Monday, December 3rd

• New London Law Library will close at 4:00 p.m.
  

Tuesday, December 4th

• Hartford Law Library will close at 3:00 p.m.

Friday, December 7th

• New Britain Law Library will open at 2:00 p.m. and close at 4:30 p.m.

• Posted in:
• Library Notices

SC19928 - Breton v. Commissioner of Correction (“Claim that the “2013 amendment to General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 54-125a; see Public Acts 2013, No.13-3, § 59 (P.A. 13-3), codified at General Statutes (Supp.2014) § 54-125a; which eliminated risk reduction credit awarded pursuant to General Statutes § 18-98e from the calculation of a violent offender’s initial parole eligibility date, thereby requiring the offender to complete 85 percent of his definite sentence before becoming parole eligible, as applied retroactively to him, violates the ex post facto clause of the United States constitution because he was statutorily entitled to such earlier parole consideration when he committed the crimes for which he is now incarcerated.”… On appeal, the petitioner renews his claim of an ex post facto violation. We agree with the petitioner that the ex post facto clause bars the respondent from applying the 2013 amendment to the petitioner, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court.”)

SC19927 - Garner v. Commissioner of Correction (Claim of ineffective assistance; claim that a “2013 amendment to General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 54-125a; see Public Acts 2013, No. 13-3, § 59 (P.A. 13-3), codified at General Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 54-125a; which eliminated risk reduction credit awarded pursuant to General Statutes § 18-98e from the calculation of a violent offender’s initial parole eligibility date, as applied retroactively to him, violates the ex post facto clause of the United States constitution, because, under the version of § 54-125a in effect when he committed his offenses, he was entitled to have any such credit that he had earned applied to advance his initial parole eligibility date…The habeas court, Fuger, J., rejected the petitioner’s ex post facto claim…On appeal, the petitioner challenges both of these determinations by the habeas court. Although we reject the petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim, we agree that the ex post facto clause bars the respondent from applying the 2013 amendment retroactively to the petitioner. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the habeas court.”)

AC39715 - Boria v. Commissioner of Correction (Practice Book § 23-29; “The petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly dismissed his claim (1) that amendments to the risk reduction earned credits statute in 2013 and 2015 violated the ex post facto clause of the United States constitution and (2) that his right to due process had been violated because his guilty plea in his underlying criminal case was not knowingly and voluntarily made. As to the first claim, we disagree and, accordingly, affirm that aspect of the judgment of the habeas court. As to the second claim, although we agree with the petitioner that the habeas court should not have dismissed that claim as an improper successive petition under Practice Book § 23-29, we affirm that aspect of the judgment on the alternative ground that it was barred by collateral estoppel.”)

• Concurrence

AC40090 - Davis v. Commissioner of Correction (“On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court (1) abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal and (2) erred in concluding that his trial counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance by failing to (A) file a motion in limine to preclude certain evidence, (B) consult with and present the testimony of an eyewitness identification expert, (C) object to the testimony of a laboratory supervisor on the ground that the testimony violated his right to confrontation under the federal constitution and (D) prepare the petitioner for the presentence investigation interview. We dismiss the petitioner’s appeal.”)

AC40101 - Nicholson v. Commissioner of Correction (Amended writ; “On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court (1) abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal, (2) erroneously concluded that he failed to establish that his state and federal constitutional rights to the effective assistance of counsel were violated,1 (3) abused its discretion in declining to treat a witness at the habeas trial as an expert witness, and (4) abused its discretion in failing to review certain evidence admitted at the habeas trial prior to denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We conclude that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.”)

• Posted in:
• Habeas Corpus Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC40477 - State v. Barjon (Robbery in first degree; conspiracy to commit robbery in first degree; robbery in second degree; conspiracy to commit robbery in second degree; "The defendant, Jean Barjon, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2), conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-134 (a) (2), robbery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 53a-135 (a) (1), and conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree in violation of § 53a-48 and General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 53a-135 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court violated his right to conflict free counsel under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC40694 - State v. Davis (Violation of probation; motion to dismiss; motion for continuance; "The defendant, Frederick M. Davis, appeals from the judgment of the trial court revoking his probation and committing him to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction for nine years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) improperly denied his motion to dismiss predicated on an alleged lack of jurisdiction, (2) violated his constitutional right to be present at a critical stage of the probation revocation proceeding, and (3) improperly denied his request for a continuance. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC39759 - LeSueur v. LeSueur ("In this postmarital dissolution appeal, the plaintiff, Janine LeSueur, appeals from the postjudgment orders of the trial court granting the motion for modification of custody and child support filed by the defendant, Andrew LeSueur, and denying her motion for modification of unallocated alimony and child support. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the court, Tindill, J., (1) abused its discretion by granting the defendant's motion to modify custody and child support because the child support order is predicated on clearly erroneous factual findings and because it terminated the defendant's child support obligation retroactively without sufficient information to evaluate the parties' financial circumstances, and without considering that she continued to incur and pay expenses for the parties' son from September 2, 2015, until the date of the hearing; (2) misconstrued the parties' separation agreement (agreement) regarding the parties' obligations to pay for their children's postsecondary education; and (3) abused its discretion by denying her motion to modify unallocated alimony and support. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Family Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC40282 - Bruno v. Whipple ("This case returns to us following a remand to the trial court for a hearing in damages. See Bruno v. Whipple, 162 Conn. App. 186, 130 A.3d 899 (2015), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 901, 138 A.3d 280 (2016).The self-represented plaintiff, Lisa Bruno, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant Heritage Homes Construction Company, LLC. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court (1) improperly concluded that she failed to prove actual damages resulting from the defendant's breach of a residential construction contract and (2) exceeded the scope of the remand order. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions