Copyright © 2002, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. All rights reserved.
Post Majority Child Support
(Dependent Disabled)
AN ACT PROVIDING DEPENDENT DISABLED SUPPORT PAYMENTS AND PERMITS
FOR BICYCLES WITH HELPER MOTORS
SUMMARY: By law, parents must support their children until they reach age 18. If the parents are divorced, legally separated, or have had their marriage annulled, the court can issue orders directing such support; and it can extend support for an unmarried child living at home until the child finishes high school or turns 19.
This act allows the court to order the payment of child support for any 18-, 19-, or 20-year-old who is mentally retarded or physically or mentally disabled, lives with a parent, and is primarily dependent on the parent for support. Judges do not have to follow the state's child support guidelines for these orders. Orders may be issued only for divorces, dissolutions, annulments, and legal separations entered after September 30, 1997, or as part of initial support orders entered after that date in cases involving parents who were never married.
The act also allows the commissioner of motor vehicles to issue a special permit to a qualified person allowing him to operate a bicycle with a helper motor without having to obtain the normally required motor vehicle operator's license. To qualify for such a special permit, the person must present a certificate from his licensed physician stating that he is physically disabled, but not blind, and that he is capable of riding a bicycle with a helper motor. He must also demonstrate that he can ride a bicycle both (1) without a helper motor on level terrain and (2) with a helper motor.
The commissioner can impose limitations on the permit designed to protect the holder's safety including the maximum speed of the motor. The person must carry the permit when operating the bicycle, follow any limitations on it, and renew it yearly.
Report on Bills Favorably Reported by Committee
Senate Vote Sequence Number 600
The Joint Committee on Judiciary held a public hearing on Substitute Senate Bill 417 on February 24, 1997 at which Senator Sullivan who sponsored the bill responded to questions from the other members of Joint Committee.
The bill was subsequently given a favorable report. The bill passed the Senate on May 7th. On June 4th the House passed the bill with Amendment Schedule A. On the same day the Senate passed the House amendment and the bill became Public Act 97-321.
It was signed by the Governor on July 10th.
P.A. 97-321 appears in Connecticut General Statutes:
Section 1 ........................................................ §46b-84 (c)
Section 2......................................................... §14-286
EDITOR: Donna Izbicki, Connecticut Judicial Branch, Law Library at Putnam, 155 Church Street, Putnam, CT 06260 (860) 928-3716 EMAIL
Title: AN ACT PROVIDING DEPENDENT DISABLED SUPPORT PAYMENTS AND PERMITS FOR BICYCLES WITH HELPER MOTORS.
Statement of Purpose:To authorize courts in marital dissolution proceedings to order support payments beyond the age of eighteen for any son or daughter with mental retardation or a mental or physical disability who is domiciled in the home of a parent and principally dependent on such parent for maintenance.
Bill History:
07-10 REF. TO JOINT COMM. ON Judiciary
07-10 JUD – VOTE TO DRAFT
07-10 DRAFTED BY COMMITTEE
07-10 REF. TO JOINT COMM. ON Judiciary
07-10 PUBLIC HEARING 02/24 (PH0224)
07-10 JUD – JOINT FAVORABLE SUBSTITUTE
07-10 FILED WITH LCO
07-10 REFERRED TO OLR, OFA
07-10 RPTD. OUT OF LCO
07-10 FAV. RPT., TAB. FOR CAL., SEN.
07-10 SENATE CALENDAR NUMBER 208
07-10 FILE NO. 324
07-10 SENATE PASSED
07-10 FAV. RPT., TAB. FOR CAL. HO.
07-10 HOUSE CALENDAR NUMBER 534
07-10 HO. ADOPTED HO. AMEND. SCH. A:LCO-10089
07-10 HO. PASSED, HO. AMEND. SCH. A
07-10 TRANSMITTED PURSUANT TO JOINT RULES.
07-10 D/A,TAB. FOR CAL., SEN.
07-10 RULES SUSPENDED
07-10 SEN. ADOPTED HO. AMEND. SCH. A
07-10 SEN. PASSED, HO. AMEND. SCH. A
07-10 PUBLIC ACT 97‑321
07-10 TRANS. SEC. OF STATE
07-10 SIGNED BY GOVERNOR
Co‑sponsors:
|
SEN. SULLIVAN, 5th DIST.REP. WIDLITZ, 98th DIST.REP. GARCIA, 128th DIST. |
REP. TERCYAK, 26th DIST.REP. PANARONI, 102nd DIST. |
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SENATOR SULLIVAN: Senator Williams, members of the Committee, I appreciate this opportunity to testify in support of SB417 which is on your hearing list today.
SB417 is a proposition which in fact has now been passed by the State Senate and perhaps even three times. My memory was a little bit unclear this morning in looking at the file. It has yet to find favor because I suspect it has not traveled in the full consideration of the Legislature yet, but we are hopeful that this would be the year.
In short, what it does, and your staff and research folks can confirm this, is it would bring Connecticut into conformance with a number of other states which have recognized an unfairness, if you will, in the granting of child support. And that is that this legislation would empower, though not require, the courts to award child support in cases of children with mental retardation of a mental or physical disability who have attained the age of 18, but who remain domiciled and principally dependent on one of the parents.
In effect, what this says is that one cannot escape the obligation which is, in often cases, lifetime
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obligation of support for people with extreme retardation and mental or physical disabilities in the case of a martial dissolution and make some fair provision in that dissolution for the life time support of these individuals.
As I indicated, it does not require the court to do so, but it would amend our law to allow, where the court is not permitted, allow the court to take this into consideration in marital dissolution actions.
I would recommend it to your attention as it has been adopted in other states. I believe it is fair and I believe it would be a significant help to those parents who are otherwise left with the life time burden of what was a two‑person relationship, but nonetheless, now becomes a one person obligation.
SEN. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Senator. Questions? Representative Farr.
REP. FARR: Yes, Senator. Just a quick question for you. I think the problem that has come up on these types of bills in the past is that if the parties are not divorced they are under no legal obligation to support their offspring who is now over the age of 18 and what happens under this bill is that because of the divorce, they may now be forced to have a legal obligation and I just wonder if you could reconcile that problem. I mean if the parties stay together, the court has no power to order them to provide any support for this child, but if they were to be divorced, suddenly there's an obligation that didn't exist before.
