McLACHLAN, J., concurring. I concur with the plurality reluctantly. I concur reluctantly because the majority opinion in *State* v. *Salamon*, 287 Conn. 509, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008), compels me to concur. Although I agree with the holding of *Salamon*, namely, that "to commit a kidnapping in conjunction with another crime, a defendant must intend to prevent the victim's liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that which is necessary to commit the other crime"; id., 542; I disagree with that portion of the analysis in which the court concluded that for more than thirty years, and in innumerable cases, the courts of this state, including this court, have misconstrued our kidnapping statutes. The discussion of legislative acquiescence in the dissent in *State* v. *Salamon*, supra, 595–601, convinces me that the courts of the state, including this court, had not misconstrued General Statutes § 53a-91 et seq. for a period of over thirty years. Thus, when the petitioner in the present case, Peter Luurtsema, was convicted of kidnapping in 2000, it was in accordance with the laws of this state, which had been consistently interpreted at that time for more than twenty years.

In *Salamon*, this court adopted a "new rule" expressly overruling the law in existence at the time of the petitioner's crime and conviction. Id., 542. As reasoned by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, "[t]o pretend that [past precedent] never existed or applied to any case simply to reach a desired result is disingenuous to the litigants, attorneys and . . . courts that were bound by those decisions." *State* v. *Lagundoye*, 268 Wis. 2d 77, 100, 674 N.W.2d 526 (2004). To date the United States Supreme Court has not required "new" interpretations of statutes to be applied retroactively in criminal cases, and I would not so provide. See *Fiore* v. *White*, 531 U.S. 225, 121 S. Ct. 712, 148 L. Ed. 2d 629 (2001). Although I would prefer to follow our long-standing principle of finality of judgments and would deny the petitioner the relief that he seeks, I am compelled to follow the precedent established by *Salamon*, and, accordingly, concur in the result.