FLYNN, C. J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion accurately sets forth the facts of this case, so I need not recite them again except to say that while the defendant, Michael D. Pires, Sr., was represented by an attorney, on December 20, 2005, the attorney informed the court that outside of the courtroom, the defendant "indicate[s] now that he wishes to represent himself in this matter." In my opinion that was an unequivocal request made under *Faretta* v. *California*, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). If there was any doubt about that, it was incumbent on the court "to elicit that elevated degree of clarity through a detailed inquiry." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *State* v. *Flanagan*, 293 Conn. 406, 424, 978 A.2d 64 (2009).

I recognize that the trial court in this case did not have the benefit of our Supreme Court's decision in *Flanagan* at the time the defendant made his request for self-representation. Nonetheless, the request was clear enough to trigger the court's obligation to canvass the defendant in accordance with Practice Book § 44-3. I realize that this places an additional trial management burden on the court, but the right of self-representation is an important civil right guaranteed to all citizens by both the state and federal constitutions, which the *Flanagan* court found to be structural, requiring a new trial when a Practice Book § 44-3 canvass has not been made.

For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for a new trial. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.