SEN. SULLIVAN: If I can, through the Chair, to Representative Farr, the obligation would be one imposed not unilaterally and automatically, but as one evaluates the conditions of the dissolution. I understand that point that since this person has attained the age of majority and the couple were to have stayed together would not otherwise have that obligation, that couple would at least have the opportunity as a couple to make a determination about the future care of that individual. Once the
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divorce has happened, that couple no longer has that opportunity, only one person has that opportunity, the one with whom the individual is domicile, the one whom upon the individual, usually a woman, by the way, must rely.
So what it simply says is that as we look at other things in the disposition of a long term relationship, we ought to look at the long term obligation to an individual who is, for all intent and purposes, going to remain dependent either on one or the other of the parents or, in the alternative, on the State of Connecticut.
So that we would do two things. I think we would look at equity, if not legal obligation and we would look at the fact that this is also a way of reducing the State's obligations over time.
REP. FARR: Okay. Thank you.
SEN. WILLIAMS: Other questions?
SEN. SULLIVAN: I thank the chairs.
SEN. UPSON: No, I want to –
SEN. WILLIAMS: Senator Upson.
SEN. UPSON: You peaked my interest, but I have – as you know, two years ago in '95 we passed, in the Senate and happily it didn't pass the House. Is the same type of ‑‑ is this the same wording as was '95 passed in the Senate?
SEN. SULLIVAN: Senator, I would only note, unhappily, it did not pass in the House and that happily we are going to have an opportunity to reconsider this ‑‑
SEN. UPSON: Thank you, but is it the same language? I don't mean to be rude, but –
SEN. SULLIVAN: It is one of two provisions of legislation that we passed in the Senate. You may recall the second introduced by Senator Fleming which dealt with life time support for higher
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education costs in the case of a stranded dependent. This is not that piece. It is the ‑‑
SEN. UPSON: Just for handicapped?
SEN. SULLIVAN: ‑‑ handicapped adult. Yes.
SEN. UPSON: Just for handicapped?
SEN. SULLIVAN: Yes.
SEN. UPSON: And is there –
SEN. SULLIVAN: A dependent domicile totally.
SEN. UPSON: Say that again.
SEN. SULLIVAN: Dependent totally. Domicile with. Handicapped.
SEN. UPSON: Handicapped. So that's the only one you are pushing this time, not majority ‑‑ not anything over 21. Just handicapped dependent?
SEN. SULLIVAN: That's correct, in this legislation, sir.
SEN. UPSON: And Senator Sullivan, how long would that last? In other words, is there any age ‑‑ there is no age or it is through the majority to 21?
SEN. SULLIVAN: Equitable determination of the court in awarding dissolutions ‑‑ in the dissolution proceeding as other things are now.
SEN. UPSON: Is there anything we can do in the case, assuming that you are correct and we should do that and I understand where you are coming from, what would happen ‑‑ so we have a divorce action. Let's say someone is 15 years old. We have a divorce action or dissolution as they call it, although everyone calls it divorce. Dissolution action. And that would be part of the negotiation process?
SEN. SULLIVAN: It would be if the court chose an equity to open up the proceedings to consider the award of extended benefits ‑‑ sorry, extended child support
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beyond the age of majority.
SEN. UPSON: Alright. And then ‑‑ there's no cut off date or cut off time for age. Correct?
SEN. SULLIVAN: That is correct. The presumption is ‑‑ in fact, the fact is that this individual, as described, will remain forever dependent on someone, if not of the two parents, then on the public.
SEN. UPSON: And what would the criteria be? Right now we have ‑‑ when we consider alimony, you would consider if someone could work and if somebody could ‑‑ how long they are married and all that. What would the criteria be? Just normal support criteria?
SEN. SULLIVAN: I think it would be an assessment of the present costs of maintenance and support for that child. Some sort of estimate as to how those might vary over time. I suspect as this practice occurred in dissolution after dissolution, although it would be fairly rare circumstances. Nonetheless, as it occurred some base lines would begin to be established as to what's a reasonable expectation of life time support. But we are, I should be fair in saying that we are talking about, in these cases, life time support in as much as there is no expectation that this individual has the capacity to live independently.
SEN. UPSON: Now, using support guidelines, let's say that someone is in ‑‑ let's say the parents' income is $1,000 and $700 is the husband's and $300 is the wife's. The wife would then have 30% obligation also. Do you ‑‑ you understand. So you are obligating both parties in the future. What if someone had temporarily been on the State and the State also and there was an arrearage ‑‑ the State also would be a party in some cases if a person is institutionalized or if one of the parties had been on welfare and there was ‑‑ I don't mean welfare, whatever you want to call it, State welfare, I guess. And there was an arrearage, they still would be included in that divorce – dissolution action?
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SEN. SULLIVAN: If the individual is not domicile with the parent prior ‑‑
SEN. UPSON: Well, let's say –
SEN. SULLIVAN: ‑‑ you said institutionalized.
SEN. UPSON: Alright. Let's ‑‑ let's get off that. I will get off that.
Right now if there is a dissolution, and if one of the parties had been on welfare or AFDC or whatever it is, that has to be listed and the State becomes a party. Even if there is just an arrearage and there is not current ‑‑ the person currently isn't receiving state aid, would the State become a party to this action because we are trying to alleviate State costs? I don't know, maybe not.
SEN. SULLIVAN: I assume –
SEN. UPSON: I am thinking aloud with you.
SEN. SULLIVAN: I'm not sure what you are asking. If you are asking if welfare or public benefits are involved in caring for this individual then it would be subject to the same standards as current law when there are –
SEN. UPSON: Correct.
SEN. SULLIVAN: ‑‑ past public benefits engaged. It would be no different.
SEN. UPSON: Alright. I am just thinking aloud with you. I guess I have one more question.
I'm not saying that it is not a laudable thing that you want to do in this case. Then what happens and I think you were asked this by Representative Farr, what happens with parents who don't get divorced and why should we ‑‑ I am assuming you asked this ‑ ‑ and why should that be a different burden or a different obligation?
SEN. SULLIVAN: I think the answer that I would try to offer again is one that I attempted to offer to
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Representative Farr. When a couple remains a couple and share an obligation, you are correct that there is not a legal duty beyond adulthood of the individual. On the other hand, there is an opportunity for two individuals to consider what to do and what obligation to take.
Following a dissolution there is not an opportunity for two individuals to consider anything. One of those parents in all likelihood has obtained permanent custody and responsibility for that child and the other parent has no further obligation. So I think there is a difference in fact in practice.
