Services Gary A. Roberge

**Director Administration**Julie M. Revaz

Director
Bail – Pretrial Services
Michael G. Hines

Director
Adult Probation Services
Mark E. White

**Director Family Services**Joseph J. DiTunno

Director
Juvenile Probation Services
Tasha M. Hunt

Director
Juvenile Residential Services
Cathy Foley Geib

The Judicial Branch Court Support Services Division oversees pretrial services, family services, probation supervision of adults and juveniles, pretrial residential services for juveniles, and post-adjudicatory juvenile justice services. The division also prepares presentence investigation reports to assist the court at sentencing and administers a network of statewide contracted community providers that deliver services to court-ordered clients. The biennium highlights contributions from the division's Administration, Adult Probation Services, Family Services, Juvenile Clinical, Education, and Residential Services, Juvenile Probation Services, and Pretrial Services.

#### **Administration**

- ❖ In FYs 2023 and 2024, the Computer Support, Facilities, Materials Management and Policy Unit provided videoconferencing equipment to several Department of Correction and State Police locations, allowing Pretrial Services staff to conduct virtual bail interviews with clients in lock-up facilities at additional locations. The unit continues to provide smartphones to clients who need them to enhance communication with their probation officer or pretrial staff.
- ❖ In FY 2023, the Fiscal Administration Unit managed approximately \$122 million in funding for contracted goods and services among more than 220 contracts; processed over 7,500 invoices for payments to vendors; and managed approximately 200 legislatively identified contracts totaling over \$17 million. In addition, approximately \$3.6 million in restitution payments were collected and disbursed to victims. In FY 24, the unit managed approximately \$130 million for goods and services among 220 contracts; processed over 7,500 invoices; and managed approximately 244 legislatively identified contracts totaling over \$22 million. In addition, approximately \$4 million in restitution payments were collected and disbursed to victims.
- ❖ The Information Technology Unit continued to collaborate with multiple state agencies to facilitate the automated Clean Slate erasure of eligible offenses. The unit also collaborated with Juvenile Probation Services and Juvenile Court to make certain juvenile justice information available to law enforcement. Authenticated users may now search for pending juvenile delinquency charges, suspended detention orders and adjudications in the 90 days preceding the search.

#### **Adult Probation Services**

❖ Adult Probation Services continued its partnership with Central Connecticut State University (CCSU) in transitioning to a risk-based supervision strategy intended to change problematic thinking patterns. This evidence-based practice uses multiple evidence-based models including traditional cognitive behavioral therapy, motivational interviewing, risk-need-responsivity principles and criminogenic thinking. Adult Probation Services and CCSU also finalized PrediCT YA, a validated a risk/needs assessment tool specific to young adults aged 18-24. The instrument is designed to more effectively

#### COURT SUPPORT SERVICES DIVISION

- assess the risk and needs of young males in addition to the probability of reoffending.
- Adult Probation Services enhanced its collaboration with the Department of Children and Families to better protect children who have an adult participating in their lives who is also under probation supervision. For example, training for home visits now includes what probation officers should look for related to children in the home; the training will use DCF-simulated homes.
- The General Assembly in 2023 created a new designation for serious firearm offenders. In response, CSSD established policy and procedures to screen all persons under adult probation supervision for this designation as well as new offenders sentenced to probation. The policy also instructs probation officers regarding the management of this population.
- The American Correctional Association reaccredited Adult Probation Services in 2022, a national designation that the unit has held since 2006. Accreditation and reaccreditation signify that Adult Probation Services holds itself to, and meets, the rigorous industrydeveloped best practices in adult supervision.
- CSSD encourages Adult Probation staff to participate in activities that benefit the communities they serve. During the biennium, probation staff provided and served meals to people in need at a local soup kitchen and participated in a community resource fair.

#### **Family Services**

❖ The General Assembly in 2023 enacted a law requiring that the Judicial Branch expand its Alert Notification/ GPS program statewide to better protect domestic violence victims. Family Services oversees the ongoing rollout of the program and expects that statewide completion will be achieved by October 2025. The program's goal is to use GPS technology to provide a warning to victims if a high-risk defendant is within a pre-determined area. If a zone violation occurs, the victim is alerted by cell phone, and local police are notified via the monitoring center. The victim meanwhile can immediately implement a pre-determined safety plan. The program also increases accountability as violations are addressed through the court process with increased sanctions.

- ❖ In 2023, Family Services rolled out a new adult criminal court dual risk assessment tool for family violence cases. The new tool combines two previous tools: the DVSI-R (risk of family violence recidivism) and the Supplemental Risk Indicators (predicts the likelihood of danger). In 2024, Dr. Kirk Williams, a national expert in domestic violence and one of the authors of the DVSI-R, researched data sets provided by CSSD and found a high degree of predictive validity, as well as the elimination of any bias in the risk assessment.
- ❖ Family Services addressed recidivism among certain family violence offenders requiring more robust interventions. As a result, Family Services initiated a pilot program for male offenders charged with domestic violence. The Alternative Behavioral Choices program consists of sixteen 90-minute weekly group sessions and focuses on managing emotions, changing beliefs, identifying negative patterns and resolving interpersonal conflict. Family Services piloted the program in Bridgeport in 2023, and the program expanded to New Britain and New Haven courts in 2024.

# Family Services addressed recidivism among certain family violence offenders requiring more robust interventions.

❖ As part of the Family/Civil Court Pathways process, Family Services conducts Resolution Plan Date (RPD) screenings as ordered by the Court or as scheduled in each judicial district. This early intervention process is the initial meeting for a family entering the system; parties also obtain information about the process and the most effective pathway to resolution. From July 1, 2022, to June 30, 2024, Family Services completed approximately 37,000 RPDs, with over 30 percent identified as TRACK A, meaning the cases were ready for judgment early in the court process.

#### **Juvenile Clinical, Education, and Residential Services**

The National Commission on Correctional Health Care reaccredited the Bridgeport and Hartford Juvenile Residential Centers in October 2022. Reaccreditation validates that Connecticut's Juvenile Residential Services are held to the highest industry standards and exceed

#### COURT SUPPORT SERVICES DIVISION

the standards in many areas. In 2024, auditors for the American Correctional Association recommended reaccreditation of the residential centers for the seventh time.

❖ Juvenile Court Clinics (JCC) are now fully staffed at 15, with a licensed clinical coordinator at all 10 Superior Court for Juvenile Matters locations. The JCCs continue to conduct comprehensive, court-ordered forensic clinical evaluations of juveniles to inform disposition and treatment planning. These assessments answer several questions, including but not limited to recommended interventions by order of importance and whether services should be provided at home, in the community, or at a staff-secure or hardware secure residential treatment program.

#### **Juvenile Probation Services**

- ❖ Juvenile Probation Services began the new biennium with the implementation of legislation that added global positioning system (GPS) electronic monitoring as a possible condition of probation supervision. The Juvenile Probation On-Call Team, consisting of Juvenile Probation Services supervisors and officers, is available after-hours to perform electronic monitoring checks and address alerts; respond to notifications regarding clients who abscond or fail to return to a court-ordered residential placement after an authorized leave; complete and process Take into Custody Orders; respond to law enforcement requests for information for Orders to Detain; and address issues requiring an immediate response.
- In January 2023, Juvenile Probation Services launched Risk-Based Case Handling, which are new delinquency intake procedures that complement changes to the Connecticut Practice Book. This process allows Juvenile Probation Services to screen and base delinquency case handling decisions on the child's risk of reoffending and behavioral health needs instead of the charges and prior court history.
- In December 2023, through training and consultation with the Center for Restorative Practices at Suffolk University, Juvenile Probation Services created the Juvenile Probation Restorative Justice Response Team, a group of Juvenile Probation staff trained to utilize restorative circles to address the harm caused in delinquency cases. This approach focuses on addressing

the harm done to the individual, holding those who have caused the harm accountable for their behavior, and engaging the community in the resolution of that conflict.

#### **Pretrial Services**

- ❖ Pretrial Services, working with Central Connecticut State University, is in the final stages of revalidating the Case Data Record, a validated risk assessment tool used to make release decisions in police holding facilities and recommendations to the Court. The revalidation will ensure that clients receive the appropriate assistance.
- ❖ With American Rescue Plan Act funding, CSSD is expanding an existing Rapid Rehousing Program Collaborative with the Connecticut Department of Housing to include not only probationers, but pretrial clients as well. Under the program, CSSD will fund a housing case manager to assist the individual with finding an apartment, navigating the leasing process and will include a partial housing subsidy for four to six weeks. CSSD has also collaborated with the Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services to fund an additional 37 Recovery House beds for pretrial clients who are incarcerated, but need substance use treatment in the community.
- The Treatment Pathways Program (TPP) continues to be a great success at courts in Bridgeport, Danielson, Manchester, New Britain, New Haven, New London, Torrington and Waterbury; in May 2024, the State Opioid Advisory Council funded all eight sites from July 1, 2024, through June 30. 2027. This pretrial diversionary program identifies individuals charged with non-violent crimes who are suffering from alcohol and/or opiate addiction; who otherwise are not likely to be released from pretrial incarceration via bond or another diversionary mechanism; and who may benefit from access to immediate behavioral health care and other care in the community. Sixty-two percent of all clients accepted into the program are engaged in treatment within one day, and 75 percent of those who were admitted to the program received a sentence that does not include incarceration. The most telling number involves those with an opiate dependency diagnosis: 70 percent of those in the program who received Medication Assisted Treatment (MAT) successfully completed the program compared to only 45 percent who did not receive MAT.

#### EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION

**Executive Director External Affairs** Melissa A. Farley, Esq.

**Deputy Director Communications, Education** and Outreach

Rhonda J. Hebert

**Deputy Director Legislative Affairs** Lee B. Ross, Esq.

**Program Manager Education and Outreach** Alison M. Chandler

**Staff Attorney Legislative Affairs** Brittany E. Kaplan, Esq. The mission of the External Affairs Division is to promote public trust and confidence in the Judicial Branch by fostering relationships with the Legislative and Executive Branch, the media and communities at large; educating students, community groups, professional organizations and the public about the role and responsibilities of the Judicial Branch; and providing high school and college students with the opportunity to explore careers within the Judicial Branch through its Experiential Learning Program.

