SC20243 - Graham v. Friedlander (Negligent hiring; "The plaintiffs, the parents of four school-age children, individually and on behalf of their children, brought this action against the Board of Education of the City of Norwalk (board) and three of its members, in their official capacities (board defendants), the city of Norwalk (city), and Spectrum Kids, LLC, and its owner . . . On appeal, we are asked to determine whether the claims alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint seek relief for a failure to provide special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (act), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., thus triggering an administrative exhaustion requirement contained in that act and within General Statutes § 10-76h, or whether the plaintiffs' action seeks relief for something other than the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE), thereby relieving the plaintiffs of the exhaustion requirement. To decide this issue at this stage in the litigation—on review of the trial court's decision to grant the board defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of a failure to exhaust administrative remedies—we must confine our inquiry to the allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint. On the basis of those allegations, we conclude that the plaintiffs seek relief for something other than the denial of a FAPE and were, therefore, not obligated to exhaust their administrative remedies. Accordingly, we agree with the plaintiffs that the trial court improperly dismissed their action on the ground that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies. As an alternative ground for upholding the granting of the motion to dismiss, the defendants ask us to determine that the board defendants acted as agents of the state in providing special education services, therefore entitling them to sovereign immunity. We agree with the trial court that the board defendants were acting under the control of, and as an agent of, the municipality rather than the state, and were not entitled to sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court's denial of the board defendants' motion to dismiss on the sovereign immunity ground. . .

The judgment is reversed only as to the granting of the board defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and the case is remanded with direction to deny the board defendants' motion to dismiss as to the exhaustion claim and for further proceedings according to law; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.")

• Posted in:
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC41634 - Dunkling v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc. (Whether defendant general contractor was principal employer; whether Compensation Review Board improperly affirmed ruling denying motion to correct; “The defendants’ central claim on appeal is that the board erred as a matter of law when it affirmed the commissioner’s determination that, on the date that the plaintiff, Michael J. Dunkling, sustained a compensable injury, Brunoli was a principal employer pursuant to General Statutes § 31-291. We affirm the decision of the board”).

• Posted in:
• Recent Opinions,
• Workers' Compensation Law

AC41647 - Lenti v. Commissioner of Correction (“On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court (1) improperly concluded that he had failed to establish that his plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and (2) abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal from the court’s determination that he had received the effective assistance of counsel. Both of these claims rest on the petitioner’s assertion that he was impaired at the time of his plea by the ingestion of medications prescribed by Department of Correction personnel. We disagree with this assertion and the petitioner’s claims and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal”).

AC41765 - Bagalloo v. Commissioner of Correction (“On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court (1) abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal and (2) improperly denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged, inter alia, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when the petitioner entered into a plea agreement. Because the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, we dismiss the appeal”).

• Posted in:
• Habeas Corpus Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC41112, AC41154 - State v. Corprew (Motion to correct illegal sentence; claim that sentences were illegal because they included period of special parole, which is not definite sentence; "The defendant, Avery Corprew, appeals from the judgments of the trial court denying his motions to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the sentences imposed on him for a term of incarceration followed by a period of special parole were authorized by statute and, thus, were not illegal. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

Wednesday, January 29th

• New London Law Library opens at 9:30 a.m.

Thursday, January 30th

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• Posted in:
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