SEN. UPSON: But what ‑‑ as you know, in a dissolution the judge makes the final decision. And I've had cases where you go before a judge and the judge refuses the alimony agreement saying it is not reasonable, let's say, and both parties have agreed to it. And what if, in a case such as this, they do not have an agreement over this child or they do have an agreement over the child and let's say they have no agreement and let's say neither party has considered this child. A judge could say you must consider it and you must offer support for the rest of the child's life?
SEN. SULLIVAN: I think in principle, the proposal before you suggests that the court may do that either as the issue is raised between the parties to a dissolution or, as you suggest, by the court itself. If you are troubled by the latter prospect, I suppose you could deal with that by not making that an option.
SEN. UPSON: I am not troubled. I am just thinking aloud with you if you don't ‑‑ just to –
SEN. SULLIVAN: Right. I think it's a distinguishable ‑ ‑ it's a distinction and maybe it ‑‑
SEN. UPSON: Nor am I trying to kill this idea. I think it's an interesting idea. I am just trying to go through the whole –
SEN. SULLIVAN: I suspect we could look a little bit at
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other jurisdictions which have had this body of practice for some time and determine how they have applied it as well. We would be happy to help the committee do that.
SEN. UPSON: It is interesting though because as I said, a judge can make a decision on his own or her own, on alimony no matter what the parties come up with. And we would give the same leeway now in a case of a handicapped ‑‑ what's the definition? Handicapped child, you say?
SEN. SULLIVAN: Permanently disabled ‑‑
SEN. UPSON: Permanently disabled.
SEN. SULLIVAN: ‑‑ dependent domiciled.
SEN. UPSON: But on the other hand, are parents legally obligated ‑‑ this is my last question ‑‑ on the other ‑‑ parents who are not getting divorced. Are they legally obligated with the State to provide the means to pay for this person's disability as if they ‑‑ for their medicals or their other needs?
SEN. SULLIVAN: No. I think you know that in the case of an adult, disabled, including permanently disabled and domiciled, there is no legal obligation. The State does provide relief and assistance in some cases. But that goes back to your prior question, Senator, and that is what's different about this and the difference is that you have a stranded dependent in the case of a dissolution reliant upon one party to that former marriage. The other party no longer present or in any fashion, obligated to care.
SEN. UPSON: Okay. So it would only be a dependent whose under age 18, I take it? Correct?
SEN. SULLIVAN: No. When you say ‑‑
SEN. UPSON: If I got divorced and I had a 19 year old. Would that also –
SEN. SULLIVAN: Yup.
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SEN. UPSON: ‑‑ be subject ‑‑ oh, so it's any – no matter what –
SEN. SULLIVAN: Yup.
SEN. UPSON: ‑‑ the age is?
SEN. SULLIVAN: The deal ‑‑ because you have the obligation below 18 now since the child is involved. So of course ‑‑
SEN. UPSON: But –
SEN. SULLIVAN: ‑‑ over 18.
SEN. UPSON: Correct. But if my child is 19, would that also be subject to this?
SEN. SULLIVAN: That's the point, yes.
SEN. UPSON: No. I mean 19 at the time of the dissolution.
SEN. SULLIVAN: That's the point.
SEN. UPSON: Alright.
SEN. SULLIVAN: That is one of the points.
SEN. UPSON: Okay. Thank you very much.
SEN. SULLIVAN: Thank you.
SEN. WILLIAMS: Senator Kissel.
SEN. KISSEL: Welcome, Senator Sullivan. I just want to say it's a pleasure. I think there is a lot of merit to your proposal. I see it as a way that the State could indeed save money in the future if there was individual involved in one of these dissolution actions that had the financial where with all to take care of one of these children. They may try to not shoulder that responsibility unless a court imposed its will and allowed that to take place. And also, for an individual that might find themselves shouldering a portion of the financial responsibility and would also allow them
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into the future to have input as to issues regarded with that children so it is not just negative things into the future, but there would be positive things as well.
I would ask that when you provide this committee with information regarding other jurisdictions that have passed this, as someone on this committee who is sympathetic to your proposal, if I could be included on that list, it would be most beneficial.
Thank you.
SEN. SULLIVAN: Senator, I think you make a good point that I did not make, in another argument in support of this, and you may be assured that at least when we provide information to committees, we provide it to everybody.
SEN. WILLIAMS: Representative O'Neill.
REP. O'NEILL: You said in your testimony that the idea here was that it was supposed to be a permanent disability. Is that what you wanted this to say because that's not in the copy that I have in front of me.
SEN. SULLIVAN: The language of the prior amendment passed, as I indicated, two or three times, indicates the court may make appropriate orders of support of any child with mental retardation or a mental or physical disability who has attained the age of 18, who is domiciled in the home of a parent, and is principally dependent upon such parent for maintenance.
REP. O'NEILL: That's the language that is in front of me right now, ‑‑
SEN. SULLIVAN: Right.
REP. O'NEILL: ‑‑ but there's no mention of the word "permanence" in there.
SEN. SULLIVAN: I think that when we are talking about mental retardation, in particular, we are talking about a condition which is not likely to change.
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REP. O'NEILL: Well that usually is true of mental retardation, but not necessarily of a physical disability or a mental disability. Mental retardation, I am pretty sure, has a definition in the statute. I am not so sure about mental or physical disability. Do you know if there are free standing other definitions that would import some knowledge to that?
SEN. SULLIVAN: There are in ‑‑ Representative, in both the statutes dealing with mental illness and physical disability under Social Services, under Education. I cannot testify fairly to you this morning whether those are consistent and clear. I do think you raise a good point in terms of being more careful with the permanency which is not reflected in this language of the mental or physical disability. This is not a temporary condition that may result in permanent support for a temporary condition. So I think that's a fair point.
REP. O'NEILL: Well, child support is always modifiable so somebody could come back in and say that things have changed.
SEN. SULLIVAN: Right.
REP. O'NEILL: The other thing that ‑‑ and apparently this has been recurring in the versions of this thing which is the use of the word, "domicile" as opposed to the word, "residence" which is if you look ‑‑ well, you don't perhaps have it in front of you, but the rest of the statute that this would become a part of refers generally to the residence of the child being with one parent or the other.
Domicile, as I understand it, really is a concept of where you happen to have your sort of legal address, but you could live some place else and still be domicile in a particular location. I guess what I am driving at is, is the domicile there for the purpose of using that the way it is normally used, or is that supposed to be "residence"?
SEN. SULLIVAN: I have learned, after ten or so years of
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this place, do not take too much pride in words and to offer the committee the opportunity, I think, to craft the correct language. I believe that domicile was chosen with a purpose, the purpose you indicate. However, I think that in reflection, the word, "residence with the parent" is probably more to the point because what we are trying to get after is the circumstance where that individual is in place, is dependent, is not somewhere else, and is, indeed, being cared for and taken care of by that parent.