Highlights of the biennium include:

#### **Legislative/Government Relations**

During the 2023 and 2024 legislative sessions, External Affairs continued its work to ensure that the Judicial Branch's budgetary and operational concerns were heard and addressed by the members of the General Assembly. Toward that end, representatives of External Affairs:

- ❖ Drafted and shepherded the Branch's legislative proposals through the General Assembly. The proposals addressed, among other issues: access to juvenile records by the Department of Children and Families' education unit; victim notification regarding termination of special parole; and increased notification and participation of crime victims in proceedings involving their perpetrator.
- Provided written and oral testimony on 78 pieces of legislation, tracked over 500 bills and produced 17 legislative updates and two legislative summaries for distribution.
- Facilitated and participated in meetings with legislators, the Governor's staff, advocacy groups and other stakeholders on a number of proposals such as: An Act Concerning Risk Protection Orders or Warrants and Disqualifiers for Firearm Permits and Eligibility Certificates Based on Temporary Commitment Under a Physician's Emergency Certification; An Act Concerning Erasure of Criminal History Records; An Act Concerning Gun Violence; An Act Concerning Coerced Debt; and An Act Concerning Revisions to Various Laws Concerning Ignition Interlock Devices, the Department of Corrections, Judicial Retirement Salaries and Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure.
- Resolved over 100 constituent matters brought to the division's attention.
- ❖ Assisted in the elevation of a new chief justice of the Supreme Court, the elevation of a new Appellate Court judge, the reappointment of 29 Superior Court judges, senior judges and judge trial referees; as well as the reappointment of three family support magistrates and a family support referee.

#### EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION

### Media Relations, Social Media and the Judicial Branch website

- The division responded to more than 2,000 media inquiries over the biennium, including requests for documents and permission to videotape, photograph and audiotape court proceedings. The division also prepared Quick Cards for judges and journalists regarding rules for camera coverage during court proceedings.
- The Judicial Branch's YouTube page, which External Affairs manages, currently has 110 videos. As of November 18, 2024, these videos had been viewed 345,000 times, and the Branch's channel had 2,510 subscribers. The Judicial Branch's X (Twitter) account had 4,291 subscribers as of November 18, 2024.
- The division remained involved with the Judicial Branch website, with two External Affairs representatives serving on the Web Board, one of whom serves as chair. Other Web Board members include representatives from the Branch's other four divisions and a representative from the appellate system as well.

#### Calendar Call Podcast

External Affairs schedules, edits and posts Calendar Call, a podcast hosted by Support Enforcement Services Director Paul Bourdoulous and Attorney Matthew Berardino of the Legal Services Unit. The podcast, which began in January 2019, qualifies as free MCLE credits for Connecticut attorneys and covered many different topics over the biennium, including cannabis erasure; Name, Image and Likeness laws; attorney succession planning; and pretrial services and diversionary programs.

#### **Judicial Branch Civics Academy**

In February 2022, the Judicial Branch launched its Civics Academy, in partnership with the Connecticut Bar



Civics Academy presentation to elementary school students

Association. As part of the academy, specially trained judges and lawyers visit elementary school classes from grades 4 to 6 to present a 50-minute interactive civics education lesson plan that helps young students understand their role in a democracy. The first section of the lesson plan is *Rules and Fairness*; the second, *Representative Democracy*; and the third, *Democracy and You*. Through this program, 21 judges and justices presented to roughly 1,625 students in 17 different communities.

#### **Judges Speakers Bureau**


During this biennium, justices and judges spoke to a variety of audiences, from school children to library patrons. In all, 112 judges and justices spoke to more than 13,000 people at 207 different events.


#### **Supreme Court Tours**

External Affairs offers tours of the historic Supreme Court courtroom as well as an explanation of the appellate process. The division conducted 77 tours over the biennium to more than 2,500 students.

#### EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION







#### **Graphic Design/Publications**

From July 1, 2022, to June 30, 2024, the division's graphic designer oversaw the design and production of 231 projects. Some of these projects included: the 2020-2022 Biennial Report; Law Day posters for the Law Library Services Unit; a Human Resources recruitment stand-up banner; quarterly issues of The Water Cooler newsletter; the Clerkships with the Connecticut Supreme Court & Connecticut Appellate Court booklet; a CT Treatment Pathway Program e-vite and information sheet; The Intern Handbook rebrand; and the development of a Call Center graphic for binders and notepads.

### **Judicial Branch Experiential Learning Programs Internship Program**

The Experiential Learning Program is completely back in person and has seen incredible growth over this biennium. Judicial Branch

employees served as hosts to nearly 500 interns during this two-year period. In addition to increasing the number of interns participating in the program, the Experiential Learning Program staff recruited dozens of new workplace hosts. And, as the pool of applicants for the program has grown, the Experiential Learning Program staff has worked hard to select only the best candidates for participation in the program. This discernment has resulted in the hiring of several interns as temporary and permanent Judicial Branch staff.

#### Job Shadow and Court Aide Programs

Each spring, the Judicial Branch hosts a virtual and in-person Job Shadow Program for high school students, which includes the opportunity to hear from a Supreme Court justice before learning about specific jobs in the Branch. Students also can shadow Judicial Branch employees. During the biennium, 34 students participated in this program.

The Court Aide Program is an opportunity for high school seniors to volunteer at the Branch and learn about the court process. During the biennium, 27 students participated in this program.



Experiential Learning Program Internship Orientation Program

### INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DIVISION

Executive Director
Information Technology Division
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Judicial Information Systems
Applications Development
& Support
Diby Kundu

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Shams Akberzai

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Deputy Director Commission on Official Legal Publications (COLP) Joseph DiBenedetto

Deputy Director
Judicial Information Systems
Risk Management
Christopher Duryea, Esq.

Manager, Administrative Services
Judicial Information Systems
Financial Management
Maria Mennella

The Information Technology Division (ITD) provides state-of-the-art data processing and publication services to the Judicial Branch and its customers in the legal community, outside agencies and the public. ITD staff demonstrate their commitment to public service by engaging in the design, development and maintenance of a sophisticated, secure and reliable network, computing and printing infrastructure. This infrastructure provides for the gathering, transmission, storage, retrieval, backup, display and publication of data and information processed most often through automated systems developed inhouse and deployed to support the Branch's operating and administrative divisions. Such services provide public information access, enhanced "self-service" support for self-represented parties, access to interactive forms, technological improvements in courtrooms and an improved ability to interact with the court remotely.

Highlights of the biennium include:

❖ ITD used bond funds to upgrade sound amplification in nearly 100 courtrooms. The project, which will eventually comprise all 310 courtrooms and hearing rooms statewide, will increase the quality of the audio recordings, along with adding the capability to conduct court proceedings in a hybrid environment. ITD anticipates that the project will be completed over a five-year period.

ITD developed a robust remote interpreting system that allows the Judicial Branch to more efficiently provide federally required language assistance service to all limited English proficient (LEP) stakeholders.

- ❖ ITD helped develop a robust remote interpreting system that allows the Judicial Branch to more efficiently provide federally required language assistance service to all limited English proficient (LEP) stakeholders. By using remote interpreters, the Branch's limited number of staff interpreters can cover more assignments, which has reduced reliance on vendor services and mileage reimbursements.
- ❖ A new platform, the Judicial Online Communication Exchange (JOCE), allows state and municipal police officers to electronically submit secure Probable Cause Determination requests and Risk Protection Order applications for a judge's review. The platform includes fully automated rotating duty judge assignments, as well as electronic notifications (text, email and phone calls) to duty judges whenever a new request is uploaded into the system. With the platform, police officers no longer need to hand deliver these documents to a judge at a courthouse during business hours or at the judge's home during non-business hours. The platform team worked with well over 100 local police departments for three months to get them successfully connected to JOCE.

### INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DIVISION

- \* ITD continued to develop the Remote Justice Scheduler, a single, central system to schedule and manage case events for remote proceedings. Through this system, more than 20,000 litigants and other participants to remote proceedings have a safe and secure method of accessing remote join links for civil, family, housing, small claims, juvenile and Uniform Interstate Family Support Act cases. Integration with the civil/family case management system began during this biennium and will continue to grow into the next.
- In January 2024, ITD expanded its online ordering of court transcripts to include the online ordering of court audio. This allows attorneys, litigants, the media and members of the public to register with eServices and submit requests for court audio. This system replaced the manual process of ordering court audio and has streamlined the process the Branch uses to deliver these files. As of December 1, 2024, individuals with access to E-Services may make electronic payment and receive the court audio electronically.
- On January 1, 2023, pursuant to legislation, IT processed erasures for certain cannabis convictions between January 1, 2000, and September 30, 2015. Notifications were made to all required units and agencies either electronically through the Connecticut Information Sharing System (CISS) or by report or file for processing at those agencies. If the cannabis charge(s) was the only charge on a case, then the case was erased. The erased data also was removed from CISS inquiries.
- ❖ In 2022, ITD completed the first phase of a project to automate the processing of electronic arrests that are submitted by police departments through CISS. ITD also began providing electronic notifications to systems at both the state Division of Criminal Justice and the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (DESPP).
- Since January 1, 2023, ITD has assisted with the Clean Slate Project that DESPP is directing.


- In FY23 and FY24, ITD implemented several computer changes to improve the state's support of the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, a national eligibility program for persons who apply for a permit or initiate the purchase of firearms, ammunition or explosives. ITD implemented the improvements in response to various changes in federal law and FBI systems regarding domestic violence offenders and persons who pose an imminent risk of physical injury to other persons.
- ❖ During the biennium, ITD implemented an Appellate E-filing functionality for state Department of Correction counselors that allows them to submit electronic appellate court filings.
- Enhancements to the Judicial Branch website included: making more webpages mobile friendly; a new webpage that lists Memoranda of Decisions; among other improvements to the jobs webpage, shortening the URL (https://jud.ct.gov/jobs); and improved visibility in Google search results.
- Over the last two years, ITD has embraced the use of Microsoft's Power Platform development tools to provide low-code application solutions to modernize the daily work of Judicial Branch employees. With this technology, ITD developed a Property Scanning App to streamline inventory control and a Vehicle Mileage App that retires the paper process and makes logging trips using state vehicles easy while tracking mileage, days used, and other important data. ITD developed another tool, the Access Request App, so supervisors can request security access to different applications for new staff without filling out a PDF form. Other applications developed during the biennium are the Business Support Services Telecom Request App, the Employee Education and Development Course Approval App, and the COLP Order Request App. These three apps allow staff to streamline requests with the respective business unit, along with receiving updates during the workflow.

#### INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DIVISION

Over the last two years, ITD has embraced the use of Microsoft's Power Platform development tools to provide low-code application solutions to modernize the daily work of Judicial Branch employees.

- ❖ ITD has standardized new applications on the Microsoft Entra identity platform, which provides contemporary login services to both internal and external facing applications. Entra allows Judicial employees to access all of their applications using a single set of credentials, and public users to create an account with the Judicial Branch in just a few clicks. All of this significantly improves security and compliance, while providing a seamless experience for users.
- \* ITD deployed Microsoft OneDrive during the biennium, which provides secure, cloud-based storage and file sharing that enhances collaboration and accessibility. Users in courts or other areas can store, sync, and share large files from judicial devices, enabling seamless teamwork, whether in the office or remotely. With OneDrive in production, it increased productivity, enhanced data security through encryption and compliance features, and reduces reliance on physical storage like USB.
- The Cybersecurity Unit has built a process for daily threat analysis and remediation, which involves regular monitoring and assessing potential cybersecurity threats, identifying vulnerabilities, and taking immediate action to mitigate risks.

- This proactive approach enables the unit to detect and respond to threats quickly, minimizing the impact of security incidents. By continuously updating defenses and addressing vulnerabilities, the unit enhances its security posture, reduces the likelihood of breaches, and ensures business continuity. This process also helps the branch to maintain compliance regulations, protect sensitive data, and build trust with customers and stakeholders.
- ❖ ITD updated its Enterprise Fax system for the Protective Order Registry (POR). These upgrades impact the software, the servers and the web client. The functionality also has been expanded to allow local police departments to accept POR notifications in their email boxes as well as by fax.
- \* ITD and the Branch's Commission on Official Legal Publications (COLP) developed an application to revamp COLP's antiquated paper-based job ticket ordering process. COLP's Order Request Application (CORA) not only keeps customers apprised of their order status in real time, but it also provides quantifiable and usable data at the push of a button. The dashboard within CORA provides an ease of integration that can determine the length of time it takes to complete orders, total orders by job type and other statistical data to further improve efficiencies and productivity within the COLP job order workflow.



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Director
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Krista Hess

Director
Support Enforcement Services
Paul Bourdoulous, Esq.

Director
Office of Victim Services
Mary E. Kozicki

**Director Judicial Marshal Services**O'Donovan Murphy

Director
Performance Management,
Quality Assurance and
Judicial Branch Statistics
Joseph P. Greelish

The Superior Court Operations Division assists the Judicial Branch in the administration of justice by providing quality services and information to the court, its users and the community in an effective, professional and courteous manner. The division, the largest in the Judicial Branch, also provides judges and support staff with the resources needed to process cases in a timely and efficient manner. In addition, the division's Centralized ADA Office provides hundreds of accommodations to members of the public as part of its commitment to and compliance with Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Highlights of the biennium include:

### **Court Operations**

- The Centralized Infractions Bureau, through American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) funds, implemented several electronic initiatives that streamlined procedures for the purpose of reducing pandemic-related backlogs. Attorneys representing clients in infraction and payable violation matters are now able to file their appearances electronically, resulting in email communication of notices directly to eservices inboxes. In addition to online payments, defendants can pay fines with a credit card via telephone.
- ❖ The Jury Selection Task Force's recommendations were implemented, pursuant to Public Act 21-170, An Act Concerning the Recommendations of The Jury Selection Task Force. Beginning October 1, 2022, the act requires the jury administrator to compile the number of jurors summoned from each town who complied with the summons. Beginning July 1, 2023, the number of jurors chosen from each town must reflect the proportional representation of each town's population within the judicial district, based on the data collected and a specified formula. Also, as of November 1, 2023, the Branch began collecting demographic data from jurors, including race.
- \* The Judicial Branch, in collaboration with the Connecticut Information Sharing System (CISS) and police departments, continues to implement the initiative through which law enforcement agencies send arrest information to the courts electronically. The process is more efficient for law enforcement, court clerks' offices, and other agencies.
- ❖ The statutory elimination of the 90-day waiting period for dissolution and legal separation cases under certain circumstances took effect October 1, 2023. The change authorizes the Judicial Branch to issue a dissolution of marriage or legal separation prior to the return date upon request in cases where the parties have a full agreement, or under other circumstances as enacted by the legislature. In addition, and effective January 1, 2024, the Family Mediation Center at the Middlesex Judicial District courthouse began taking statewide referrals to help parties resolve their financial and custody disputes.

- \* The new Jury Management System (JMS) is now fully automated and is used to summon all individuals called to serve on a jury in a state courthouse. Anyone summoned for jury service may access the online JMS E-Response system to respond to their summons; those who cannot access the internet can call the 1-844 number printed on the summons and use the JMS Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system that allows them to respond to the summons. During the second quarter of 2024 (April-June) 46 percent of all prospective jurors responded to their summons online, and 69 percent of all postponements were processed online. Over 17,308 individuals opted to use the new IVR to request an excusal rather than use the phone or email. Jury Administration expects these numbers to increase as more people use E-Response on the Judicial Branch website to respond to their summons.
- ❖ The Juvenile Matters Unit rolled out an electronic system to transfer cases on appeal to the Connecticut Appellate and Supreme Courts in 2023. In May 2024, a Mediation Program for child protection cases was piloted for the Hartford and New Britain judicial districts. Mediation gives parents an opportunity to be seated at the table and participate in the mediation process.

#### ADA, Americans with Disabilities Act

- ❖ A new policy, entitled *Policy on Requests for*Accommodation Sought Under the Americans with

  Disabilities Act, was implemented September 1, 2023.

  In response, mandatory training on the new policy was presented to all judges, magistrates and staff, and new and revised policies, forms, brochures, and webpages were created to reflect the new process.
- ❖ Between July 1, 2022 and June 30, 2024, the Branch acted upon a wide range of requests for accommodations, including but not limited to requests for: American Sign Language; Certified Deaf Interpretation; Communication Access Realtime Translation (CART); use of a support person; audio recordings or written transcripts of proceedings; assistive technology, such as the use of a Frequency Modulator assistive listening kit (FM kit); and other auxiliary aids, as well as requests for continuance or to have one's matter heard remotely or in-person.

SES continues its Family Court referral program to better match and connect interested families with the state's IV-D child support program.

#### **Support Enforcement Services (SES)**

- ❖ The Support Enforcement Services (SES)Unit, in partnership with the Department of Social Services (DSS), collected and disbursed over \$200 million dollars in child support during the state Fiscal Year 2023. SES continues to see a steady increase in postpandemic child support activity.
- ❖ In FY 2023 and FY 2024, SES continued its partnership with DSS to design and implement a system modernization project, which will upgrade and replace the Connecticut Child Support Enforcement System (CCSES). SES and the Judicial Branch contributed significant resources to this Executive Branch partnership project.
- \* SES continues its Family Court referral program to better match and connect interested families with the state's IV-D child support program. Child support applications are available in Family Clerks' Offices, Court Service Centers, Law Libraries, and Family Relations' Offices. SES received and processed approximately 1,000 new child support applications for Judicial Branch court patrons between FY 23 and FY 24.

#### **Project Management and Administration**

❖ In June 2023, the Interpreter and Translator Services Unit, in conjunction with the Information Technology Division, launched a new video remote interpreting (VRI) system in the criminal arraignment courts. The new VRI system allows the Branch to make efficient use of its highly qualified staff interpreters to expedite the delivery of services to its limited English proficient stakeholders. The system is currently used for the following languages: Spanish, Portuguese, Polish, and Chinese Mandarin. This new VRI system attempts to mirror the in-person courtroom interpreter experience by allowing for simultaneous interpreting and for attorney-client private conferences to take place.

Based on the success of the roll-out in the arraignment courtrooms, equipment has been installed in the Civil, Family, Housing, Juvenile and Family Support Magistrate courtrooms. Due to the portability of the equipment, VRI can be conducted in any courtroom that is video conferencing equipped. During the biennial, over 2,700 events have been covered using the new VRI system.

#### **Interpreter Services**

❖ During this biennium, the Judicial Branch provided in-person interpreter services on 59,879 occasions, in 85 different languages and dialects. The Judicial Branch also contracts with telephonic interpreter vendors to provide interpreter services outside of the courtroom. During this biennium, 59,835 calls were placed, utilizing interpreters in 85 different languages and dialects. Those calls equate to 689,446.40 minutes, or 11,488.64 hours, or almost 478 days of continued telephonic interpretation. Additionally, 636 documents were translated during this biennium.

#### **Court Transcript Services**

During the biennium, Court Transcript Services fulfilled over 23,000 transcript requests and over 1,100 requests for audio recordings.

#### **Legal Services**

- Legal Services advised the Chief Court Administrator, Deputy Chief Court Administrator, Chief Administrative Judges, and the Executive Directors and divisional managers and supervisors on a broad range of legal and policy matters and assisted in implementing or unwinding many aspects of the Branch's response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
- Among various other initiatives, Legal Services provided extensive assistance to implement and facilitate funding afforded through the *American Rescue Plan Act* (ARPA).
- In October 2022, the Connecticut Bar Examining Committee successfully rolled out a new online application and applicant portal, marking a significant step forward in modernizing the bar admissions

- process in Connecticut and reaching the goal of becoming a near paperless process.
- Legal Services assisted the Committee on Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the Connecticut Legal System in its charge to determine how to address the impact of AI and embrace or limit its use and recommend ways that AI can enhance access to justice.

### Office of Victim Services (OVS)

- ❖ Over the biennium, OVS expanded the advocacy and support services it provides to victims whose offenders are under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB) or have matters before the juvenile courts in Middletown, New Britain, or Rockville. The expansion includes enhancing OVS Helpline services for victims requesting assistance navigating the PSRB process.
- \* The OVS victim compensation program provided \$4.3 million in reimbursement to victims and eligible family members for out-of-pocket, crime-related expenses. The types of expenses eligible under the program included medical, dental, and mental health; funeral and burial; lost wages; loss of support from a deceased family member; travel to attend court and post-conviction proceedings; and crime scene cleanup. Additionally, An Act Concerning Court Operations and Administrative Proceedings (Public Act 24-108) was enacted, expanding the victim compensation program in several ways, including extending the time frame to apply.
- In 2023, OVS received a federal Edward Byrne Justice Assistance Grant to assess its current IT capacity and data management needs. The state Office of Policy and Management administers the grant.

### **Judge Support Services (JSS)**

❖ The annual Connecticut Judges' Institute (CJI) occurred in June 2023 and June 2024. Thirty-eight CJI courses were presented to judges and family support magistrates, and written summaries of important Connecticut appellate decisions were made available electronically for each division. Highlights of CJI presentations during the biennium included courses



**Judicial Marshal Training Academy** 

concerning hate crimes; the role of judges in the Holocaust; procedural justice; freedom of speech and the internet; domestic violence, including intimate partner violence and coercive control; using a traumainformed approach in courts and the justice system; child welfare and child protection; the potential impacts of adversity, treatment, and trauma exposure on child development; adolescent brain development and juvenile justice; wellness; and judicial ethics.

- ❖ JSS conducted comprehensive Pre-Bench Orientation Programs during the biennium for 41 new judges and 3 new family support magistrates.
- Judicial Branch law librarians remained a critical component in enhancing access to justice and assisting patrons through remote reference services such as the "Ask a Librarian," the Branch's "Ask Us a Question," the "Live Chat" service, which offers real time, legal reference assistance and the NewsLog subscription service. This subscription service provides notices of advance release opinions, up-to-date information about state legislative developments, online legal research tools and new law library resources. As

of June 2024, the service had over 940 subscribers, representing a steady increase over the biennium.


#### **Judicial Marshal Services**

- The Judicial Marshal Services unit is responsible for the security of all courthouses and Judicial Department facilities. Judicial Marshals are responsible for providing courtroom security for Superior Court and Family Support matters; supervising prisoners within courthouses; transporting prisoners between courthouses, correctional facilities, and treatment centers; serving capias mittimus orders issued by Family Support Magistrates; and monitoring jurors in criminal cases involving crimes punishable by life imprisonment. Additionally, the Judicial Marshal Services unit oversees The Office of Protective Intelligence, which provides several layers of security through enhanced security technology and information sharing.
- From July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2024, judicial marshals conducted 2,990,100 screenings at the metal detector and transported 73,132 prisoners.


### SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION

### 13 Judicial Districts and 17 Geographical Areas

### **Connecticut Judicial Districts**




### **Judicial Branch Geographical Areas**



<sup>★</sup> Indicates town where Geographical Area Courthouse is located

### **11 Juvenile Districts**

#### **Connecticut Juvenile Matters Courts**



### STATISTICAL OVERVIEW

CT Judicial Branch Basic Facts

Supreme and Appellate Court matters

**❖** Movement of Caseload

**Superior Court** 

- Juvenile Matters
  - Delinquency
  - Child Protection petitions

**Judicial District Locations** 

**❖** Criminal Matters

**Geographical Area Locations** 

Criminal Matters

**Civil Matters** 

Small Claims

**Family Matters** 


**Housing Session** 

Non-Housing session

**Adult Probation/Contracted Services** 

Data Produced by: The Performance Management and Judicial Branch Statistics Unit

Please note that underlined words are "hyperlinked" to statistics pages in this biennial report.



## **CT** Judicial Branch

2024

Added Cases 2023

**BASIC FACTS** 

### **Courts**

Supreme Court **Appellate Court Superior Court** 

### **Number of Judgeships**

201 including the justices of the Supreme Court, and the judges of the Appellate and **Superior Courts** 

### **Method of Appointment**

Nomination by the Governor from a list compiled by the Judicial Selection Commission; appointment/ reappointment by the **General Assembly** 

### **Term in Office**

Eight years

## **Summary - Added**

## Total Cases Added<sup>1</sup> For the Superior Court Division

	-		
		FY 2022-2023	FY 2023-2024
Criminal <sup>2</sup>	Total Criminal	60,064	62,396
	Judicial District	1,921	1,855
	Geographical Area	58,143	60,541
Motor Vehicle <sup>2</sup>		37,432	31,720
Civil		47,107	52,563
Small Claims <sup>3</sup>		31,065	40,990
Family	Total Family	26,903	27,157
	Family	24,056	24,287
	Family Support Magistrate	2,229	2,298
	Family Support Magistrate UIFSA	618	572
Juvenile	Total Juvenile	15,089	15,275
	Delinquency	6,409	5,956
	Child Protection	8,680	9,319
Housing Matters (Summary Process)		24,824	23,915
Total Cases Add	led	242,484	254,016

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Added includes re-opened and transferred cases

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Does not include infractions or payable violations

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Includes small claims housing

### **CT** Judicial **Branch** -continued

2024

2023

Disposed Cases

BASIC FACTS

### **General Fund Appropriation**

FY 2022-2023 \$584,961,972 FY 2023-2024

\$588,811,080

### **Permanent full-time** authorized employment

**positions** (including judges)

FY 2022-2023

4,274

FY 2023-2024

4,274

### **Total Cases Added During The Biennium** 2022-2024

**Supreme Court Cases** 280

**Appellate Court Cases** 2,138

**Superior Court Cases** 496,500

## **Summary - Disposed**

## Total Cases Disposed<sup>1</sup> For the Superior Court Division

	Г		
		FY 2022-2023	FY 2023-2024
Criminal <sup>2</sup>	Total Criminal	66,184	61,816
	Judicial District	2,355	2,280
	Geographical Area	63,829	59,536
Motor Vehicle <sup>2</sup>		46,684	36,841
Civil		53,425	52,480
Small Claims <sup>3</sup>		30,869	37,825
Family	Total Family	28,408	27,575
	Family	25,612	24,636
	Family Support Magistrate	2,189	2,364
	Family Support Magistrate UIFSA	607	575
Juvenile	Total Juvenile	14,761	15,845
	Delinquency	6,161	6,262
	Child Protection	8,600	9,583
Housing Matters (Summary Process)		26,463	24,437
Total Cases Disposed		266,794	256,819

Disposed includes re-opened and transferred cases

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Does not include infractions or payable violations

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Includes small claims housing

## **Supreme Court**

July 1, 2022 to June 30, 2023

FY23	Pending, Start of Period
Civil <sup>1</sup>	102
Criminal	53
Total	155

	Disposed						
Added	opinion	court motion	party motion	transferred	withdrawn	other	Total
75	45	1	0	8	5	19	78
41	37	1	0	1	0	4	43
116	82	2	0	9	5	23	121

### July 1, 2023 to June 30, 2024

FY24	Pending, Start of Period
Civil <sup>1</sup>	99
Criminal	51
Total	150

	Disposed						
Added	opinion	court motion	party motion	transferred	withdrawn	other	Total
103	57	1	0	6	7	73	144
61	14	0	0	3	1	22	40
164	71	1	0	9	8	95	184

Pending, End of Period	Change Pending
58	(41)
72	21
130	(20)

Pending,

**End of Period** 

51

150

Change

**Pending** 

(5)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Civil category includes: Civil, Family, and Juvenile cases

## **Appellate Court**

July 1, 2022 to June 30, 2023

FY23	Pending, Start of Period
Civil <sup>1</sup>	584
Criminal	62
Total	646

	Disposed						
Added	opinion	court motion	party motion	transferred	withdrawn	other	Total
937	275	153	114	34	180	123	879
90	32	10	7	3	4	18	74
1,027	307	163	121	37	184	141	953

Pending, End of Period	Chang Pendir
640	56
77	15
717	71

Change Pending
56
15
71

FY24	Pending, Start of Period
Civil <sup>1</sup>	644
Criminal	78
Total	722

	Disposed						
Added	opinion	court motion	party motion	transferred	withdrawn	other	Total
981	296	175	105	12	178	139	905
130	26	9	7	3	10	17	72
1,111	322	184	112	15	188	156	977

Pending, End of Period	Change Pending
720	76
136	58
856	134

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Civil category includes: Civil, Family, and Juvenile cases

# **Delinquency**

**FY23** 

	Pending, Start of Period			
	0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total
Bridgeport	181	23	7	211
Hartford	93	26	18	137
Middletown	74	19	4	97
New Britain	107	19	4	130
New Haven	287	55	8	350
Rockville	51	13	21	85
Stamford	75	31	18	124
Torrington	45	19	2	66
Waterbury	158	57	14	229
Waterford	130	41	32	203
Willimantic	74	20	24	118
Total	1,275	323	152	1,750

Added	Disposed
905	882
786	610
391	375
688	619
1,306	1,250
331	310
328	388
169	197
834	820
407	412
264	298
6,409	6,161

P	Pending, End of Period				
0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total		
191	31	12	234		
247	53	13	313		
83	27	3	113		
179	12	8	199		
295	87	24	406		
82	22	2	106		
58	5	1	64		
27	6	5	38		
141	70	32	243		
115	44	39	198		
51	18	15	84		
1,469	375	154	1,998		

Change
Pending
23
176
16
69
56
21
(60)
(28)
14
(5)
(34)
248

# **Delinquency**

**FY24** 

	Pending, Start of Period			
	0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total
Bridgeport <sup>1</sup>	249	36	13	298
Hartford	247	53	13	313
Middletown	83	27	3	113
New Britain	179	12	8	199
New Haven	295	87	24	406
Rockville	82	22	2	106
Torrington	27	6	5	38
Waterbury	141	70	32	243
Waterford	115	44	39	198
Willimantic	51	18	15	84
Total	1,469	375	154	1,998

Added	Disposed
1,210	1,172
704	831
326	346
648	718
1,245	1,327
453	428
157	153
577	631
395	408
241	248
5,956	6,262

P	Pending, End of Period				
0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total		
251	47	38	336		
129	46	11	186		
70	19	4	93		
114	9	6	129		
223	60	41	324		
100	18	13	131		
35	7	0	42		
132	33	24	189		
128	36	21	185		
49	20	8	77		
1,231	295	166	1,692		

Change Pending
38
(127)
(20)
(70)
(82)
25
4
(54)
(13)
(7)
(306)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Stamford Juvenile activity is consolidated into Bridgeport

## Child Protection Petitions<sup>1</sup>

**FY23** 

July 1, 2022 to June 30, 2023

	Pending, Start of Period			
	0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total
Bridgeport	210	58	31	299
Hartford	198	28	20	246
Middletown	101	22	20	143
New Britain	177	25	12	214
New Haven	242	55	15	312
Rockville	97	9	12	118
Stamford	47	8	12	67
Torrington	67	7	14	88
Waterbury	180	31	27	238
Waterford	229	39	71	339
Willimantic	108	23	40	171
Total	1,656	305	274	2,235

Added	Disposed
1,137	1,005
1,118	1,135
512	476
822	876
1,204	1,223
523	468
205	194
321	343
1,273	1,202
1,033	1,093
532	585
8,680	8,600

P	ending, Er	nd of Perio	d
0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total
319	72	40	431
200	22	7	229
135	22	22	179
148	11	1	160
225	43	25	293
119	34	20	173
50	6	22	78
56	9	1	66
286	18	5	309
209	33	37	279
90	20	8	118
1,837	290	188	2,315

	Change Pending
	132
	(17)
	36
	(54)
	(19)
	55
	11
	(22)
	71
	(60)
	(53)
	80

<sup>1</sup> Petition Types Include:

Neglect Neglect, Uncared For Neglect, Abused Neglect, Uncared For, Abused Uncared For Uncared For, Abused

Abused Emancipation Contested Application Removal of Guardian Contested Petition for Terminated Rights Appeal from Probate Revocation

Termination of Parental Rights Motion for Review of Permanency Plan Administrative Appeal Reinstate Parent As Guardian Adoption OTC.

