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Workers' Compensation Law

Workers' Compensation Law Supreme Court Opinions

   by Townsend, Karen

 http://vvv.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3899

SC20319- Coughlin v. Stamford Fire Dept. (Denial of benefits pursuant to General § 7-433c (a); “On appeal, the defendant asserts that the board incorrectly determined that the plaintiff’s heart disease claim was timely because, at the time of his diagnosis and disability, the plaintiff had retired as a firefighter and was no longer employed by the defendant. Additionally, the defendant asserts that a claim for a new injury of heart disease cannot be established on the basis of its causal relationship to the plaintiff’s initial compensable claim for hypertension because § 7-433c mandates that hypertension and heart disease be treated as separate and distinct injuries. The plaintiff responds that his heart disease claim was timely because it flowed from his compensable claim for hypertension, and neither a plain reading of § 7-433c nor this court’s interpretation of that statute requires hypertension and heart disease to be treated as separate diseases when they are causally related. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the decision of the board").

SC20244- Dickerson v. Stamford (“On appeal, the defendant asserts that the board incorrectly determined that the commissioner had jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim because, at the time of his diagnosis and disability, the plaintiff had retired and was no longer a uniformed member of the Stamford Police Department (department). Furthermore, the defendant asserts that a claim for a new injury of heart disease cannot be established on the basis of its causal relationship to the plaintiff’s initial compensable claim for hypertension because § 7-433c mandates that hypertension and heart disease be treated as separate and distinct injuries. Therefore, the defendant claims, the plaintiff was required to give a separate, timely notice of his heart disease claim within one year of his diagnosis. The plaintiff responds that the jurisdictional prerequisites of § 7-433c were met and that his heart disease claim was timely because it flowed from his compensable claim for hypertension, and neither a plain reading of § 7-433c nor this court’s interpretation of that statute requires hypertension and heart disease to be treated as separate diseases when they are causally related…The plaintiff responds that the long-standing substantial factor standard that applies to subsequent injury claims brought under the Workers’ Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq., also applies to his claim. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the decision of the board”).


Workers' Compensation Appellate Court Opinion

   by Townsend, Karen

 http://vvv.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3848

AC41634 - Dunkling v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc. (Whether defendant general contractor was principal employer; whether Compensation Review Board improperly affirmed ruling denying motion to correct; “The defendants’ central claim on appeal is that the board erred as a matter of law when it affirmed the commissioner’s determination that, on the date that the plaintiff, Michael J. Dunkling, sustained a compensable injury, Brunoli was a principal employer pursuant to General Statutes § 31-291. We affirm the decision of the board”).


Workers' Compensation Appellate Court Opinion

   by Townsend, Karen

 http://vvv.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3784

AC40899 - Dombrowski v. New Haven (Denial of motion to open parties' stipulation that settled claims; reviewability of claims not presented to commissioner; settlement contingent upon approval of the city; claim that opening the stipulation not warranted due to failure of offering any evidence of “fraud, misrepresentation, accident, or mistake”; "On appeal, the plaintiff raises a number of claims that, in essence, challenge the propriety of the board’s decision affirming the commissioner’s denial of his motion to open. We affirm the decision of the board.")


Workers' Compensation Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Penn, Michele

 http://vvv.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3561

AC41943 - McGinty v. Stamford Police Dept. ("The defendants, the Stamford Police Department (police department), and PMA Management Corporation of New England, the workers' compensation liability insurer for the police department, appeal from the decision of the Compensation Review Board (board) affirming the finding and award (award) of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Seventh District (commissioner) with respect to the claim filed by the plaintiff, Thomas McGinty, under General Statutes § 7-433c, commonly referred to as the Heart and Hypertension Act. On appeal, the defendants principally claim that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner's award concluding that the plaintiff had suffered from compensable heart disease. Before the commissioner and on appeal, the defendants have argued that the plaintiff's condition, arterial sclerosis, is not a disease unique to the heart, but a systemic condition, and is, therefore, not compensable heart disease. We affirm the decision of the board.")



Workers' Compensation Appellate Court Opinion

   by Townsend, Karen

 http://vvv.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3544

AC41237 - Brocuglio v. Thompsonville Fire District #2 (Heart and Hypertension Act (sec. 7-433c); notice of claim (sec. 31-294c (a)) “The defendant claims that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner’s award because the plaintiff’s heart disease claim was not timely filed pursuant to General Statutes § 31-294c (a), and § 7-433c (a) does not allow a claimant to file more than one claim for heart disease. We conclude that because the plaintiff failed to file a claim in 2000 when he was first informed by a medical professional that he had heart disease, the claim he filed for heart disease in 2013 is jurisdictionally barred. We, therefore, reverse the decision of the board.”)