REP. O'NEILL: Thank you.
SEN. WILLIAMS: Other questions? Thank you very much, Senator Sullivan.
SEN. SULLIVAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REPORT ON BILLS FAVORABLY REPORTED BY COMMITTEE
COMMITTEE: Judiciary
File No.:
Bill No.: SB-417
PH Date: 02/24/97
Action/Date: JFS 3/31/97
Change of Reference:
TITLE OF BILL:
AN ACT PROVIDING DEPENDENT DISABLED SUPPORT PAYMENTS.
SPONSORS OF BILL:
JUDICIARY (SEN. SULLIVAN)
REASONS FOR BILL:
SENATE BILL 417 AUTHORIZES COURTS IN DIVORCE CASES TO ORDER SUPPORT PAYMENTS FOR A CHILD WITH MENTAL RETARDATION OR A MENTAL OR PHYSICAL DISABILITY UNTIL THAT CHILD REACHES THE AGE OF 21.
THE ORIGINAL BILL ALLOWED CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT BEYOND THE AGE OF 18.
SENATOR UPSON OFFERED AN AMENDMENT TO THE BILL THAT REMOVED THE SECTION ON DIVORCE. THE MOTION PROPOSED TO MAKE ALL PEOPLE, REGARDLESS OF DIVORCE, FINANCIALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR MENTALLY HANDICAPPED CHILDREN TILL THE AGE OF 21. THE MOTION WAS SECONDED BY REP. WINKLER. THE MOTION FAILED IN A ROLL CALL VOTE: 9 YEA, 23 NAY, 9 ABSENT
REPRESENTATIVE O'NEILL OFFERED AN AMENDMENT TO THE BILL THAT CHANGED THE WORDS "IS DOMICILED" IN THE 3RD LINE OF THE SUBSTITUTE LANGUAGE TO "RESIDES." THE MOTION WAS SECONDED BY REP. DANDROW. THE MOTION PASSED ON A VOICE VOTE.
REPRESENTATIVE HAMZY OFFERED AN AMENDMENT THAT WOULD PUT A REFERENCE IN THIS BILL TO THE CURRENT STATUTORY DEFINITION OF MENTAL RETARDATION. THE MOTION WAS SECONDED BY REP. CAPPIELLO.
THE MOTION PASSED ON A VOICE VOTE.
RESPONSE FROM ADMINISTRATION/AGENCY:
STATE SENATOR KEVIN SULLIVAN: SENATE BILL 417 ALLOWS, BUT DOES NOT REQUIRE, THE COURTS TO AWARD CHILD SUPPORT BEYOND THE AGE OF 18 FOR CHILDREN WITH MENTAL RETARDATION. THIS BILL CORRECTS AN UNFAIRNESS IN THE GRANTING OF CHILD SUPPORT BY RECOGNIZING THAT MENTALLY HANDICAPPED CHILDREN MAY NOT BE ABLE TO SUPPORT THEMSELVES AS SOON AS MOST CHILDREN. IN FACT, THEY MAY NEVER BE ABLE TO SUPPORT THEMSELVES.
NATURE AND SOURCES OF SUPPORT:
NONE
NATURE AND SOURCES OF OPPOSITION:
NONE
Connecticut General Assembly
January Session, A.D., 1997
AN ACT PROVIDING DEPENDENT DISABLED SUPPORT PAYMENTS.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:
Section 46b-84 of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof:
(a) Upon or subsequent to the annulment or dissolution of any marriage or the entry of a decree of legal separation or divorce, the parents of a minor child of the marriage, shall maintain the child according to their respective abilities, if the child is in need of maintenance.
(b) If there is an unmarried child of the marriage who has attained the age of eighteen, is a full-time high school student and resides with a parent, the parents shall maintain the child according to their respective abilities if the child is in need of maintenance until such time as such child completes the
twelfth grade or attains the age of nineteen, whichever first occurs. The provisions of this subsection shall apply only in cases where the decree of dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment is entered on or after July 1, 1994.
(c) THE COURT MAY MAKE APPROPRIATE ORDERS OF SUPPORT OF ANY CHILD WITH MENTAL RETARDATION, AS DEFINED IN SECTION 1‑1g, OR A MENTAL DISABILITY OR PHYSICAL DISABILITY, AS DEFINED IN SUBDIVISION (15) OF SECTION 46a-51, WHO RESIDES WITH A PARENT AND IS PRINCIPALLY DEPENDENT UPON SUCH PARENT FOR MAINTENANCE UNTIL SUCH CHILD ATTAINS THE AGE OF TWENTY‑ONE. THE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 46b‑215a SHALL NOT APPLY TO ORDERS ENTERED UNDER THIS SUBSECTION. THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SUBSECTION SHALL APPLY ONLY IN CASES WHERE THE DECREE OF DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE, LEGAL SEPARATION OR ANNULMENT IS ENTERED ON OR AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUBSECTION OR WHERE THE INITIAL SUPPORT ORDERS IN ACTIONS NOT CLAIMING ANY SUCH DECREE ARE ENTERED ON OR AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ACT.
[(c)] (d) In determining whether a child is in need of maintenance and, if in need, the respective abilities of the parents to provide such maintenance and the amount thereof, the court shall consider the age, health, station, occupation, earning capacity, amount and sources of income, estate, vocational skills and employability of each of the parents, and the age, health, station, occupation, educational status and expectation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of the child.
[(d)] (e) At any time at which orders are entered in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, annulment, legal separation, custody, or support, whether before, at the time of, or after entry of a decree or judgment, if health insurance coverage for a child is ordered by the court to be maintained, the court shall provide in the order that (1) the signature of the custodial parent or custodian of the insured dependent shall constitute a valid authorization to the insurer for purposes of processing an insurance reimbursement payment to the provider of the medical services, to the custodial parent or to the custodian, (2) neither parent shall prevent or interfere with the timely processing of any insurance reimbursement claim and (3) if the parent receiving an insurance reimbursement payment is not the parent or custodian who is paying the bill for the services of the medical provider, the parent receiving such insurance reimbursement payment shall promptly pay to the parent or custodian paying such bill any insurance reimbursement for such services. For purposes of subdivision (1), the custodial parent or custodian is responsible for providing the insurer with a certified copy of the order of dissolution or other order requiring maintenance of insurance for a child provided if such custodial parent or custodian fails to provide the insurer with a copy of such order, the Commissioner of Social Services may provide the insurer with a copy of such order. Such insurer may thereafter rely on such order and is not responsible for inquiring as to the legal sufficiency of the order. The custodial parent or custodian shall be responsible for providing the insurer with a certified copy of any order which materially alters the provision of the original order with respect to the maintenance of insurance for a child. If presented with an insurance reimbursement claim signed by the custodial parent or custodian, such insurer shall reimburse the provider of the medical services, if payment is to be made to such provider under the policy, or shall otherwise reimburse the custodial parent or custodian.