## **Child Protection Petitions**<sup>1</sup>

**FY24** 

July 1, 2023 to June 30, 2024

	P	ending, Sto	art of Peri	od			P	ending, Er	nd of Perio	d	Change
	0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total	Added	Disposed	0 to 6 months	7 to 12 months	Over 12 months	Total	Pending
Bridgeport <sup>2</sup>	369	78	62	509	1,477	1,640	279	39	28	346	(163)
Hartford	200	22	7	229	1,388	1,311	277	18	11	306	77
Middletown	135	22	22	179	541	572	118	19	11	148	(31)
New Britain	148	11	1	160	838	843	129	18	8	155	(5)
New Haven	225	43	25	293	1,494	1,476	272	28	11	311	18
Rockville	119	34	20	173	594	606	143	13	5	161	(12)
Torrington	56	9	1	66	308	293	77	4	0	81	15
Waterbury	286	18	5	309	1,076	1,180	184	19	2	205	(104)
Waterford	209	33	37	279	1,107	1,149	191	33	13	237	(42)
Willimantic	90	20	8	118	496	513	92	7	2	101	(17)
Total	1,837	290	188	2,315	9,319	9,583	1,762	198	91	2,051	(264)

<sup>1</sup> Petition	Types	Include:
-----------------------	-------	----------

Termination of Parental Rights Neglect Abused Motion for Review of Permanency Plan Neglect, Uncared For Emancipation Contested Application Removal of Guardian Administrative Appeal Neglect, Abused Neglect, Uncared For, Abused Contested Petition for Terminated Rights Reinstate Parent As Guardian Appeal from Probate Uncared For Adoption Uncared For, Abused OTC' Revocation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Stamford Juvenile activity is consolidated into Bridgeport

			Added				Dispo	sed				
	Pending,	Transfer	red from:		Without		Tr	Transferred to:			Pending,	Change
	Start of Period	Part B <sup>2</sup>	Part A <sup>3</sup>	Trial	With Trial	Part B <sup>4</sup>	Part A <sup>5</sup>	Other	Total	End of Period	Pending	
Ansonia/Milford	423	121	3	124	176	0	5	6	0	187	332	(91)
Danbury	484	73	0	73	252	13	1	3	0	269	283	(201)
Fairfield	719	231	10	241	267	21	8	7	0	303	626	(93)
Hartford	575	237	5	242	266	18	4	2	0	290	517	(58)
Litchfield	277	91	2	93	185	3	1	4	0	193	185	(92)
Middlesex	128	61	4	65	63	3	1	1	0	68	124	(4)
New Britain	363	193	2	195	174	8	15	6	0	203	346	(17)
New Haven	366	212	8	220	175	10	6	4	0	195	375	9
New London	228	104	2	106	118	8	1	3	1	131	206	(22)
Stamford	446	208	6	214	133	5	8	5	0	151	468	22
Tolland	168	66	1	67	97	2	2	0	2	103	136	(32)
Waterbury	536	218	5	223	206	7	6	8	0	227	515	(21)
Windham	137	56	2	58	34	0	0	1	0	35	168	31
Total	4,850	1,871	50	1,921	2,146	98	58	50	3	2,355	4,281	(569)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> From FY23 forward, data only includes CR Part A dockets. MV Part A dockets are excluded.

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$  Part B - transferred from a GA location to the identified judicial district location.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Part A - transferred from a different judicial district location to the identified judicial district location.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Part B - transferred to a GA location from the identified judicial district location.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Part A - transferred to a different judicial district location from the identified judicial district location.

**FY24** 

			Added				Dispo	osed				
	Pending,	Transfer	red from:		Without		Tr	ansferred t	0:		Pending,	Change
	Start of Period	Part B <sup>2</sup>	Part A <sup>3</sup>	Total	Trial	With Trial	Part B <sup>4</sup>	Part A <sup>5</sup>	Other	Total	End of Period	Pending
Ansonia/Milford	332	119	4	123	168	5	7	10	0	190	256	(76)
Danbury	281	66	1	67	110	8	3	2	0	123	231	(50)
Fairfield	628	220	2	222	426	18	10	9	0	463	365	(263)
Hartford	511	210	6	216	204	28	4	13	0	249	481	(30)
Litchfield	186	139	2	141	92	4	3	0	0	99	203	17
Middlesex	124	64	2	66	57	0	1	1	0	59	127	3
New Britain	344	151	1	152	185	9	3	11	0	208	296	(48)
New Haven	387	204	15	219	153	11	4	5	1	174	409	22
New London	205	96	0	96	126	2	6	6	0	140	167	(38)
Stamford	471	181	5	186	131	4	2	0	0	137	507	36
Tolland	149	66	14	80	65	0	0	0	0	65	149	0
Waterbury	509	183	9	192	262	10	31	5	0	308	395	(114)
Windham	168	94	1	95	62	1	2	0	0	65	190	22
Total	4,295	1,793	62	1,855	2,041	100	76	62	1	2,280	3,776	(519)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> From FY23 forward, data only includes CR Part A dockets. MV Part A dockets are excluded.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Part B - transferred from a GA location to the identified judicial district location.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Part A - transferred from a different judicial district location to the identified judicial district location.

 $<sup>^4</sup>$  Part B - transferred to a GA location from the identified judicial district location.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Part A - transferred to a different judicial district location from the identified judicial district location.

**FY23** 

## Pending June 30, 2023

		Pe	nding, End of	Period		Median Age	Cases for Confi	ned Defendan
	Active		Inactive		Total	of Cases	6-12 months	12+ months
	ACIIVE	Programs	Rearrests	Other	332	(in months)	0-12 1110111113	12   1110111113
Ansonia/Milford	243	31	12	46	332	16.5	22	74
Danbury	105	41	114	23	283	10.9	5	13
Fairfield	495	19	47	65	626	16.4	46	141
Hartford	441	13	36	27	517	13.4	71	150
Litchfield	143	18	13	11	185	12.3	12	34
Middlesex	101	7	6	10	124	8.6	9	19
New Britain	308	14	13	11	346	11.9	50	85
New Haven	322	4	46	3	375	10.4	67	82
New London	178	9	7	12	206	11.6	29	44
Stamford	229	48	38	153	468	13.9	31	68
Tolland	56	1	23	56	136	9.8	4	11
Waterbury	434	17	24	40	515	13.6	71	131
Windham	126	1	12	29	168	12.4	8	26
Total	3,181	223	391	486	4,281	12.1	425	878

Age	cases for Confi	nea verenaants
5 <b>e S</b> hs)	6-12 months	12+ months
	22	74
	5	13
	46	141
	71	150
	12	34
	9	19
	50	85
	67	82
	29	44
	31	68
	4	11
	71	131
	8	26
	425	878

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> From FY23 forward, data only includes CR Part A dockets. MV Part A dockets are excluded.

**FY24** 

## Pending June 30, 2024

		Pei	nding, End of	Period		Median Age	Cases for Confi	ned Defendants
	Active		Inactive		Total	of Cases	6-12 months	12+ months
	ACTIVE	Programs	Rearrests	Other	Total	(in months)	0-12 1110111113	12   1110111113
Ansonia/Milford	196	25	7	28	256	17.1	19	45
Danbury	77	15	116	23	231	9.8	12	5
Fairfield	249	15	52	49	365	9.6	41	51
Hartford	379	15	36	51	481	12.7	49	116
Litchfield	147	27	10	19	203	9.7	28	35
Middlesex	106	8	6	7	127	9.9	15	22
New Britain	256	14	12	14	296	10.4	42	54
New Haven	352	7	44	6	409	11.2	47	109
New London	131	10	8	18	167	10.8	12	30
Stamford	198	50	47	212	507	24.0	7	76
Tolland	86	4	22	37	149	5.2	10	18
Waterbury	325	15	30	25	395	16.9	54	113
Windham	165	8	12	5	190	11.8	20	30
Total	2,667	213	402	494	3,776	13.0	356	704

of Cases (in months)	6-12 months	12+ months
17.1	19	45
9.8	12	5
9.6	41	51
12.7	49	116
9.7	28	35
9.9	15	22
10.4	42	54
11.2	47	109
10.8	12	30
24.0	7	76
5.2	10	18
16.9	54	113
11.8	20	30
13.0	356	704

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> From FY23 forward, data only includes CR Part A dockets. MV Part A dockets are excluded.

