The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.
AC41824 - Turek v. Zoning Board of Appeals (Zoning; "The defendant, the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Milford (board), appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the appeal filed by the plaintiffs . . . and reversing the decision of the board that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a variance. On appeal, the board claims that the trial court erroneously sustained the appeal, and causes us to consider (1) whether the plaintiffs demonstrated a legally cognizable hardship, and (2) whether the plaintiffs' proposal qualifies under the exception to the hardship requirement set forth in Adolphson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 205 Conn. 703, 710, 535 A.2d 799 (1988), and its progeny. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.")
AC41902, AC42138, AC42139, AC42206 - Berka v. Middletown (Zoning; "These four appeals pertain to certain real property in Middletown owned by the self-represented plaintiff, George Berka, and rented by him to multiple individuals. Although neither the cases nor the appeals have been officially consolidated, we write one opinion for the purpose of judicial economy and assess the claims made in each appeal.
The plaintiff appeals from four judgments of the Superior Court granting the motions of the defendant the city of Middletown to dismiss the complaints in four cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In two of his appeals to this court—Docket Nos. AC 41902 and AC 42206—the plaintiff's claims relate either to a citation issued to him in 2016 for conditions on his property alleged to have violated the Middletown blight ordinance, which citation subsequently was unilaterally withdrawn by the defendant, or to a subsequent citation issued to him in 2018 concerning essentially the same alleged violations. In his appeal in Docket No. AC 42138, the plaintiff challenges the denial of his application for a special exception to operate a sober house. The appeal in Docket No. AC 42139 concerns the propriety of the court's dismissal of the plaintiff's petition to have the blight ordinance invalidated on constitutional and other grounds. We affirm the judgments of the court with respect to the plaintiff's claims asserted in Docket Nos. AC 41902 and AC 42206. We dismiss Docket No. AC 42138 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the court's judgment in Docket No. AC 42139 with respect to its dismissal of the plaintiff's petition insofar as it (1) asks the court to amend the Middletown blight ordinance, and (2) is predicated on nonconstitutional grounds but we reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to its dismissal of the plaintiff's constitutional claims asserted in an individual capacity.")
AC41924 - Benchmark Municipal Tax Services, Ltd. v. Greenwood Manor, LLC ("In this action to foreclose certain municipal property tax liens on a 9.9 acre parcel of property in Bridgeport (property), the substitute defendant and cross claim plaintiff, Main Street Business Management, Inc. (Main Street), appeals from the trial court's judgment rendered against it on its cross claim alleging that the cross claim defendant, Manuel Moutinho, tortiously interfered with a business expectancy and violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110 et seq. (CUTPA), and on its counterclaim alleging that the city engaged in tortious interference with a business expectancy and improperly sought to affect the property's value adversely by interfering with a proposed zone change.
On appeal, Main Street, as Greenwood's successor in interest, claims that the court improperly determined that (1) Moutinho did not tortiously interfere with a proposed sale of the property by Greenwood to the city, (2) the city did not tortiously interfere with the business relationship between Greenwood and Moutinho, and (3) the city did not tortiously interfere by causing the city's planning and zoning commission (commission) to reject a zoning reclassification that would have benefited Greenwood by increasing the property's marketability. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.")
SC19972 - Mayer-Wittmann v. Zoning Board of Appeals ("The issue that we must decide in this appeal is whether the named defendant, the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Stamford (zoning board), properly granted the application of the defendant Paul E. Breunich for variances to reconstruct a legally nonconforming accessory structure on his property after it was severely damaged by a hurricane. Breunich sought variances from various setback requirements and height restrictions of the Stamford zoning regulations on the ground that, as applied to his property, their strict enforcement would impose an unusual hardship because he could not comply both with those regulations and with the regulations applicable to flood prone areas, which required him to elevate the structure. The Planning Board of the City of Stamford (planning board) unanimously recommended approval of the application, and, after a hearing, the zoning board unanimously approved it. The plaintiff, Karl Mayer-Wittmann, executor of the estate of Gerda Mayer-Wittmann, who owns property adjacent to Breunich's property, appealed from the decision of the zoning board to the trial court, which, after a trial, dismissed the appeal. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")
AC41275 - Wozniak v. Colchester (Writ of mandamus; "This case concerns the obligation of a municipality to file an application on behalf of a property owner to correct flood maps promulgated by federal administrative authorities. The plaintiffs . . . appeal from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, the town of Colchester. The dispositive issue is whether the trial court properly determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a writ of mandamus. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. . .
The plaintiffs have presented no basis on which this court reasonably could conclude that an individual property owner is prohibited, as a matter of federal administrative law, from filing a LOMR application with FEMA. The relevant federal regulations and the materials submitted in connection with the motion for summary judgment all contemplate such filings by property owners, and the case law reflects that property owners routinely apply for and secure LOMRs from FEMA. The availability of that legal remedy, which would provide the plaintiffs the very relief they seek, is fatal to their mandamus action. See Sterner v. Saugatuck Harbor Yacht Club, Inc., 188 Conn. 531, 534, 450 A.2d 369 (1982) ("for mandamus to lie, the plaintiff must have no other adequate remedy"); 55 C.J.S., Mandamus § 7 (2009) ("mandamus is used sparingly . . . and only when it is the sole available remedy"). We therefore conclude that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant in the present case. The judgment is affirmed.")