[(e)] (f) After the granting of a decree annulling or dissolving the marriage or ordering a legal separation, and upon complaint or motion with order and summons made to the Superior Court by either parent or by the Commissioner of Administrative Services in any case arising under subsection (a) or (b) of this section, the court shall inquire into the child's need of maintenance and the respective abilities of the parents to supply maintenance. The court shall make and enforce the decree for the maintenance of the child as it considers just, and may direct security to be given therefor, including an order to either party to contract with a third party for periodic payments or payments contingent on a life to the other party. The court may order either parent to name any child who is subject to the provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of this section as a beneficiary of any medical or dental insurance or benefit plan carried by such parent or available to such parent on a group basis through an employer or a union.
[(f)] (g) Whenever an obligor is before the court in proceedings to establish, modify or enforce a support order, and such order is not secured by a wage garnishment, the court may require the obligor to execute a bond or post other security sufficient to perform such order for support, provided the court finds that such a bond is available for purchase within the financial means of the obligor. Upon failure of such obligor to comply with such support order, the court may order the bond or the security forfeited and the proceeds thereof paid to the state in AFDC cases or to the obligee in non-AFDC cases.
JUD COMMITTEE VOTE: YEA 29 NAY 7 JFS
May 7, 1997
CITE AS: 40 S. Proc., Pt.5, 1997 Sess., p. ____ .
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THE CLERK: Calendar 208, File 324, Substitute for SB417 An Act Providing Dependent Disabled Support Payments.
Favorable Committee Report from Judiciary.
THE CHAIR: Senator Williams.
SEN. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Madam President. Madam President, I
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move adoption of the Joint Committee's Favorable Report and passage of the bill.
THE CHAIR: The question is on passage. Will you remark?
SEN. WILLIAMS: Yes. Madam President, under current law, parents must support their children up to age 18. What this bill would do, would allow a court to order additional support payments through the age of 21 for any child residing with a parent who is either mentally retarded or physically or mentally disabled.
And that is the essence of the bill, Madam President.
THE CHAIR: The question is on passage. Will you remark further? Senator Freedman.
SEN. FREEDMAN: Yes, through you, Madam President, a question to the proponent.
THE CHAIR: Please proceed.
SEN. FREEDMAN: Does this now make these parents that keep their parents at home legally liable for their costs that are incurred through the Department of Mental Retardation
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if they're receiving services from that agency?
THE CHAIR: Senator Williams.
SEN. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Madam President. In terms of liability to the Department, I'm not sure of the specifics of this question.
What this bill permits is for parents of the child to be responsible for support payments in the same way that parents of a child are now responsible for support payments up to the age of 18. It merely allows that responsibility to go forward to age 21, the responsibility of the parent to pay support in the case of mentally retarded or physically or mentally disabled child living with the parent.
In terms of liability of either parent to the state, it's my understanding this bill does not contain any provisions in that regard. Through you, Madam President.
THE CHAIR: Senator Freedman.
SEN. FREEDMAN: Yes, thank you, Madam President. I believe it's my understanding that currently under legally liable relatives, it's up to age 18. Now when support comes
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in, and I'm assuming it's through divorce or whatever the situation may be, the state would not be able to go after those funds through the divorced parent that is receiving it for that child. Through you, Madam President.
THE CHAIR: Senator Williams.
SEN. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Madam President. I'm unaware that this would change the law in that regard.
THE CHAIR: Senator Freedman.
SEN. FREEDMAN: Thank you, Madam President.
THE CHAIR: Thank you. Will you remark further? Senator Sullivan.
SEN. SULLIVAN: Thank you, Madam President. First let me thank Senator Williams for bringing the bill forward. Let me also join him in assuring Senator Freedman that there is no impact on the issue that she has raised.
And third, let me thank Senator Upson for supporting at least this limited step. I know he has had concerns in the past. I would go much farther and
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have gone much farther on this amendment. I think this is a fair compromise. It reaches the age in which we deal with a total disability for young people below the age of 21.
It gives us also, a step I think, to see how this does work out in the courts before proceeding as far as some of us might want and I'm pleased that we're able to take this vote today.
THE CHAIR: Thank you, Senator. Will you remark further? Senator Cook.
SEN. COOK: Thank you, Madam President. I rise in support of this bill as well. One of the matters that I've come very close to lately is the high divorce rate among parents of children with disabilities. It approaches 80%.
Now, that is a very difficult statistic to live with. It's one that I do live with and I think it is entirely appropriate that the state recognize that children with disabilities who do go, and they go to our public schools through the age of 21, deserve to have support from their divorcing parents through those years that they're going to be attending public school and I support this bill. Thank you.
1668
THE CHAIR: Thank you, Senator Cook. Will you remark further? Will you remark further? Senator Upson.
SEN. UPSON: Thank you, Madam President. Thank you, Senator Sullivan and Senator Williams and Senator Cook. I will support this bill and they know that. I think one of the problems I have in my short lifetime, we've changed the majority age from 21 to 18, so that when divorces or dissolutions, whatever you want to call it, occurred in the past, people were responsible and they should be responsible.
I believe that people should be responsible for their children through college, not just through high school or 19 as the law provides.
One of the bills I tried to add or amendment add on to make sure that married people have the same responsibilities and divorced people. One of the problems I have with this bill is that it singles out people who are divorced and makes them a greater responsibility on their part than it does for people who are married. And I realize that and as Senator Nickerson said, which way do you want us to vote? He didn't really say that, but how do you think I should vote on this and I still favor, obviously, the fact
1669
someone has mental retardation, it's a special case, so to speak, it needs special care.
Number two, I think it should apply to everybody, not just divorced people. But, it's a case where people do have control over the parties. They are in front of a judge and I guess it is appropriate that these people with special needs are going to be protected by law through the age of 21.