## Geographical Area Criminal<sup>1</sup>

**FY23** 

		Pendin	ıg, Start of	Period					Pendi	ng, End of	Period	
			Inactive			Added	Disposed			Inactive		
	Active	Marked for Disposition	Programs	Rearrest or 14-140	Total	Audou	Бізрозоц	Active	Marked for Disposition	Programs	Rearrest or 14-140	Tota
Bridgeport	3,961	818	1,942	1,671	8,392	4,977	5,761	3,646	209	2,014	1,748	7,617
Danbury	590	343	802	553	2,288	1,664	2,131	473	121	689	581	1,864
Danielson	780	263	763	793	2,599	1,676	1,714	950	163	686	791	2,590
Derby	534	824	651	524	2,533	1,682	1,943	513	791	563	404	2,271
Enfield <sup>2</sup>	381	69	309	55	814	267	1,107	0	0	0	3	3
Hartford	4,370	1,092	2,445	2,646	10,553	10,244	9,424	4,657	846	2,543	3,279	11,325
Manchester	1,530	165	1,118	333	3,146	3,141	3,418	1,249	184	1,063	398	2,894
Meriden	1,174	178	1,065	384	2,801	3,092	3,276	1,125	126	943	440	2,634
Middletown	966	58	595	469	2,088	1,931	1,922	975	53	611	461	2,100
Milford	748	100	478	514	1,840	1,802	1,947	635	114	470	488	1,707
New Britain	3,110	243	1,746	1,067	6,166	5,783	6,060	2,837	209	1,790	1,066	5,902
New Haven	2,351	586	1,906	2,525	7,368	6,216	7,202	2,107	296	1,506	2,486	6,395
New London	1,548	520	1,359	2,203	5,630	2,900	3,511	1,293	371	1,194	2,210	5,068
Norwalk <sup>3</sup>	66	117	50	13	246	11	262	2	0	0	12	14
Norwich	724	284	942	553	2,503	2,091	2,270	624	451	723	530	2,328
Rockville	588	230	690	380	1,888	1,278	1,513	437	161	633	416	1,647
Stamford	1,577	1,817	1,667	2,264	7,325	3,510	2,736	1,658	1,650	2,285	2,490	8,083
Torrington	799	193	640	385	2,017	1,588	1,974	540	115	616	355	1,626
Waterbury	2,994	440	2,004	1,730	7,168	4,290	5,658	2,150	234	1,639	1,794	5,817
Total	28,791	8,340	21,172	19,062	77,365	58,143	63,829	25,871	6,094	19,968	19,952	71,885

Excludes Criminal Infractions and Payable Violation Cases

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Enfield operations consolidated with Hartford

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Norwalk operations consolidated with Stamford

## Geographical Area Criminal<sup>1</sup>

**FY24** 

		Pendin	g, Start of	Period					Pendi	ng, End of	Period	
			Inactive			Added	Disposed			Inactive		
	Active	Marked for Disposition	Programs	Rearrest or 14-140	Total	Audou	210 2000	Active	Marked for Disposition	Programs	Rearrest or 14-140	Total
Bridgeport	3,746	308	2,029	1,512	7,595	5,325	5,763	3,332	62	2,071	1,657	7,122
Danbury	467	121	689	579	1,856	1,993	1,579	676	109	821	641	2,247
Danielson	943	171	687	788	2,589	1,877	1,626	1,016	114	854	854	2,838
Derby	512	794	557	399	2,262	1,712	1,912	552	575	540	390	2,057
Hartford <sup>2</sup>	4,644	975	2,572	3,121	11,312	10,478	10,866	4,363	815	2,514	3,214	10,906
Manchester	1,221	197	1,063	399	2,880	3,175	2,841	1,462	80	1,202	451	3,195
Meriden	1,117	126	945	437	2,625	3,330	3,481	982	142	1,006	322	2,452
Middletown	966	54	611	461	2,092	1,917	1,824	829	93	752	498	2,172
Milford	634	115	468	486	1,703	2,074	1,911	753	64	514	513	1,844
New Britain	2,824	214	1,788	1,066	5,892	5,523	5,363	2,877	158	1,848	1,144	6,027
New Haven	2,095	301	1,502	2,489	6,387	6,565	6,132	2,424	229	1,625	2,531	6,809
New London	1,270	528	1,220	2,036	5,054	2,764	3,139	1,099	395	1,087	2,068	4,649
Norwich	602	467	731	523	2,323	2,352	1,963	823	362	922	595	2,702
Rockville	436	162	630	413	1,641	1,325	1,296	464	140	656	401	1,661
Stamford <sup>3</sup>	1,636	1,656	2,271	2,478	8,041	3,844	3,086	1,181	2,233	2,759	2,610	8,783
Torrington	535	117	619	355	1,626	1,662	1,671	669	52	503	398	1,622
Waterbury	2,141	242	1,650	1,776	5,809	4,625	5,083	1,980	187	1,653	1,521	5,341
Total	25,789	6,548	20,032	19,318	71,687	60,541	59,536	25,482	5,810	21,327	19,808	72,427

Excludes Criminal Infractions and Payable Violation Cases

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Enfield operations consolidated with Hartford

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Norwalk operations consolidated with Stamford

## Geographical Area Motor Vehicle<sup>1</sup>

**FY23** 

		Pendin	ıg, Start of	Period					Pendi	ng, End of	Period	
			Inactive			Added	Disposed			Inactive		
	Active	Marked for Disposition	Programs	Rearrest or 14-140	Total	Auueu	Dishosed	Active	Marked for Disposition	Programs	Rearrest or 14-140	Total
Bridgeport	2,408	177	601	2,650	5,836	2,716	3,252	1,913	48	581	2,751	5,293
Danbury	355	352	465	1,118	2,290	1,091	1,495	295	110	369	1,151	1,925
Danielson	598	92	449	2,050	3,189	1,050	1,309	492	60	296	2,097	2,945
Derby	541	442	318	1,104	2,405	1,795	2,370	555	202	257	832	1,846
Enfield <sup>2</sup>	370	43	234	21	668	320	1,004	0	0	0	1	1
Hartford	6,382	1,762	1,129	12,791	22,064	4,639	7,299	4,041	905	900	13,569	19,415
Manchester	1,312	331	674	2,263	4,580	2,607	3,014	885	168	516	2,631	4,200
Meriden	1,253	396	422	6,989	9,060	2,515	2,851	891	155	413	7,273	8,732
Middletown	679	58	411	1,863	3,011	1,386	1,507	572	37	352	1,932	2,893
Milford	324	24	114	1,844	2,306	1,127	989	335	36	178	1,885	2,434
New Britain	2,408	167	867	4,752	8,194	4,018	5,160	1,473	103	675	4,816	7,067
New Haven	1,446	266	498	7,421	9,631	2,571	3,303	833	135	362	7,601	8,931
New London	1,312	395	781	3,747	6,235	2,506	2,932	1,077	233	746	3,799	5,855
Norwalk <sup>3</sup>	89	21	40	5	155	63	231	0	0	1	0	1
Norwich	829	252	534	1,291	2,906	1,496	1,988	480	234	341	1,369	2,424
Rockville	493	190	449	1,306	2,438	1,229	1,415	374	120	387	1,373	2,254
Stamford	1,370	374	763	3,188	5,695	2,859	2,087	1,462	531	998	3,454	6,445
Torrington	607	122	382	423	1,534	1,413	1,568	442	83	366	510	1,401
Waterbury	1,912	209	476	3,858	6,455	2,031	2,910	976	127	391	4,117	5,611
Total	24,688	5,673	9,607	58,684	98,652	37,432	46,684	17,096	3,287	8,129	61,161	89,673

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Excludes Motor Vehicle Infractions and Payable Violation Cases

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Enfield operations consolidated with Hartford

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Norwalk operations consolidated with Stamford

## Geographical Area Motor Vehicle<sup>1</sup>

**FY24** 

		Pandin	ıg, Start of	Pariod					Pandi	ng, End of	Pariod		
		I GIIUIII	<u>.</u>	1 CIIUU					I GIIUI		I GIIUU		
			Inactive			Added	Disposed			Inactive			
	Active	Marked for Disposition	Programs	Rearrest or 14-140	Total		·	Active	Marked for Disposition	Programs	Rearrest or 14-140	Total	
Bridgeport	1,950	75	578	2,662	5,265	2,078	2,551	1,434	30	580	2,750	4,794	
Danbury	303	112	363	1,132	1,910	1,256	1,125	424	39	418	1,140	2,021	
Danielson	507	66	294	2,063	2,930	864	916	486	36	257	2,095	2,874	
Derby	557	208	255	822	1,842	1,301	1,380	481	133	240	905	1,759	
Hartford <sup>2</sup>	4,355	1,076	904	13,069	19,404	4,430	6,748	2,331	477	897	13,402	17,107	
Manchester	954	227	518	2,491	4,190	1,668	1,853	708	101	476	2,725	4,010	
Meriden	1,384	829	416	6,086	8,715	1,999	3,431	580	115	402	6,180	7,277	
Middletown	602	46	353	1,885	2,886	1,020	1,188	417	47	307	1,944	2,715	
Milford	348	40	178	1,867	2,433	1,251	1,107	438	29	181	1,930	2,578	
New Britain	1,551	110	675	4,723	7,059	3,503	3,434	1,468	64	655	4,926	7,113	
New Haven	949	165	360	7,451	8,925	2,201	2,184	842	77	363	7,650	8,932	
New London	1,084	356	743	3,643	5,826	1,856	2,582	686	201	565	3,658	5,110	
Norwich	510	247	346	1,319	2,422	1,326	1,190	502	192	464	1,385	2,543	
Rockville	391	131	382	1,348	2,252	1,055	1,116	373	82	362	1,370	2,187	
Stamford <sup>3</sup>	1,471	534	972	3,409	6,386	2,558	2,360	884	981	1,134	3,582	6,581	
Torrington	453	98	367	483	1,401	1,426	1,421	457	49	353	563	1,422	
Waterbury	1,145	137	382	3,944	5,608	1,928	2,255	821	87	369	3,986	5,263	
Total	18,514	4,457	8,086	58,397	89,454	31,720	36,841	13,332	2,740	8,023	60,191	84,286	

Excludes Motor Vehicle Infractions and Payable Violation Cases

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Enfield operations consolidated with Hartford

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Norwalk operations consolidated with Stamford

## Civil Case Movement<sup>1</sup>

July 1, 2022 to June 30, 2023

	Pending,	Added				Disposed				Pending,	
	Start of Period	New Filings	Reopened	Transferred In	Total	With Trial	Other	Transferred Out	Total	End of Period	
Ansonia/Milford	2,451	2,029	165	49	2,243	71	2,231	87	2,389	2,305	
Bridgeport	7,048	5,930	603	53	6,586	283	7,093	110	7,486	6,148	
Danbury	2,259	1,955	54	28	2,037	127	2,222	32	2,381	1,915	
Hartford	8,978	8,128	285	111	8,524	204	8,331	542	9,077	8,425	
Litchfield	1,479	1,186	97	13	1,296	98	1,349	24	1,471	1,304	
Meriden	983	882	28	5	915	37	990	98	1,125	773	
Middlesex	1,496	1,634	55	23	1,712	49	1,642	94	1,785	1,423	
New Britain	3,177	3,182	112	954	4,248	100	3,579	36	3,715	3,710	
New Haven	10,431	6,568	258	71	6,897	439	9,058	100	9,597	7,731	
New London <sup>2</sup>	3,127	2,811	122	76	3,009	94	3,277	166	3,537	2,599	
Stamford	3,902	3,260	70	46	3,376	108	3,194	159	3,461	3,817	
Tolland <sup>3</sup>	1,832	1,384	103	14	1,501	136	1,504	21	1,661	1,672	
Waterbury	4,896	3,356	141	82	3,579	121	4,293	54	4,468	4,007	
Windham	791	1,079	97	8	1,184	28	1,234	10	1,272	703	
Total	52,850	43,384	2,190	1,533	47,107	1,895	49,997	1,533	53,425	46,532	

	Does no	t include	Housing	or Small	Claims
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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Includes Norwich

Note: Discrepancies between Transferred In and Transferred Out figures result from transfers to and from housing session locations, which are reported separately Note: Total Disposed and Reopened cases include all instances during the time frame. A single case can go to judgment then reopen and go to judgment again.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Includes TSR - Rockville Habeas

## Civil Case Movement<sup>1</sup>

July 1, 2023 to June 30, 2024

	Pending,		Added				Disposed			
	Start of Period	New Filings	Reopened	Transferred In	Total	With Trial	Other	Transferred Out	Total	Pending, End of Period
Ansonia/Milford	2,305	2,337	176	82	2,595	81	2,537	33	2,651	2,249
Bridgeport	6,146	6,614	533	65	7,212	211	7,135	243	7,589	5,769
Danbury	1,915	2,173	50	116	2,339	96	2,168	94	2,358	1,896
Hartford	8,424	8,873	263	130	9,266	196	8,581	274	9,051	8,639
Litchfield	1,304	1,410	114	16	1,540	34	1,355	23	1,412	1,432
Meriden	773	1,183	35	13	1,231	36	1,112	43	1,191	813
Middlesex	1,424	1,969	37	48	2,054	43	1,653	39	1,735	1,743
New Britain	3,707	3,629	76	551	4,256	133	3,963	48	4,144	3,819
New Haven	7,729	7,262	290	85	7,637	492	7,170	125	7,787	7,579
New London <sup>2</sup>	2,599	3,397	82	85	3,564	109	3,157	200	3,466	2,697
Stamford	3,811	3,840	74	59	3,973	152	3,831	230	4,213	3,571
Tolland <sup>3</sup>	1,672	1,500	93	20	1,613	132	1,578	29	1,739	1,546
Waterbury	4,003	3,698	130	150	3,978	171	3,772	36	3,979	4,002
Windham	703	1,199	94	12	1,305	25	1,131	9	1,165	843
Total	46,515	49,084	2,047	1,432	52,563	1,911	49,143	1,426	52,480	46,598

1	Dags	not	incli	ahı	Нош	ina ni	lnm2	l Claims	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Includes Norwich

Note: Discrepancies between Transferred In and Transferred Out figures result from transfers to and from housing session locations, which are reported separately Note: Total Disposed and Reopened cases include all instances during the time frame. A single case can go to judgment then reopen and go to judgment again.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Includes TSR - Rockville Habeas

# **Small Claims Housing**

<b>FY23</b>	Pending, Start of Period		
Ansonia/Milford	9		
Bridgeport Housing	88		
Danbury	6		
Hartford Housing	66		
Litchfield	11		
Meriden	14		
Middlesex	8		
New Britain Housing	21		
New Haven Housing	98		
New London	46		
Norwalk Housing	25		
Tolland	4		
Waterbury Housing	83		
Windham	4		
Total	483		

		Trans	ferred	Disposed	
Added	Reopened	In	Out		
33	1	1	2	32	
132	9	4	5	149	
30	0	0	1	29	
251	22	2	4	269	
45	5	1	0	47	
31	5	1	0	43	
55	4	1	0	58	
111	7	3	2	118	
166	23	5	5	251	
82	8	0	0	110	
104	10	1	0	113	
23	2	0	0	23	
83	7	5	5	83	
28	1	0	0	23	
1,174	104	24	24	1,348	

Pending, End of Period
10
79
6
68
15
8
10
22
36
26
27
6
90
10
413

# **Small Claims Housing**

<b>FY24</b>	Pending, Start of Period			
Ansonia/Milford	10			
Bridgeport Housing	79			
Danbury	6			
Hartford Housing	69			
Litchfield	15			
Meriden	8			
Middlesex	10			
New Britain Housing	22			
New Haven Housing	36			
New London	26			
Norwalk Housing	27			
Tolland	6			
Waterbury Housing	90			
Windham	10			
Total	414			

		Trans	ferred		
Added	Reopened	In	Out	Disposed	
65	5	0	0	52	
118	4	1	2	120	
37	1	0	0	31	
247	15	4	6	255	
28	3	0	0	37	
25	4	0	1	31	
28	1	0	1	35	
118	4	4	2	107	
176	10	9	7	164	
67	6	0	0	77	
93	14	1	1	100	
21	3	2	0	24	
62	1	3	4	130	
37	4	0	0	37	
1,122	75	24	24	1,200	

Pending, End of Period
28
80
13
74
9
5
3
39
60
22
34
8
22
14
411

## **Small Claims**

July 1, 2022 to June 30, 2023

FY23	Pending, Start of Period			
Ansonia/Milford	486			
Bridgeport	1,338			
Danbury	240			
Hartford	1,609			
Litchfield	188			
Meriden	265			
Middlesex	159			
New Britain	482			
New Haven	764			
New London	994			
Stamford	479			
Tolland	144			
Waterbury	728			
Windham	184			
Total	8,060			

Ad	ded		Trans	ferred		
New Filings	From Legacy System	Reopened	In	Out	Disposed	
1,665	77	53	21	16	1,928	
2,969	190	55	19	62	2,674	
948	68	28	6	8	1,084	
5,554	192	100	26	112	5,797	
993	58	22	12	14	1,006	
1,573	49	34	13	11	1,683	
1,091	47	32	19	6	1,148	
2,560	66	59	100	40	2,765	
2,658	114	101	26	11	2,990	
1,916	100	68	7	4	2,192	
1,625	83	48	19	11	1,695	
821	49	23	11	2	889	
2,075	98	51	25	12	2,234	
1,080	46	14	6	1	1,102	
27,528	1,237	688	310	310	29,187	

R	eturn	to	Statistica	Overview

Pending, End of Period

358

1,835

1,572 253

240 194 462

662 889 548

157 731 227

8,326

## **Small Claims**

<b>FY24</b>	Pending, Start of Period			
Ansonia/Milford	358			
Bridgeport	1,835			
Danbury	198			
Hartford	1,571			
Litchfield	253			
Meriden	240			
Middlesex	194			
New Britain	462			
New Haven	662			
New London	889			
Stamford	548			
Tolland	157			
Waterbury	731			
Windham	227			
Total	8,325			

Ado	ded		Trans	Transferred		
New Filings	From Legacy System	Reopened	Reopened In		Disposed	
2,371	28	26	47	51	1,978	
3,939	72	53	61	157	4,783	
1,391	21	28	21	11	1,294	
7,657	72	64	35	252	6,875	
1,442	15	16	26	11	1,266	
2,439	21	22	8	46	2,203	
1,399	12	16	10	13	1,297	
3,292	34	42	205	35	3,232	
3,600	46	36	40	14	2,870	
2,820	23	91	17	4	2,593	
1,980	42	60	101	26	2,007	
1,288	20	15	19	1	1,097	
3,066	23	41	41	20	3,184	
1,471	12	22	10	0	1,281	
38,155	441	532	641	641	35,960	

Pending, End of Period
801
1,020
354
2,272
475
481
321
768
1,500
1,243
698
401
698
461
11,493

## Family Case Movement<sup>1</sup>

July 1, 2022 to June 30, 2023

	Pending,		Ad	ded			Disp	osed		Pending,
	Start of Period	New Filings	Reopened	Transferred In	Total	With Trial <sup>3</sup>	Other	Transferred Out	Total	End of Period
Ansonia/Milford	532	1,166	43	9	1,218	532	773	13	1,318	432
Bridgeport	842	2,430	129	65	2,624	1,243	1,498	11	2,752	714
Danbury	416	1,035	30	3	1,068	605	540	10	1,155	329
Hartford	1,244	4,018	126	32	4,176	1,800	2,632	16	4,448	972
Litchfield	196	736	22	5	763	325	398	10	733	226
Meriden	234	734	36	8	778	308	544	15	867	145
Middlesex	288	822	49	10	881	460	498	16	974	195
New Britain	578	1,820	64	33	1,917	830	1,266	24	2,120	375
New Haven	960	2,817	116	20	2,953	1,219	1,865	14	3,098	815
Norwich <sup>2</sup>	551	2,090	88	25	2,203	935	1,311	27	2,273	481
Stamford	1,005	1,626	114	4	1,744	966	983	61	2,010	739
Tolland	299	840	63	3	906	419	547	7	973	232
Waterbury	342	1,728	83	13	1,824	659	1,159	8	1,826	340
Windham	303	976	21	4	1,001	349	714	2	1,065	239
Total	7,790	22,838	984	234	24,056	10,650	14,728	234	25,612	6,234

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Excludes Family Support Magistrate cases

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Includes New London

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Judgment by hearing or trial

## Family Case Movement<sup>1</sup>

July 1, 2023 to June 30, 2024

	Pending,		Ad	ded			Disp	osed		Pending,
	Start of Period	New Filings	Reopened	Transferred In	Total	With Trial <sup>3</sup>	Other	Transferred Out	Total	End of Period
Ansonia/Milford	432	1,221	53	11	1,285	550	807	28	1,385	332
Bridgeport	714	2,393	93	113	2,599	1,183	1,410	16	2,609	704
Danbury	329	992	35	4	1,031	524	537	5	1,066	294
Hartford	972	4,217	142	23	4,382	1,692	2,650	16	4,358	996
Litchfield	226	733	21	2	756	369	420	13	802	180
Meriden	145	818	59	5	882	301	569	13	883	144
Middlesex	195	825	49	9	883	354	498	14	866	212
New Britain	375	1,881	51	23	1,955	702	1,219	17	1,938	392
New Haven	815	2,798	78	39	2,915	1,109	1,852	10	2,971	759
Norwich <sup>2</sup>	481	2,118	55	38	2,211	864	1,367	29	2,260	432
Stamford	739	1,526	77	11	1,614	781	853	111	1,745	608
Tolland	232	852	44	5	901	425	468	4	897	236
Waterbury	340	1,751	55	10	1,816	608	1,150	16	1,774	382
Windham	239	1,039	16	2	1,057	343	736	3	1,082	214
Total	6,234	23,164	828	295	24,287	9,805	14,536	295	24,636	5,885

