SC19980 - State v. Purcell ("In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459–60, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994), the United States Supreme Court determined that, after a defendant has been informed of his Miranda rights, the police officers conducting a custodial interrogation have no obligation to stop and clarify an ambiguous invocation by the defendant of his right to have counsel present. Instead, they must cease interrogation only upon an objectively unambiguous, unequivocal invocation of that right. See id. The court recognized that this standard "might disadvantage some suspects who—because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons—will not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present." Id., 460.

This certified appeal requires us to decide whether the Davis standard was met in this case, and, if not, whether a more protective prophylactic rule is required under the Connecticut constitution. The defendant, Robert John Purcell, appeals from the Appellate Court's judgment affirming his conviction of three counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21. We conclude that the defendant's statements during interrogation did not meet Davis' "clear and unequivocal" standard so as to require suppression of subsequent inculpatory statements under the federal constitution. We further conclude, however, that the Connecticut constitution does not condone a rule that could disadvantage the most vulnerable of our citizens. We hold that, to adequately safeguard the right against compelled self-incrimination under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, police officers are required to clarify an ambiguous request for counsel before they can continue the interrogation. Because no such clarification was elicited in the present case and the failure to do so was harmful, we conclude that the defendant is entitled to a new trial.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC41165 - Holbrook v. Commissioner of Correction ("The petitioner, Michael Holbrook, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly concluded that he failed to prove (1) ineffective assistance of his prior habeas counsel, and (2) that the state suppressed exculpatory evidence at his criminal trial in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.")

• Posted in:
• Habeas Corpus Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC40274 - Marino v. Statewide Grievance Committee ("The plaintiff, Debra B. Marino, an attorney, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her appeal from the sanctions imposed by the reviewing committee of the defendant, the Statewide Grievance Committee, for violating rule 4.4 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly upheld the defendant's conclusion that the motion for a capias that she filed while representing a client in a family proceeding had no substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden the complainant, Melissa Mathison. We agree with the plaintiff and reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Legal Malpractice & Attorney Discipline Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC40834 - Cohen v. King (Defamation; "The self-represented plaintiff, Debra Cohen, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, Patricia A. King. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in concluding that the doctrine of litigation privilege barred her action sounding in defamation and fraud. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC40956 - Harvey v. Dept. of Correction (Wrongful death; "The plaintiff, Sandra Harvey, administratrix of the estate of Isaiah Boucher, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the wrongful death action filed against the defendants, the Department of Correction and the University of Connecticut Health Center Correctional Managed Health Care, to which we collectively refer in this opinion as the state. On July 16, 2015, the Claims Commissioner (claims commissioner) authorized Boucher to bring a medical malpractice action against the state. Boucher, however, died during September, 2015, without having filed an action, and the plaintiff did not commence the underlying action on behalf of Boucher's estate until more than one year later. The state filed a motion to dismiss the action because it was untimely pursuant to General Statutes § 4-160 (d), which requires a party who is granted authorization by the claims commissioner to sue the state to do so within one year from the date such authorization is granted. The plaintiff claims on appeal that the court improperly granted the state's motion to dismiss because the statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-555 (a), which permits a wrongful death action to be brought within two years from the date of the decedent's death, had not expired and is not limited by § 4-160 (d). Alternatively, the plaintiff claims that the one year limitation period prescribed in § 4-160 (d) was extended in this case by operation of General Statutes § 52-594, and, therefore, her action was timely. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC40785 - Premier Capital, LLC v. Shaw (Action on judgment; lack of standing; "The defendant, Jay Shaw, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, following a bench trial, rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Premier Capital, LLC (plaintiff LLC). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the present case as a result of the plaintiff LLC's lack of standing, (2) the court erred in determining that the plaintiff LLC established ownership of the prior judgment it sought to enforce because there were breaks in the chain of title, and (3) the court erred in concluding that his special defense was invalid. We agree with the defendant on the first claim and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC40619 - Saint Francis Hospital & Medical Center v. Malley (Default judgment; "The defendant Tracy Malley appeals from the default judgment rendered against her in favor of the plaintiff, Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center, in this action to collect a debt for unpaid medical expenses incurred by Edward Malley. On appeal, the defendant claims that there was no basis for the entry of a default against her, and, therefore, the rendering of the default judgment was improper.The plaintiff, who prevailed before the trial court, did not file a brief, therefore, this appeal was considered on the basis of the defendant's brief, argument, appendix and record only. We agree with the defendant and reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC40424 - Ion Bank v. J.C.C. Custom Homes, LLC ("In this replevin action, the plaintiff, Ion Bank, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, J.C.C. Custom Homes, LLC (J.C.C.), Rock On Excavation Services, LLC (Rock On), John C. Ciappetta, and Dawn E. Ciappetta. The court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action because, prior to commencing it, the plaintiff had assigned its interest in the underlying promissory note to Nutmeg Financial Holdings, LLC (Nutmeg), and, therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions