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Administrative Appeal Supreme Court Opinion

Jan 31 2018 4:21PM by Booth, George

http://vvv.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=868

SC19825, SC19826, SC19827 - Kirby of Norwich v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act ("The issue that we must resolve in these appeals is whether certain individuals who have engaged in door-to-door sales of vacuums provided by the plaintiff, Kirby of Norwich, also known as GP Industries of Norwich, Inc., should be classified as independent contractors or, instead, as employees of the plaintiff for purposes of the Unemployment Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-222 et seq. The named defendant, the Unemployment Compensation Act Administrator (administrator), found that there was an employer-employee relationship between the plaintiff and those individuals, thereby obligating the plaintiff to contribute to the state's unemployment compensation fund (fund), because the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of satisfying the requirements of all three prongs of the ABC test, codified at General Statutes § 31-222 (a) (1) (B) (ii) (I), (II) and (III), with parts A, B and C of the test corresponding to clauses (I), (II) and (III), respectively, of that statutory provision. After the administrator's decisions were sustained by the Employment Security Appeals Division (appeals division) and the defendant Employment Security Board of Review (board), the plaintiff appealed to the trial court, which agreed with the administrator in three separate cases that such individuals are the plaintiff's employees on the ground that the plaintiff failed to establish that the individuals are "customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business of the same nature as that involved in the service performed" for the plaintiff, within the meaning of part C of the ABC test. See General Statutes § 31-222 (a) (1) (B) (ii) (III). The plaintiff now appeals from the judgments of the trial court, claiming that the court in each case interpreted § 31-222 (a) (1) (B) (ii) (III) too narrowly and, as a result, incorrectly concluded that the individuals engaged in door-to-door sales of the plaintiff's product were employees of the plaintiff rather than independent contractors. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

Criminal Law Supreme Court Opinion

Jan 31 2018 4:20PM by Booth, George

http://vvv.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=867

SC19772 - State v. Panek ("The defendant, John Panek, was accused of engaging in sexual activity with a woman in his home and, while doing so, making a video recording of the encounter without the woman's knowledge or consent. He was accused of doing the same thing on at least two other occasions with two other women. In three separate informations, the state charged the defendant with violating General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-189a (a) (1). This section generally prohibits a person from, knowingly and with malice, video recording another person "(A) without the knowledge and consent of such other person, (B) while such other person is not in plain view, and (C) under circumstances where such other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy . . . ." General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-189a (a) (1). The present appeal concerns the meaning of the element requiring that the victim be "not in plain view" when she is recorded. General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-189a (a) (1) (B). More specifically, we are asked to determine to whose plain view the statute refers.

The defendant moved to dismiss the informations on the ground that the "not in plain view" element refers to the plain view of the defendant. He asserted he could not be charged or convicted under this statute for his conduct because each of the women he was with was within his plain view at the time he recorded them. The state responded that the "not in plain view" element of § 53a-189a (a) (1) referred instead to the perspective of the general public and that, because the defendant and the victim were inside his home at the time, they were "not in plain view" of the public when the alleged offenses occurred. The trial court concluded that the statute plainly and unambiguously referred to the plain view of the defendant and dismissed the informations. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgments of dismissal. State v. Panek, 166 Conn. App. 613, 635, 145 A.3d 924 (2016).

Contrary to the trial court and Appellate Court, we conclude that the text of § 53a-189a (a) (1) plausibly could refer to either the plain view of the defendant or the general public, rendering the statute ambiguous. Consulting extratextual sources, we are persuaded that the "not in plain view" element refers to the general public. We also reject the defendant's alternative ground for affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court, namely, that the "not in plain view" element is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. We therefore reverse the Appellate Court's judgment.")

Insurance Law Supreme Court Opinion

Jan 30 2018 4:30PM by Roy, Christopher

http://vvv.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=866

SC19728 - Ridgaway v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. ("Trial court judges have the difficult task of maintaining order over the judicial proceedings before them and ensuring the integrity of those proceedings. To do so, judges have broad discretion to impose the sanctions necessary to ensure parties’ compliance with court orders and the rules of the court. In this certified appeal, the defendant, Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company, contends that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the trial court abused its discretion when it rendered a judgment of nonsuit against the plaintiffs, William P. Ridgaway, Sr., individually and as administrator of the estate of William P. Ridgaway, Jr., and Rita Grant, for their counsel’s conduct in relation to counsel’s failure to comply with an order of the court. The plaintiffs contend, as an alternative ground for affirmance, that the trial court based its sanction of nonsuit on facts that were not supported by the record. Although we agree with the plaintiffs that certain factual findings were not supported by the record, we cannot determine as a matter of law whether the trial court would have imposed the same sanction in the absence of those facts. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court insofar as that court reversed the judgment of nonsuit, but we direct that court to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings to consider a sanction proportionate to the facts supported by the record.")

Habeas Supreme Court Opinion

Jan 30 2018 4:20PM by Townsend, Karen

http://vvv.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=865

SC19460 - St. Juste v. Commissioner of Correction (Amended petition for writ of habeas; immigration act; claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; "This certified appeal presents a question of first impression to this court, namely, whether we should apply the federal courts’ modified categorical analysis to determine whether a Connecticut criminal statute, which lists potential offense elements in the alternative, carries the adverse immigration consequences attendant to a crime of moral turpitude as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (13) (C) (v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (immigration act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.… Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded that a prior unchallenged conviction of threatening in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 53a-62 (a),3 which the Appellate Court concluded constituted a crime of moral turpitude under the immigration act, would remain as an impediment to the petitioner’s reentry. Id. Following case law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, we conclude that § 53a-62 (a) is a divisible statute because it lists potential offense elements in the alternative, not all of which constitute crimes of moral turpitude as a matter of federal law. Applying a modified categorical approach to this divisible statute, because the record does not establish the subdivision of § 53a- 62 (a) under which the petitioner was convicted, we further conclude that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the petitioner’s threatening conviction constituted a crime of moral turpitude that rendered moot his habeas appeal challenging his assault conviction. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.")