DiPENTIMA, J., concurring. I agree with my colleagues that the conviction of the defendant, Nicketa Wright, should be affirmed. I respectfully disagree, however, that the defendant adequately has briefed the threshold question of whether this court should review his claims pursuant to *State* v. *Golding*, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the majority.

Our Supreme Court recently stated: "It is well established . . . that parties *affirmatively* seek to prevail under *Golding*, and bear the burden of establishing that they are entitled to appellate review of their unpreserved constitutional claims." (Emphasis added.) *In re Melody L.*, 290 Conn. 131, 154, 962 A.2d 81 (2009). Moreover, this court repeatedly has observed that the "failure to address the four prongs of *Golding* amounts to an inadequate briefing of the issue . . . ." (Internal quotation marks.) *State* v. *Bourguignon*, 82 Conn. App. 798, 801, 847 A.2d 1031 (2004); see also *State* v. *DeVivo*, 106 Conn. App. 641, 647, 942 A.2d 1066 (2008); *State* v. *David P.*, 70 Conn. App. 462, 474, 800 A.2d 541, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 907, 810 A.2d 275 (2002).

I am persuaded by the majority's reasoning that there is no necessity for a talismanic incantation[1] of the *Golding* citation or the rote recitation of its four prongs. I agree that to demonstrate that appellate review of an unpreserved claim of a constitutional deprivation is warranted, a defendant is required to employ the methodology of *Golding* by providing an adequate record for review and alleging that a constitutional violation occurred at the trial court. To accomplish this, a defendant must present this court with a coherent, logical argument for review with authoritative citations to precedent. I depart from the majority in its conclusion that the defendant has satisfied that latter requirement. The defendant's appellate brief sets forth a claim of a constitutional violation. It fails, however, to address his entitlement to review, much less the adequacy of the record. As a result, I reluctantly depart from the opinion of the majority and conclude that the defendant has failed to brief adequately the issue of whether he is entitled to *Golding* review.

I respectfully concur.

[1] "Connecticut courts have refused to attach talismanic significance to the presence or absence of particular words or phrases. See, e.g., *State* v. *Robinson*, 227 Conn. 711, 731, 631 A.2d 288 (1993) (failure to use talismanic words does not indicate failure to make necessary determination); *State* v. *Onofrio*, 179 Conn. 23, 45, 425 A.2d 560 (1979) ([t]here is no talismanic ritual of words that must be spoken by a dying declarant to render statements admissible); *State* v. *Peters*, 89 Conn. App. 141, 146, 872 A.2d 532 (the fact that the court did not use the specific words psychiatric disabilities does not warrant reversal under the plain error doctrine), cert. denied, 274 Conn. 918, 879 A.2d 895 (2005); *State* v. *Peters*, 40 Conn. App. 805, 823, 673 A.2d 1158 (jury charge not improper for failure to recite talismanic words), cert.

denied, 237 Conn. 925, 677 A.2d 949 (1996).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *State* v. *Edwards*, 100 Conn. App. 565, 578–79 n.6, 918 A.2d 1008, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 928, 929, 926 A.2d 666, 667 (2007).