ESPINOSA, J., concurring. Although I agree with the majority that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, I write separately to emphasize that, despite the majority's suggestion to the contrary in dictum, the present case does not provide support for the new rule adopted by this court in *State* v. *Pond*, 315 Conn. 451, A.3d (2015), namely, that in order for a defendant to be convicted of conspiracy in violation of General Statutes § 53a-48 (a), the state is required to prove that the defendant specifically intended that every element of the conspired offense be accomplished, even an element that itself carries no specific intent requirement. In my dissenting opinion in *Pond*, I observed that the new rule created by that decision would require the state to prove the existence of a formal or express agreement between the conspirators. Id., 497. The problem with that new rule, I explained, is that "[i]t is only in rare instances that conspiracy may be established by proof of an express agreement to unite to accomplish an unlawful purpose." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *State* v. *Lewis*, 220 Conn. 602, 607, 600 A.2d 1330 (1991). As I explain in my concurring opinion in the companion case released today, *State* v. *Danforth*, 315 Conn. 518, 538, A.3d (2015), the present case is one of those rare instances in which the state was able to provide evidence that the coconspirators actually sat down together prior to committing the crime that was the subject of the conspiracy and arrived at a "collective agreement" regarding its details, including the use of an airsoft pellet gun during the robbery. Accordingly, the present case illustrates the stringent burden now placed on the state by *Pond*, and should not be used as a representative example useful in establishing that the new rule set forth in *Pond* will be a workable one.

Accordingly, I concur.