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Press Advisory re: Office of the Governor vs. Select Committee of Inquiry
The
Connecticut Supreme Court has issued a decision in the case of
Office of the Governor vs. Select Committee of Inquiry
The "officially released" date that appears near
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published in the Connecticut Law Journal or
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as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications
Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law
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reproduced and distributed without the express written
permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications,
Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
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OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR v. SELECT
COMMITTEE
OF INQUIRY TO RECOMMEND WHETHER
SUFFICIENT GROUNDS EXIST FOR
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TO IMPEACH GOVERNOR JOHN G.
ROWLAND PURSUANT TO ARTICLE
NINTH OF THE STATE
CONSTITUTION
(SC 17211)
Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer,
Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.
Argued June 18 -- officially released June 18, 2004
Procedural History
Motion to quash a subpoena to compel the governor to testify
in proceedings before the defendant investigating whether
grounds exist to impeach the governor, and action to enjoin the
defendant from enforcing the subpoena and to declare the
enforcement of the subpoena unconstitutional as a violation of
the separation of powers, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Langenbach,
J., denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and issued a
memorandum of decision denying the motion to quash and the
request for injunctive and declaratory relief, and the
plaintiff, upon certification from the Chief Justice that a
matter of substantial public interest is at issue, appealed to
this court. Affirmed; stay vacated.
Ross H. Garber, with whom was Melinda M. Decker,
for the appellant (plaintiff).
Cynthia S. Arato, pro hac vice, with whom were Steven
F. Reich, pro hac vice, Marc Isserles, pro hac vice,
and Laura Jordan and Mary Anne O'Neill, for the
appellee (defendant).
Opinion
PER CURIAM.1 The principal issue in this appeal2 is whether the
plaintiff, the office of the governor of Connecticut3, John G.
Rowland, is categorically immune, by virtue of article second of
the constitution of Connecticut4, the separation of powers
provision, from a subpoena issued by the defendant, the select
committee of inquiry to recommend whether sufficient grounds
exist for the House of Representatives to impeach Governor John
G. Rowland pursuant to article ninth of the state constitution,
to compel the governor to testify before the defendant in
connection with its duties. The plaintiff claims that the
subpoena is invalid because: (1) the governor is categorically
immune from being compelled to testify, regarding the
performance of his official duties, before the defendant, in the
performance of its duties, on the ground of the separation of
powers provision contained in article second of the state
constitution; and (2) even if the governor is not categorically
immune, this subpoena is inconsistent with the separation of
powers provision. The defendant, in addition to responding to
the plaintiff's claims on the merits, contends that both the
trial court and this court lack subject matter jurisdiction over
the plaintiff's challenge to the subpoena because: (1) it is
barred under this court's decision in Kinsella v. Jaekle,
192 Conn. 704, 475 A.2d 243 (1984); (2) it is barred by the
speech or debate clause contained in article third, § 15, of
the constitution of Connecticut;5 (3) it is premature; and (4) it
is not subject to judicial review because it is a political
question.
For reasons that we will give in full in due course; see
footnote 1 of this opinion; we reject the defendant's
jurisdictional claims, and we conclude that: (1) the governor is
not categorically immune from compelled testimony by this
subpoena; and (2) the subpoena is not inconsistent with the
separation of powers provision of the state constitution. We
therefore conclude that the trial court properly denied the
plaintiff's motion to quash the subpoena and for injunctive
relief.
The judgment is affirmed, and the stay of the subpoena,
previously issued by this court until 5 p.m. on this date, is
vacated, effective immediately.
SULLIVAN, C. J., and ZARELLA, J., dissenting. We respectfully
dissent from the majority opinion. We would conclude that the
complaint of the plaintiff, the office of the governor of
Connecticut, seeking to quash the subpoena issued by the
defendant, the select committee of inquiry to recommend whether
sufficient grounds exist for the House of Representatives to
impeach Governor John G. Rowland pursuant to article ninth of
the state constitution, should be dismissed as premature. This
conclusion is compelled by our state constitution's speech or
debate clause and by the separation of powers doctrine. In our
view, the court should not reach out and decide difficult
constitutional questions involving the balance of powers between
the legislature and the chief executive in the absence of an
immediate and compelling need to do so. Accordingly, for reasons
that we will discuss more fully in due course, we believe that
the case should be remanded to the trial court with direction to
dismiss the plaintiff's complaint.
1 This preliminary opinion is the result of a
collaborative effort by the members of the majority of this
court, namely, Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Vertefeuille,
Js. Hence, it is issued as a per curiam opinion in which those
members of the court join.
This case was briefed and argued before this court on an
expedited basis. Following oral argument on this date, the court
has decided the appeal by rendering its judgment in this
truncated form. A full opinion will follow in due course.
2 Following certification by the Chief Justice, the plaintiff
has filed this expedited, public interest appeal pursuant to
General Statutes § 52-265a, from the judgment of the trial
court denying its motion to quash a subpoena and for injunctive
relief.
General Statutes § 52-265a provides: "(a)
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 52-264 and 52-265,
any party to an action who is aggrieved by an order or decision
of the Superior Court in an action which involves a matter of
substantial public interest and in which delay may work a
substantial injustice, may appeal under this section from the
order or decision to the Supreme Court within two weeks from the
date of the issuance of the order or decision. The appeal shall
state the question of law on which it is based.
"(b) The Chief Justice shall, within one week of receipt
of the appeal, rule whether the issue involves a substantial
public interest and whether delay may work a substantial
injustice.
"(c) Upon certification by the Chief Justice that a
substantial public interest is involved and that delay may work
a substantial injustice, the trial judge shall immediately
transmit a certificate of his decision, together with a proper
finding of fact, to the Chief Justice, who shall thereupon call
a special session of the Supreme Court for the purpose of an
immediate hearing upon the appeal.
"(d) The Chief Justice may make orders to expedite such
appeals, including orders specifying the manner in which the
record on appeal may be prepared.
3 The plaintiff in this case is the office of the governor of
Connecticut, and not the governor himself. The governor did not
bring or join the trial court proceedings or participate in this
appeal. Nonetheless, we recognize that our decision in the
present case affects him in his official capacity.
4 The constitution of Connecticut, article second, as amended
by article eighteen of the amendments, provides in relevant
part: "The powers of government shall be divided into three
distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate
magistracy, to wit, those which are legislative, to one; those
which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial,
to another. . . ."
5 The constitution of Connecticut, article third, § 15,
provides: "The senators and representatives shall, in all
cases of civil process, be privileged from arrest, during any
session of the general assembly, and for four days before the
commencement and after the termination of any session thereof.
And for any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be
questioned in any other place."
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