AC37216 - Olson v. Mohammadu ("The defendant, Fusaini Mohammadu, appeals from the ruling of the trial court, Ficeto, J., denying his postjudgment motion for modification of alimony and child support orders, rendered on remand following the decision of our Supreme Court in Olson v. Mohammadu, 310 Conn. 665, 81 A.3d 215 (2013). Additionally, in his amended appeal, the defendant challenges a subsequent ruling of the trial court, Albis, J., that ordered him to pay the plaintiff, Marianne Olson, $6002 in a previously found arrearage pursuant to an order he claimed had been suspended, and the court’s ruling that granted the plaintiff’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees to defend the present appeal. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Family Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC38010 - Flomo v. Commissioner of Correction (Habeas; "On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly rejected his claims that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s failure to advise him properly of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea in accordance with Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010), and (2) his guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the trial court failed to ensure that he fully understood the precise immigration consequences of his plea. We conclude that the habeas court properly rejected the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the ground that he failed to demonstrate prejudice, as required under the test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Additionally, the petitioner’s second claim fails as a matter of law because immigration and naturalization consequences of a plea, although often significant, are not of a constitutional magnitude for purposes of evaluating whether a plea is knowing and voluntary. See State v. Malcolm, 257 Conn. 653, 663 n.12, 778 A.2d 134 (2001). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.")

• Posted in:
• Habeas Corpus Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC38367 - State v. Andriulaitis (Disorderly conduct; "In State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 640 A.2d 986 (1994), our Supreme Court applied an interpretive gloss to certain provisions of the disorderly conduct statute, General Statutes § 53a-182, in order to preserve their constitutionality. At issue in this appeal is the gloss providing that the phrase "offensive or disorderly conduct" in § 53a-182 (a) (2) means "conduct that is grossly offensive, under contemporary community standards, to a person who actually overhears it or sees it." Id., 818. The defendant, William Andriulaitis, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a trial to the court, of disorderly conduct in violation of § 53a-182 (a) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he engaged in conduct that was "offensive or disorderly" under the standard set forth in Indrisano, and that the court improperly failed to consider the Indrisano gloss in its deliberations because it did not reference the gloss when explaining the evidentiary and factual bases for its guilty verdict.The court, however, is presumed to have applied the proper legal standard in arriving at its legal conclusions, and the defendant has not identified any basis in the record to rebut that presumption. In any case, the defendant's argument that his conviction should be reversed simply because the court did not reference the Indrisano gloss when announcing its verdict misapprehends this court's standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims. Our review, by long-standing precedent, focuses on whether, in light of the entire evidentiary record together with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, a rational fact finder could find that the state proved all of the necessary elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that the evidence adduced at trial meets this standard and, accordingly, affirm the defendant's conviction.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

Curious about the regulatory process in Connecticut? The E-Regulations System, maintained by the Secretary of State's office, offers an overview of Regulation-Making in Connecticut:

Regulations are rules adopted by Connecticut state agencies and some boards and commissions. Regulations are adopted in Connecticut pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act Chapter 54 of the General Statutes and the rules of the Legislative Regulation Review Committee (LRRC). Generally, a regulation must (1) be properly noticed, (2) have a public comment period, (3) be approved by the Attorney General as to legal sufficiency, (4) be approved by the LRRC, and (5) be filed in the Secretary of the State's office.
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Agencies may only adopt regulations that are authorized by Connecticut statute. Some agencies have very broad authority to adopt regulations, while other agencies have more limited authority that is often limited to a particular topic. With some exceptions, an agency’s regulation-making authority generally falls into two categories, mandatory and permissive. Mandatory regulations are those that an agency is required to write pursuant to a public act. Many agencies also have permissive regulatory authority, which means they have authority to write regulations on a particular topic, but are not required to do so.

There is also a Glossary of Terms and Acronyms and a helpful guide for users searching for regulations: How to Use this Site.

• Posted in:
• Agency Rules and Regulations,
• Did You Know?,
• FYI,
• Legal Research

AC39013 - In re Jacquelyn W. (Child neglect; "The respondent mother, Wendy F., appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, granting a motion to transfer permanent legal guardianship of the respondent's minor daughter, Jacquelyn W., to Jacquelyn's aunt, Shirley R. The respondent claims that the court improperly granted the petitioner's motion for permanent transfer of guardianship because the court failed (1) to canvass her prior to the hearing in accordance with In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015); and (2) to advise her that the court could draw an adverse inference from her failure to testify. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Juvenile Law,
• Recent Opinions