STATE v. CHRISTOPHER SHAW, SC 18207

Judicial District of New Haven

 Criminal; Admissibility of Evidence Under Rape Shield Statute; Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence as Excited Utterance; Admissibility of Laboratory Report Through Analyst who did not Perform Test; Whether Witness was Properly Qualified as Expert; Whether Court Should have Charged Jury on Credibility of Child Witnesses. The defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault and risk of injury to a minor in connection with charges that he sexually assaulted an eleven year old girl.  The defendant was arrested after the victim’s mother, with whom the defendant lived, arrived home to find the defendant in bed with the victim.  The doctor who examined the victim that night claimed that the victim had injuries consistent with a sexual assault occurring within seventy-two hours prior to the examination.  On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly refused to admit evidence of sexual conduct by the victim under the rape shield statute, General Statutes § 54-86f.  Specifically, the defendant claims that the court should have admitted evidence that the victim engaged in sexual relations with her brother less than forty-eight hours prior to her medical examination.  The defendant argues that the evidence was admissible to rebut the inference that he caused the victim's injuries and to show that the victim had a motive for falsely accusing him.  The defendant also claims that evidence that the victim had previously made a false claim of sexual assault should have been admitted under § 54-86f.  Also on appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly admitted, under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay doctrine, testimony from the police officer who responded to the home on the night of the arrest concerning the victim's mother's statement that the defendant had raped the victim.  Among the defendant's other claims are that the trial court improperly allowed the doctor who examined the victim to testify  where it was never established that the doctor was qualified to give an expert opinion, improperly refused to instruct the jury on the credibility of child witnesses and improperly admitted a laboratory report containing the results of serology tests performed on the victim's underwear as a business record through an analyst who did not observe or perform the tests.