2011-22 (October 7, 2011)
Disqualification;
Rule 2.11
Issue: May a Judicial
Official preside over a case involving a financial institution
if the Judicial Official owns collateralized mortgage obligation
bonds (hereinafter, CMOs) worth over $5,000 that were issued by
the financial institution?
Response: According to information provided
by or on behalf of the Judicial Official, CMOs are bonds that
represent claims to specific cash flows from large pools of home
mortgages. While most CMOs are issued by Ginnie Mae (a U.S.
government agency), Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae (government-sponsored
enterprises), private financial institutions may also issue CMOs
(known as private label CMOs). The value of the portfolio in a
CMO typically is one billion dollars or more, and an investor
does not know which individual mortgages are pooled to create
the fund that secures the bond payments the investor receives.
In addition, an investor has no control or influence over the
mortgages that go into the fund to secure the payments, and nothing
that the investor or issuing financial institution does can impact
the investment. For example, when Freddie Mac was going bankrupt,
the value of its CMOs were not affected. (What does impact a CMO
is a change in interest rates, as CMOs typically trade inversely
to interest rate changes.) CMOs are analogous to a mutual fund.
Unlike a stock investment, an investor in a CMO does not acquire
an ownership interest in the issuing entity. Hence, if one owns
a private label CMO issued by a financial institution, the return
and value of the CMO is not affected by whether the financial
institution itself is profitable. While with a typical corporate
bond the issuing company is liable for the bond payments, with a
CMO it is the mortgage portfolio, not the issuing financial
institution that is responsible for making or guaranteeing
payments.
Rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires disqualification
if a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including
but not limited to if a judge has “more than a de minimis interest
that could be substantially affected by the proceeding” (Rule 2.11(a)(2)(C)),
or if a judge “has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy
or in a party to the proceeding” (Rule 2.11(a)(3)). The term “de minimis”
means “an insignificant interest that could not raise a reasonable
question regarding the judge’s impartiality.” Code of Judicial
Conduct, Terminology (defining “economic interest”). The term “economic
interest” is defined in relevant part to include “ownership of more than
a de minimis legal or equitable interest.” Code of Judicial Conduct,
Terminology (defining “economic interest”). The Code makes clear that
unless a judge “participates in the management of such a legal or
equitable interest, or the interest could be substantially affected
by the outcome of a proceeding before the judge,” the term “economic
interest” does not include “an interest in the individual holdings
within a mutual or common investment fund,” or “a deposit in a
financial institution,” or “an interest in the issuer of government
securities held by a judge.” Id.
The Committee concluded that the Judicial Official’s investment in
this matter is neither a “more than de minimis interest” under Rule
2.11(a)(2)(C) nor an “economic interest” under Rule 2.11(a)(3), and
therefore that the Judicial Official’s CMO investment does not require
disqualification. The Judicial Official’s CMO investment is not a “more
than de minimis interest” within the meaning of Rule 2.11(a)(2)(C)
because any ruling in favor of or against the interests of the financial
institution could not affect the value of or return from the CMO
investment. The CMO investment is not an “economic interest”
within the meaning of Rule 2.11(a)(3) because the Judicial Official
has no role in managing the CMO, because the value of the CMO could
not be affected by the outcome of the proceeding before the Judicial
Official, and because the nature of the Judicial Official’s financial
interest is analogous to an interest in the individual holdings of a
mutual or common investment fund (which is expressly excluded from
the definition of an “economic interest” under the Code).
The Committee concluded that its prior opinion in JE 2011-08 is
distinguishable because it concerned a Judicial Official’s direct
investment in the stocks or bonds of a financial institution appearing
as a party before the Judicial Official. In contrast, the facts before
the Committee in this matter do not concern a direct investment in a
party and negate any connection between the value of or return from
the Judicial Official’s investment and a ruling in favor of or against
the financial institution.