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DiPENTIMA, C. J., concurring. I agree with most of the majority's thoughtful and well reasoned opinion affirming the conviction of the defendant, Rafael Medrano. My only point of departure with the reasoning of that decision is the conclusion, found in part II C, that the prosecutor improperly expressed her personal opinion that characterized the defendant as not credible. In my view, the prosecutor's comments did not amount to an impropriety, and therefore I would not engage in a due process analysis with respect to this claim.

The defendant elected to testify in his defense. He acknowledged that he previously had been convicted of larceny in the second degree in February, 2001. During cross-examination, the defendant admitted that he had failed to include this felony conviction on an employment application.

As stated in the majority opinion, the prosecutor argued to the jury that the defendant was not a credible person and that he demonstrated this lack of credibility by omitting the prior felony conviction from his employment application. In other words, there was evidence to support the prosecutor's assertion regarding the credibility of the defendant. I am in full agreement with the statement of the majority, with reference to *State v. Thompson*, 266 Conn. 440, 462, 832 A.2d 626 (2003), that a "prosecutor may not express her personal opinion that a witness is not credible." Our law, however, does permit a prosecutor to comment on the credibility of a witness "as long as the comment reflects reasonable inferences from the evidence adduced at trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Luster*, 279 Conn. 414, 440, 902 A.2d 636 (2006); see also *State v. Long*, 293 Conn. 31, 44, 975 A.2d 660 (2009); *State v. Kendall*, 123 Conn. App. 625, 646–47, 2 A.3d 990, cert. denied, 299 Conn. 902, 10 A.3d 521 (2010); *State v. Dawes*, 122 Conn. App. 303, 311, 999 A.2d 794, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 912, 4 A.3d 834 (2010); *State v. Wickes*, 72 Conn. App. 380, 388, 805 A.2d 142, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 914, 811 A.2d 1294 (2002). The prosecutor's comments during closing argument regarding the credibility of the defendant constituted comment on the evidence and argument regarding inferences that the jury could draw therefrom. I conclude, therefore, that the prosecutor's comments regarding the credibility of the defendant, as set forth in part II C of the majority opinion, were not improper. Accordingly, I respectfully concur with the result reached by my colleagues.