- 1	
	Pending, End of Period
	332
	704
	294
	996
	180
	144
	212
	392
	759
	432
	608
	236
	382
	214
	5,885

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Excludes Family Support Magistrate cases

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Includes New London

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Judgment by hearing or trial

## **Family Support Magistrate Case Movement**

July 1, 2022 to June 30, 2023

FY23	Pending, Start of Period
Ansonia/Milford	12
Bridgeport	87
Danbury	18
Hartford	139
Litchfield	16
Meriden	20
Middlesex	14
New Britain	45
New Haven	67
Norwich	54
Stamford	18
Tolland	9
Waterbury	87
Windham	16
Total	602

	Ad	ded			Disposed	
New Filings	Reopened	Transferred In	Total	Disposed	Transferred Out	Total
71	2	0	73	70	0	70
282	1	0	283	263	0	263
48	2	0	50	42	0	42
506	17	1	524	517	2	519
52	4	0	56	60	0	60
96	2	0	98	99	0	99
67	5	1	73	68	0	68
128	3	0	131	144	1	145
348	6	1	355	351	0	351
144	1	2	147	146	1	147
101	1	0	102	101	0	101
53	5	0	58	56	0	56
222	4	0	226	214	1	215
52	1	0	53	53	0	53
2,170	54	5	2,229	2,184	5	2,189

Pending,
End of Period
15
107
26
144
12
19
19
31
71
54
19
11
98
16
642

## **Family Support Magistrate Case Movement**

July 1, 2023 to June 30, 2024

FY24	Pending, Start of Period
Ansonia/Milford	15
Bridgeport	107
Danbury	26
Hartford	144
Litchfield	12
Meriden	19
Middlesex	19
New Britain	31
New Haven	71
Norwich	54
Stamford	19
Tolland	11
Waterbury	98
Windham	16
Total	642

Added				Disposed		
New Filings	Reopened	Transferred In	Total	Disposed	Transferred Out	Total
85	2	0	87	83	0	83
239	3	1	243	275	0	275
60	2	0	62	69	1	70
499	12	0	511	506	2	508
54	2	0	56	61	1	62
100	0	1	101	87	2	89
68	3	1	72	75	0	75
183	5	2	190	192	0	192
383	2	0	385	391	0	391
126	0	0	126	116	0	116
104	2	0	106	110	0	110
65	5	0	70	67	0	67
210	2	2	214	252	0	252
72	3	0	75	73	1	74
2,248	43	7	2,298	2,357	7	2,364

Pending, End of Period
19
75
18
147
6
31
16
29
65
64
15
14
60
17
576

# Family Support Magistrate UIFSA<sup>1</sup> Case Movement

July 1, 2022 to June 30, 2023

FY23	Pending, Start of Period
Bridgeport	5
Danbury	4
Hartford	20
Middlesex	0
New Britain	5
New Haven	4
Norwich	1
Putnam	2
Rockville	0
Stamford	1
Torrington	2
Waterbury	13
Total	57

Added				Disposed		
New Filings	Reopened	Transferred In	Total	Disposed	Transferred Out	Total
90	1	0	91	86	0	86
23	2	0	25	27	0	27
108	1	0	109	121	0	121
17	0	0	17	16	0	16
49	0	0	49	42	0	42
101	1	0	102	102	0	102
64	0	0	64	63	0	63
22	2	0	24	22	0	22
10	0	0	10	8	0	8
31	0	0	31	26	0	26
27	0	0	27	25	0	25
69	0	0	69	69	0	69
611	7	0	618	607	0	607

Pending, End of Period
10
2
8
1
12
4
2
4
2
6
4
13
68

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Uniform Interstate Family Support Act

# Family Support Magistrate UIFSA<sup>1</sup> Case Movement

July 1, 2023 to June 30, 2024

FY24	Pending, Start of Period
Bridgeport	10
Danbury	2
Hartford	8
Middlesex	1
New Britain	12
New Haven	4
Norwich	2
Putnam	4
Rockville	2
Stamford	6
Torrington	4
Waterbury	13
Total	68

Added				Disposed		
New Filings	Reopened	Transferred In	Total	Disposed	Transferred Out	Total
73	2	0	75	79	0	79
19	1	0	20	17	0	17
113	1	0	114	110	1	111
18	0	0	18	19	0	19
63	0	0	63	67	0	67
98	0	0	98	88	0	88
39	0	0	39	35	0	35
34	0	0	34	37	0	37
21	0	0	21	22	0	22
36	0	1	37	37	0	37
11	0	0	11	13	0	13
42	0	0	42	50	0	50
567	4	1	572	574	1	575

Pending, End of Period
6
5
11
0
8
14
6
1
1
6
2
5
65

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Uniform Interstate Family Support Act

## **Housing Session - Summary Process**

FY23	Pending, Start of Period
Bridgeport	461
Hartford	1,344
New Britain	201
New Haven	869
Norwalk	324
Waterbury	507
Total	3,706

		Trans		
Added	Reopened	ln	Out	Disposed
2,599	225	15	12	2,913
5,123	596	15	29	6,119
2,103	204	35	13	2,326
3,658	413	33	35	4,492
1,724	154	11	12	1,903
2,134	255	24	13	2,633
17,341	1,847	133	114	20,386

Pending, End of Period
375
930
204
446
298
274
2,527

July 1, 2023 to June 30, 2024

FY24	Pending, Start of Period	
Bridgeport	375	
Hartford	930	
New Britain	204	
New Haven	446	
Norwalk	298	
Waterbury	274	
Total	2,527	

			Transferred	
Added	Reopened	In	Out	Disposed
2,459	311	11	18	2,796
4,866	705	25	29	5,762
1,898	225	28	20	2,132
3,532	457	41	30	4,048
1,648	243	9	15	1,954
2,045	295	18	12	2,403
16,448	2,236	132	124	19,095

Pending, End of Period
343
734
203
398
229
217
2,124

# **Non-Housing Session - Summary Process**

FY23	Pending, Start of Period
Ansonia/Milford	113
Danbury	158
Litchfield	99
Meriden	131
Middlesex	171
New London	207
Norwich	240
Tolland	44
Windham	162
Total	1,325

		Transferred		
Added	Added Reopened	In	Out	Disposed
483	59	15	24	548
428	45	2	1	501
492	27	3	16	538
397	46	10	8	443
592	57	2	2	738
841	104	11	16	1,053
685	103	15	9	935
378	40	1	5	409
592	71	4	1	716
4,888	552	63	82	5,881

Pending, End of Period		
98		
131		
67		
133		
82		
94		
99		
49		
112		
865		

# **Non-Housing Session - Summary Process**

<b>FY24</b>	Pending, Start of Period
Ansonia/Milford	98
Danbury	131
Litchfield	67
Meriden	133
Middlesex	82
New London	94
Norwich	99
Tolland	49
Windham	112
Total	865

			ferred	
Added	Reopened	In	Out	Disposed
421	59	17	21	463
450	38	7	2	563
417	23	4	11	434
347	38	7	18	481
498	47	3	3	534
802	110	26	23	881
630	81	28	26	710
378	68	10	3	447
529	58	3	6	592
4,472	522	105	113	5,105

Pending, End of Period		
111		
61		
66		
26		
93		
128		
102		
55		
104		
746		

## **Adult Probation Summary of Clients**

July 1, 2022 to June 30, 2023

FY23	Total Incoming	
	Clients	Cases
Summary	14,455	15,561
Accelerated Rehabilitation	4,420	4,422
Drug Dependency	10	10
Youtful Offender	53	53
Total	4,483	4,485

Total Outgoing		
Clients Cases		
13,516 14,405		
4,415	4,425	
10	10	
60	60	
4,485	4,495	

Probation at Start		
Clients Cases		
30,147	32,971	
5,118	5,121	
219	223	
25	25	
5,362	5,369	

Probation at End			
Clients	Cases		
30,806	33,893		
5,183	5,185		
26	26		
204	208		
5,413	5,419		

<b>FY24</b>	Total Incoming	
	Clients	Cases
Summary	14,772	15,992
Accelerated Rehabilitation	4,874	4,875
Drug Dependency	8	8
Youtful Offender	62	64
Total	4,944	4,947

Total Outgoing		
Clients	Cases	
14,379	15,302	
4.007		
4,296	4,305	
16	16	
64	65	
4,376	4,386	

١	Probation at Start			
	Clients	Cases		
	30,806	33,893		
i				
	5,183	5,185		
	26	26		
	204	208		
	5,413	5,419		

Probation at End			
Clients Cases			
30,400	33,521		
5,558	5,559		
13	13		
195	197		
5,766	5,769		

## **Contracted Services**

FY23 | FY24

Adult Programs	Refe	rrals
Adult Behavioral Health Services	17,582	18,758
Alternative in the Community	7,062	7,165
Residential Services	2,894	3,135
Sex Offender Services	715	738
Women and Children Services	24	27
Drug Intervention Program	0	0

Family Services	Referrals	
Domestic Violence-Evolve	467	432
Domestic Violence-Explore	3,279	3,331
Family Violence Education Program (FVEP)	6,324	6,706
Bridgeport Domestic Violence Intervention Services	64	0

Community Service Programs	Referrals	
Community Court <sup>1</sup>	967	998

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> There were no referrals to Community Court during Fiscal Year 2021. Community Court cases were handled in their respective Geographical Area courts

Notes for future years:

Count is for referrals within the fiscal year AIC is all referrals for all client categories for AIC + AIC-CS + AIC-JAMS Residential is DMHAS, TH, DOC, and REACH. Excluded State Hospital, Community Beds, Womens and Children ABHS counts all client categories





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