So I congratulate Senator Sullivan and I know Senator Fleming also was interested in this even though on a much broader basis in 1995 and I do, though, caution that we're, we proceed opening up the flood gates, so to speak, because I don't think divorced people should have to provide a different, have a different responsibility than those people who are not divorced. Thank you very much.
THE CHAIR: Thank you, Senator. Will you remark further? Senator Williams.
SEN. WILLIAMS: Yes, Madam President. And I'd just like to comment on Senator Upson's point which is an excellent one. I would note that this does apply not only to those who have been divorced, but also to those who never married and on line 35 of the bill after all the
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language about those who have gone through a divorce, or were the initial support orders in actions not claiming such decree are entered. So it does apply in those cases as well and that's certainly a good concern for Senator Upson.
If there's no objection, Madam President, I would move this to a Consent Calendar.
THE CHAIR: Motion is to refer this item to the Consent Calendar. Senator Upson.
SEN. UPSON: If I may just for legislative history to Senator Williams, ask for a definition of physical disability because we're saying, I believe it's mentally retarded, mentally handicapped, I've forgotten the language.
But what is the, for the benefit of legislative history, what is a physical disability, someone who's in a wheelchair or what kind of gravity, through you, Madam President.
THE CHAIR: Senator Williams.
SEN. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Madam President. The bill does reference our current Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities' definition for physical and mental
1671
disability and that is specifically, includes mental retardation, physical disability as defined in that particular statute.
There is further definition. Handicapped is defined in the Federal Fair Housing Act, and that act defines the handicapped as either one, a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits life activities, two, a record of having such an impairment or three, being regarded as having such an impairment.
And for legislative purposes, it specifically does not include abuse of controlled substances.
THE CHAIR: Senator Upson.
SEN. UPSON: Yes, through you, Madam President, again, for legislative history, what if somebody gets divorced and the person, the children reach age 18 and thereafter, or 19 as we say, and thereafter are physically handicapped or mentally retarded. What would the, would you be able to open up a judgment to go until 21, what's the cut‑off date here?
THE CHAIR: Senator Williams.
SEN. WILLIAMS: Madam President –
1672
SEN. UPSON: Again, I'm not trying to put you on the spot –
THE CHAIR: Senator Upson.
SEN. UPSON: -- just for legislative history.
THE CHAIR: Senator Williams.
SEN. WILLIAMS: I believe, Madam President, that as it is written, it applies, at the time that the decree of dissolution of marriage is entered, or in the case where there is no marriage, at the time of initial support orders, that I believe is the time, Madam President, through you.
THE CHAIR: Senator Upson.
SEN. UPSON: Through you Madam President. So, of course support orders are continually open until they're paid off or until someone reaches age 18. You're suggesting to me, then, that only if at the time of initial, let's say the divorce, okay, back up if I may. Excuse me, Madam President.
Initial divorce, a divorce decree provides for, if
1673
you have a mentally retarded or handicapped child, at that time then it would pertain to age 21. However, what if there's no divorce, what if, for example, as you said, there are people who have been living together and have a child. That's an ongoing, there's no dissolution, that's an ongoing process. So would that continue if a child becomes handicapped or disabled, or mentally retarded at age 19 or 20, would they still be obligated? I'm just talking about the people who never got married by law, common law marriage so to speak. I guess I have two questions for you there.
THE CHAIR: Senator Williams.
SEN. WILLIAMS: Through you, Madam President, as I read the language in the statute here, I don't believe those questions are specifically addressed.
It would appear that if you had an order of support prior to the age of 18, and there were a mental deficiency of some sort that were to arise at that time, that that would be, it would be appropriate then to move to continue support beyond age 18.
If, however, and I believe your questions is addressing the situation if there's an order of support
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through age 18 and the child reaches the age of majority and there is no longer a support order in effect at that time and a mental deficiency occurs, say at age 20, I do not see guidance in this statute to answer that particular question.
THE CHAIR: Senator Upson.
SEN. UPSON: So, through you, Madam President, for the legislative history then, we're stating that the disability whether it be mental, retardation, mental or physical disability, has to occur before the child reaches age 18 or 19 to graduate from high school to be effective, it cannot happen after those dates. Through you, Madam President.
THE CHAIR: Senator Williams.
SEN. WILLIAMS: Through you, Madam President. Thank you, Madam President. Through you, Madam President, that also is not clear in this statute, Senator Upson. It is not stated that that would be the case, that there is an absolute cut‑off if any mental deficiency has not manifested itself by age 18.
THE CHAIR:
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Senator Upson.
SEN. UPSON: I'm not trying to slow down business and I would ask Senator Sullivan and Senator Williams if we could, I think it's a mistake to send this out and have a problem with the courts if we could maybe produce an amendment or something just so that's clear. I don't mean to, again, I'm in favor of this. I'm just trying to, when does it stop, that's all. Through you, Madam President.
THE CHAIR: Senator Williams.
SEN. WILLIAMS: Madam President, I understand Senator Upson's questions and I've answered them such as the statute presents itself.
THE CHAIR: Senator Upson.
SEN. UPSON: Would you pass this and we can prepare an amendment just so it's very clear what the cut‑off date is? Through you, Madam President.
THE CHAIR: Senator Upson, did you put that in the form of a motion?
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SEN. UPSON: Yes, I would like to, I'd like to, Senator, if I could for just a minute.
THE CHAIR: The Chamber will stand at ease for a moment, please. Senator Upson.
SEN. UPSON: Yes, through you, Madam President, for legislative history again, to Senator Williams. If a child, I shouldn't say a child, an adult? Well, an adult, I guess, has reached age, has either graduated from high school or reach age 18 or graduate from high school, would this apply if that disability as defined in the statute, those individual disabilities apply, would a divorced parent be responsible? Through you, Madam President.
THE CHAIR: Senator Williams.
SEN. WILLIAMS: Thank you. Through you, Madam President. Yes. Having had a chance to chat with the sponsor, Senator Sullivan, of this bill, even though the statutory language before us is not absolutely clear, for legislative history purposes, it would be the intent of this act to allow a support action if a mental
1677
infirmity presented itself after age 18 but before age 21.
THE CHAIR: Senator Upson.
SEN. UPSON: Thank you very much. Not just mental but physical infirmity, etc?
THE CHAIR: Senator Williams.
SEN. WILLIAMS: That's correct.
THE CHAIR: Senator Upson.
SEN. UPSON: Thank you very much, Madam President. Senator Williams.
SEN. WILLIAMS: With that clarification, Madam President, I would move this to the Consent Calendar.
THE CHAIR: Without objection, so ordered.
SB‑417 Sequence Number 195
The following is the result of the vote at 6:24 p.m.:
Total Number Voting.................................................................................. 36
Necessary for Adoption............................................................................ 19
Those voting Yea...................................................................................... 36
Those voting Nay........................................................................................ 0
Those absent and not voting.................................................................... 0
The following is the roll call vote:
Y 10 TONI N. HARP Y 28 FRED H. LOVEGROVE, JR.
Y 11 MARTIN M. LOONEY Y 29 DONALD E. WILLIAMS, JR.
LCO No. 10089
General Assembly
January Session, A.D., 1997
Offered by REP. WARD, 86th DIST.
SEN. ANISKOVICH, 12th DIST.
To Subst. Senate Bill No. 417 File No. 324 Cal No. 534
Entitled: "AN ACT PROVIDING DEPENDENT DISABLED SUPPORT PAYMENTS."
In line 1, before "Section", insert "Section 1."
After line 131, insert the following:
"Sec. 2. Section 14-286 of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof:
(a) Each person operating a bicycle upon and along a sidewalk or across any roadway upon and along a crosswalk shall yield the right‑of‑way to any pedestrian and shall give an audible signal within a reasonable distance before overtaking and passing a pedestrian. Each person operating a bicycle upon a roadway shall within a reasonable distance give an audible signal before overtaking and passing a pedestrian or another bicycle operator.
No person shall operate a bicycle upon or along a sidewalk or across a roadway upon and along a crosswalk if such operation is prohibited by any ordinance of any city, town or borough or by any regulation of the State Traffic Commission issued or adopted pursuant to the provisions of section 14-298.
(b) No person shall ride a bicycle with a helper motor unless that person holds a valid motor vehicle operator's license or motorcycle operator's license. No person shall operate a bicycle with a helper motor at a rate of speed exceeding thirty miles per hour; nor shall any bicycle with a helper motor be operated on any sidewalk, limited access highway or turnpike.
(c) (1) NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROVISIONS OF SUBSECTION (b) OF THIS SECTION, THE COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES MAY ISSUE TO A PERSON WHO DOES NOT HOLD A VALID OPERATOR'S LICENSE A SPECIAL PERMIT THAT AUTHORIZES SUCH PERSON TO RIDE A BICYCLE WITH A HELPER MOTOR IF (A) SUCH PERSON PRESENTS TO THE COMMISSIONER A CERTIFICATE BY A PHYSICIAN LICENSED TO PRACTICE MEDICINE IN THIS STATE THAT SUCH PERSON IS PHYSICALLY DISABLED, AS DEFINED IN SECTION 1‑1f, OTHER THAN BLIND, AND THAT, IN THE PHYSICIAN'S OPINION, SUCH PERSON IS CAPABLE OF RIDING A BICYCLE WITH A HELPER MOTOR, AND (B) SUCH PERSON DEMONSTRATES TO THE COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES THAT HE IS ABLE TO RIDE A BICYCLE (i) WITHOUT A HELPER MOTOR ON LEVEL TERRAIN, AND (ii) WITH A HELPER MOTOR. (2) SUCH PERMIT MAY CONTAIN LIMITATIONS THAT THE COMMISSIONER DEEMS ADVISABLE FOR THE SAFETY OF SUCH PERSON AND FOR THE PUBLIC SAFETY, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE MAXIMUM SPEED OF THE HELPER MOTOR SUCH PERSON MAY USE. NO PERSON WHO HOLDS A VALID SPECIAL PERMIT UNDER THIS SUBSECTION SHALL OPERATE A BICYCLE WITH A HELPER'S MOTOR IN VIOLATION OF ANY LIMITATIONS IMPOSED IN THE PERMIT. ANY PERSON TO WHOM A SPECIAL PERMIT IS ISSUED SHALL CARRY THE PERMIT AT ALL TIMES WHILE OPERATING THE BICYCLE WITH A HELPER'S MOTOR. EACH PERMIT ISSUED UNDER THIS SUBSECTION SHALL EXPIRE ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE OF ISSUANCE.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of any statute or regulation to the contrary, the State Traffic Commission shall adopt regulations in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54 determining the conditions and circumstances under which bicycle traffic may be permitted on those bridges in the state on limited access highways which it designates to be safe for bicycle traffic. Bicycle traffic shall not be prohibited on any such bridges under such conditions and circumstances.
(e) [The term] AS USED IN THIS SECTION: (1) "sidewalk" [, as used in this section, shall mean] MEANS any sidewalk laid out as such by any town, city or borough, and any walk which is reserved by custom for the use of pedestrians, or which has been specially prepared for their use. [It shall] "SIDEWALK" DOES not include crosswalks [, nor shall it include] AND DOES NOT INCLUDE footpaths on portions of public highways outside thickly settled parts of towns, cities and boroughs, which are worn only by travel and are not improved by such towns, cities or boroughs or by abutters; [. The term] (2) "bicycle" [, as used in this section,] includes all vehicles propelled by the person riding the same by foot or hand power or a helper motor; AND (3) "HELPER MOTOR" MEANS A MOTOR having a capacity of less than fifty cubic centimeters piston displacement, [and] rated not more than two brake horsepower, [and] capable of a maximum speed of no more than thirty miles per hour and equipped with automatic transmission.
(f) Any person who pleads not guilty of violation of any of the provisions of this section shall be prosecuted within fifteen days of such plea.
[(b)] (g) No person may operate a high-mileage vehicle defined in section 14-1 on any sidewalk, limited access highway or turnpike.
[(c)] (h) Violation of any provision of this section shall be an infraction."
SB‑417 Roll Call Number 454
The Speaker ordered the vote be taken by roll call at 3:07 p.m.
The following is the result of the vote:
Total Number Voting................................................ 149
Those voting Yea.................................................... 149
Those voting Nay........................................................ 0
Those absent and not voting.................................... 2
The following is the roll call vote:
Y BACKER Y GREEN Y STILLMAN Y MADDOX
Y BEALS Y HENRICI Y STRATTON Y MATTIELLO
Y BEAMON Y JARJURA Y THOMPSON Y MAZZOCCOLI
Y BOUKUS X JARMOC Y TONUCCI Y METZ
Y BYSIEWICZ Y JOHNSTON Y TRUGLIA Y MILLER
Y CARDIN Y KEELEY Y TULISANO Y NYSTROM
X CARTER Y KERENSKY Y VILLANO Y O'NEILL
Y CARUSO Y KIRKLEY‑BEY Y WALLACE Y PISCOPO
Y CHRIST Y KNOPP Y WIDLITZ Y POWERS
Y CLEMMONS Y LANDINO Y PRELLI
Y CLEMONS Y LAWLOR Y RORABACK
Y COCCO Y LESCOE Y BELDEN Y RYAN
Y CONCANNON Y LYONS Y BERNHARD Y SAN ANGELO
Y CONWAY Y MALONE Y BOUCHER Y SANTA‑MARIA
Y CURREY Y MANTILLA Y CAFERO Y SAWYER
Y DARGAN Y MARTINEZ Y CAPPIELLO Y SCALZO
Y DAVIS Y MCCAVANAGH Y CARON Y SIMMONS
Y DEMARINIS Y MCDONALD Y CLEARY Y STONE
Y DIAMANTIS Y MCGRATTAN Y COLLINS Y STRIPP
Y DIAZ Y MERRILL Y D'AMELIO Y TERCYAK
Y DILLON Y MICHELE Y DANDROW Y TYMNIAK
Y DONOVAN Y MIKUTEL Y DELGOBBO Y VARESE
Y DOYLE Y MORDASKY Y DEPINO Y VELTRI
Y DYSON Y MUSHINSKY Y DICKMAN Y WARD
Y EBERLE Y NARDELLO Y FAHRBACH Y WASSERMAN
Y ESPOSITO Y NEWTON Y FARR Y WINKLER
Y FELTMAN Y O'ROURKE Y FEDELE
Y FLAHERTY Y ORANGE Y FERRARI
Y FLEISCHMANN Y OREFICE Y FLAHERTY
Y FONTANA Y PANARONI Y FUSCO
Y FOX Y RITTER, J. Y GARVEY Y RITTER (SPKR)
Y FRITZ Y ROY Y GOOGINS
Y GARCIA Y RYAN Y GREENE
Y GELSI Y SAMOWITZ Y GYLE Y PUDLIN (DEP)
Y GERAGOSIAN Y SAUER Y HAMMERS Y HARTLEY (DEP)
Y GERRATANA Y SCALETTAR Y HAMZY Y HYSLOP (DEP)
Y GIANNAROS Y SCHIESSL Y HARKINS
SB‑417 Sequence Number 600
The following is the result of the vote at 10:04 p.m.:
Total Number Voting.................................................. 36
Necessary for Adoption............................................ 19
Those voting Yea...................................................... 36
Those voting Nay........................................................ 0
Those absent and not voting.................................... 0
The following is the roll call vote:
Y 2 ERIC D. COLEMAN Y 20 MELODIE PETERS
Y 3 GARY LEBEAU Y 21 GEORGE L. GUNTHER
Y 4 MARY ANN HANDLEY Y 22 ANGELINA LEE SCARPETTI
Y 5 KEVIN B. SULLIVAN Y 23 ALVIN W. PENN
Y 6 THOMAS A. BOZEK Y 24 MARK NIELSEN
Y 7 JOHN A. KISSEL Y 25 ROBERT L. GENUARIO
Y 8 JAMES T. FLEMING Y 26 JUDITH G. FREEDMAN
Y 9 BIAGIO CIOTTO Y 27 GEORGE C. JEPSEN
Y 10 TONI N. HARP Y 28 FRED H. LOVEGROVE, JR.
Y 11 MARTIN M. LOONEY Y 29 DONALD E. WILLIAMS, JR.
Y 12 WILLIAM A. ANISKOVICH Y 30 M. ADELA EADS
Y 13 THOMAS P. GAFFEY Y 31 THOMAS A. COLAPIETRO
Y 14 WINTHROP SMITH, JR. Y 32 LOUIS C. DELUCA
Y 15 THOMAS F. UPSON Y 33 EILEEN M. DAILY
Y 16 STEPHEN R. SOMMA Y 34 BRIAN M. MCDERMOTT
Y 17 JOSEPH J. CRISCO, JR. Y 35 ANTHONY GUGLIELMO
Y 18 CATHERINE W. COOK Y 36 WILLIAM H. NICKERSON
sSB 417
Judiciary Committee
AN ACT PROVIDING DEPENDENT DISABLED SUPPORT PAYMENTS AND PERMITS
FOR BICYCLES WITH HELPER MOTORS
SUMMARY: By law, parents must support their children until they reach age 18. If the parents are divorced, legally separated, or have had their marriage annulled, the court can issue orders directing such support; and it can extend support for an unmarried child living at home until the child finishes high school or turns 19.
This act allows the court to order the payment of child support for any 18‑, 19‑, or 20‑year‑old who is mentally retarded or physically or mentally disabled, lives with a parent, and is primarily dependent on the parent for support. Judges do not have to follow the state's child support guidelines for these orders. Orders may be issued only for divorces, dissolutions, annulments, and legal separations entered after September 30, 1997, or as part of initial support orders entered after that date in cases involving parents who were never married.
The act also allows the commissioner of motor vehicles to issue a special permit to a qualified person allowing him to operate a bicycle with a helper motor without having to obtain the normally required motor vehicle operator's license. To qualify for such a special permit, the person must present a certificate from his licensed physician stating that he is physically disabled, but not blind, and that he is capable of riding a bicycle with a helper motor. He must also demonstrate that he can ride a bicycle both (1) without a helper motor on level terrain and (2) with a helper motor.
The commissioner can impose limitations on the permit designed to protect the holder's safety including the maximum speed of the motor. The person must carry the permit when operating the bicycle, follow any limitations on it, and renew it yearly.
EFFECTIVE DATE: October 1, 1997
FURTHER EXPLANATION
Mental Retardation and Physical and Mental Disability
The act uses the standard statutory definition of mental retardation and the definition of physically disabled used in the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) law. Although the term "mental disability" appears in a number of statutes, neither the act nor statutes define it.
The CHRO law defines "physical and mental disability" to include mental retardation and physical disability, as defined in statute, and "handicapped as defined in the federal Fair Housing Act." The federal act defines handicap as (1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits life activities, (2) a record of having such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. It specifically does not include abuse of controlled substances.
Physical Disability and Helper Motor
A physical disability is a chronic physical handicap, infirmity, or impairment, including epilepsy, deafness or hearing impairment, or reliance on a wheelchair or other remedial device. It can be congenital or the result of injury, illness, or organic changes. A helper motor is one with less than 50 cubic centimeters displacement, rated up to two horsepower, capable of speeds of no more than 30 m.p.h., and with an automatic transmission.
Report on Bills Favorably Reported by Committee
Senate Vote Sequence Number 600