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MIHALAKOS, J., dissenting in part. The majority concludes that it is necessary, for proper disposition of the claim by the defendant, William Aley, that the trial court was without sufficient evidence to render its financial orders for asset distribution and payment obligations, to remand the case for the court to articulate on two points, the value of the marital home and the defendant's gross and net earnings. Although I agree with the analysis set forth in parts I and II of the majority's opinion, I write separately because I respectfully disagree with the majority's decision to remand the matter for articulation.

"An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's orders [financial or otherwise] in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. . . . In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . We apply that standard of review because it reflects the sound policy that the trial court has the unique opportunity to view the parties and their testimony, and is therefore in the best position to assess all of the circumstances surrounding a dissolution action, including such factors as the demeanor and the attitude of the parties." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *Dombrowski v. Noyes-Dombrowski*, 273 Conn. 127, 132, 869 A.2d 164 (2005).

Although a court must consider all of the statutory factors for determining alimony and property distribution set forth in General Statutes §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82, respectively, our Supreme Court has emphasized that a court need not make explicit reference to the statutory criteria that it considered in making its decision or make express findings as to each statutory factor. *Dombrowski v. Noyes-Dombrowski*, supra, 273 Conn. 137. "It is axiomatic . . . that [t]he trier [of fact] is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the evidence offered by either party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Cushman v. Cushman*, 93 Conn. App. 186, 195, 888 A.2d 156 (2006); see also *Olson v. Olson*, 71 Conn. App. 826, 833, 804 A.2d 851 (2002).

The majority's decision to remand suggests its concern either that the court had no evidence of valuation and earnings, or that whatever evidence did exist was insufficient for the entry of its financial orders. That is not the case.

Regarding the distribution of the marital home, the court had before it the defendant's financial affidavit, which showed the value of the home, on which it was

entitled to rely in awarding the home to the plaintiff, Susan Aley. The court was not required to make explicit reference to the value it assigned to the marital home. Because only one estimate of value was presented to the court, it is clear that this is the value the court chose to adopt.

Moreover, the court had before it the defendant's financial affidavit and a child support guidelines worksheet showing the defendant's gross and net earnings and the child support to be paid by the defendant in accordance with those earnings. The court was entitled to accept whatever evidence was before it in determining net and gross income. The defendant's financial affidavit, which was a few months old, represented the defendant's gross weekly earnings as \$846.16 and net weekly earnings as \$657.16. The child support guidelines worksheet, in contrast, represented the defendant's gross weekly earnings to be \$904 and his net weekly earnings to be \$676. The court ordered the sum of \$139 to be paid by the defendant, which was the exact figure shown on the support guidelines worksheet. Although the court did not explicitly state that it found the gross and net earnings to be \$904 and \$676, respectively, it is clear from the court's orders that it chose to adopt the figures set forth in the child support worksheet because the amount of child support ordered, \$139, was identical to that set forth in the worksheet.

"When faced with the constraints of incomplete information, a court cannot be faulted for fashioning an award as equitably as possible under the circumstances." *Commissioner of Transportation v. Larobina*, 92 Conn. App. 15, 32, 882 A.2d 1265, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 931, 889 A.2d 816 (2005); see also *Brycki v. Brycki*, 91 Conn. App. 579, 591–92, 881 A.2d 1056 (2005). I believe that no articulation is necessary in the present case and that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the court's orders. For the reasons previously discussed, I respectfully dissent only as to the majority's remand for articulation and would affirm the judgment of the trial court.